

Security Intelligence. Think Integrated.

WELCOME

Joe Ruthven

BUE - IBM Security Systems, MEA







| Time | Торіс | Speakers |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 9:05am - 9:45am | Security Stream Kickoff-Security and compliance Overview and X Force | Joe Ruthven and Sukhdev Singh |
| 9:45am - 10:25am | Threat | Lekgale Mokota |
| 10:25am - 10:40am | Break | |
| 10:40am - 11:10am | Q1 Labs Security Intelligence Strategy and Roadmap – How to use Security Intelligence for detecting threats and exceeding compliance mandates | Murray Benadie |
| 11:10am - 11:40am | Sukhdev Singh | |
| 11.40am - 12:10pm Identity Intelligence: Enabling Secure Cloud and Mobile Access | | Kevin Mckerr (Puleng) |
| 12:10pm - 12:15 pm | Closing and Questions | |
| 12:15pm | Lunch and Networking | |



Security Intelligence. Think Integrated.

IBM Security

Intelligence, Integration and Expertise August 2012

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The world is becoming more digitized and interconnected, opening the door to emerging threats and leaks...

| DATA EXPLOSION | The age of Big Data – the explosion of digital information – has arrived and is facilitated by the pervasiveness of applications accessed from everywhere |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| CONSUMERIZATION OF IT | With the advent of Enterprise 2.0 and social business, the line between personal and professional hours, devices and data has disappeared |
| EVERYTHING IS EVERYWHERE | Organizations continue to move to new platforms including cloud, virtualization, mobile, social business and more |
| ATTACK SOPHISTICATION | The speed and dexterity of attacks has increased coupled with new actors with new motivations from cyber crime to terrorism to state-sponsored intrusions |





Targeted Attacks Shake Businesses and Governments







Motivation and sophistication is evolving rapidly

| Motive | 1995 – 2005 1 st Decade of the Commercial Internet | 2005 – 2015 2 nd Decade of the Commercial Internet |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| National Security | | Nation-state actors |
| Espionage, Political Activism | • | Competitors, hacktivists |
| Monetary Gain | Org sop | anized criminals with histicated tools |
| Revenge | Insiders, usir | ng inside information |
| Curiosity | Script-kiddies or had a second sec | ackers |

Adversary

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IT Security is a board room discussion







Solving a security issue is a complex, four-dimensional puzzle



It is no longer enough to protect the perimeter – silo'd point products will not secure the enterprise





In this "new normal", organizations need an intelligent view of their security posture







Security Intelligence is enabling progress to optimized security

| Security Intelligence | ĸ | Security Intelligence: Information and event management Advanced correlation and deep analytics External threat research | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| C | Optimized | Role based analytics Identity governance Privileged user controls | Data flow analytics Data governance | Secure app engineering processes Fraud detection | Advanced network monitoring Forensics / data mining Secure systems | | | | |
| F | Proficient | User provisioning Access mgmt Strong authentication | Access monitoring Data loss prevention | Application firewall Source code scanning | Virtualization security Asset mgmt Endpoint / network security management | | | | |
| | Basic | Centralized directory | Encryption Access control | Application scanning | Perimeter security Anti-virus | | | | |
| | | People | Data | Applications | Infrastructure | | | | |





IBM Security: Delivering intelligence, integration and expertise across a comprehensive framework



IBM Security Systems

- Only vendor in the market with end-toend coverage of the security foundation
- 6K+ security engineers and consultants
- Award-winning X-Force® research
- Largest vulnerability database in the industry

Intelligence . Integration . Expertise









Intelligence: Leading products and services in every segment







Analysts recognize IBM's superior products and performance

| Domain | Report | | Analyst Recognitio | n | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------|-----------------|--|
| Security Intelligence, | Security Information & Event Management (SIEM) | 2011 | | 2010 🔶 | |
| Analytics and GRC | Enterprise Governance Risk & Compliance Platforms | 2011 | 2011 | | |
| | User Provisioning / Administration | 2011 | | | |
| Pooplo | Role Management & Access Recertification | | 2011 | | |
| Реоріе | Enterprise Single Sign-on (ESSO) | 2011* | | 2010 | |
| | Web Access Management (WAM) | 2011* | | | |
| Data | Database Auditing & Real-Time Protection | | 2011 | | |
| | Static Application Security Testing (SAST) | 2010 | | 2010 | |
| Applications | Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) | 2011 | | 2010 | |
| Network | Network Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPS) | 2010 🔆 | | 2010 🗙 | |
| Infrastructure | EndPoint Protection Platforms (EPP) | 2010 | | | |
| | Gartner 🧚 Challenger 🦂 Leader 🗔 Visionary 🛌 Nich | ne Plaver | DC 🔥 Leader (#1.2 o | r 3 in segment) | |
| | FORRESTER Leader Strong Performer Conter | nder * Ga | artner MarketScope | | |





Expertise: Unmatched global coverage and security awareness





IBM Institute for Advanced Security

Enabling cybersecurity innovation and collaboration





10B analyzed Web pages & images
150M intrusion attempts daily
40M spam & phishing attacks
46K documented vulnerabilities
Millions of unique malware samples



World Wide Managed Security Services Coverage

- 20,000+ devices under contract
- 3,700+ MSS clients worldwide
- 9B+ events managed per day
- 1,000+ security patents
- 133 monitored countries (MSS)





Intelligent solutions provide the DNA to secure a Smarter Planet





Security Intelligence. Think Integrated.

Ahead of the Threat



Sukhdev Singh CISSP , CISSM, X Force Expert, Certified Enterprise Architect ... Technical London Growth Markets, IBM Security Systems



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2012 IBM Chief Information Security Officer Assessment

To obtain a global snapshot of security leaders' strategies and approaches, we asked 138 security leaders in...

- Seven countries
- A wide range of industries
- ~20% from enterprises with 10,000+ employees
- ~55% from enterprises with 1,000-9,999 employees





Security leaders shared their views on how the security landscape is changing





•87% expect double-digit increases•11% expect increases of > 50%.









X-Force research

One of the most renowned commercial security research & development groups in the world

The mission of the IBM X-Force[®] research and development team is to:

- Research and evaluate threat and protection issues
- Deliver security protection for today's security problems
- Develop new technology for tomorrow's security challenges
- Educate the media and user communities



X-Force Research

- **14B** analyzed Web pages & images
- **40M** spam & phishing attacks
- 60K documented vulnerabilities
- **13B** security events daily

Provides Specific Analysis of:

- Vulnerabilities & exploits
- Malicious/Unwanted websites
- Spam and phishing
- Malware
- Other emerging trends





We analyze them all...

