Web application security management White paper January 2008

Rational. software



Understanding Web application security challenges.

### Contents

- 2 What makes Web applications vulnerable?
- 3 Typical Web application attacks
- 4 Table 1: Common types of Web application attacks
- 6 Basic guidelines for providing security for Web applications
- 7 Understanding the Web application lifecycle
- 9 Security testing throughout the application lifecycle
- 10 Table 2: Relative cost of error fixes, based on time of discovery
- 10 Considering the right testing approaches
- 10 Table 3: Web application security testing approaches
- 12 Four strategic best practices for protecting Web applications
- 15 Table 4: Inception defining security requirements
- 16 Table 5: Elaboration and construction—modeling and coding for security measures

As businesses grow increasingly dependent upon Web applications, these complex entities grow more difficult to secure. Most companies equip their Web sites with firewalls, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), and network and host security, but the majority of attacks are on applications themselves – and these technologies cannot prevent them.

This paper explains what you can do to help protect your organization, and it discusses an approach for improving your organization's Web application security.

### What makes Web applications vulnerable?

In the Open System Interconnection (OSI) reference model,<sup>1</sup> every message travels through seven network protocol layers. The application layer at the top includes HTTP and other protocols that transport messages with content, including HTML, XML, Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) and Web services.

This paper focuses on application attacks carried by HTTP-an approach that traditional firewalls do not effectively combat. Many hackers know how to make HTTP requests look benign at the network level, but the data within them is potentially harmful. HTTP-carried attacks can allow unrestricted access to databases, execute arbitrary system commands and even alter Web site content.

Without governance measures to manage security testing throughout the application delivery lifecycle, software teams can expose applications to HTTP-carried attacks as a result of:

- Analysts and architects viewing security as a network or IT issue, so that only a few organization security experts are aware of application-level threats.
- Teams expressing application security requirements as vague expectations or negative statements (e.g., You will not allow unprotected entry points) that make test construction difficult.
- Testing application security late in the lifecycle-and only for hacking attempts.

### **Typical Web application attacks**

A Web application's specific vulnerabilities should dictate the technology you use to defend it. Figure 1 shows many points within a system that might require protection. Often, it is best to employ generic countermeasure concepts first to help ensure that you choose the technology best suited to your needs rather than one that claims to counter the latest hacking technique.




Figure 1: Web application security concerns

To protect Web applications against attacks, enterprises should employ generic preventive approaches as well as targeted technologies.

Enterprises can employ multiple preventive measures against Web application breaches caused by impersonation, tampering and repudiation. Table 1 shows common threats and preventive measures. However, specific threats to your application may be different.

## Table 1: Common types of Web application attacks

| Description   | Common causes  | Preventive measures  |
|---|--|--|
| Impersonation   |  |  |
| Typing a different user's credentials or changing a cookie or parameter   | <ul> <li>Using communications-<br/>based authentication to allow<br/>access to any user's data</li> </ul>  | Use stringent authentication and protection for credential information using:  |
| to impersonate a user or<br>pretend that the cookie<br>originates from a differ-<br>ent server                                  | <ul> <li>Using unencrypted<br/>credentials that can be<br/>captured and reused</li> <li>Storing credentials in cookies<br/>or parameters</li> <li>Using unproven authentication<br/>methods or authentication<br/>from the wrong trust domain</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Operating system (OS)-<br/>supplied frameworks</li> <li>Encrypted tokens such<br/>as session cookies</li> <li>Digital signatures</li> </ul>       |
|   | <ul> <li>Not permitting client software<br/>to authenticate the host</li> </ul>  |  |
| Tampering   |  |  |
| Changing or deleting<br>a resource without<br>authorization (e.g.,<br>defacing a Web site,<br>altering data in transit)         | <ul> <li>Trusting data sources without validation</li> <li>Sanitizing input to prevent execution of unwanted code</li> <li>Durping with exceleted</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Use OS security to lock<br/>down files, directories<br/>and other resources</li> <li>Validate your data</li> <li>Useb and size data in</li> </ul> |
|   | <ul> <li>Running with escalated privileges</li> <li>Leaving sensitive data unencrypted</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>Hash and sign data in<br/>transit (by using SSL or<br/>IPsec, for example)</li> </ul>   |
| Repudiation   |  |  |
| Attempting to destroy,<br>hide or alter evidence<br>that an action occurred<br>(e.g., deleting logs,<br>impersonating a user to | <ul> <li>Using a weak or missing<br/>authorization and<br/>authentication process</li> <li>Logging improperly</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Use stringent authenti-<br/>cation, transaction logs<br/>and digital signatures</li> <li>Audit</li> </ul>   |
| request changes)  | <ul> <li>Allowing sensitive<br/>information on unsecured<br/>communication channels</li> </ul>   |  |

