


Within a federation, organizations play one or both of two roles.

Identity Provider:

The identity provider (IdP) is the authoritative site responsible for authenticating an end user and asserting an identity for that user in a trusted fashion to trusted partners. The identity provider is responsible for account creation, provisioning, password management, and general account management and also acts as a collection point or client to trusted identity providers.

Service Provider:

Those partners who offer services but do not act as identity providers are known as service providers. The service provider (SP) relies on the IdP to assert information about a user, leaving the SP to manage only those user attributes that are relevant to the SP.




This slide shows the how responsibility for a users identity lifecycle and session lifecycle are split between Identity Providers and Service Providers in a federation.


The four responsibilities are "Manage Identity", "Authenticate", "Authorize" and "Provide Service".


Without a federation each partner would be responsible for all four parts. With a federation, each is only responsible for two.


If there are many partners in the federation the benefit is multiplied.


Note that Provisioning of guest accounts is optional. If the Service Provider doesn't need to maintain information about each user then an individual guest account for each user may not be required.
















Web Services are widely perceived to be the next evolutionary step in the use of the Internet. Web Services will enable the creation of a new breed of end-user applications that are not restricted to today's model of a "web application" that must use HTML talking to a web server.

Instead users will use "active clients" that exchange XML messages with multiple applications in parallel to create a significantly enhanced user experience.

The Federated Single Sign-on capability of FIM offers great advantages in the area of identity management – allowing the separation of service offerings from user management. This will create an enhanced user experience at reduce cost for today's standard web-based applications.

The potential for the next generation of web service based applications can only be realized, however, if web services are secure. Further, the security infrastructure used by these applications must be flexible and effectively managed.

For this reason FIM's Web Services Security Management is an essential enabler of the new "active client" applications that build upon the trust relations of a federation - allowing trust-worthy application-to-application interaction across federated identity and service providers.

These applications will integrate many distributed services to create a higher-value, more effective user experience than is possible with today's HTML/HTTP technology.



The SOAP specification does not address security requirements for SOAP messages. From SOAP 1.1:

8.0 Security Considerations

Not described in this document are methods for integrity and privacy protection. Such issues will be addressed more fully in a future version(s) of this document

It is possible to use the security capabilities of the transport protocol that carries the SOAP message, but this approach has the drawback that multiple-hop transport paths may introduce ambiguity of origin and unacceptable "gaps" in the security. More importantly, the application-to-application nature of web services require *message-level* facilities for management that cannot be achieved using only transport protocol facilities.

The OASIS standard, "Web Services Security – SOAP Message Security" describes how to use SOAP Header elements that encrypt and sign the SAOP Body and include "security tokens". These elements allow a SOAP message to be "self securing". That is, the SOAP message can be transported in any manner and the message origin, integrity and privacy are not affected because these are properties of the message itself.

These capabilities of SOAP Security are vital, but do not in themselves provide any security *management*. For example, it is important to know that the received message has not been changed and that the message came from entity-X. But what rights does the client have in the local environment?

Also, the identity in the SOAP Security token may have a different representation in the local environment – requiring an identity mapping capability. Is the client identity *authorized* to access the target web service? Are local or remote attributes of the client identity required to make an authorization decision?

WS-Security does, however, provide the elements that can be used as building blocks in the overall management solution.




WS-Security:SOAP Message Security is an extendable framework that allows for many types of *security tokens* that identify the origin of the message. As SOAP security evolves new Security Tokens will be created. It is important that the management infrastructure be able to easily accommodate new types of security tokens without requiring changes to applications.

For the local management system to make relevant decisions about web service access, the user of the web service must be represented by a local credential. Only a local credential will contain the locally defined values for users, groups, security attributes that are relevant to the local security policy. It may not be possible (or efficient), of course, for every possible web service client to have a local identity. An "identity mapping" capability is required to allow for such clients to obtain a local credential that is meaningful to the local access policy.

An enterprise may deploy web services onto a number of vendor platforms. Two of the most important today are J2EE and .NET. The management infrastructure must provide a solution for BOTH of these web service platforms.


Many applications will require attributes about the user. Some of these attributes will be provided as part of the request (remote attributes) and others will be part of the local identity (local attributes). The token exchange mechanism should allow for the mapping of remote attributes and the addition of locally defined attributes and the resultant security token must be available to the target web service application.


There are, of course, other security requirements not covered by this list, and individual customers/architectures will have ones unique to them. For example, Key Management is required is required for the keys that encrypt and sign the SOAP messages. The FIM Administration Console provides key import and export capabilities, but the PKI system that creates the keys & certificates is another subject.




This diagram shows a user at company A, accessing a resource at company B via a web service request.


- 1.User at Company-A invokes a web service using her local ID.
- 2.Web services functionality at Company-A side may do identity/attribute mapping as part of creating a security token to be added to the Request
- 3. The Request is sent across the Internet to Company B. A number of different technologies can be used to provide message privacy & integrity SSL, SOAP-Security, VPN tunnel, etc.)
- 4.The initial point of contact at Company B could be an XML/WS Firewall or Gateway or similar. The general requirement for this node is to "normalize" and authorize inbound requests such that they can be processed in the local environment. Its functionality may include:
 - Mapping of identity claimed in incoming token to a locally valid id
 - Mapping of attributes claimed in incoming token to local valid attributes such as groups/roles
 - Exchange of presented token for a local valid token format
 - Invocation of back end app as a web service or as a local app (eg J2EE)







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Web Servi	ces Security F	Roadmap			
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	WS-Security				
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












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Federated Provisioning - Value	
 User Management link from Identity to Service Provider add/remove authorized users to Service Providers user entitlements can be sent to Service Provider 	
 Allows Service Providers to establish local accounts middleware, registries, applications required to provide the service local accounts used to maintain service-specific attributes, e.g. user preferences user consent to data handling, disclosure, etc 	
 Could provide remote-to-local account linkage via aliases > eliminates need for account <i>federation</i> step during SSO 	
 Allows automated updates for: > user entitlements > de-provisioning 	
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