- Most comprehensive Vulnerability Database in the world
 - Over **65,000** unique vulnerabilities cataloged
 - Entries date back to the 1990's
- Updated daily by a dedicated research team
- The X-Force database currently tracks over...
 - 8000 Vendors
 - 17,000 Products
 - 40,000 Versions







Cyber breaches are having a growing impact 2011 Sampling of Security Breaches by Attack Type, Time and Impact 2011 Sampling of Security Incidents by Attack Type, Time and Impact conjecture of relative breach impact is based on publicly disclosed information regarding leaked records and financial losses Online Attack Type Gaming SQL Injection Gaming Central IT Security Government URL Tampering Online Gaming Spear Phishing Defense Entertainment Consume Online Services lectronics Central 3rd Party Software Banking Government Consulting Online DDoS Banking Services Online Online Heavy Marketing National Gaming Gaming SecureID Industry Police Consulting Gaming Services Trojan Software Internet Online Services Defense Online Unknown Gaming Consumer Entertainment Gaming Electronics Insurance IT Security Entertainment Central Agriculture Government Centra Apparel State Financial Government Government Police Defense Market Consulting IT Security Gaming Internet Central Tele-Government Services communications Central Central Consumer Government Size of circle estimates relative impact of Government Electronics Online breach in terms of cost to business Defense Gaming Central National Government Central Consumer Police Government Electronics March April May July Oct Jan Feb June Aug Sep Nov Dec

"The Year of the Security Breach" – IBM's X-Force® R&D

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Who is attacking our networks?

Attacker Types and Techniques 2011







Key Messages from the 2011 Trend Report

- New Attack Activity
 - -Rise in Shell Command Injection attacks
 - Spikes in SSH Brute Forcing
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- The Challenge of Mobile and the Cloud
 - Mobile exploit disclosures up
 - Cloud requires new thinking
 - Social Networking no longer fringe pastime





SQL injection attacks against web servers



Top MSS High Volume Signatures and Trend Line – SQL_Injection

2011





SQL Injection Attack Tools

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Shell Command Injection attacks



Top MSS High Volume Signatures and Trend Line – Shell_Command_Injection



Anonymous proxies on the rise



Volume of Newly Registered Anonymous Proxy Websites

 Approximately 4 times more anonymous proxies than seen 3 years ago

 Some used to hide attacks, others to evade censorship

Top MSS High Volume Signatures and Trend Line – Proxy_Bounce_Deep

- Signature detects situations where clients are attempting to access websites through a chain of HTTP proxies
- Could represent
 - legitimate (paranoid) web surfing
 - attackers obfuscating the source address of launched attacks against web servers







MAC malware

- 2011 has seen the most activity in the Mac malware world.
 - Not only in volume compared to previous years, but also in functionality.
- In 2011, we started seeing Mac malware with functionalities that we've only seen before in Windows® malware.









Key Messages from the 2011 Trend Report

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 - Better patching
- The Challenge of Mobile and the Cloud
 - Mobile exploit disclosures up
 - Cloud requires new thinking
 - Social Networking no longer fringe pastime



We Track All Public Exploits...

Public exploit disclosures up in 2010 down in 2011

- Approximately 14.9% of the vulnerabilities disclosed in 2010 had public exploits, which is down slightly from the 15.7% 2009.
- 2011 has seen less public exploits than 1H 2010
- The vast majority of public exploits are released the same day or in conjunction with public disclosure of the vulnerability.



True Exploits Released 2006-2011





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Turkojan – 1997 and still going strong

- Constructor/Turkojan
- V.4 New features
 - Remote Desktop
 - Webcam Streaming
 - Audio Streaming
 - Remote passwords
 - MSN Sniffer
 - Remote Shell
 - Advanced File Manager
 - Online & Offline keylogger
 - Information about remote computer
 - Etc..





It's just business...

| ſ | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Bronze Edition |
| A NY COXUN | This product is the improved version of Turkojan 3.0 and it has some limitations(Webcam - audio streaming and msn sniffer doesn't work for this version) 1 month replacement warranty if it gets dedected by any antivirus 7/24 online support via e-mail Supports only Windows 95/98/ME/NT/2000/XP Realtime Screen viewing(controlling is disabled) |
| | Silver Edition |
| TURK BJAN | 4 months (maximum 3 times) replacement warranty if it gets dedected by any antivirus 7/24 online support via e-mail and instant messengers Supports 95/98/ME/NT/2000/XP/<i>Vista</i> Webcam streaming is available with this version Realtime Screen viewing(controlling is disabled) Notifies changements on clipboard and save them Price : 179\$ (United State Dollar) |
| | Gold Edition |
| TURK D.J.A.W | 6 months (unlimited) or 9 months(maximum 3 times) replacement warranty if it gets dedected by any antivirus (you can choose 6 months or 9 months) 7/24 online support via e-mail and instant messengers Supports Windows 95/98/ME/NT/2000/2003/XP/V<i>ista</i> Remote Shell (Managing with Ms-Dos Commands) Webcam - audio streaming and msn sniffer Controlling remote computer via keyboard and mouse Notifies changements on clipboard and save them Technical support after installing software Viewing pictures without any download(Thumbnail Viewer) |





Better patching



| | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | ent |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|
| Unpatched % | 46.6% | 44.6% | 51.9% | 45.1% | 43.3% | 36.0% | |





Decline in web application vulnerabilities

- In 2011, 41% of security vulnerabilities affected web applications
 - Down from 49% in 2010
 - Lowest percentage seen since 2005









Predict what the attacker will exploit

High

Potential Reward

Low



- 16 high value, cheap-toexploit
 - Publicly available exploits for most of them
- 12 harder to exploit but high value
 - This is a higher number that in previous years

Exploit Effort vs. Potential Reward Sophisticated Attack Widespread Exploitation High value vulnerabilities Inexpensive to exploit Harder to exploit Large opportunity Email attachments - X-Force Discoveries - Drive by download OS updates help mitigate exploitation - Client-side remote code execution DoS attacks (increasing in frequency) zero Not Targeted Widely Occasional Exploitation Hard to exploit Inexpensive to exploit Low potential reward Low reward Difficult Easy Exploit Effort to Achieve





Key Messages from the 2011 Trend Report

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Mobile OS vulnerabilities & exploits

 Continued interest in Mobile vulnerabilities as enterprise users request a "bring your own device" (BYOD) strategy for the workplace

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 Attackers finding these devices represent lucrative new attack opportunities



2006-2011





Challenges of cloud security

- We saw a number of high profile cloud breaches in 2011 affecting well-known organizations and large populations of their customers
- Customers looking at cloud environments should consider:
 - Cloud-appropriate workloads
 - Appropriate service level agreements (SLAs)
 - Lifecycle approaches to deployment that include exit strategies should things not work out

Securing access to cloud-based applications and services







Social Networking – no longer a fringe pastime

- Attackers finding social networks ripe with valuable information they can mine to build intelligence about organizations and its staff:
 - Scan corporate websites, Google, Google News
 - Who works there? What are their titles?
 - · Create index cards with names and titles
 - Search Linkedin, Facebook, Twitter profiles
 - Who are their colleagues?
 - Start to build an org chart
 - Who works with the information the attacker would like to target?
 - What is their reporting structure?
 - Who are their friends?
 - What are they interested in?
 - What are their work/personal email addresses?







