## Propositional Attitude Vocabulary

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Last Update: 12/13/02
Copyright© 1996-2002. All rights reserved. See Terms of Usage.

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### Goals

#$Goal goal **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> Typically, this attribute characterizes relationships holding between Cyc formulas and a particular agent when the formula describes a state of affairs that the agent intends to take steps to actualize, i.e., when actualizing the state of affairs is a goal of the agent. However, it might also be seen as an attribute of the relationship between the agent and the static situation depicted by that cyc formula (see #$StateFn). This is the most general goal attribute and should be used only when one is unable to specify more exactly what kind of goal the relevant state of affairs is for an agent.
> guid: bd58fb03-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$AttributeValue #$Individual

#$subGoals sub goals **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$subGoals G SUB) means that SUB is a subordinate goal of G. In other words, SUB is an intermediate objective or milestone to be accomplished in the course of pursuing the overall #$Goal G.
> guid: bd59012e-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$AsymmetricBinaryPredicate #$TransitiveBinaryPredicate

#$goals objective (propositional attitude predicate) (mental predicate) (extensional representation predicate) **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$goals AGENT SENT) means that the proposition PROP expressed by the sentence SENT is the content of a goal that AGENT has. That is, one of AGENT's goals is that PROP be made (or kept) true. Goals are typically future-directed : either (i) PROP is not currently true (or at least is believed by AGENT not to be currently true) and AGENT wants it to become true or (ii) PROP is currently true (or at least is believed by AGENT to be currently true) and AGENT wants it to remain true. Also, AGENT intends to play some sort of active role in bringing about the truth of PROP, and plans accordingly. This distinguishes goals from mere desires or expectations (see #$desires and #$expects). See also #$Goal and #$goalCategoryForAgent.
> guid: bd5880d1-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$hasOpinionAsToTruthOf #$desires

#$purposeInEvent purpose in event **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$purposeInEvent AGENT EVENT SENT) means that AGENT takes part in EVENT deliberately (see #$deliberateActors), and does so because both (1) AGENT wants the #$Proposition (q.v.) expressed by SENT to be (or become) true and (2) AGENT believes that EVENT's occurring will make (or help to make) this happen.
> guid: bd58d24e-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$TernaryPredicate

### Intent

#$intends intent (propositional attitude predicate) (mental predicate) (extensional representation predicate) **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> This predicate can be used to state some particular thing that a given intelligent agent intends or has in mind as a purpose, represented as a propositional attitude. (#$intends AGENT SENT) means that AGENT intends the proposition PROP expressed by SENT to become (or remain) true. This implies that AGENT believes s/he has at least some degree of influence or control over bringing about (or maintaining) the truth of PROP. While this predicate is obviously similar to #$goals (q.v.), AGENT's intending PROP is likely to be more short-term and event-centered ( I did it because I intended that... ) and more mechanically satisfied ( I intend to turn off the lamp ) than any of AGENT's goals. You may intend to turn off the lamp, but it would be odd to call that one of your goals. For a similar predicate that represents intending in relation to types of temporal situations, see #$intends-SitType.
> guid: bd58e34d-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$desires

### Desires

#$desires desire **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$desires AGT PROP) means that the #$Agent AGT desires that the world be as the proposition PROP (represented by a #$ELSentence-Assertible) describes it to be. #$desires is implied by #$goals, but is weaker: PROP might be some desirable state of affairs that the agent is not actively working, or planning, to make/keep true; e.g., #$WorldPeace. See also #$goals and #$intends.
> guid: bd5880d0-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$positiveInterest-Prop #$hasEmotionAboutProposition

### Expectation

#$Expectation expectations **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> The collection of microtheories whose propositions represent what some #$Agent (or #$Group of #$Agents) believes will be true at some future time.
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> direct instance of: #$MicrotheoryType #$ObjectType
> direct specialization of: #$Microtheory

#$expects expected

> (#$expects AGT PROP) means that AGT believes it highly likely that PROP will be true at some time in the future.
> guid: bd590aaa-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$hasOpinionAsToTruthOf

### Beliefs

#$BeliefSystemType belief system types **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> The collection of all the kinds of #$BeliefSystems -- religious, philosophical, political, ethical, cultural, and scientific. Some elements of this collection include #$Religion, #$PhilosophyBeliefs, etc. The most general member of this set is #$BeliefSystems (qv).
> guid: bd590588-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$SecondOrderCollection
> direct specialization of: #$FirstOrderCollection

