


# Addressing Audit and Compliance requirements in a DB2 z/OS environment

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Session: 003




IBM Information  
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INFORMATION-LED  
TRANSFORMATION



LEAD  
THE WAY



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## Landscape – Customer Challenges

- Tremendous regulatory compliance pressures to demonstrate adequate institutional controls including audit reporting.
- Current DB2 on z/OS environment typically has minimal auditing
- Manual effort requiring interaction by DBA's
- Reactive in nature with the implication that you only find information post event, or after the first breach
- Home grown process can provide some level of access reporting, however:
  - Application managed code you have to maintain
  - Exposure as a lack of robust application change controls can allow disabling of audit processing
- Overhead ( perceived or actual) in many cases drive decision to not audit DB2 on z/OS data
- DB2 trace based processes are managed by DBA's
  - The DBA's are responsible for generating audit data with which they are in turn audited, this constitutes a significant security risk and exposure.**

## DB2 Audit Trace versus RACF

### Why Audit when Production is Locked Down?

#### → Common arguments:

- "We don't need to audit, we have controls surrounding who can access data"
- "We control who is connected to the DB2 SYSADM group and we know what those people are authorized to do"

#### → Counter arguments:

##### – RACF does two things:

- Prevents people from accessing a resource that is not essential or appropriate for their jobs
- Allows people access to the necessary data to do their jobs

##### – But RACF does NOT:

- prevent a malicious update if the user has authority to the data.
- prevent an authorized user from accessing sensitive data that is **NOT** within the scope of their job.
  - E.g. a bank teller looks up the CEOs bank balance or personal customer information
- provide meaningful information about access to protected DB2 resources (authorized or not).

## What to Audit – A busy slide

- **Closed Application Environment (*Probably not a candidate*)**
  - **Traditional Application controls well defined and comprehensive**
    - CICS and IMS TM – Signon and Transaction Access secured via RACF
    - **Production Batch – Controlled via program pathing / Job Scheduling**
- Data warehouse – no risk of update but access audit might be needed
- Adhoc execution environment – QMF, SPUFI, etc. Constitutes exposure
  - SPUFI Plan can be restricted but ALL use should be audited
- Privileged ID's (DBA/Sysadmin) should be audited
- Data may not be as granular as you think
  - Depending on how you configured your connections into DB2 – CICS attach, SAP, or CICS users with unique id's, and distributed transactions. May get all audit data but may not be meaningful because of attach environments. Group versus AUTHID. SQLESETI implementation can help
- “Offline” Utilities and certain tools are used outside of DB2
  - RACF dataset access defined controls
  - “Trigger” based audit
  - Use of DSN1COPY should be restricted



## Audit data sources

### → DB2 catalog

- SQL queries on catalog, other data
- audit, accounting and performance traces
- recovery log, current & historical data
- RACF audit facility, other SMF data, ...

### → Audit tools and techniques

- tracing: audit, performance, accounting, monitor
- formatting the traces: OMPE or PM, others
- DB2 Audit Management Expert, others
- DSN1SMFP, others
- log formatting: tools, DSN1LOGP, Log Analyzer



# What actions are needed to start the Audit trace?

- -DSN START TRACE (AUDIT) CLASS (1,2,4,5,8) DEST (SMF)
  - Requires one of the following privileges:
    - SYSOPER
    - SYSCTRL
    - SYSADM
    - TRACE
  - In addition, Class 4 and 5 events will only be collected for objects (tables) with the audit attribute turned on via ALTER:
    - AUDIT CHANGES – enables collection of changes in conjunction with CLASS (4)
    - AUDIT ALL – enables collection of changes and / or reads with CLASS 4 and/or 5 active
  - Note: When ALTER AUDIT is performed, plan and package invalidation occurs which requires a rebind to be performed

# Audit class Events that are traced

1. Access attempts that DB2 denies because of inadequate authorization. This class is the default.
2. Explicit GRANT and REVOKE statements and their results. This class does not trace implicit grants and revokes.
3. CREATE, ALTER, and DROP statements that affect audited tables, and the results of these statements. This class traces the dropping of a table that is caused by DROP TABLESPACE or DROP DATABASE and the creation of a table with AUDIT CHANGES or AUDIT ALL. ALTER TABLE statements are audited only when they change the AUDIT option for the table.
4. Changes to audited tables. Only the first attempt to change a table, within a unit of recovery, is recorded. (If the agent or the transaction issues more than one COMMIT statement, the number of audit records increases accordingly.) The changed data is not recorded, only the attempt to make a change is recorded. If the change is not successful and is rolled back, the audit record remains; it is not deleted. This class includes access by the LOAD utility.