Preventive measures can also be taken to ward off attacks that attempt to access sensitive information and overwhelm server resources.

| Description   | Common causes   | Preventive measures  |
|---|---|--|
| Information disclosure  |   |  |
| Revealing personally<br>identifiable information<br>(PII) such as passwords<br>and credit card data,<br>plus information about<br>the application source<br>and/or its host machines  | <ul> <li>Allowing an authenti-<br/>cated user access to<br/>other users' data</li> <li>Allowing sensitive infor-<br/>mation on unsecured<br/>communication channels</li> <li>Selecting poor encryption<br/>algorithms and keys</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Store PII on a session<br/>(transitory) rather than<br/>permanent basis</li> <li>Use hashing and<br/>encryption for sensitive<br/>data whenever possible</li> <li>Match user data to user<br/>authentication</li> </ul>                                       |
| Denial of service (DoS)   | algorithms and keys   | dunentication  |
| <ul> <li>Flooding — sending<br/>many messages or<br/>simultaneous requests<br/>to overwhelm a server</li> <li>Lockout — sending<br/>a surge of requests<br/>to force a slow ser-<br/>ver response by<br/>consuming resources<br/>or causing the appli-<br/>cation to restart</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Placing too many applications<br/>on a single server or placing<br/>conflicting applications on the<br/>same server</li> <li>Neglecting to conduct<br/>comprehensive unit testing</li> </ul>                                     | <ul> <li>Filter packets using<br/>a firewall</li> <li>Use a load balancer to<br/>control the number of<br/>requests from a single<br/>source</li> <li>Use asynchronous<br/>protocols to handle<br/>processing-intensive<br/>requests and error<br/>recovery</li> </ul> |
| Elevation of privilege  |   | '  |
| Exceeding normal<br>access privileges to<br>gain administrative<br>rights or access to<br>confidential files  | <ul> <li>Running Web server<br/>processes as "root" or<br/>"administrator"</li> <li>Using coding errors to allow<br/>buffer overflows and elevate<br/>application into a debug state</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Use fewest-privileges<br/>context whenever possible</li> <li>Use type-safe languages<br/>and compiler options<br/>to prevent or control<br/>buffer overflows</li> </ul>   |

By applying several basic practices, software development teams can help prevent common Web application security violations and reduce remediation costs.

#### Basic guidelines for providing security for Web applications

By using security-specific processes to create applications, software development teams can guard against security violations like those shown in table 1. Specifically, you can apply several basic guidelines to existing applications and new or reengineered applications throughout your process to help achieve greater security and lower remediation costs, such as:

- Discover and create baselines: Conduct a complete inventory of applications and systems, including technical information (e.g., Internet Protocol [IP], Domain Name System [DNS], OS used), plus business information (e.g., Who authorized the deployment? Who should be notified if the application fails?). Next, scan your Web infrastructure for common vulnerabilities and exploits. Check list serves and bug tracking sites for any known attacks on your OS, Web server and other third-party products. Prior to loading your application on a server, ensure that the server has been patched, hardened and scanned. Then, scan your application for vulnerabilities to known attacks, looking at HTTP requests and other opportunities for data manipulation. And, finally, test application authentication and user-rights management features and terminate unknown services.
- Assess and assign risks: Rate applications and systems for risk-focusing on data stores, access control, user provisioning and rights management. Prioritize application vulnerabilities discovered during assessments. Review organizational, industry and governmental policy compliance. And identify both acceptable and unacceptable operations.
- Shield your application and control damage: Stay on top of known security threats and apply available patches to your applications and/or infrastructure. If you cannot fix a security issue, use an application firewall, restrict access, disable the application or relocate it to minimize exposure.
- Continuously monitor and review: Schedule assessments as part of your documented change management process. When you close one out, immediately initiate a new discovery stage.

The Rational Unified Process delivers a comprehensive, iterative framework for developing Web applications based on industry best practices.

