

Securing Virtualised Environments

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PulseANZ2010

Meet the people who can help advance your infrastructure





Agenda

- Introduction to Virtualization
- Security and Risk Implications
- Operational and Organizational Implications
- Common Mistakes
- What Can I Do?
 - Current technologies and solutions
 - The future of virtualization and enterprise security



Introduction to Virtualisation





Basics: Disruptive Innovation

Virtualization is a Disruptive Innovation


Virtualization:

The logical abstraction of physical computing resources (OS, application, switches, storage, networks) designed to create computing environments that are not restricted by physical configuration or implementation.



Basics: Virtualization Architecture


After Virtualization









Basics: Virtualization Types



Examples:

KVM (Linux)
VMware Workstation
VMware Server
Microsoft Virtual PC





Examples:

Xen
VMware ESX
IBM pHype / LPARs
Microsoft Hyper-V





What does Virtualization Change?

- Everything
 - Dynamic, fluid data-center
 - Resource pools
 - Commoditization of everything
 - Increased efficiency
- Nothing
 - Virtual IT is still IT
 - Security, sprawl, management, complexity, h





Major Players



- Founded in 1998
- Division of EMC

www.are

- Pioneered virtualization over 40 years ago
- LPAR, sHype, VSS

CİTRİX

- Acquired XenSource in 2007 for \$500 million
- Based on open-source Xen hypervisor

Microsoft^{*}

- Virtual server, acquired VirtualPC in 2003 from Connectix
- Hyper-V

Virtualiron*

Based on open-source Xen hypervisor






Security and Risk Implications



Virtualization and Enterprise Security

- Virtualization != Security
 - Standard servers are as secure as standard VMs
- Partitioning divides VMs, but does not secure them
- Same principles apply
 - Defense in depth
 - Network design and segmentation
 - Unified security management







Threat Landscape


- New Swath of Availability Attacks
 - Owning a single guest
 - Breaking out of the guest
 - Guest theft
 - Compromise of Virtual Console/Management
 - Provision my own evil guest(s)
 - Adjust resource quotas
 - Shut OFF guest(s)
 - Compromise of the VMM/Hypervisor
 - IsGameOver()






Threat Landscape (cont.)

- Other Threats...
 - Regulatory
 - Auditors
 - Org-Charts...
 - Separation of Duties
 - Politics





Points of Exposure








Operating Systems and Applications


- Traditional threats remain:
 - Malware: Viruses, Worms, Trojans, Rootkits
 - DoS/DDoS attacks
 - Buffer Overflows, SQL Injection, XSS
 - Data Leakage
 - Access Control, Compliance, Integrity
- Virtualized OSes and Apps threats remain:
 - Disaster Recovery and Sandboxing are notable arguments
 - However, they do not increase native resistance to OS/Application threats






Virtual Machines

- Compliance and Patching
 - Ability to "Suspend" / "Activate" VMs alters update lifecycle.






- Dynamic Relocation (Live Migration)
 - Are VMs moving to less secure machines, networks, datacenters, etc?
 - Static security policies no longer apply.






Virtual Machines (cont.)

- Replay Attacks and Data Retention
 - VM replay may foster advanced cryptographic attacks.






 VMs are just files, its trivial to steal a full system or groups of systems.





Exploiting Live Migration: Xensploit





By default, live migration traffic is sent in plain text across the network. A man-in-the-middle attack can be used to own endpoints in limitless ways.



Virtual Machine Manager / Hypervisor

- Single Point-of-Failure/Attack
- Mandatory Access Control / Resource Sharing
 - Can we guarantee isolation, sharing and communication?
- Inter-VM Traffic Analysis:










VMM / Hypervisor (cont.)


- Attacks against the VMM / Hypervisor.
 - There are going to be bugs that lead to security risks.
 - Shrinking size of VMMs is good for security, but does not make them immune to risk. Features demand complex code.





VMware ESX 3i
~32MB Surface Area
Lines of Code: ~200,000

- Hypervisor Services
 - Network DHCP, vSwitching, general packet processing
 - Communication Inter-domain communication APIs (VMCI, XenSocket)
 - Other Services Security (VMsafe), Disaster Recovery (vMotion), etc.





Virtualization-Aware Hardware

- Hardware Assist (Intel-VT, AMD-V)
 - Techniques (e.g. rootkits) with stealth capabilities.
 - Low-level makes detection more difficult.
 - Risk to non-virtualized deployments.
 - Blue Pill: Malicious hypervisor injection for AMD-V
 - Vitriol: Leverages Intel VT-x





OS

VMM or Hypervisor

Hardware

Mgmt

Virtual

Machine

- I/O Virtualization
 - VMs natively share virtualization-aware I/O devices.
 - Virtual Ethernet Cards (vNICs), Virtual FC HBAs (vHBAs), etc.
 - How do we secure a new class of on-demand, dynamic and virtualized allocation of resources?






Management Infrastructure

Software Threats:

- Keys to the castle.
- Vulnerabilities in management applications.
- Secure storage of Virtual Machines and management data.




- Managing risk requires new technology, skills and expertise.
- We now also factor the extremely dynamic nature of virtualization into our evaluation of overall risk.



Vulnerabilities by Year

XFDB Search: VMware, Xen, Virtual PC, QEMU, Parallels, etc.







Organizational Ownership?