Accesses to a dependent table that are caused by attempted deletions from a parent table are also audited. The audit record is written even if the delete rule is RESTRICT, which prevents the deletion from the parent table. The audit record is also written when the rule is CASCADE or SET NULL, which can result in deletions that cascade to the dependent table.

5. All read accesses to tables that are identified with the AUDIT ALL clause. As in class 4, only the first access within a DB2 unit of recovery is recorded. References to a parent table are also audited.
6. The bind of static and dynamic SQL statements of the following types:
  - INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, CREATE VIEW, and LOCK TABLE statements for audited tables. Except for the values of host variables, the audit record contains the entire SQL statement.
  - SELECT statements on tables that are identified with the AUDIT ALL clause. Except for the values of host variables, the audit record contains the entire SQL statement.
7. Assignment or change of an authorization ID because of the following reasons:
  - Changes through an exit routine (default or user-written)
  - Changes through a SET CURRENT SQLID statement
  - An outbound or inbound authorization ID translation
  - An ID that is being mapped to a RACF ID from a Kerberos security ticket
8. The start of a utility job, and the end of each phase of the utility.



## Audit Trace Overhead

- The performance impact of auditing is directly dependent on the amount of audit data produced. When the audit trace is active, the more tables that are audited and the more transactions that access them, the greater the performance impact. The overhead of **audit trace is typically less than 5% but workload dependent.**
- Consider the frequency of certain events. Eg. security violations are not as frequent as table accesses. The frequency of utility runs is likely to be measured in executions per day. Alternatively, authorization changes can be numerous in a transaction environment.
- Weigh auditing requirements against workload and anticipated impacts to application service levels and performance objectives carefully.
- Don't underestimate impact on SMF activity and associated overhead



## DSN1SMFP offline utility

- The DSN1SMFP utility processes DB2 trace data into reports.
- DSN1SMFP accepts data that SMF collects in standard SMF format and produces from one to fifteen reports. DSN1SMFP accepts all SMF record types, but it processes only type 101 (DB2 Accounting) and 102 (DB2 Performance) records.
- DSN1SMFP checks each type 101 and 102 record for DB2 audit trace types of these DB2 IFCIDs:
  - 003: Accounting - DDF Data by Location (security-relevant fields only)
  - 004: Trace Start
  - 005: Trace Stop
  - 023: Utility Start
  - 024: Utility Change
  - 025: Utility End
  - 106: System Parameters (security-relevant fields only)
  - 140: Audit Authorization Failures
  - 141: Audit DDL Grant/Revoke
  - 142: Audit DDL Create/Alter/Drop
  - 143: Audit First Write
  - 144: Audit First Read
  - 145: Audit DML Statement
  - 350: SQL Statement

The OMPE "File" Report  
command is used to create DB2  
Load compatible record formats

