

This presentation describes support for the z/OS Identity Propagation exploitation included in IBM WebSphere Application Server for z/OS V8.

	IBM
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This is the agenda of what is covered in this presentation. In the Overview, the problem is presented, and the way it had been solved in the past. It is highlighted how this feature is a better solution. Next, the main usage scenario for this feature is discussed. At the end, a summary is given of the advantages of this feature and how to use it. In the References, useful links are included to articles in the Information Center.

		IBM
Section		
	Overview	
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The Overview section describes the problem being solved by this feature, how it was solved in the past, and the advantages of using this feature.



This feature addresses the problem of how to handle distributed identities on the mainframe. Nowadays, customers have WebSphere Application Server on distributed platforms like AIX talking to WebSphere Application Server on the z/OS platform. The user repository is shared across all the Application Servers, but when the distributed identity arrives at z/OS customers want the z/OS security product to handle authorizing this identity, and when talking to a backend resource like CICS or DB2, the identity must be a z/OS SAF identity. WebSphere Application Server customers need a way of mapping the distributed identities to z/OS SAF identities.



In order to map distributed identities to z/OS SAF identities, WebSphere Application Server offered a limited solution before V8. A customer had to write a custom JAAS login module and add it to the Application Server security configuration in order to map the distributed identity to the z/OS SAF identity.



Using the JAAS login module solution has two limitations: auditability and manageability. Audit records generated by the z/OS SMF Auditing system will contain only the z/OS SAF identity- the original user, the distributed identity, is not tracked or audited. As far as manageability, the mapping is handled by the WebSphere administrator, instead of the z/OS security administrator.



This diagram depicts a typical user scenario. WebSphere Application Server is deployed on the z/OS system using a non-Local OS user repository, in this case LDAP. The WebSphere Application Server security configuration is using SAF authorization, and the WebSphere Application Server administrator has configured a JAAS login module that will map the distributed identity of Bob to the z/OS SAF identity of SAM. In the first step, the user logs in with their LDAP identity of Bob. Secondly, Bob is authenticated against the LDAP registry. Thirdly, Bob is mapped to the z/OS SAF identity of SAM.



In step 4, The SAF user SAM is authorized. At this point, the original identity, Bob, has been lost. When the z/OS SMF audit facility generates an audit record for authorizing SAM, the only information available is about the SAF identity.



The solution for handling distributed identities on the mainframe is to take advantage of the new feature in SAF: distributed identity propagation.



Being able to map and propagate distributed identities on z/OS is a SAF feature that was introduced in z/OS 1.11. This feature allows z/OS transactional subsystems, such as WebSphere and CICS, to associate a user's distributed identity with a SAF identity. The key advantages for this feature are auditability and manageability. When a distributed identity is mapped to a SAF identity using this feature, the z/OS SMF auditing subsystem does not lose track of the original user's identity, the distributed identity. Audit records will contain both identities. As far as manageability, the control for mapping distributed identities to SAF identities is now shifted to the z/OS security administrator, instead of the WebSphere administrator.



This results in a more secure and accountable environment.

Section		IBM
	Usage scenario	

This section describes one usage scenario.

	IBM
Usage scenario: Definition (1 of 3)	
 WebSphere Application Server for z/OS Administrator wants to use SAF database for authorization with the non-Local OS user repository 	
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The main usage scenario for exploiting the z/OS identity propagation feature involves being able use a non-Local OS user repository for authenticating users, but then use the SAF repository for authorization.