IBM's own strategy: Ten essential practices for security leaders

Kristin Lovejoy IBM Vice President, IT Risk









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| 11:10am - 11:40am | Driving Effective Application Security in the Enterprise: An End to End Approach to Addressing One of the Biggest Threats to a Business | Sukhdev Singh |
| 11.40am - 12:10pm | Identity Intelligence: Enabling Secure Cloud and Mobile Access | Kevin Mckerr (Puleng) |
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Security Intelligence. Think Integrated.

What is the IBM Vision for Infrastructure Security



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IBM Security: Delivering intelligence, integration and expertise across a comprehensive framework



- Only vendor in the market with end-toend coverage of the security foundation
- 6K+ security engineers and consultants
- Award-winning X-Force® research
- Largest vulnerability database in the industry

Intelligence . Integration . Expertise

IBM Security Framework













In this "new normal", organizations need an intelligent view of their security posture







Security Intelligence is enabling progress to optimized security

| Security Intelligence | <u>\</u> | Security Intelligence: Information and event management Advanced correlation and deep analytics External threat research | | | |
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| | Optimized | Role based analytics Identity governance Privileged user controls | Data flow analytics Data governance | Secure app engineering processes Fraud detection | Advanced network monitoring Forensics / data mining Secure systems |
| | Proficient | User provisioning Access mgmt Strong authentication | Access monitoring Data loss prevention | Application firewall Source code scanning | Virtualization security Asset mgmt Endpoint / network security management |
| | Basic | Centralized directory | Encryption Access control | Application scanning | Perimeter security Anti-virus |
| | | People | Data | Applications | Infrastructure |





Advanced Threats: The sophistication of Cyber threats, attackers and motives is rapidly escalating

| | 1995 — 2005 1 st Decade of the Commercial Internet | 2005 — 2015 2 nd Decade of the Commercial Internet |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Motive | | |
| National Security | | Nation-state Actors; Targeted Attacks / Advanced Persistent Threat |
| Espionage, Political Activism | | Competitors, Hacktivists |
| Monetary Gain | Org | ganized Crime, using sophisticated tools |
| Revenge | Insiders, using in | nside information |
| Curiosity | Script-kiddies or hackers | s using tools, web-based "how-to's" |
| | | → Adversary |

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Techniques used by attackers are bypassing traditional defenses

Advanced

- Using exploits for unreported vulnerabilities, aka a "zero day"
- Advanced, custom malware that is not detected by antivirus products
- Coordinated attacks using a variety of vectors

Persistent

- Attacks lasting for months or years
- Attackers are dedicated to the target they will get in
- Resistant to remediation attempts

Threat

- Targeted at specific individuals and groups within an organization, aimed at compromising confidential information
- Not random attacks they are actually "out to get you"

These methods have eroded the effectiveness of traditional defenses including firewalls, intrusion prevention systems and antivirus - *leaving holes in the network*



Closer look at the attack vectors of today's threats

1. User Attacks (Client-side)

- Drive-by Downloads: User browses to a malicious website and/or downloads an infected file using an unpatched browser or application
- **Targeted Emails:** Email containing an exploit or malicious attachment is sent to an individual with the right level of access at the company

2. Infrastructure Attacks (Server-side)

- SQL Injection: Attacker sends a specially crafted message to a web application, allowing them to view, modify, or delete DB table entries
- General Exploitation: Attacker identifies and exploits a vulnerability in unpatched or poorly written software to gain privileges on the system



Despite the growing number of techniques used to gain access, one fact remains constant: *a remote attacker must gain access over the corporate network*





What is the IBM Vision for Infrastructure Security

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IBM Advanced Threat Protection

Our strategy is to protect our customers with advanced threat protection at the network layer - by strengthening and integrating network security, analytics and threat Intelligence capabilities

1. Advanced Threat Protection Platform

Evolve our Intrusion Prevention System to become a Threat Protection Platform – providing packet, content, file and session inspection to stop threats from entering the corporate network

2. QRadar Security Intelligence Platform

Build tight integration between the Network Security products, X-Force intelligence feeds and QRadar Platform product with purpose-built analytics and reporting for threat detection and remediation

3. X-Force Threat Intelligence

Increase investment in threat intelligence feeds and feedback loops for our products. Leverage the existing Cobion web and email filtering data, but expand into botnet, IP reputation and Managed Security Services data sets





The Requirements for an Advanced Threat Protection Platform

| What are the threats | Are we configured to prote | ct What is happening | What was the |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| affecting my business? | against these threats? | right now? | impact? |
| Security Information a | nd Event Management • Log Manag | ement • Configuration Monitoring | Vulnerability Management |
| | Threat Intelliger | nce and Research | |
| What are the latest vulnerabilities? | What websites are malicious or suspicious? | Who is infected or conducting attacks? | What network traffic is associated with botnets? |
| Vulnerability Re | esearch • Malicious URLs • Spam / | Phishing Emails • IP Reputation | Botnet Domains |
| | Advanced Th | reat Protection | |
| s someone trying to break nto my network? | Is this file hiding an attack or sensitive data? | Is this application allowed on my network? | What evidence do we have o an intrusion? |
| Intrusion Preven | ntion • Content Inspection • Malwa | re Analysis • Application Control | Network Forensics |
| Vulnerability PREDICTI | ON / PREVENTION PHASE | xploit REACTION / REME | DIATION PHASE Remediation |
| | | | |



Infrastructure (Network)

Area of Focus

Guard against sophisticated attacks using an Advanced Threat Protection Platform with insight into users, content and applications



Portfolio Overview

IBM Security Network Intrusion Prevention (IPS)

•Delivers Advanced Threat Detection and Prevention to stop targeted attacks against high value assets

•Proactively protects systems with IBM Virtual Patch® technology.

•Protects web applications from threats such as SQL Injection and Cross-site Scripting attacks

•Integrated Data Loss Prevention (DLP) monitors data security risks throughout your network

•Provides Ahead of the Threat® protection backed by world renowned IBM X-Force Research

IBM Security SiteProtector

•Provides central management of security devices to control policies, events, analysis and reporting for your business





Introducing IBM Security Network Protection XGS 5000



| | NEW WITH XGS | NEW WITH XGS |
|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|
| PROVEN SECURITY | ULTIMATE VISIBILITY | COMPLETE CONTROL |
| Extensible, 0-Day protection powered by X-Force® | Understand the Who, What and When for all network activity | Ensure appropriate application and network use |

IBM Security Network Protection XGS 5000

builds on the proven security of IBM intrusion prevention solutions by delivering the addition of next generation *visibility* and *control* to help balance security and business requirements

QRadar Network Anomaly Detection Optimized for the Advanced Threat Protection Platform

- QRadar Network Anomaly Detection is an optimized version of QRadar which complements SiteProtector to provide deep network visibility and real-time insight to identify threats; upgradeable to full QRadar SIEM
- Market-leading network behavioral analytics improves proficiency in threat detection empowering customers with proactive Threat Protection
- Meets the needs of new and existing SiteProtector/IPS customers who desire greater visibility into their network
- Integration of network flow capture with behavioral analysis and anomaly detection provides greater security intelligence:
 - Traffic profiling for added protection from Low and Slow and zero-day threats
 - Correlation of threat data, flow data and system and application vulnerabilities for **enhanced incident analysis**
- Includes support for identity sources to associate user activity with incidents; and support for vulnerability data to correlate attack with vulnerable assets
- Appliance (2Q12) and VMware Image (future)





- SiteProtector as core for command & control
- QRadar Network Anomaly Detection for enhanced analytics
- QRadar QFlow and VFlow collectors provide Network Awareness via deep packet inspection
- Integrated policy management & workflows within SiteProtector facilitate a rapid response to threat and more proactive visibility.