OMPE "File" report  
commands

OMPE Audit  
Detail Report

```

MSG. ID.      DESCRIPTION
-----
FPEC2001I    COMMAND INPUT FROM DDNAME SYSIN
              AUDIT
              REPORT
              LEVEL (DETAIL)
              TYPE (DDL DML)
              DDNAME (AUDITDD)
              FILE
              TYPE (DDL)
              DDNAME (AUFILDD1)
              FILE
              TYPE (DML)
              DDNAME (AUFILDD2)
              FILE
              TYPE (AUTHFAIL)
              DDNAME (AUFILDD3)
              EXEC
    
```

```

LOCATION: NDCDB203          OMEGAMON XE FOR DB2 PERFORMANCE EXPERT (V3)          PAGE: 1-1
GROUP: N/P                AUDIT REPORT - DETAIL                          REQUESTED FROM: NOT SPECIFIED
MEMBER: N/P                ORDER: PRIMAUTH-PLANNAME                                     TO: NOT SPECIFIED
SUBSYSTEM: DSNC           SCOPE: MEMBER                                     ACTUAL FROM: 09/06/06 01:47:43.60
DB2 VERSION: V8                                                  TO: 09/06/06 01:49:38.83
PRIMAUTH CORRNAME CONNTYPE
ORIGAUTH CORRNMBR INSTANCE
PLANNAME CONNECT          TIMESTAMP  TYPE          DETAIL
-----
SYS248  SYS248  DB2CALL    01:47:43.60 DML          TYPE : 1ST READ
SYS248  'BLANK'  BF5CF720228D    DATABASE: SYS248SA          TABLE OBID: 5
ETIPLAN1 DB2CALL    PAGESET : SYS248TS          LOG RBA : X'000000000000'

SYS248  SYS248  DB2CALL    01:48:22.56 DML          TYPE : 1ST WRITE
SYS248  'BLANK'  BF5CF7454387    DATABASE: SYS248SA          TABLE OBID: 5
ETIPLAN1 DB2CALL    PAGESET : SYS248TS          LOG RBA : X'00036FBEA220'

SYS248  SYS248  DB2CALL    01:48:22.56 DML          TYPE : 1ST WRITE
SYS248  'BLANK'  BF5CF7454387    DATABASE: SYS248SA          TABLE OBID: 5
ETIPLAN1 DB2CALL    PAGESET : SYS248TS          LOG RBA : X'00036FBEA3DA'
    
```

# A view of the audit data stored in the OMPE performance warehouse using DB2 Control Center

Log RBA can be used to locate details about other actions for the LUW

Open Table - DB2PMFAUDT\_DML  
DSNC - DSNC - AUDITDB - SYS248 - DB2PMFAUDT\_DML

E	PRIMAUTH	ORIGAUTH	TIMESTAMP	IFCID	DATABASE_DBID	PAGESET_OBID	TABLE_OBID	DATABASE_NAME	PAGESET_NAME	...	...
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:47:41 AM 602771	144	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS		
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:48:22 AM 560444	143	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS	00036FBEA220	
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:48:22 AM 564498	143	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS	00036FBEA3DA	
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:48:28 AM 130075	144	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS		
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:48:58 AM 571847	143	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS	00036FBEEA62	
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:48:58 AM 579028	143	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS	00036FBEEAC1C	
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:49:06 AM 253828	144	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS		
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:49:38 AM 826482	143	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS	00036FBEEADD6	
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:49:38 AM 831367	143	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS	00036FBEEB000	
	SYS248	SYS248	Sep 6, 2006 1:49:38 AM 838245	143	307	2	5	SYS248SA	SYS248TS	00036FBEEB1BA	

Commit Roll Back Filter Fetch More Rows

Automatically commit updates 10 row(s) in memory Close Help

Table OBD will require join with DB2 Catalog SYSTABLES for meaningful reporting

## Limitations of the audit trace


- Does not record everything
  - Only records when Audit Trace is ON
  - only the tables that you specifically choose to audit.
- Does NOT capture before/after change data
- Only records first access within a single unit of recovery
- The audit trace does not audit some utilities. eg COPY, RECOVER, REPAIR, DSN1CHKR and DSN1PRNT.
- You cannot audit the catalog tables.
- Dynamic SQL host variable data not collected
- When you choose classes of events to audit, consider that you might ask for more data than you are willing to process.
- Depending on AUDIT classes active, and workload mix, significant increases in SMF activity might be experienced. One customer scenario, with CLASS (1-6) a 12% increase in SMF was observed.

# Separation of Roles and Responsibilities

- DB2 trace based processes are managed by DBA's
  - The DBA's are responsible for generating audit data with which they are in turn audited, this constitutes a significant security risk and exposure
  - Trace data collection can be interfered with or turned off completely
    - DBA can issue –DSN Stop Trace
    - Use IFASMFDMF to selectively filter SMF data based on timestamp
    - Use DB2PM (Or Equivalent) filter such as DATE/TIME/EXCLUDE to filter selected records
  - **Having the DBA involved in the collection of audit data is viewed as weak from a compliance and control perspective**
- Security and Auditors with system privileges
  - Also viewed as problematic from a compliance perspective
  - Requires additional technical skills not within their core competencies
  - Misuse of privileges without coordination can result in performance and availability issues
    - Turning on traces without proper filtering to reduce overhead or quantity of trace data collected
    - Altering objects to AUDIT without ensuring that plan/package invalidation is not an issue