	IBM
Usage scenario: Definition (2 of 3)	
WebSphere Application Server for z/OS Administrator wants to use SAF data authorization with the non-Local OS user repository	atabase for
 Roles: WebSphere administrator: configures security for WebSphere Application S z/OS security administrator: configures security for the z/OS systems and n auditing End user: logs in to the application hosted by the z/OS Application Server 	Gerver nonitors SMF
 Goals: When the distributed user logs into the application, the user is authenticated distributed registry, then mapped to a SAF identity and the authorization chaperformed using the SAF identity. Any audit records that are generated will contain both the distributed user a mapped SAF identity. 	ed against the eck is ind the
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There are three roles in this usage scenario: first, the WebSphere administrator who is responsible for configuring security on the Application Server. The second role is the z/OS security administrator who is in charge of configuring security for the z/OS systems and monitors the SMF auditing records. Finally, the third role is that of the user who is logging into the application hosted by the z/OS application server. There are two goals in this usage scenario: first, the end user is able to log in using their distributed user id. The user is authenticated against the distributed user repository, and authorized against the SAF database, where it is mapped to a SAF identity. Secondly, the audit records that are generated for the end user logging in will contain both the distributed user and the mapped SAF identity.



In order to complete this usage scenario, the z/OS system must be at 1.11 or later, and WebSphere Application Server for z/OS must be at V8 or later. There are certain configuration changes that need to be made. The WebSphere administrator configures the application server to use a non-Local OS user repository with SAF authorization. The z/OS security administrator configures filters in the SAF database for mapping the distributed users to SAF users. An example of the syntax for defining a filter is shown.



To illustrate this usage scenario, the same environment is used as the one described previously when presenting the problem. WebSphere is configured on a z/OS system with a distributed user repository for authentication, and SAF for authorization. In the first step, the user logs in to an application hosted on the Application Server by using their distributed identity, Bob. In step 2, Bob is authenticated in the LDAP repository. As one might notice, these first two steps remain identical to the problem scenario.



However, in step 3, the difference is now apparent. Before, a JAAS login module was configured to map the distributed identity to a SAF identity. Now, the SAF API to authorize the user can be called using the distributed identity of Bob. The filters defined by the z/OS security administrator in the SAF database then determine that Bob gets mapped to the z/OS SAF identity of SAM.



In the final step, an authorization check is made, and audit records the z/OS SMF Auditing subsystem contain both identities: Bob and SAM. Before, the record contained only SAM.



This page signals the start of a live demonstration. Skip to slide 30 after live demo.

		IBM
Usage sce	enario - Demonstration	
WebSp	where Application Server for z/OS administrator wants to use SAF da authorization with the non-Local OS user repository	tabase for
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The main usage scenario for exploiting the z/OS identity propagation feature involves being able to use a non-Local OS user repository for authenticating users, but then use the SAF repository for authorization.



The user logs in to the administrative console, and the Global Security link is selected.



On the administrative console, the stand-alone LDAP registry is selected from the dropdown under "Available realm definitions", then the Configure button is clicked.

		(11110 LDAF (3 014))
Step 3: The required information is entered for the LDAP server, such as <i>Host</i> and <i>Port</i> , then <i>OK</i> is clicked:	Ceneral Properties LDAP server Type of LDAP server [IBM Tivoil Directory Server [IBM Tivoil Directory Server [IBM Tivoil Directory Server [IBM Tivoil Directory Server] Host Port [cowin12.austin.lbm.com] 389 Failover hosts New Delete Select Host Port Base distinguished name (DN) Base distinguished name	Security Automatically generated server identity Automatically generated server identity Server identity that is stored in the repository Server user ID or administrative user on a Version 6.0.x node Password Bind distinguished name (DN) (gerroat Bind distinguished name (DN) (

On the LDAP server panel, the required information is entered for the LDAP server, and OK is clicked.

	TRM
Demonstration: Configure the current realm to LDAP (4 of 4)	
• Step 4: Back on the <i>Global Security</i> panel, the Set as current is clicked, then Appl	у:
User account repository	
Realm name	
ccwin12.austin.ibm.com:389	
Current realm definition	
Standalone LDAP registry	
Available realm definitions	
Standalone LDAP registry \$ Configure Set as current	
Analy Baset	
Appiy Reset	

On the Global Security panel, the button "Set as current" is clicked to switch to the LDAP user repository, then Apply is clicked.