### Understanding the Web application lifecycle

Shown in figure 2, the IBM Rational<sup>®</sup> Unified Process<sup>®</sup>, or IBM RUP<sup>®</sup>, solution delivers a widely used iterative process framework for developing Web applications based on industry best practices. The core phases of the framework (which may require two or more iterations to complete) are:

- Inception: Establish a business case, scope and operational vision. Then, create an initial use-case model, project plan, risk assessment and project description, including core requirements, security requirements (such as clarification of security compliance and policies), constraints, features and prototype candidate architectures.
- Elaboration: Refine your vision, address architecturally significant scenarios to establish a baseline architecture, and detail the use-case model. Then, create and test one or more prototypes to mitigate technical risks.
- Construction: Develop detailed designs for specific components and their interactions with other applications, continuously tracking against requirements. Generate code and test components for performance, reliability and security—while tracking and resolving issues—and integrate tested components into a first release.
- **Transition:** Deploy the application, train users and conduct beta testing to verify security and performance and validate the application against requirements. Continuously monitor performance, reliability and security as the application undergoes changes.

Each of the four phases of the Rational Unified Process inception, elaboration, construction and transition—spans multiple disciplines and may require multiple iterations.




Figure 2: Phases, disciplines and milestones in the IBM Rational Unified Process

Enterprises can use the RUP framework throughout the Web application lifecycle to proactively discover and fix vulnerabilities before they become more costly to remedy. When marketplace pressures motivate organizations to push Web applications through development phases without adequate security testing, serious vulner-abilities can place the business at risk.

#### Security testing throughout the application lifecycle

By applying the RUP framework guidelines early in the Web application lifecycle, you can discover and fix vulnerabilities when it is most cost-effective to do so. As applications move through the development and delivery process, errors can quickly become more complicated and expensive to remedy.

For example, teams that gather requirements during the inception and elaboration phases may not understand common Web application security threats and, therefore, neglect to specify requirements to prevent them. In construction, without clear application-level security requirements, coders might reuse flawed code or generate new code using a security-unaware integrated development environment (IDE) wizard, and then fail to properly validate data or correctly interpret security features in the application framework. In the transition phase, organizations often entrust Web application review to a few security experts who attempt to catch vulnerabilities before deployment, leading to process bottlenecks. Moreover, flaws that experts discover at this stage are likely to be expensive and time-consuming to fix.

As the figures in table  $2^2$  show, fixing a design error after a Web application is available costs approximately 30 times more than addressing it during design. And these estimates do not even factor in costs such as losses in marketshare, reputation or customer satisfaction.

Fixing a design error after a Web application has been deployed costs approximately 30 times more than addressing it during design.

To help prevent expensive fixes, enterprises can build application security testing approaches into their development and delivery process.

### Table 2: Relative cost of error fixes, based on time of discovery

| Type of<br>error | Design | Coding | Integration | Beta | Deployment |
|------------------|--------|--------|-------------|------|------------|
| Design           | 1x     | 5x     | 10x         | 15x  | 30x        |
| Coding           |        | 1x     | 10x         | 20x  | 30x        |
| Integration      |        |        | 1x          | 10x  | 20x        |

### Considering the right testing approaches

To help prevent expensive fixes, organizations need to build application security testing approaches, such as those shown in figure 3, into their development and delivery process alongside other quality management measures.

### Table 3: Web application security testing approaches

| Description   | Pros  | Cons  |
|---|---|---|
| Manual  |   |   |
| Penetration or security<br>acceptance testing by<br>a small set of security<br>experts using known<br>tools and scripts | Generates well-targeted<br>tests for specific application<br>functions  | <ul> <li>Limits testing to experts, which<br/>may lead to bottlenecks</li> <li>Can lead to a high error rate<br/>and recurring costs</li> </ul> |
|   |   | <ul> <li>Limits application coverage<br/>due to time constraints</li> </ul>   |
| Automated   |   |   |
| Typically built in one of<br>two ways:<br>• Bottom up—Specific<br>tests for individual                                  | Offsets expenses with<br>improvements in quality,<br>reduced effort for accep-<br>tance testing and iterative | Requires greater overhead to<br>create and maintain than manual<br>testing requires   |
| functions, built by the code developer  | development processes   |   |
| <ul> <li>Top down—QA<br/>teams build tests<br/>from an end-user<br/>perspective</li> </ul>                              |   |   |

Black-box and white-box testing approaches can leverage commercial tools, while gray-box testing calls for a uniquely defined application framework.