# Audit Management Expert - Monitor and Audit

- ➔ **Helps auditors answer:**
  - Who, What, Where, Why, When, How
- ➔ **Centralizes the audit data**
  - Pulls together disparate data sources from all the systems into a central repository
- ➔ **Automates auditing process**
  - Eliminates all home grown processes
- ➔ **Creates segregation of duties**
  - Gives auditors the business activity collected without being reliant on the technical personnel they need to monitor
- ➔ **Flexible Reporting**
  - Drill down from overview to detail for forensic analysis



# Audit Management Expert Overview


- Auditors will be able to Access:
  - SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE activity by user or by object
  - **SQL Text and Host Variable value for each statement**
    - **Row count that SQL statement affects**
  - CREATE, ALTER, and DROP operations against an audited object
  - Explicit GRANT and REVOKE operations
  - Utility access to an audited object
  - DB2 commands entered
  - Assignment or modification of an authorization ID
  - Authorization failures
- **Provides auditors with flexible options for examining the data in the audit repository**
  - Audit Trace Data, **Audit SQL Collector (ASC)**, Log Analysis data
    - V2.1 no longer needs to alter objects to 'AUDIT ALL' for read/update
    - DB2 Catalog Objects can now be audited for SQL read/update



DB2 Audit Management Expert Reporter v2.1

File Reports Settings Help

Log in Reporting Log Analysis



DB2 SYSTEMS

OBJECTS

DB2 AUDIT MANAGEMENT EXPERT

Welcome barry

> Overview Subsystem

Help

Report Options:

Date Range:

From:    
 Sun, Jan 6, 2008 Hour: 0

To:    
 Sun, Jan 6, 2008 Hour: 23

Last Summary Table Update: 01-06-2008 12:59

No Filters applied

Activity Type:

Set time period to check for Threshold:

- Every Hour
- Every Day
- Every Week
- Every Month

- |                           |                              |   |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|---|
| a. Access Attempts        | b. Read of Audited Object    | c. Change of Audited Object                 |
| d. CREATE, ALTER and DROP | e. Explicit GRANT and REVOKE | f. Assignment or change of authorization ID |
| g. IBM Utility Access     | h. DB2 Commands              | i. Other Authorization Failures             |

<b>Critical</b>	<b>Warning</b>	<b>Normal</b>

Subsystem: RS01:I81B

a.	b.	c.
d.	e.	f.
g.	h.	i.

> Available Dates: 2007-12-27 to 2008-1-6

Go to Report

Copy

Print

- ◆ Level1: Subsystem Overview
- Level2: Subsystem Summary
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- Access Attempts
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- Read of Audited Object
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- Change of Audited Object
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- Create, Alter and Drop
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- Explicit Grant and Revoke
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- Assignment or change of auth. ID
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- IBM Utility Access
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- DB2 Commands
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- Other Authorization Failures
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- Objects
- Level3: Subsystem Detail- All Authorization Failures
- Collection History

Level1\_Overview

0.08

2.21

100%

Connected to I81B ADH21 Reporting

**Report Options:**

**Date Range:**  
 From: Calendar > **Thu, Dec 27, 2007** Hour: **0**  
 To: Calendar > **Sun, Jan 6, 2008** Hour: **23**  
 > Available Dates: 2007-12-27 to 2008-1-6  
 Last Summary Table Update: 01-06-2008 12:59

**Subsystem:**  
 RS01:I81B

**Chart Options...**




No filters applied

**Activity Result:**  
 All

**Set time period to check for Threshold:**  
 Every Hour  
 Every Day  
 Every Week  
 Every Month


Export... Refresh  
 Filter Options... Display Colors...

