# Agile Systems Engineering

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
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The Premier Event for Software and Systems Innovation

# State of the Practice for Systems Development


- · Systems and Software Engineering Environments, in general,
  - Are document-centric
  - Require huge investment in planning that doesn't reflect actual project execution
  - Have difficulty adapting to change.
  - Require expensive and error-prone manual review and update processes.
  - Require long integration and validation cycles to beat out many defects
  - Are difficult to maintain over the long haul
  - Additional standards constraints (eg DO-178C, ARP4761, ISO26262, IEC 62304, AUTOSAR, DoDAF) add to the challenge
  - Tooling Selection
  - Dependability engineering
    - Safety
    - Reliability
    - Security
  - System certification






#### Modern Processes and Practices are Evolving

Past



Model-Based Engineering Defect Avoidance Defensive Design Continuous Integration Risk Management Project Governance Dynamic Planning



Moving from waterfall "ballistic" planning to incremental, adaptive approach



# Key Concepts for Agility

- Improve quality through continuous feedback
  - Verification (*do it right*)
    - Analysis
    - Review
    - · Testing via execution or simulation
  - Customer feedback (meet the need)
    - Correctness
    - Appropriateness
    - Usability
  - Defensive Design
- Efficiency through
  - Concentrate on high-value tasks
  - Avoid rework
  - Paying attention to how you're doing against goals
    - Project retrospective
    - Risk management
- Planning
  - Don't plan beyond the fidelity of the information you have
  - Plan enough but not more than that
  - Adjust plans based on "truth on the ground" (metrics)

Primarily build executable things Verify them continuously Validate them with the customer early & often

#### Active and continuous risk mitigation

#### **Dynamic planning**

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# What does "agile" mean for Systems Engineering?


- Do what you need to do, no more and no less
- This depends heavily on industry, regulation, and business environment
- Often requires detailed traceability links among work products (e.g. requirements traceability)
- Use tooling to automate manually-intensive, error-prone work
- Work iteratively and incrementally
- Group requirements with user stories or use cases
- Verify continuously
- With Q/A activities
- With testing
- With customer
- Outcome contains textual specifications but linked to executable & *verifiable* specifications
- Use dynamic planning to adjust project plans based on "truth on the ground"
  - Use goal-based metrics (KPIs) to track project progress
  - Continuously track progress against plan. Adjust planning frequently
- Safety, Reliability, Security
- Not "done once" but continuously assessed
- Model-based hand off to downstream engineering

# Best Practices for Agile Systems Engineering

- High-fidelity model-based engineering (Hi-MBE)
- Incremental functional analysis with use cases
- Executable requirements modeling with SysML / UML
- Test-driven development of system specifications
- Integrated safety and reliability analysis
- Model-based handoff to downstream engineering
- Automated document generation from model artifacts

Note: a key difference between agile SW and agile SE is that the *outcome* of SE is *specifications* and the *outcome* of SW is *implementation* 









# But Why High-Fidelity Modeling???

- Hi-MBE brings to engineering
  - Precision
  - Verification via executability or formal methods
  - Stakeholder/Analysis-relevant viewpoints at any desired level of abstraction e.g.
    - Functionality
    - State-based behavior
    - · Algorithmic/control behavior
    - Structure and Architecture
  - Integration of engineering work, e.g.
    - Functional requirements
    - Dependability analysis Safety


Reliability

Cyberphysical security and Information Assurance

- · Architectural structure, behavior, and allocation
- Control modeling and analysis



#### Models and Viewpoints in Model-Based Systems Engineering






# **Use Cases for Systems Engineering**

- · A system-level use case
  - Can be thought of as a comprehensive user story
  - Is cross-discipline and usually results in mechanical, electronic and software implementation
  - Is a coherent set of requirements clustered around a systems capability or usage
  - Has bi-directional traceable links to system requirements
  - While focusing on functionality, *must* also include quality of service requirements and constraints, such as
    - Safety
    - Reliability
    - Security
    - Performance (worst-case, throughput, average case, etc)
    - Maintainability
    - Parametric requirements (heat, weight, recurring cost, etc)
- Three primary work flows for "detailing the use case"
  - Scenario-driven
  - Activity-driven
  - State-driven
    - It should be noted that the use case state machine is really the normative specification of the system with respect to that system capability




#### **Detailing Use Cases with Statecharts and Scenarios**





#### Scenario Driven Use Case Construction / Validation



# Making it agile

- 1. Incrementally specify
  - 1. Use cases/User stories
  - 2. Specification nanocycles
- 2. Continuously verify
  - 1. Build executable models
  - Frequently validate

3.

4.

5.

6.