| Description   | Pros   | Cons   |
|---|--|--|
| Black box or system   |  |  |
| Looks only at system<br>input and output,<br>modifying normal<br>user input to make the<br>application behave in<br>unintentional ways          | Uses well-established<br>automated test tools that<br>require minimal application<br>knowledge to use  | <ul> <li>Possible only when all<br/>application components are<br/>ready for testing (late staging<br/>or production environment)</li> <li>May produce transactions that<br/>are difficult to ignore or reverse<br/>through user input mutations</li> <li>Can obscure flaws by limiting<br/>visibility into the application</li> </ul> |
| White box or source   |  |  |
| Assesses individual<br>components for<br>specific functional<br>errors, often in<br>combination with code<br>scanning tools and<br>peer reviews | Uses tools that have<br>established integrations with<br>developer IDEs, enabling<br>the well-defined discovery of<br>flaws in tested functions  | <ul> <li>Does not uncover requirement<br/>and design flaws</li> <li>May not uncover vulnerabilities<br/>to attacks involving multiple<br/>components or specific timing<br/>not covered by unit testing</li> <li>Assumes that coders are<br/>aware of needed security tests</li> </ul>   |
| Gray box (using an appli  | cation-defined framework)  |  |
| Combines black- and<br>white-box testing to<br>create tests unavailable<br>via commercial tools   | <ul> <li>Provides the most<br/>comprehensive method<br/>by combining system-<br/>and unit-level testing</li> <li>Provides state- and<br/>timing-based tests, and<br/>uses agents or proxies</li> <li>Integrates the framework<br/>into the application to</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Requires that a framework be<br/>specified during the inception<br/>phase and design activities</li> <li>May require as much effort to<br/>build the test framework as to<br/>build the application</li> </ul>  |
|   | monitor data flows and<br>conduct audits without<br>affecting production data  |  |

### Four strategic best practices for protecting Web applications

To address security-related issues as they pertain to Web applications, organizations can employ four broad, strategic best practices.

1. Increase security awareness

This encompasses training, communication and monitoring activities, preferably in cooperation with a consultant.

#### Training

Provide annual security training for all application team members: developers, quality assurance professionals, analysts and managers. Describe current attacks and a recommended remediation process. Discuss the organization's current security practices. Require developers to attend training to master the framework's prebuilt security functions. Use vendor-supplied material to train users on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) security tools, and include security training in the project plan.

With help from a third-party consultant, enterprises can employ training, communication and monitoring activities to improve security awareness.

#### Communication

Collect security best practices from across all teams and lines of business in your organization. Distribute them in a brief document and make them easily accessible on an intranet. Get your IT security experts involved early and develop processes that include peer mentoring. Assign a liaison from the security team to every application team to help with application requirements and design.

#### Monitoring

Ensure that managers stay aware of the security status of every application in production. Track security errors through your normal defect tracking and reporting infrastructures to give all parties visibility.

#### 2. Categorize application risk and liability

Every organization has limited resources and must manage priorities. To help set security priorities, you can:

- Define risk thresholds and specify when the security team will terminate application services.
- Categorize applications by risk factors (e.g., Internet or intranet vs. extranet).
- Generate periodic risk reports based on security scans that match issues to defined risk thresholds.
- Maintain a database that can analyze and rank applications by risk, so you can inform teams of how their applications stack up against deployed systems.

Highlights

To allocate limited security resources, enterprises can prioritize risk and liability issues.

To help govern development and delivery processes and to manage compliance, enterprises must establish a security program and set a zero-tolerance enforcement policy.

By integrating security testing throughout the software delivery lifecycle, enterprises can improve application design, development and testing. 3. Set a zero-tolerance enforcement policy

An essential part of governing the development and delivery process, a welldefined security policy can reduce your risk of deploying vulnerable or noncompliant applications. During inception, determine which tests the application must pass before deployment, and inform all team members. Formally review requirements and design specifications for security issues during inception and elaboration—before coding begins. Allow security exceptions only during design and only with appropriate executive-level approval.

4. Integrate security testing throughout the development and delivery process By integrating security testing throughout the delivery lifecycle, you can have significant positive effects on the design, development and testing of applications. You should base functional requirements on security tests your application must pass, making sure that your test framework:

- Uses automated tools and can run at any point during the development and delivery process.
- Includes unit and system tests as well as application-level tests.
- Allows for audit testing in production.
- Includes event-driven testing.
- Uses an agile development methodology for security procedures.
- · Can be run during coding, testing, integration and production activities.