**Summary Report for Subsystem: RS01:I81B**



- a. Access Attempts
- b. Read of Audited Object
- c. Change of Audited Object
- d. CREATE, ALTER and DROP
- e. GRANT and REVOKE
- f. Assignment or change of auth. ID
- g. IBM Utility Access
- h. DB2 Commands
- i. Other Authorization Failures

# Audit Management Expert GUI Client



# Audit Management Expert GUI Client

**DB2 AUDIT EXPERT** Welcome testuser

DB2 SYSTEMS | USERS | OBJECTS

Overview System Detail Options Log Analysis Back

Detail, Exceptions: Authorization attempts denied, 2005-02-10, DBSXRS on R81C, Selected objects and users

Time	User	Object Type	Object Name	Value	Description
1. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.50	USER1	TABLE	JEREMY.EMP_ACT	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
2. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.51	TESTID	TABLE	JEREMY.DEPARTMENT	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
3. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.53	USER1	TABLE	JEREMY.EMP_ACT	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
4. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.56	USER1	TABLE	JEREMY.EMP_RESUME	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
5. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.57	USER1	TABLE	JEREMY.EMPLOYEE	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
6. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.57	TESTID	TABLE	JEREMY.IN_TRAY	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
7. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.57	TESTID	TABLE	JEREMY.ORG	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
8. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.58	TESTID	TABLE	JEREMY.STAFF	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
9. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.58	TESTID	DATABASE	.SAMPLE	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
10. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.59	TESTID	TABLE	JEREMY.IN_TRAY	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
11. 2005-02-10 : 11.15.59	TESTID	TABLE	JEREMY.ORG	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
12. 2005-02-10 : 11.16.00	TESTID	TABLE	JEREMY.PROJECT	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
13. 2005-02-10 : 11.16.00	USER1	TABLE	JEREMY.SALES	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
14. 2005-02-10 : 11.16.00	TESTID	TABLE	JEREMY.STAFF	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
15. 2005-02-10 : 11.16.01	TESTID	TABLE	AEREPOS.CHKACCESS	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.
16. 2005-02-10 : 11.16.01	USER1	TABLE	AEREPOS.CHKAPPROVAL	ACCESS DENIED	Access is not approved; rather, it was denied.

Export Data Page 1 of 10 Previous Next

From: 2/6/2005 To: 2/10/2005 Update Dates OR Day Selected: 2005-02-10

2/6 2/7 2/8 2/9 2/10

**Audit Management Expert Data for level3\_change**

Option

Record Count: 212

TO...	STATEMENT_TXT	ROWS_AFFECTED	MEM
	INSERT INTO PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL03 VALUES(2999,'XYZ','X','XYZ56789')	1	181 B
	INSERT INTO PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL03 VALUES(3999,'XYZ','X','XYZ56789')	1	181 B
	INSERT INTO PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL03 VALUES(5999,'XYZ','X','XYZ56789')	1	181 B
	INSERT INTO PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL03 VALUES(19999,'XYZ','X','XYZ56789')	1	181 B
	UPDATE PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL02 SET COL_3 = 'PDDAVI' WHERE COL_2 = 'JMP'	40	181 B
	UPDATE PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL07 SET COL_3 = 'PDDAVI' WHERE COL_2 = 'JMP'	40	181 B
	UPDATE PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL03 SET COL_3 = 'PDDAVI' WHERE COL_2 = 'JMP'	40	181 B
	UPDATE PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL03 SET COL_3 = 'PDDAVIA' WHERE COL_2 = 'JMP'	40	181 B
	UPDATE PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL08 SET COL_3 = 'PDDAVI' WHERE COL_2 = 'JMP'	40	181 B
	UPDATE PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL03 SET COL_3 = 'PDDAVI4' WHERE COL_2 = 'JMP'	40	181 B
	UPDATE PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL08 SET COL_3 = 'PDDAVIA' WHERE COL_2 = 'JMP'	40	181 B
	UPDATE PDDAVI.PDDAVI_TBL08 SET COL_3 = 'PDDAVIB' WHERE COL_2 = 'JMP'	40	181 B

Copy    Export    Zoom    Search    Cancel    Close    Help

# Log Analysis Reports

DB2 LOG ANALYSIS- SUMMARY REPORT: D8A  
\*\*\*\*\*

LOG RANGE

```
-----
START DATE      : 2006/03/13
START TIME     : 21:07:00
END DATE       : 2006/03/13
END TIME      : 21:17:00
```

FILTERS

```
-----
SHOW UPDATES   : Y
SHOW INSERTS   : Y
SHOW DELETES   : Y
SHOW ROLLBACKS : N
CATALOG DATA  : N
  INCLUDE-TABLE..... ADHSCH1.ADH1T1
```

```
*****
* COMMITTED ACTIVITY *
*****
```