#$BeliefSystem belief systems (AIT) (things that exists in time)

> A specialization of #$AbstractInformationalThing. Each instance of #$BeliefSystem is an ideology (systems of belief) in terms of which an agent characterizes (i.e., makes sense of) the world. Instances of #$BeliefSystem include: #$VegetarianBeliefs, #$GermanNaziIdeology, #$RepublicanPartyIdeology, #$CommunistIdeology, #$PacifistIdeology, #$Atheism, etc. See also #$ClassificationSystem.
> guid: bd58bd47-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$BeliefSystemType
> direct specialization of: #$AbstractInformationalThing #$TemporalThing
> direct generalization of: #$ReligiousBeliefs

#$beliefStatements belief statements

> (#$beliefStatements SYSTEM BELIEF) means that the belief expressed by the #$ELSentence-Assertible BELIEF is part of the #$BeliefSystem SYSTEM. Note that #$BeliefSystems -- ideologies in terms of which agents make sense of the world -- are instances of #$AbstractInformationalThing (q.v.). In order to relate a belief to an actual #$Agent who believes it, see the predicate #$beliefs.
> guid: bd58fdaf-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$IntangibleObjectRelatingPredicate #$BinaryPredicate

#$beliefs belief

> (#$beliefs AGENT SENT) means that the #$Agent AGENT subscribes to the truth of the proposition PROP expressed by SENT (an #$ELSentence-Assertible). Note that PROP might or might not actually be true. See also the predicate #$beliefStatements, which relates a belief to a #$BeliefSystem.
> guid: bd5880d2-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$hasOpinionAsToTruthOf #$thinksProbable

#$hasBeliefSystems belief system (binary predicate) (CycL predicate) (relationship)

> This predicate relates intelligent agents to belief-systems (such as religions, philosophical schools, political theories, etc.) that they accept. (#$hasBeliefSystems AGENT SYSTEM) means that AGENT holds the #$BeliefSystem SYSTEM. For example, (#$hasBeliefSystems BorisYeltsin #$RussianOrthodoxReligion) holds.
> guid: bd58ac5a-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$BinaryPredicate
> direct specialization of: #$knowsAbout

#$subBeliefSystem sub belief system

> This predicate relates belief systems to more specialized belief systems. (#$subBeliefSystem BSYS SUB) indicates that SUB is a more specialized branch of belief system BSYS. Thus the #$beliefStatements of SUB will be a superset of the #$beliefStatements of BSYS (sometimes with a few changes and deletions.) Some examples of this are: (#$subBeliefSystem #$Islam #$ShiiteIslam), which means that Shiite Islam is a specialized belief system with respect to Islam; (#$subBeliefSystem #$ProtestantReligion #$PresbyterianReligion), which means that Presbyterianism is a specialized form of Protestantism; and (#$subBeliefSystem #$MilesianSchoolBeliefs #$AnaximandersPhilosophy), which means that Anaximander's philosophical beliefs comprise one variety of Milesian School belief.
> guid: bd58a069-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$AsymmetricBinaryPredicate #$TransitiveBinaryPredicate
> direct specialization of: #$temporallyRelated

### Opinion

#$ExchangeOfOpinion discussing **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> Elements are #$Conversation s in which two or more people make known to each other some of their #$beliefs in a serious discussion.
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> direct instance of: #$HumanCapabilityType #$TemporalObjectType
> direct specialization of: #$Conversation

#$opinions opinion **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$opinions AGENT PROP) implies that (i) AGENT believes PROP is true, but (ii) the evidence AGENT has for PROP falls short of justifying his/her belief in PROP. Since (#$opinions AGENT PROP) implies that AGENT's belief in PROP is not fully justified, #$opinions is a #$negationPreds of #$knows (q.v.). Note that (#$opinions AGENT PROP), unlike (#$knows AGENT PROP), does not imply that PROP is true, although it also does not imply that PROP is false (since an agent can have a true belief, even if the evidence available to that agent does not justify that belief).
> guid: bd590b79-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$beliefs

### Knowledge

#$knows knows

> (#$knows AGENT PROP) means that AGENT (an instance of #$IntelligentAgent) knows PROP (an instance of #$ELSentence-Assertible). (#$knows AGENT PROP) implies that (i) the proposition PROP is true, (ii) AGENT believes the proposition PROP, and (iii) AGENT is justified in believing PROP.
> guid: bd590bb6-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$beliefs