Who owns the Virtual [Fill in the Blank]?


Network Admin

Server Admin

Application Owners

Data Custodians







Virtual Network



Organizational Ownership?

 Traditional disciplines and functions still require competence



- Separation/Segregation of Duties remains critically important
- Care and Feeding of the Virtual Infrastructure will also be required
 - Are you likely to have a mix of Physical and Virtual Servers?
 - Are you likely to have a heterogeneous mix of Virtual platforms?



Politics of Ownership

- "Turf Wars" and "Land Grabs" are possible
- "Hot Potato" is also possible
- "Finger Pointing" is probable





New Operational Challenges

- Find the Server...
 - Live Migration makes servers harder to track
- Configuration/Patch Management
 - Pause/Offline features impact:
 - Audits
 - Scanning
 - Patching
 - Boot Prone?
- Image Management
 - Storage
 - Version Control





Operational Controls

- Discipline, Discipline
- What are your policies for use of Virtualization?
 - Which Servers can be clustered?
 - Which Servers cannot be clustered?
- What are your controls for provisioning?
 - Easy to slip into Virtual Sprawl
 - Two Key System?







Elective Risk

- Understand the inherent differences in Type 2 vs Type 1 Virtualization for Production
- These "Free" versions of the platform are meant for Testing
- Type-2 VMM specific vulnerabilities



Failure to Establish Policy


Before it gets away from you...

- Establish Clear Use Guidelines
- Establish Clear Roles & Responsibilities
- Establish Controls for Provisioning
- Establish Intelligent Image Management
- Establish Security Guidelines
- Establish Compliance Requirements



Failure to Consider Compliance

- Anticipate Future Regulatory Granularity
 - Right now Virtualization is ahead of Compliance



- Will you still be PCI Compliant?
 - Consult your Auditors Early and Often
- PCI DSS 2.2.1 states: "Implement only one primary function per server"
 - How does your auditor interpret this?



Failure to Involve Security


- By default, Virtualization reduces your security posture
 - New attack surfaces
 - New operational risks
 - New availability risks
 - Increased complexity that comes with beneficial features
 - E.g. Live Migration
- Security Analysis/Design can inform smart compensating controls and best practices while countermeasures mature





Failure to Control Live Migration

- Cascading Failover Example
 - True Story…
- We often overlook the fluid realities of Live Migration
 - E.g VMotion





Meet the people who can help advance your infrastructure



"Silver Bullet" Virtual Appliances

- Today's Virtual Security Appliances are very nascent
 - Coverage is limited
 - There is NO Silver Bullet
 - Buzz Words and Snake Oil abound
 - Realistic expectations can help reduce over-confidence in these products
- Security will improve as Virtual Platforms release their Security APIs and as Security Vendors leverage them





What Can I Do?



Virtualization Security Evolution

Existing solutions certified for protection of virtual workloads



Threat protection delivered in a virtual form-factor



Integrated virtual environmentaware threat protection







Traditional Security in the Virtual Environment

Network IPS

Server Protection

System Patching

Security Policies

Seems Secure Not Secure Enough

Only blocks threats and attacks at the perimeter

Secures each physical server with protection and reporting for a single agent

Patches critical vulnerabilities on individual servers

Policies are specific to critical applications in each network segment and server

Should protect against threats at perimeter and between VMs

Securing each VM as if it were a physical server adds time, cost and footprint

Needs to protect against vulnerabilities that result from VM state changes


Policies must be able to move with the VMs






Host-Based IPS

- Captures inter-VM communication...
 - IF host agent is installed
- Larger "total" footprint on a hypervisor






Virtual IPS vs. Security Virtual Machine







Integrated Virtual Infrastructure Protection





Integrated Security Benefits

- Simplified deployment
- Eliminates visibility gaps
 - Inter-VM communication
 - Discovery
 - VM whitelisting/vNAC
- Automated protection
- Advanced security techniques
 - Introspection-based malware detection
- Control of resources allocated to security



Host Security Footprint Reduction

- Security Virtual Machines take over host-level firewall and IPS/IDS functions from HIPS agent
 - Fewer resources (CPU, memory) consumed
 - Less intrusive (kernel drivers)
 - Guest OS-independent
- More to come...



Simplified Deployment

- Virtual appliance form-factor
 - No reconfiguration of virtual network
 - Abstracts underlying network topology
 - Consolidated, locked-down VM dedicated to security
 - OVF format reduces configuration time
 - Compatible with automated image deployment solutions






Control VM Sprawl

- Identify VMs that are invisible to traditional discovery tools
- Control unauthorized crossing of trust zones
- Ensure VMs that come online do not introduce vulnerabilities
- Quarantine unauthorized VMs
 - VMs that are not considered trusted are given limited network access



Dynamic Environment Protection








Is There a Need for Host-Based Agents

- YES!
- Host context required for many security functions
 - Privileged-access control/monitoring
 - File integrity monitoring
 - Encryption
 - Anti-malware
 - Patching
 - Security configuration management






Defense in Depth





IBM Virtual Server Protection for VMWare

Helps customers to be more secure, compliant and cost-effective by delivering integrated and optimized security for virtual data centers.





Summary

- Virtualization <u>does</u> impact security posture
- "Traditional" tools are still relevant
- New products adapted for virtual environments are available
- No single product provides adequate protection



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