OBJECT TYPE/NAME	UPDATES	INSERTS	DELETES	MD
TABLE..... ADHSCH1.ADH1T1	0	4	0	
TABLESPACE. ADHTS1	0	4	0	
DATABASE... ADHDB1	0	4	0	

OBJECT TYPE/NAME (RI ACTIONS ONLY)	UPDATES	INSERTS	DELETES	MD

TOTAL SUMMARY REPORT

```
-----
TOTAL UPDATES: 0
TOTAL INSERTS: 4
TOTAL DELETES: 0
```

# Log Analysis Detailed Reports

DB2 LOG ANALYSIS - DETAILS REPORT: D8A

\*\*\*\*\*

---

ACTION DATE	TIME	TABLE OWNER	TABLE NAME	URID
INSERT 2006-03-13	21.15.38	ADHSCH1	ADH1T1	00164DB5A558

DATABASE	TABLESPACE	DBID	PSID	OBID	AUTHID	PLAN	CONNTYPE	LRSN
ADHDB1	ADHTS1	00538	00002	00003	PDUSERA	DSNTEP2	BATCH	BE7FB51C73B2

MEMID	CORRID	CONNID	LW=NETID/LUNAME/UNIQUE/COMMIT	PAGE/RID
00001	PDUSERT1	BATCH	ABCDNET1/D8ADB2 /BE7FB51B2EE6/0001	00000003/72

ROW STATUS	COL1	COL2
POST-CHANGE	ADHS1	ADHSCHXXXXXX
PRE-CHANGE	-	-

## Security and separation of roles


- Supporting internal and external auditors in collection and reporting of DB2 audit data
  - Does not require auditors to be DB2 defined users within the monitored DB2 system(s)
  - Does not require the auditors to log on to the operating system where the monitored system is running
    - Does not require extensive interaction between the auditor and the system support personnel (DBA/Sys admin)
- Auditor will not be able to directly manipulate any DB2 resources
- Provide complete visibility of all auditable objects to an administrator level user
- Provide controls for limiting visibility to auditors of auditable objects
- Removes DBA from audit data collection process. With V2.1 removes the “ALTER for AUDIT” requirement



## Audit Trace only or Audit Trace and Audit SQL Collector (ASC)


- AME can collect audit information by using Audit Trace Data, Audit SQL Collector data and Log Analysis data
- Audit Trace
  - Class 1,2,7 & 8 - little or no overhead
    - 1 Access attempts that DB2 denies,
    - 2 Explicit GRANT and REVOKE,
    - 7 Assignment or change of an authorization ID,
    - 8 start of a utility job
  - Class 3 create, alter, drop of **AUDIT ALL** Tables - little or no overhead
  - Class 4 & 5 (read, update) may show overhead of 15 -18%
    - 4 Changes to **AUDIT ALL** tables (Only the first attempt within a unit of recovery)
    - 5 Read accesses to **AUDIT ALL** tables (Only the first attempt within a unit of recovery)
  - IFCID 90 & 91 for DB2 COMMANDS – little or no overhead
- ASC:
  - Using the ASC Audit SQL Collector is an alternative to using Classes 4 & 5
  - Advantage of using the ASC
    - ASC sees every read or update
    - Collects SQL text, Host Variable value, affected row count
    - Tables do not require **AUDIT ALL** for read or update
  - AME Agent Started Task starts ASC started task and Audit trace as required
    - If valid collection profile defined for that DB2
    - Agent definition of collection method
    - Can change collection choice and/or collection profile without stopping Agent

# DB2 Audit Management Expert Architecture




# DB2 Audit Management Expert Architecture Dual Mode

DB2 Audit  
Management Expert  
Administrator GUI  
Windows



DB2 Audit  
Management Expert  
Reporting GUI  
Windows





# Redbook on Audit and Encryption on DB2 for z/OS – SG24-7720

**IBM**

Draft Document for Review March 4, 2009 6:04 pm


SG24-7720-00

## Securing and Auditing Data on DB2 for z/OS

Prepare for the threat from within and  
without

Comply with IBM Data Server  
Security Blueprint

Extend the skills of data  
professionals



Paolo Bruni  
Felipe Bortoletto  
Thomas Hubbard  
Ernest Mancill  
Hennie Mynhardt  
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THANK  
YOU