Infrastructure (Endpoint and Server)

Area of Focus

Ensuring endpoints, servers, and mobile devices remain compliant, updated, and protected against todays threats



Portfolio Overview

IBM Endpoint Manager for Security and Compliance

•Addresses distributed environments with endpoint and security management in a single solution

IBM Endpoint Manager for Core Protection

•Real-time protection from malware and other threats

IBM Endpoint Manager for Mobile Devices

• Secure and manage traditional endpoints as well as iOS, Android, Symbian, and Microsoft devices

IBM Security Server Protection

Multilayered protection against threats, supporting a broad range of operating systems

IBM Security Virtual Server Protection for VMware

Dynamic security for virtualization with VM rootkit detection, auditing, network intrusion prevention



IBM Security Virtual Server Protection for VMware Customers get robust, efficient security for their virtualized data centers

- Customers transitioning to virtualized data centers or cloud deployment architectures face additional security threats – VSP can help mitigate these risks
- Virtual Server Protection is integrated with the hypervisor and optimized for virtualized deployments to maximize data center capacity
- Provides visibility into intra-VM network traffic along with traffic between the virtual and physical infrastructures
- Supports ESX 4.1 and 5.0 as well as 10Gb Ethernet
- Create and manage security policies across multiple
 VMware ESX servers
- Facilitate auditing and compliance requirements by capturing and aggregating relevant events

Core Capabilities

Agentless Protection -- Powered by IBM Research and X-Force technology to provide deep packet inspection, firewall, network segmentation, and rootkit detection with no in-guest VM footprint

Improve governance in the virtual data center by reducing VM sprawl, quarantining insecure VMs, and maintaining real-time visibility across the environment

Maximize virtualization ROI by optimizing the security footprint on your physical systems

Move to IBM Virtual Server Protection

Manage risk with a solution optimized for your virtual data center environment



Intrusion Prevention Content Providestion Content Providestion Detection

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IBM Security Endpoint Defense

Customers get proactive security for their critical systems, powered by X-Force

- Customers can protect their critical endpoints with preventive technology and intelligence from IBM X-Force
- Broaden situational awareness by monitoring critical files, OS audit logs, ASCII text logs, and the Windows registry for changes
- Inspect SSL-encrypted network traffic for potential threats
- Enforce security policies based on network location to ensure the right level of protection for the mobile workforce
- Supports Windows, Linux, and UNIX
- Facilitate auditing and compliance by capturing and aggregating security events

Core Capabilities

Host-level Protection -- Identify potential threats with technology from IBM X-Force, while monitoring critical files, OS subsystems, and applications

Proactive defense helps you to stay ahead of the threat, by using a vulnerability-centric approach to protect against whole classes of exploits

Centralize administration of security across a heterogeneous environment by providing robust security across multiple OS platforms





IBM Advanced Threat Protection Platform Solves Key Customer Challenges

IT Security Problem

IBM ATPP Helps...

| Incident response efforts take too long, impacting confidence in IT | Block malicious traffic |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| We experience too much downtime due to uncertainty over virus and malware outbreaks | Block malicious traffic |
| Internal executive reporting is limited, unable to demonstrate effectiveness of security systems | Report on blocked threats |
| IT compliance reporting is slow and manual | Provide comprehensive compliance reports |
| Unique network traffic patterns and unpredictable events cause planning and availability issues | Write and import custom rules and utilize freely available open source files |
| We don't have efficient tools to proactively analyze network traffic to find unusual user behavior and other anomalies | Integrated analysis of network flow data and integration with SiteProtector |
| Lack the ability to manage user access to web and non-web applications and internet sites | Controls to manage user access at granular level and decrease bandwidth utilization |





SUMMARY: Advanced Threat Protection Platform helps protect Customer Networks Today and Tomorrow



- 1Q12: Launched IBM Security Network IPS Powered by X-Force
- 2 2Q12: Launch QRadar Network Anomaly Detection
- 3 Future: Platform Expansion

This is just the beginning, We have more exciting things to tell you about next quarter !





Learn More about the Advanced Threat Protection Platform

Learn More about IBM Security http://www.ibm.com/security

Learn more what the Aberdeen Group has to say about Threat Management http://aberdeen.reg.meeting-stream.com/threat_management/default.aspx?cid=ibm



ibm.com/security

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Security Intelligence. Think Integrated.

Intermission

Next presentation to start promptly in 15 minutes







| Time | Торіс | Speakers |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 9:05am - 9:45am | Security Stream Kickoff-Security and compliance Overview and X Force | Joe Ruthven and Sukhdev Singh |
| 9:45am - 10:25am | Threat | Lekgale Mokota |
| 10:25am - 10:40am | Break | |
| 10:40am - 11:10am | Q1 Labs Security Intelligence Strategy and Roadmap – How to use Security Intelligence for detecting threats and exceeding compliance mandates | Murray Benadie |
| 11:10am - 11:40am | Driving Effective Application Security in the Enterprise: An End to End Approach to Addressing One of the Biggest Threats to a Business | Sukhdev Singh |
| 11.40am - 12:10pm | Identity Intelligence: Enabling Secure Cloud and Mobile Access | Kevin Mckerr (Puleng) |
| 12:10pm - 12:15 pm | Closing and Questions | |
| 12:15pm | Lunch and Networking | |



Q1Labs.com

Q1 Labs & QRadar SIEM

QRadar SIEM enables security professionals to gain the visibility they need to protect their networks and better protect IT assets from a growing landscape of advanced threats as well as meet current and emerging compliance mandates.

August 2012



Who Q1Labs is:

- Innovative Security Intelligence software company
- One of the largest and most successful SIEM vendors
- Leader in Gartner 2011, 2010, 2009 Magic Quadrant

Award-winning solutions:

 Family of next-generation Log Management, SIEM, Risk Management, Security Intelligence solutions

Proven and growing rapidly:

- Thousands of customers worldwide (1 customer 14 Billion events per day)
- Five-year average annual revenue growth of 70%+

Now part of IBM Security Systems:

Unmatched security expertise and breadth of integrated capabilities



Who Zenith Systems is:

- Started in 2001
- Implemented solutions in most SA corporates

Focused on QRadar:

- 4 year relationship with Q1
- Certified reseller
- Comprehensive pre and post sales capability
- IBM BP

Deployed in Many SA/African organisations:

- RMB
- First Rand
- Post office
- Allan Gray
- Access Bank
- Standard Chartered ZW



What is Security Intelligence?

