# Abstract

This document describes a way to add origin authentication, message integrity,
and replay resistance to HTTP REST requests.  It is intended to be used over
the HTTPS protocol.

# Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2011 Joyent, Inc. and the persons identified as document authors.
All rights reserved.

Code Components extracted from this document must include MIT License text.

# Introduction

This protocol is intended to provide a standard way for clients to sign HTTP
requests.  RFC2617 (HTTP Authentication) defines Basic and Digest authentication
mechanisms, and RFC5246 (TLS 1.2) defines client-auth, both of which are widely
employed on the Internet today.  However, it is common place that the burdens of
PKI prevent web service operators from deploying that methodoloy, and so many
fall back to Basic authentication, which has poor security characteristics.

Additionally, OAuth provides a fully-specified alternative for authorization
of web service requests, but is not (always) ideal for machine to machine
communication, as the key acquisition steps (generally) imply a fixed
infrastructure that may not make sense to a service provider (e.g., symmetric
keys).

Several web service providers have invented their own schemes for signing
HTTP requests, but to date, none have been placed in the public domain as a
standard.  This document serves that purpose.  There are no techniques in this
proposal that are novel beyond previous art, however, this aims to be a simple
mechanism for signing these requests.

# Signature Authentication Scheme

The "signature" authentication scheme is based on the model that the client must
authenticate itself with a digital signature produced by either a private
asymmetric key (e.g., RSA) or a shared symmetric key (e.g., HMAC).  The scheme
is parameterized enough such that it is not bound to any particular key type or
signing algorithm.  However, it does explicitly assume that clients can send an
HTTP `Date` header.

## Authorization Header

The client is expected to send an Authorization header (as defined in RFC 2617)
with the following parameterization:

    credentials := "Signature" params digitalSignature
    params := 1#(keyId | [algorithm] | [headers] | [ext])
    digitalSignature := plain-string

    keyId := "keyId" "=" <"> plain-string <">
    algorithm := "algorithm" "=" <"> plain-string <">
    headers := "headers" "=" <"> 1#headers-value <">
    ext := "ext" "=" <"> plain-string <">

    headers-value := plain-string
    plain-string   = 1*( %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E )

### Signature Parameters

#### keyId

REQUIRED.  The `keyId` field is an opaque string that the server can use to look
up the component they need to validate the signature.  It could be an SSH key
fingerprint, an LDAP DN, etc.  Management of keys and assignment of `keyId` is
out of scope for this document.

#### algorithm

REQUIRED. The `algorithm` parameter is used if the client and server agree on a
non-standard digital signature algorithm.  The full list of supported signature
mechanisms is listed below.

#### headers

OPTIONAL.  The `headers` parameter is used to specify the list of HTTP headers
used to sign the request.  If specified, it should be a quoted list of HTTP
header names, separated by a single space character.  By default, only one
HTTP header is signed, which is the `Date` header.  Note that the list MUST be
specified in the order the values are concatenated together during signing. To
include the HTTP request line in the signature calculation, use the special
`request-line` value.  While this is overloading the definition of `headers` in
HTTP linguism, the request-line is defined in RFC 2616, and as the outlier from
headers in useful signature calculation, it is deemed simpler to simply use
`request-line` than to add a separate parameter for it.

#### extensions

OPTIONAL.  The `extensions` parameter is used to include additional information
which is covered by the request.  The content and format of the string is out of
scope for this document, and expected to be specified by implementors.

### Digital Signature

The `digitalSignature` portion of the credentials is a REQUIRED field, and is
generated by the client. The client uses the `algorithm` and `headers` request
parameters to form a canonicalized `signing string`.  This `signing string` is
then signed with the key associated with `keyId` and the algorithm corresponding
to `algorithm`.  The result is then `Base64` encoded.

### Signing String Composition

In order to generate the string that is signed with a key, the client MUST
take the values of each HTTP header specified by `headers`, in the order they
appear, and separate with an ASCII newline `\n`.  The last header in the list
MUST NOT include a trailing ASCII newline.

# Example Requests

All requests refer to the following request (body ommitted):

    POST /foo HTTP/1.1
    Host: example.org
    Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2011 20:51:35 GMT
    Content-Type: application/json
    Content-MD5: h0auK8hnYJKmHTLhKtMTkQ==
    Content-Length: 123

## Default parameterization

    Authorization: Signature keyId="123" Base64(RSA-SHA256(Tue, 07 Jun 2011 20:51:35 GMT))

## Header List

    Authorization: Signature keyId="123",headers="content-type Date content-md5" Base64(RSA-SHA256(Tue, 07 Jun 2011 20:51:35 GMT))

The client would compose the signing string as (`+ "\n"` inserted for
readability):

    application/json + "\n"
    Tue, 07 Jun 2011 20:51:35 GMT + "\n"
    h0auK8hnYJKmHTLhKtMTkQ==

## Algorithm

    Authorization: Signature keyId="123",algorithm="hmac-sha1" Base64(HMAC-SHA1(Tue, 07 Jun 2011 20:51:35 GMT))

# Signing Algorithms

Currently supported algorithm names are:

* rsa-sha1
* rsa-sha256
* rsa-sha512
* hmac-sha1
* hmac-sha256
* hmac-sha512

# Security Considerations

## Default Parameters

Note the default parameterization of the `Signature` scheme is only safe if all
requests are carried over a secure transport (i.e., TLS).  Sending the default
scheme over a non-secure transport will leave the request vulnerable to
spoofing, tampering, replay/repudiaton, and integrity violations (if using the
STRIDE threat-modeling methodology).