During the inception phase, enterprises can structure requirements that address multiple applicationlevel security concerns. Table 4 suggests ways to structure requirements that address a spectrum of application-level security concerns during the inception phase.

## Table 4: Inception—defining security requirements

| Application concern           | Considerations for constraints/requirements  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Application<br>environment    | <ul> <li>Identify, understand and accommodate your organization's secur-<br/>ity policies</li> </ul>   |
|                               | <ul> <li>Recognize infrastructure restrictions, such as services, protocols<br/>and firewalls</li> </ul>   |
|                               | <ul> <li>Identify hosting environment restrictions (e.g., virtual private network<br/>[VPN], sandboxing)</li> </ul>  |
|                               | <ul> <li>Define the application deployment configuration</li> </ul>  |
|                               | <ul> <li>Define network domain structures, clustering and remote appli-<br/>cation servers</li> </ul>  |
|                               | Identify database servers  |
|                               | Identify which secure communication features the environment supports  |
|                               | <ul> <li>Address Web farm considerations (including session state management, machine-specific encryption keys, SSL, certificate deployment issues and roaming profiles). If the application uses SSL, identify the certificate authority (CA) and types to be used</li> </ul> |
|                               | Address required scalability and performance criteria  |
|                               | Investigate the code trust level   |
| Input/data                    | <ul> <li>Assume that all client input is potentially dangerous</li> </ul>  |
| validation and authentication | <ul> <li>Identify all trust boundaries for identity accounts and/or resources<br/>that cross those boundaries</li> </ul>   |
|                               | <ul> <li>Define account management policies and a least-privileged<br/>accounts policy</li> </ul>  |
|                               | Specify requirements for strong passwords and enforcement measures   |
|                               | <ul> <li>Encrypt user credentials using SSL, VPN, IPsec or the like, and<br/>ensure that authentication information (e.g., tokens, cookies, tickets)<br/>will not be transmitted over nonencrypted connections</li> </ul>  |
|                               | <ul> <li>Ensure that minimal error information will be returned to the client in<br/>the event of authentication failure</li> </ul>  |
| Session                       | Limit the session lifetime   |
| management                    | <ul> <li>Protect the session state from unauthorized access</li> </ul>   |
|                               | <ul> <li>Ensure that session identifiers are not passed in query strings</li> </ul>  |

Coding and data validation measures can offer significant benefits during the elaboration and construction phases of the software development and delivery process. Table 5 details activities during elaboration and construction that align with defined security requirements.

## Table 5: Elaboration and construction—modeling and coding for security measures

| Security consideration   | Elaboration  | Construction   |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| Coding practices         |  | <ul> <li>Do not reduce or change<br/>default security settings<br/>without testing to understand<br/>the implications</li> </ul> |
|                          |  | <ul> <li>Do not rely on obscurity to<br/>protect secrets; avoid putting<br/>them into code</li> </ul>                            |
|                          |  | <ul> <li>Do not expose unneeded<br/>information</li> </ul>   |
|                          |  | <ul> <li>Test often for security errors<br/>and fix them early</li> </ul>  |
|                          |  | <ul> <li>Direct failures to safe mode; do<br/>not display stack traces or leave<br/>sensitive data unprotected</li> </ul>        |
| Input/data<br>validation | <ul> <li>Treat all client input as suspect;<br/>validate it on a server controlled<br/>by the application, even if you<br/>also validate on the client side</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Validate all input parameters,<br/>including form fields, query<br/>strings, cookies and HTTP<br/>headers</li> </ul>    |
|                          | <ul> <li>Address potential structured<br/>query language (SQL) injection<br/>and cross-site scripting issues</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>Accept only known good input<br/>and reject known bad input</li> <li>Validate data by type, length,</li> </ul>          |
|                          | <ul> <li>Identify entry points and trust<br/>boundaries</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>format and range</li> <li>Ensure output containing<br/>input is properly HTML<br/>encoded or URL encoded</li> </ul>     |