Security Intelligence

--noun

 the real-time collection, normalization, and analytics of the data generated by users, applications and infrastructure that impacts the IT security and risk posture of an enterprise

Security Intelligence provides actionable and comprehensive insight for managing risks and threats from protection and detection through remediation



Security Intelligence?

Why it matters

- Cyber Crime is a global business (not if when a breach will happen)
- 2. Cyber Crime is One of the biggest threats to business and delivery

- 3. Internal and External Threats
- 4. Compliance / legislation
- 5. 80% of breach evidence contained in logs.
 - 1. Volume Overwhelming (160 000 eps, 16 Billion / day)
- 6. Lack of Integration /correlation Silos
- 7. Skills Shortages



What is QRadar SIEM/Log Manager




Solving Customer Challenges with Total Security Intelligence



Detecting threats others miss

• Discovered 500 hosts with "Here You Have" virus, which all other security products missed



Consolidating data silos

 2 Billion logs and events per day reduced to 25 high priority offenses



Detecting insider fraud

• Trusted insider stealing and destroying key data



Predicting risks against your business

 Automating the policy monitoring and evaluation process for config. change in the infrastructure



Exceeding regulation mandates

 Real-time monitoring of all network activity, in addition to PCI mandates



QRadar: The Most Intelligent, Integrated, Automated Security Intelligence Platform





Next-Generation SIEM: Total Intelligence



Threats and Fraud Detected That Others Miss

QRadar gave Texas A&M a live window into all network activity. They were able to address issues that ranged from mitigating external threats to enforcing internal policies.

Massive Data Reduction

"With QRadar, Wayne State University now detects issues that would previously have gone unnoticed. QRadar prioritizes the events, indicates the severity and credibility of an event.

Wayne State University



Bolted Together Solution



- Scale problems
- Non-integrated reporting & searching
- No local decisions
- Multi-product administration
- Duplicate log repositories
 - > Operational bottlenecks

QRadar Integrated Solution



- Highly scalable
- Common reporting & searching
- Distributed correlation
- Unified administration
- Logs stored once
 - > Total visibility



Fully Integrated Security Intelligence



Fully Integrated Security Intelligence





- Auto-discovery of log 0 Asset-based prioritization sources, applications Auto-update of threats 0 and assets Auto-response 0 Monitor Analyze Asset auto-grouping 0 **Directed remediation** 0 Centralized log mgmt 0 Automated 0 configuration audits Act
 - Auto-tuning
 - Auto-detect threats
 - Thousands of pre-defined rules and role based reports
 - Easy-to-use event filtering
 - Advanced security analytics



QRadar SIEM Technical Overview



QRadar SIEM Benefits



Reduce the risk and severity of security breaches



Remediate security incidents faster and more thoroughly



Ensure regulatory and internal policy compliance



Reduce manual effort of security intelligence operations



QRadar SIEM Product Tour: Integrated Console

- Single browser-based UI
- Role-based access to information & functions
- Customizable dashboards (work spaces) per user
- Real-time & historical visibility and reporting



- Advanced data mining and drill down
- Easy to use rules engine with out-of-the-box security intelligence



QRadar SIEM Product Tour: Data Reduction & Prioritization

| System Summary | System Summary | | • | Previous 24hr period of |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|---------|----------------------------------------------|
| Current Flows Per Second | Current Flows Per Second | | 1.4M | network and security |
| Flows (Past 24 Hours) Current Events Per Second | Flows (Past 24 Hours) | | 1.3M | activity (2.7M logs) |
| New Events (Past 24 Hours) | Current Events Per Second | | 17,384 | |
| Updated Offenses (Past 24 Hours) | New Events (Past 24 Hours) | | 677M | |
| Data Reduction Ratio | Updated Offenses (Past 24 Hours) | | 588 | |
| Most Recent Offenses | Data Reduction Ratio | | 10633 1 | QRadar correlation & |
| Offense Name | | | 1000011 | analysis of data creates |
| Local Web Scanner Detected containing Web.Image.GIF | Most Recent Offenses | | | offenses (129) |
| Potential P2P Traffic or VolP Detected preceded by Local TCP Scanner Detected containing unknown | Offense Name | Magni | tude | |
| Local Web Scanner Detected containing Web.Image.JPEG | Local Web Scanner Detected containing | | | ↓ |
| MS SMB2 Validate Provider Callback RCE Local Web Scanner Detected containing Web HTTPWeb | Potential P2P Traffic or VolP Detected preceded by Local TCP Scanner | | | Offenses are a complete |
| | Detected containing unknown | | | violation with full context |
| Zoom: max Remainder 01000 Alarm Signatures (Event 2010-Oc Remainder HTTP: HTTP on non-1 | Local Web Scanner Detected containing Web.Image.JPEG | | | about accompanying |
| MISC:CONEXANT-LOGIN HTTP:HOTMAIL:EXE-DOW 7.5 | MS SMB2 Validate Provider Callback RCE | | - | identity information |
| | Local Web Scanner Detected containing Web.HTTPWeb | | | |
| 01:15 01:30 | 01:45 | | | Offenses are further prioritized by business |

impact



QRadar SIEM Product Tour: Intelligent Offense Scoring

QRadar judges "magnitude" of offenses:

• Credibility:

A false positive or true positive?

- Severity: Alarm level contrasted with target vulnerability
- Relevance: Priority according to asset or network value
- Priorities can change over time based on situational awareness

| 7 | ld | Description | Attacker/Src | Magnitude | Target (s)/Dest |
|-----------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-----------|--------------------|
| 7 | 287 | Local SSH Scanner Detected , Suspicious - Internal - Rejected | 10.100.50.81 | | Nultiple (508) |
| ₽ | 318 | Remote FTP Scanner Detected , Excessive Firewall Denies Acros | 217.64.100.162 | | Local (99) |
| 9 27 | 274 | DoS - External - Potential Unresponsive Service or Distribute | Multiple (49 | | WebApp-Serve |
| 7 | 308 | Multiple Exploit/Malware Types Targeting a Single Source , Ex | 10.100.50.56 | | Local (8) |
| 9 2 | 309 | Multiple Exploit/Malware Types Targeting a Single Source | 10.100.50.85 | | Multple (2) |
| 7 | 286 | Remote FTP Scanner Detected , Excessive Firewall Denies Acros | 81.240.89.210 | | Remote (226) |
| -7 27 | 296 | Malware - External - Communication with BOT Control Channel , | 10.100.100.208 | | Remote (2) |
| D) | 236 | VOIP: Pingtel Xpressa Denial of Service | 10.104.143 0 | | Multiple (2) |
| 2 4 | 314 | Local Mase 11 ung Host Detected | 10.100.50.21 | | Mutiple (7) |
| | 290 | Authentication: Repeated Login Failures Single Host, Login F | 10.100.100.100 | | 10.100.150.20 |
| 2 | 291 | Authentication: Repeated Login Failures Single Host, Login F | 10.100.50.64 | | Nultiple (3) |
| 9 27 | 284 | DoS - External - Flood Attack (Low) | 205.174.165.5 | | Remote (1) |
| | | | | | |