## Insecure Transports

If sending the request over plain HTTP, service providers SHOULD require clients
to sign ALL HTTP headers, and the `request-line`.  Additionally, service
providers SHOULD require `Content-MD5` calculations to be performed to ensure
against any tampering from clients.

## Nonces

Nonces are out of scope for this document simply because many service providers
fail to implement them correctly, or do not adopt security specfiications
because of the infrastructure complexity.  Given the `header` parameterization,
a service provider is fully enabled to add nonce semantics into this scheme by
using something like an `x-request-nonce` header, and ensuring it is signed
with the `Date` header.

## Clock Skew

As the default scheme is to sign the `Date` header, service providers SHOULD
protect against logged replay attacks by enforcing a clock skew.  The server
SHOULD be synchronized with NTP, and the recommendation in this specification
is to allow 300s of clock skew (in either direction).

## Required Headers to Sign

It is out of scope for this document to dictate what headers a service provider
will want to enforce, but service providers SHOULD at minimum include the
`Date` header.

# References

## Normative References

* [RFC2616] Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1
* [RFC2617] HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication
* [RFC5246] The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2

## Informative References

    Name: Mark Cavage (editor)
    Company: Joyent, Inc.
    Email: mark.cavage@joyent.com
    URI: http://www.joyent.com

# Appendix A - Test Values

The following test data uses the RSA (2048b) keys, which we will refer
to as `keyId=Test` in the following samples:

   -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
   MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDCFENGw33yGihy92pDjZQhl0C3
   6rPJj+CvfSC8+q28hxA161QFNUd13wuCTUcq0Qd2qsBe/2hFyc2DCJJg0h1L78+6
   Z4UMR7EOcpfdUE9Hf3m/hs+FUR45uBJeDK1HSFHD8bHKD6kv8FPGfJTotc+2xjJw
   oYi+1hqp1fIekaxsyQIDAQAB
   -----END PUBLIC KEY-----

    -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
    MIICXgIBAAKBgQDCFENGw33yGihy92pDjZQhl0C36rPJj+CvfSC8+q28hxA161QF
    NUd13wuCTUcq0Qd2qsBe/2hFyc2DCJJg0h1L78+6Z4UMR7EOcpfdUE9Hf3m/hs+F
    UR45uBJeDK1HSFHD8bHKD6kv8FPGfJTotc+2xjJwoYi+1hqp1fIekaxsyQIDAQAB
    AoGBAJR8ZkCUvx5kzv+utdl7T5MnordT1TvoXXJGXK7ZZ+UuvMNUCdN2QPc4sBiA
    QWvLw1cSKt5DsKZ8UETpYPy8pPYnnDEz2dDYiaew9+xEpubyeW2oH4Zx71wqBtOK
    kqwrXa/pzdpiucRRjk6vE6YY7EBBs/g7uanVpGibOVAEsqH1AkEA7DkjVH28WDUg
    f1nqvfn2Kj6CT7nIcE3jGJsZZ7zlZmBmHFDONMLUrXR/Zm3pR5m0tCmBqa5RK95u
    412jt1dPIwJBANJT3v8pnkth48bQo/fKel6uEYyboRtA5/uHuHkZ6FQF7OUkGogc
    mSJluOdc5t6hI1VsLn0QZEjQZMEOWr+wKSMCQQCC4kXJEsHAve77oP6HtG/IiEn7
    kpyUXRNvFsDE0czpJJBvL/aRFUJxuRK91jhjC68sA7NsKMGg5OXb5I5Jj36xAkEA
    gIT7aFOYBFwGgQAQkWNKLvySgKbAZRTeLBacpHMuQdl1DfdntvAyqpAZ0lY0RKmW
    G6aFKaqQfOXKCyWoUiVknQJAXrlgySFci/2ueKlIE1QqIiLSZ8V8OlpFLRnb1pzI
    7U1yQXnTAEFYM560yJlzUpOb1V4cScGd365tiSMvxLOvTA==
    -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

And all examples use this request:

    POST /foo?param=value&pet=dog HTTP/1.1
    Host: example.com
    Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2012 21:31:40 GMT
    Content-Type: application/json
    Content-MD5: Sd/dVLAcvNLSq16eXua5uQ==
    Content-Length: 18

    {"hello": "world"}

### Default

The string to sign would be:

```
Thu, 05 Jan 2012 21:31:40 GMT
```

The Authorization header would be:

    Authorization: Signature keyId="Test",algorithm="rsa-sha256" MDyO5tSvin5FBVdq3gMBTwtVgE8U/JpzSwFvY7gu7Q2tiZ5TvfHzf/RzmRoYwO8PoV1UGaw6IMwWzxDQkcoYOwvG/w4ljQBBoNusO/mYSvKrbqxUmZi8rNtrMcb82MS33bai5IeLnOGl31W1UbL4qE/wL8U9wCPGRJlCFLsTgD8=

### All Headers

Parameterized to include all headers, the string to sign would be:

```
/foo?param=value&pet=dog HTTP/1.1
example.com
Thu, 05 Jan 2012 21:31:40 GMT
application/json
Sd/dVLAcvNLSq16eXua5uQ==
18
```

The Authorization header would be:

    Authorization: Signature
    keyId="Test",algorithm="rsa-sha256",headers="request-line host date content-type content-md5 content-length" gVrKP7wVh1+FmWbNlhj0pNXIe9XmeOA6EcnoOKAvUILnwaMFzaKaam9UmeDPwjC9TdT+jSRqjtyZE49kZcSpYAHxGlPQ4ziXFRfPprlN/3Xwg3sUOGqbBiS3WFuY3QOOWv4tzc5p70g74U/QvHNNiYMcjoz89vRJhefbFSNwCDs=