ionstration. Enable SAF authonz	zation (1 of 3)
1: On the Global security panel, the External	l authorization providers link is clicked.
Administrative security	Authorshipships
	Authentication mechanisms and expiration
Administrative ocour roles	O LTPA
Administrative authentication	Kerberos and LTPA
	Kerberos configuration
Application security	SWAM (deprecated): No authenticated communication betw
Enable application security	Authentication cache settings
	Web and SIP security
Java 2 security	RMI/IIOP security
 Use Java 2 security to restrict application access to local resources 	Java Authentication and Authorization Service
Warn If applications are granted custom permissions	Enable Java Authentication SPI (JASPI)
Restrict access to resource authentication data	Providers
User account repository	Use realm-qualified user names
Realm name	
ccwin12.austin.lbm.com: 389	 Security domains
Current realm definition	External authorization providers
Standalone LDAP registry	 Programmatic session cookie configuration
Available realm definitions	<u>Custom properties</u>

To use SAF authorization, on the Global Security panel, the "External authorization providers" link on the right is clicked.

<form></form>	De	monstration: Enable SAF authorization (2 of 3)
dropdown menu, and OK is clicked:	St	ep 2: The System Authorization Facility (SAF) authorization is selected from the
Global security > External authorization providers In external provider is employed, it must be based on the Java(TM) Authorization Contract for Containers (JACC) specification to han platform, Enterprise Edition (J2EE) authorization. Do not modify any settings on the authorization provider panels unless you have config security provider as a JACC authorization provider. The Application Server must be restarted in order for a change of authorization provider to become effective. Built-in authorization External JACC provider Vistem Authorization Facility (SAF) authorization Configure Apply DK Reset Cancel	dro	opdown menu, and <i>OK</i> is clicked:
If an external provider is employed, it must be based on the Java(TM) Authorization Contract for Containers (JACC) specification to han platform, Enterprise Edition (J2EE) authorization. Do not modify any settings on the authorization provider panels unless you have config security provider as a JACC authorization provider. The Application Server must be restarted in order for a change of authorization provider to become effective. Built-in authorization External JACC provider (Server Must be Tacle (Server Must be restarted in order for a change of authorization provider to become effective. Apply CK Reset Cancel Apply CK Reset Cancel Apply CK Reset Cancel COMPARISON		Global security > External authorization providers
Built-in authorization External JACC provider System Authorization Facility (SAF) authorization Apply OK Reset Cancel		If an external provider is employed, it must be based on the Java(TM) Authorization Contract for Containers (JACC) specification to han Platform, Enterprise Edition (J2EE) authorization. Do not modify any settings on the authorization provider panels unless you have config security provider as a JACC authorization provider. The Application Server must be restarted in order for a change of authorization provider to become effective.
Built-in authorization External JACC provider System Authorization Facility (SAF) authorization Apply OK Reset Cancel		Converting
System Authorization Facility (SAF) authorization Configure Apply OK Reset Cancel		Built-in authorization
Apply OK Reset Cancel		✓ System Authorization Facility (SAF) authorization Configure
z/OS identity propagation explaining		Apply OK Reset Cancel
z/OS identity propagation explaining		
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z/OS identity propagation exploitation		

From the dropdown menu, "System Authorization Facility (SAF) authorization" is selected, then OK is clicked.

		LBR
Demonstratior	1: Enable SAF authorization (3 of 3)	
Step 3: Back on t	he Global security panel, Apply is clicked and the chang	es are saved:
•		
	functions and is used as a default security policy for user applications. Security	
	approxime.	
	Security Configuration Wizard Security Configuration Report	
	Administrative security	
	Enable administrative securi	
	Administrative group roles	
	Administrative authentication	
	Application security	
	Enable application security	
	Java 2 security	
	Use Java 2 security to restrict application access to local	
	Warn If applications are granted custom permissions	
	Restrict access to resource authentication data	
	User account repository	
	Realm name crwin12 austin.ibm.com: 389	
	Current realm definition	
	Standalone LDAP registry	
	Available realm definitions	
	Standalone LDAP registry Configure Set as current	
	Apply Reset	

Finally, on the Global Security panel, the Apply is clicked and the changes are saved.