QRadar SIEM Product Tour: Offense Management

Clear, concise and comprehensive delivery of relevant information:

| Offense 306 | 63 | | | | | ٥ | Summary | Attackers 🧿 |) Targets 🍋 | Categories | Annotations | Network | s 🔢 Eve | ents 🔍 Flow | s 🗋 Ru | les Actions | 🔻 📥 Pri | nt 🕝 | |
|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|---------|-------------------------------------------|---------------|----------|-------------|----------------|------|---|
| Magnitude | | | | | | | | | | | Relevance | | 0 Se | everity | 8 | Credibility | | 3 | |
| Description | Target Vulnerable to De preceded by Exploit Atte preceded by Exploit/Mal preceded by Recon - Ex | etected Explo empt Procee Iware Events xternal - Pote | oit ded by Ree Across Me ential Netw | on K Iltiple Targe ork Scan | ets | Wł | nat v | was | Event c | Event count 1428 events | | | s in 3 categories | | | | 1 | | |
| Attacker/Src | 202.153.48.66 | | | | | l the | e atta | ack? | Start | Start 2009-09-29 16:05:01 | | | | | | | | | |
| Target(s)/Dest | t Local (717) | | | | | | | | Duratio | Duration 1m 32s | | | | | | | | | |
| Network(s) | Multiple (3) | | | | | | | | Assian | ed to | Not assigne | d | —Г. | | | | | | |
| | Vulnerability Correlation | /ulperability Correlation Use Case Illustr | | | | erability data wi | th IDS alerts | An attacker | originating from | – n China | (20; | was i | t | | na the | | | | |
| Notes | Conflicker worm exploit (CVE 2008-4250) Who was | | | | F | | | | | | | | succe | essf | ul? | | | | |
| Attacker Sum | mary 🌰 Details 🛛 🖌 | <u> </u> | - n | sonor | nsihle | -2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Magnitude | | | | 2000 | | | | | User | | | | | Karen | | | | | |
| Description | | | 202.153 | 48.66 | | | | | Asset | lame | | | | Unknow | 'n | | | | |
| Vulnerabilities | | | | | | | MAC | | | 7 | | Unknow | 'n | | | | | | |
| Leastion | · | | China | | | | | | Accett | Moight | | 0 | | | | | | | |
| Location | China | | | | | | | Asset | | | - | 1 | 0 | | | | | | |
| Top 5 Categori | | | | | | | | | | – Wh | ere do | | | _ | | | | | |
| Top o outogon | Namo | | | Ma | anitudo | | _ | Local Tar | not Count | find | thoma | | | | | ماريمام | | | |
| Buffer Overflow | wante | | | INIC | igintude | | 9 | Local Tal | yer count | | i them? | | - | | W V | aluad | ie | | |
| Misc Exploit | v | | w ma | nv | | | 3 | | | 3 | | | | are the targe | | | ote | | |
| Network Swee | p | | w ma | пу | | | 716 | 6 | | 1417 | | | | | | | | _ | |
| | - | 🚽 tard | pets | | | | | | | | | | | _ to t | the | busin | ess | ? | |
| Top 5 Local Ta | rgets 🔘 Targets | | | ~ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _ | |
| IP/ | DNS Name | Ma INVO | olved | ? | Chaine | ed | | User | | MAC | | | | Location | | 7 | Weight | | |
| Windows AD S | Server | | | | | | Unk | nown | Unknown | | | main | | | | 8 | | | |
| 10.101.3.3 | | Uni | nown | No | | | Unk | nown | Unknown | | | main | | | | 0 | | | |
| 10.101.3.4 | | Uni | known | NO | | | Unk | | | 1 | | main | | | | 0 | | | |
| 10 101 2 11 | | res | | NO | | | Adr | Are ar | ιγ οτ τ | nem | | main | | | | 10 | | | |
| 10.101.3.11 | | | diowii | | | | 00/ | | | | | main | | | | | | _ | |
| Top 10 Events | 1. Events | | | | | | | vuiner | able? | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Event Name | | | Magr | nitude | | | | | | itegory | D | estinati | ion | Dst Po | rt · | Time | | |
| Misc Exploit - E | Event CRE | | | | Custom Rule E | | | | | oit | 10.101 | 1.3.15 | 4 | 45 | 09-29 | 16:06:33 | | | |
| NETBIOS-DG | SMB v4 srvsvc NetrpPath0 | Co | - | | Snort @ 10.1.1.5 | | | | Buffer O | verflow | 10.101.3.10 | | 4 | 445 (| | 16:06:28 | 1 | | |
| NETBIOS-DG | SMB v4 srvsvc NetrpPath0 | Co | | | | Snort @ | nort @ 10.1.1.5 | | | | | 10.101 | 1.3.15 | 4 | 45 | 09-29 | 16:06:33 | 6 | |
| Misc Exploit - E | Event CRE | | | | | Custom | Rule Er | ngine-8 :: gradar-vi Where is | | | here is all | | 1.3.13 | 4 | 45 | 09-29 | 16:06:31 | 1 | |
| Network Swee | p - QRadar Classify Flow | | | | - | Flow Cla | assificat | tion Engine-5 qre | | | | 10.101 | 10.101.3.10 445 | | 45 | 09-29 | 16:05:01 | 1 | |
| Network Swee | p - QRadar Classify Flow | | | | _ | Flow Cl | assificat | tion Engine-5 :: gra the evide | | | evidence? | | Engine-5 :: gra the evidence? 10.101.3.15 | | 4 | 45 | 09-29 16:05:01 | | 1 |
| Network Swee | p - QRadar Classify Flow | | | | - | Flow Cla | assificat | ion Engine-5 :: (| | Stide | | 10.101 | 101.3.10 445 | | 45 | 09-29 | 16:05:01 | 1 | |
| Network Swee | p - QRadar Classify Flow | | | | _ | Flow Cl | assificat | ion Engine-5 :: (| Network Sweep 10 | | 10.101.3.15 445 | | 45 | 09-29 | 16:05:01 | 1 | | | |



QRadar SIEM Product Tour: Out-of-the-Box Rules & Searches

1000's of real-time correlation rules and analysis tests

100's of out-of-the-box searches and views of network activity and log data

Provides quick access to critical information

Custom log fields

 Provides flexibility to extract log data for searching, reporting and dashboards. Product ships with dozens of pre-defined fields for common devices.