| Highlights  | Security consideration      | Elaboration  | Construction  |
|---|-----------------------------|--|---|
| By improving authentication,<br>authorization and configuration<br>management practices, enterprises<br>can address security issues<br>during the elaboration and<br>construction phases. | Authentication              | <ul> <li>Separate access to public and restricted areas, ID accounts and resources that cross trust boundaries</li> <li>Identify accounts that service or administer the application</li> <li>Ensure that user credentials are encrypted and stored securely</li> <li>Specify the ID for authenticating with the database</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Store passwords as digests</li> <li>Return minimal error information with authentication failures</li> <li>Do not use HTTP header information for security purposes</li> </ul>     |
|   | Authorization               | <ul> <li>Specify all IDs and resources<br/>that each can access</li> <li>Identify privileged resources<br/>and privileged operations</li> <li>Separate privileges for<br/>different roles (i.e., build in<br/>authorization granularity)</li> <li>Identify code-access security<br/>requirements</li> </ul>                          | <ul> <li>Restrict database logins<br/>to access-specific stored<br/>procedures; do not allow<br/>direct access to tables</li> <li>Restrict access to system-<br/>level resources</li> </ul> |
|   | Configuration<br>management | <ul> <li>Protect administration<br/>interfaces and remote<br/>administration channels with<br/>strong authentication and<br/>authorization capabilities</li> <li>Provide role-based<br/>administrator privileges</li> <li>Use least-privileged process<br/>and service accounts</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Secure configuration stores</li> <li>Do not hold confidential data<br/>in plain text configuration files</li> </ul>  |

| Highlights  | Security consideration                      | Elaboration  | Construction  |
|---|---|--|---|
| Session protection, exception<br>management, and auditing<br>and logging can also provide<br>opportunities for improving the<br>security of Web applications. | Sensitive data<br>and session<br>protection | <ul> <li>Avoid storing secret data;<br/>identify encryption algorithms<br/>and key sizes for any that you<br/>must retain</li> <li>Identify protection mechanisms<br/>for sensitive data sent over<br/>the network</li> <li>Use SSL to protect authenti-<br/>cation cookies and encrypt<br/>their contents</li> <li>Identify a methodology to help<br/>secure encryption keys and<br/>use only known cryptography<br/>libraries and services</li> <li>Identify proper cryptographic<br/>algorithms and key size</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Do not store sensitive data<br/>in code</li> <li>Do not store database<br/>connections, passwords or<br/>keys in plain text</li> <li>Do not log sensitive data in<br/>clear text</li> <li>Do not store sensitive data<br/>in cookies or transmit it as a<br/>query string or form field</li> </ul> |
|   | Exception<br>management                     | <ul> <li>Define a standard approach to<br/>structured exception handling</li> <li>Specify generic error messages<br/>to be returned to the client</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Disclose minimal information<br/>following an exception</li> </ul>   |
|   | Auditing and logging                        | <ul> <li>Identify key parameters for<br/>auditing and logging</li> <li>Specify storage, security and<br/>analysis features for log files</li> <li>Specify how to flow caller<br/>identity across multiple tiers —<br/>at the OS or application level</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>Do not log sensitive data</li> </ul>   |

Through event-driven testing, enterprises can integrate security tests right into the application being developed. In addition to making security an integral part of the application development and delivery process, you can integrate security tests right into the application you are building to conduct event-driven testing. In this case, where a user makes a request and the application responds, the test compares the response to an expected or previously stored response to determine whether the system is operating properly. For example, in figure 3, an application uses a database as its back-end component. The tester inserts a spy proxy and a verifier into the request flow, telling the verifier what a normal request should be so that the verifier can compare it with the spy proxy's actual request.




Figure 3: Security testing a Web application with a back-end database

Any service, e-mail, XML or legacy service can serve as a back end. How you implement the code to review requests depends on the application architecture. For example, your spy component might be a mock data access object, a proxy or a class that inherits from the front-end service. You can also create code specifically for a test that you insert into the data stream to supply reporting data needed by the testing framework. Coordinating the testing objects gives you comprehensive, fine-grained control of a range of tests. You can perform these tests using either black-box or white-box testing, improving your chances of catching security problems early in the lifecycle – before they pose a serious business risk.

#### For more information

To learn more about the IBM Rational methodology and how you can create security-rich Web applications using IBM Rational automated lifecycle security tools, please contact your IBM representative or visit:

ibm.com/software/rational/offerings/testing/webapplicationsecurity



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2 www.nist.gov/director/prog-ofc/report02-3.pdf.

<sup>1</sup> International Organization for Standardization; www.iso.org.