#$knowsAbout knew **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$knowsAbout AGENT THING) means that the #$IntelligentAgent AGENT knows something about THING . This predicate represents more than simple awareness, but exactly what is known -- the content of AGENT's knowledge about THING -- is not specified. For example, (#$knowsAbout #$MichaelJordan #$Basketball-TheGame). Note: many commonsense rules can conclude (#$knowsAbout AGENT THING) -- e.g., those having to do with AGENT's occupation, college degrees, city of residence,... in fact, almost any assertion about AGENT can lead to presumptions that he/she probably #$knowsAbout something. #$knowsAbout in turn can serve (weakly) in arguments about whether or not AGENT #$knows (q.v.) specific common assertions involving THING, and in arguments about whether or not AGENT #$knowsValue (q.v.) of some particular predicate applied to THING, etc. See also #$expertRegarding.
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> direct instance of: #$CognitiveAwarenessPredicate #$IntangibleObjectPredicate
> direct specialization of: #$awareOf

#$knowsValue knows value **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$knowsValue AGENT X PRED) means that, if (PRED X VAL) is true, then the #$IntelligentAgent AGENT knows that (PRED X VAL); i.e., (#$knows AGENT (PRED X VAL)).
> guid: bd58934b-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$TernaryPredicate

#$knowsContentsOfMt knows contents of mt **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$knowsContentsOfMt ?AGT ?MT) means that the #$Agent ?AGT knows the propositional contents of the #$Microtheory ?MT.
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> direct instance of: #$BinaryPredicate

### Other

#$PropositionalAttitudeSlot propositional attitude predicates

> An instance of #$PredicateCategory. Each instance of #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot is a binary predicate relating an agent to a proposition to which the agent bears a certain propositional attitude (e.g., belief, doubt, or knowledge). The first argument place of each #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot is constrained to instances of #$Agent-Generic, while the second argument place is constrained to instances of #$ELSentence-Assertible. Instances of #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot include #$goals, #$beliefs, #$knows, and #$expects.
> guid: bd589475-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PredicateCategory #$AtemporalNecessarilyEssentialCollectionType
> direct specialization of: #$PropositionPredicate #$MentalSlot

#$notices notices **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$notices AGT PROP) means that AGT believes the proposition PROP because AGT has seen, heard, smelled, etc. PROP via some instance of #$Perceiving. Although (#$notices AGT PROP) implies (#$beliefs AGT PROP) {via the assertion (#$genlPreds #$notices #$beliefs)}, exceptions occur if AGT believes they have been hallucinating or drugged, for example. The predicate #$beliefs, unlike #$notices, can include propositions gathered through inferring, dreaming, intuiting. The temporal extent of (#$notices AGT PROP) is at least a 'short time' following the perceiving of PROP. The extent of this time is a function of the type of fact perceived or noticed, when forgetting or other overriding information comes into play.
> guid: bd58f1f4-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$beliefs

#$biases bias (propositional attitude predicate) (mental predicate) (extensional representation predicate) **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$biases AGT PROP) means that the #$Agent AGT has the unsubstantiated belief PROP (represented by a #$ELSentence-Assertible). Biases generally are so deeply rooted in the agent that the agent may not be consciously aware that PROP is rationally undersupported, and it may be concomittantly harder to change their mind about PROP. Note: PROP might or might not turn out to be true (in various contexts); often, PROP is some overgeneralization which is sometimes true but often false, or which once was true but now is usually false, etc.
> guid: bd590b2f-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$PropositionalAttitudeSlot
> direct specialization of: #$opinions

#$intendedForUseBy intended for use by **COMMENT NOT REVIEWED** **GAFs NOT REVIEWED**

> (#$intendedForUseBy PROD TYPE) means that the #$Product PROD is intended to be used by individuals of the #$ExistingObjectType TYPE, where TYPE must be a subcollection of #$Organism-Whole. E.g., many types of products are only for use by adults, by women, by dogs, etc. Note: This is a good example of a predicate which is redundant but useful. `Redundant' means that any assertion one states using #$intendedForUseBy could be stated, albeit less tersely, using other, more basic predicates in the KB, in this case #$intends and #$usesObject. Often, a huge number of axioms can be drastically shortened by introducing such a redundant predicate, and writing axioms that define it in terms of the more-basic predicates.
> guid: c0fde228-9c29-11b1-9dad-c379636f7270
> direct instance of: #$BinaryPredicate

Copyright© 1996-2002. All rights reserved. See Terms of Usage.