Default log queries/views

| Quick | Searches 🔻 🍟 Add Filter 拱 Save Criteria 📳 Save Results 🔗 Cancel 🤸 False Pos |
|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Compliance: Source IPs Involved in Compliance Rules - Last 6 Hours 🛛 🔄 |
| | Compliance: Username Involved in Compliance Rules - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Default-IDS / IPS-All: Top Alarm Signatures - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Event Category Distribution - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Event Processor Distribution - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Event Rate (EPS) - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Exploit By Source - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Exploits By Destination - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Exploits by Type - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Firewall Deny by DST IP - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Firewall Deny by DST Port - Last 6 Hours |
| | Firewall Deny by SRC IP - Last 6 Hours |
| | Firewall Permit By Log Source - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Firewall Permit by Source IP - Last 24 Hours |
| 1 | Flow Rate (FPS) - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | nbound Events by Country - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Login Failures by Log Source - Last 6 Hours |
| | Offenses by Destination IP - Last 6 Hours |
| | Offenses by Rule Name - Last 6 Hours |
| 1 | Offenses hv Source IP - Last 6 Hours |
| | D Top 10 Log Source Results By Event Count (Sum) |
| | Zoom: <u>max</u> 2010-Nov-23, 15:21 - 17:52 |
| | J SIM Audir-2 :: sting ■ lptables @ 192.108.2 ■ Custom Rule Engine-6 |
| | |
| | R 104500 |
| | |
| | |
| | way a fals of Alman with same a start fall and the |
| | |
| | 70000 |
| | |
| | 66600 |
| | 15'30 15'45 16'00 16'15 16'30 16'45 17'00 17'15 17'20 17'45 |
| | |
| | Update Details |



- Detection of day-zero attacks that have no signature
- Policy monitoring and rogue server detection
- Visibility into all attacker communication
- Passive flow monitoring builds asset profiles & auto-classifies hosts
- Network visibility and problem solving (not just security related)



| Application | Source IP (Unique Count) | Source Network (Unique Count) | Destination IP (Unique Count) | Destination Port (Unique Count) | Destination Network (Unique Count) | Source Bytes (Sum) | Destination Bytes (Sum) | Total Bytes (Sum) ▼ | Source Packets (Sum) | Destination Packets (Sum) | Total Packets (Sum) | Count |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|-----------|
| DataTransfer.Window | Multiple (24) | Multiple (7) | Multiple (13) | Multiple (2) | Multiple (7) | 16 319 315 | 531 531 708 | 547 851 023 | 178 629 | 390 655 | 569 284 | 123 |
| P2P.BitTorrent | Multiple (20) | Multiple (5) | Multiple (85) | Multiple (60) | Multiple (3) | 44 216 868 | 191 621 654 | 235 838 522 | 127 854 | 161 966 | 289 820 | 546 |
| other | Multiple (259) | Multiple (9) | Multiple (3 063) | Multiple (2 877) | Multiple (10) | 37 349 699 | 168 802 101 | 206 151 800 | 93 672 | 228 533 | 322 205 | 6 810 |
| VoIP.Skype | Multiple (5) | Multiple (4) | Multiple (40) | Multiple (40) | other | 131 172 458 | 46 819 290 | 177 991 748 | 195 570 | 76 007 | 271 577 | 171 |
| RemoteAccess.SSH | Multiple (10) | Multiple (5) | Multiple (7) | 22 | Multiple (4) | 37 885 116 | 111 228 020 | 149 113 136 | 101 404 | 261 727 | 363 131 | 122 |
| Web.Misc | Multiple (16) | Multiple (5) | Multiple (295) | 80 | other | 10 726 080 | 20 635 741 | 31 361 821 | 33 634 | 23 904 | 57 538 | 2 401 |
| Web.Application.Misc | Multiple (9) | Multiple (4) | Multiple (31) | 80 | other | 654 743 | 23 125 267 | 23 780 010 | 8 193 | 15 674 | 23 867 | 89 |
| Web.Image.JPEG | Multiple (13) | Multiple (4) | Multiple (60) | 80 | other | 2 418 857 | 18 538 204 | 20 957 061 | 15 449 | 14 150 | 29 599 | 586 |
| Woh Woh Micc | Multiple (16) | Multiple (4) | Multiple (152) | 00 | othor | 256 544 | 0 107 264 | 000 000 0 | A 10A | 000 3 | 11.014 | 761 |
| Displaying 1 to 40 of 64 items (Elapsed time: 0:00:00.106) | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 Go < 11 |



- Flow collection from native infrastructure
- Layer 7 data collection and analysis
- Full pivoting, drill down and data mining on flow sources for advanced detection and forensic examination
- Visibility and alerting according to rule/policy, threshold, behavior or anomaly conditions across network and log activity





QRadar SIEM Product Tour: Compliance Rules and Reports

| Rule Name Group Rule Cate Compliance: Auditing Services Changed on Com Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Compliance Events Become Offens Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Configuration Change Made to Devi Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Configuration Change Made to Devi Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Excessive Failed Logins to Compli Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Multiple Failed Logins to a Complia Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Sensitive Data in Transit Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Cartivity Network Activity Assets Reports Admin Group: PCI Manage Groups Actions Hide Inactiv Compliance Gustament Gustament Sox Sox Sox Compliance Gustament Sox Sox Sox Sox Sox Sox Compliance Sox Sox Sox Sox So | Display: Rules Group: Compliance | Gr 🗋 Gr |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Compliance: Auditing Services Changed on Com Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Compliance Events Become Offens Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Configuration Change Made to Devi Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Excessive Failed Logins to a Compli Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Sensitive Data in Transit Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Sensitive Data in Transit Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: FismA Compliance: CoBIT Compliance FISMA Compliance FISMA Compliance FISMA Compliance FISMA Compliance FISMA Compliance FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA COBIT FISMA FISMA COBIT FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FISMA FI | Rule Name 🔺 | Group Rule Cate |
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| Compliance: Configuration Change Made to Devi Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Excessive Failed Logins to Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Multiple Failed Logins to a Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Sensitive Data in Transit Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Compliance Custom Rul Compliance: Compliance Compliance: Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Complianc | Compliance: Compliance Events Become Offens | s Compliance Custom Rul |
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| Compliance: Sensitive Data in Transit Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance: Custom Rul Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance Compliance | Compliance: Multiple Failed Logins to a Complia | a Compliance Custom Rul |
| Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network Compliance Custom Rul Activity Network Activity Assets Reports Risks Admin Group: PCI Autorenucauon, ruenuty at Compliance Compliance COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT COBIT CO | Compliance: Sensitive Data in Transit | Compliance Custom Rul |
| C Activity Assets Reports Risks Admin Group: PCI Manage Groups Actions ▼ Hide Inactive Admenucation, roemury at Admenucation, roemury at Image Groups Actions ▼ Hide Inactive Admenucation, roemury at Image Groups Actions ▼ Hide Inactive Admenucation, roemury at Image Groups Actions ▼ Hide Inactive Image Groups Actions ▼ Hide Inactive Image Groups Actions ▼ Hide Inactive Image Groups Actions ⊂ COBIT Image Groups Actions ▼ Hide Inactive Image Groups COBIT Image Groups Actions ▼ Hide Inactive Image Groups COBIT Image Groups Actions T Image Groups Actions T Image Groups GLBA Image Groups Image Groups Image Groups Image Groups Image Groups Image Groups Image Groups GLBA Image Groups Image Groups <td>Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network</td> <td>k Compliance Custom Rul</td> | Compliance: Traffic from DMZ to Internal Network | k Compliance Custom Rul |
| Group: PCI Manage Groups Actions V Hide Inactive Compliance Report Name COBIT IZ) to Internet GLBA SX-Memo22 HIPAA NERC PCI NERC PCI SOX Image Groups Actions V HIPAA PCI PCI PCI PCI PCI PCI PCI PCI PCI PCI > Compliance PCI PCI > COBIT PCI > COBIT PCI > COBIT PCI > COBIT< | C Activity Network Activity Assets Rep | orts Risks Admin |
| Group: PCI Manage Groups Actions V Hide Inactive Actions Compliance Report Name IIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII | | |
| PCI 7.1 - Access to Cardholder and Trusted Systems (Weekly) | Constant of the second | Report Name IZ) to Internet S by Admin (Weekly) ng Applications or Services (Weekly) s (Weekly) Trusted Systems (Weekly) |