- 1. Demonstrate to customer
- Identify missing requirements
  - 1. Unspecified state transitions
  - <sup>2</sup> Unspecified scenarios
- Incrementally add traceability
- Annotate with qualities of service
- 7. Integrate with other specifications
  - 1. Other use cases
  - 2. Non-functional requirements
    - 1. Safety
    - 2. Security
    - 3. Reliability

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# **Executable Requirements?**

- A key problem is ensuring the quality of requirements for complex systems
- · This is not just a matter of making good stand alone "shall" statements
  - Truly, most requirements specifications have poorly-specified "shall" statements that
    - Are ambiguous
    - Lack precision
    - · Inappropriately include design detail
  - But the *hard part* is the subtle interactions of requirements
    - Don't cover all cases, situations, or operational environments
    - Don't discuss system error and fault responses
    - Missing data specification
    - Missing performance properties
    - Inconsistent requirements
- The "state of the practice" for requirements is protracted manual review of textual documents
  - The problem is this is error-prone and hugely expensive
- The "state of the art" is to create executable requirements models that *demonstrate* the system black-box behavior
  - The point is to clearly and unambiguously specify the **control and data transformations** (and their constraints) to be performed by the system in all relevant situations, conditions, environments, and operational scenarios




#### **Executable Requirements**

Most common workflow

- Start with textual specifications
- Incrementally construct use case behavioral model
  - Test Driven Development
  - Nanocycle Iteration
  - · Constrain with quality of service requirements
  - Continuous trace linking to textual requirements
  - · Continuous safety, reliability, security assessment
- · Outcome
  - Better requirements as workflow mitigates against
    - Incorrect requirements
    - Missing functionality
    - Missing QoS & performance requirements
    - Inconsistent requirements
    - Ambiguous requirements
  - Validation with the customer via execution of the use case
  - Model-based handoff to downstream engineering
  - Traceability supports impact analysis, change management, and safety certification

## Validation of requirements through "what if" executions

- Virtual prototype / Panel graphics support
  - Ideal communications aid for validation of customer requirements
  - Clearly shows data and control transformations specified by requirements







# Test-Driven Development isn't just for software anymore

- The principle behind TDD is to develop and apply test cases as you develop a system to demonstrate that it is correct
- This is done in parallel with the system development and not ex post facto
- This is about *defect avoidance* and less about *defect identification and repair*
- TDD applies to the development of complex system use case models
  - During the nanocycle of a use case's development
    - Make small incremental changes (e.g. add a state, or a couple of actions, or a transition or two)
    - · Identify what is the desired behavior of the system that you've specified so far
    - Execute that incomplete use case model to ensure that it is correct
    - Repeat until all requirements for the use case and all scenarios defined for the use case have been met in the normative specification
- TDD may be realized
- By "instrumenting the actors" specifying behavior of the actors to perform tests
- Tooling implementing the UML Profile for Test (e.g. Test Conductor<sup>™</sup> and Automatic Test Generator<sup>™</sup>)
- Manually writing test scripts




























# **Integrated Safety and Reliability Analysis**

- Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) connects *hazards* with logical combinations of events, conditions, errors, and faults
- · Allows you to identify
  - Effects of combinations of conditions and events on safety
  - Safety measures
  - Safety requirements
    - DO 178B/C
    - IEC 61508
    - ISO 26262
  - Impacts of architectural, technological, and design choices on safety





#### **Integrated Safety and Reliability Analysis**




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#### **Model-Based Threat Analysis**

- Security Analysis Diagram (SAD) is like a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) but for security, rather than safety
  - It looks for the logical relation between assets, vulnerabilities, attacks, and security violations
  - Permits reasoning about security
    - What kind?
    - How much?
    - Risk assessments






## **Model-Based Threat Analysis**

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- An Asset Diagram looks at the semantic relations between roles, authentication, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures. It is a way of representing the security-relevant design elements.
  - Here it is shown with traceability links to requirements
- Assets are things you want to protect, e.g.
  - Physical
  - Informational
  - Currency
  - Resource
  - Security





# Auto-generation of dependability-relevant summary data

#### Fault Source Matrix, Fault Detection Matrix, Fault-Requirement Matrix, FMEA, Hazard Analysis...


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IBM Rational Harmony for Systems Engineering



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


## Harmony Systems Engineering Workflows

IBM Rational Harmony for S	Systems Engineering			🗘 Glossary   🧮 Index   🕫 Feedback   🛈 Al	out
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		Plan Work Refine and deploy the development environment			
References ↔ About IBM® Rational® Harmo IBM® Rational® Harmony™ for	Roles	Main: • Safety Czar Mandatory:	Additional: • Reliability Czar	Back to top     Assisting:	Perform halls Safety and Particip Analysis
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


#### Harmony/SE: Design Synthesis





#### Model-Based Hand-off to Downstream Engineering



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#### Summary

- Systems Engineering capability can be greatly enhanced with two key technologies
- Use of SysML/UML Modeling to capture system
  - Behavior (executable use cases)
  - Structure (architecture)
  - Data and performance modeling
- Model-based hand off to downstream engineering
- Automatic generation of documentation from model-based work products
- Agile methods employing
  - Incremental construction of use cases
  - Test Driven Development nanocycle-level iteration
  - · Incorporating dependability analysis with the use case development
- Harmony best practice workflows embody agile for embedded systems engineering
- Rational provides the services
  - R&D Capability Assessment
  - "Agile Systems Engineering" and "Agile Embedded Software Development" courses
  - Rapid Deployment Package (training, mentoring, frequent design reviews by modeling experts)
- Rational has the tools
  - Rational DOORS provides requirements management with great traceability
  - Rational Rhapsody provides tooling for best practice realization
  - Rational Method Composer manages process and practice definitions
  - Rational Team Concert provides a project enactment & governance environment
  - Rational Quality Manager manages test cases and procedures





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