On the z/OS system, the z/OS security administrator defines the mapping filters. The image here illustrates the syntax for mapping the LDAP user of LDAPUser1 to a SAF user of SECUSER1.



For testing, the Snoop servlet is updated to print out the SAF user ID of the distributed user who logged in to the servlet. The servlet's source code is shipped with the WebSphere Application Server product. In Step1, the application ear file is expanded using the jar command, and then the war file within that ear is expanded. In Step 2, the file titled SnoopServlet.java is modified to add the code above as indicated. In Step 3, the .java file is compiled and a new class file is generated. This class file is repackaged into the .war file, and the .war file is repackaged into the .ear file. In Step 4, the modified application DefaultApplication.ear is installed on the application server.

		IBR
Demonstration: Run the te	est application (1 of 2)	
Step 1: WebSphere application se	erver is restarted.	
Step 2: A web browser URL is se LDAPUser1	t to the updated snoop app, and the user logs in with	
	https://zrock166:8042/snoopForSAFwar/SnoopForSAF	
https://zrock166:8042/snoopForSAFv	var/snoopForSAF	×
	Domain: zrock166:8042 Realm: Default Realm	
	Username: LDAPUser1 Password: ••••••	•
	Cancel Log In	
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In Step 1, the Application Server is restarted. In Step 2, the URL for the updated snoop application is accessed. When prompted for a user and password, the distributed user LDAPUser1 and its password are entered.

	Request Information:	
•Step 3: The expected output is verified. The remote user is the distributed user ID, LDAPUser1. The mapped SAE user ID will be	Request method	GET
	Request URI	/stoopForSAFwar/snoopForSAF
	Request protocol	HTTP/L1
	Servlet path	/snoopForSAF
	Path info	<10000>
ECUSER1.	Path translated	<ione></ione>
	Character encoding	<number 2010<="" td=""></number>
	Query string	<ione></ione>
	Content length	0
	Content type	<1000
	Server name	zmck166
	Server por:	8042
	Remote user	LDAPUseri
	Remote address	9.12.227.177
User Principal: LDAPUser1 Remote Credential: com.ibm.ws.security.auth com.ibm.ws.security.token.Authentic com.ibm.ws.security.auth.WSCreden	User: LDAPUser1 isUserInRole(S n.WSCredentialImpl@8d9e784 Priv cationTokenImpl@8d9ece9 Private ntialImpl@8d9e784 EndCallerCred	AFAllRole): true Caller Subject: Su rate Credential: com.ibm.ws.security Credential: com.ibm.ws.security.tol Caller SAF user id: SECUSER1

In the output, the remote user is LDAPuser1, and the mapped SAF user is SECUSER1.

Section		IBM
	Summary	

This section provides a summary of what was discussed in this presentation.

IF	M
Summary	
 Using the distributed identity mapping feature replaces the need to configure JAAS mapping modules, places more control in the hands of the z/OS security administrator, and provides complete end-to-end auditing solution for z/OS SMF. 	ng s a
 The flagship scenario for this feature involves configuring WebSphere with a non-Local OS user registry and enabling SAF authorization 	\$
 The demonstration goes over this scenario in detail 	
 Other scenarios exist in the Information Center, for mapping distributed identities in other forms (such as asserted DN, certificates, Kerberos users) to SAF identities 	
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The advantage of using the z/OS identity propagation feature is that the WebSphere administrator does not need to configure any JAAS mapping modules. Instead, the control is given to the z/OS security administrator for defining mapping filters in the SAF database. And more importantly, the audit records in the z/OS SMF product will contain both the distributed user ID and the SAF user id. The most common usage scenario to take advantage of this feature involves a non-Local OS user repository configured with SAF authorization. The demonstration goes over how to configure this scenario in detail. Furthermore, there are other usage scenarios for using the distributed identity propagation feature that are documented in more detail in the Information Center.



This slide contains links to useful information.

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