- Out-of-the-box templates for specific regulations and best practices:
 - COBIT, SOX, GLBA, NERC, FISMA, PCI, HIPAA, UK GCSx
- Easily modified to include new definitions
- Extensible to include new regulations and best practices
- Can leverage existing correlation rules



QRadar SIEM excels at the most challenging use cases:



Complex threat detection



- Malicious activity identification
- User activity monitoring



 \checkmark

Compliance monitoring



Fraud detection and data loss prevention



Network and asset discovery



Problem Statement

- Finding the single needle in the 'needle stack'
- Connecting patterns across many data silos and huge volumes of information
- Prioritizing attack severity against target value and relevance
- Understanding the impact of the threat

Required Visibility

- Normalized event data
- Asset knowledge
- Vulnerability context
- Network telemetry



QRadar SIEM Use Case: Complex Threat Detection

| Offense 3063 💿 Summary 🌰 Attackers 💿 Targets 🏠 Categories 📄 Annotations 💷 Netwo | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------|--|--|--|
| Magnitude | | | Relevance | 3 | | | |
| Description | Target Vulnerable to Detected Exploit preceded by Exploit Attempt Proceeded by Recon preceded by Exploit/Malware Events Across Multiple Targets preceded by Recon - External - Potential Network Scan | Event count | 1428 events in 3 | cate | | | |
| Attacker/Src | 202:153:48.66 | Start | 2009-09-29 16:0 | 5:01 | | | |
| Target(s)/Dest | Local (717) | Duration | 1m 32s | | | | |
| Network(s) | Multiple (3) | Assigned to | Not assigned | | | | |
| Notes | Vulnerability Correlation Use Case Illustrates a scenario invol China (202.153.48.66) sweeps a subnet using the Conficker | ving correlation of worm exploit (CVE | vulnerability data w 2008-4250). The fi | vith I irst s | | | |

Sounds Nasty... But how do we know this? The evidence is a single click away.

| Ne | twork Scan | | | | Buffer Overf | low | |
|-----|-----------------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----|
| Det | ected by QFlow | | | | Exploit attempt | seen by Sn | ort |
| | | • | | | | | |
| | Event Name | Source IP | Destination IP | Destination Port | Log Source | Low Level Category | |
| | Network Sweep - QRadar Classify Flow | 202.153.48.66 | Multiple (716) | 445 / | Flow Classification E | Network Sweer | |
| | NETBIOS-DG SMB v4 srvsvc NetrpPathConon | 202.153.48.66 | Multiple (8) | 445 | Snort @ 10.1.1.5 | Buffer Overflow | |
| | | | | | | | |

| Port | Service | OSVDB ID | Name | Description | Risk / Severity |
|------|---------|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 445 | unknown | 49243 | Microsoft Windows Server Service Crafted RPC Request Handling Unspecified Remote Code Execution | Microsoft Windows Server Service contains a flaw that may allow a malicious user to remotely execute arbitrary code. The issue is triggered when a crafted RPC request is handled. It is possible that the flaw may allow remote code execution resulting in a loss of integrity. | 3 |

Targeted Host Vulnerable Detected by Nessus

Total Security Intelligence

Convergence of Network, Event and Vulnerability data



Problem Statement

- Distributed infrastructure
- Security blind spots in the network
- Malicious activity that promiscuously seeks 'targets of opportunity'
- Application layer threats and vulnerabilities
- Siloed security telemetry
- Incomplete forensics

Required Visibility

- Distributed detection sensors
- Pervasive visibility across enterprise
- Application layer knowledge
- Content capture for impact analysis

QRadar SIEM Use Case: Malicious Activity Identification

| Offense 284 | 9 💿 Summary 🌰 Attackers 💿 Targets 🛅 Categori | es 📄 Annotations I | 💭 Networks 🔓 Events 🦳 Flows 🖹 Rules Actions 🔻 📥 Print 😮 |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Magnitude | | | Relevance 0 Sty View flows for this offense 3 |
| Description | Malware - External - Communication with BOT Control Channel containing Potential Botnet connection - QRadar Classify Flow | Event count | 6 events in 1 categories |
| Attacker/Src | 10.103.6.6 (dhcp-workstation-103.6.6.acme.org) | Start | 2009-09-29 11:21:01 |
| Target(s)/Dest | Remote (5) | Duration | 0s |
| Network(s) | other | Assigned to | Not assigned |
| Notes | Botnet Scenario This offense captures Botnet command channe servers running on non-standard ports (port 80/http), which wou | el activity from an ir Id typically bypass | nternal host. The botnet node communicates with IRC many detection techniques. This sc |

Potential Botnet Detected?

This is as far as traditional SIEM can go.

| e IP Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port | Application | ICMP Type/Cot | Source Flags | Destinat Flags | Source QoS | Destinat QoS | Flow |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| .6.6 48667 | 62.64.54.11 | 80 | IRC | NIA | S,P,A | F,S,P,A | Best Effor | Class 1 | qradar |
| .6.6 50296 | 192.1(6.224.1) | 80 | IRC | N/A | S,P,A | S,A | Best Effor | Class 1 | qradar |
| .6.6 51451 | 62.181.209.20 | 80 | IRC | N/A | S,P,A | F,S,P,A | Best Effor | Class 1 | qradar |
| .6.6 47961 | 62.211.73.232 | 80 | IRC | N/A | F,S,P,A | F,S,P,A | Best Effor | Class 1 | qradar |
| 3 3 3 | Source 26 IP Port 3.6.6 48667 3.6.6 50296 3.6.6 51451 3.6.6 47961 | ce IP Source Port Destination IP 3.6.6 48667 62.64.54.11 3.6.6 50296 192.116.224.13 3.6.6 51451 62.181.29.20 3.6.6 47961 62.211.73.232 | ce IP Source Destination IP Destination IP 3.6.6 48667 62.64.54.11 80 3.6.6 50296 192.1f 6.224.13 80 3.6.6 51451 62.181.209.20 80 3.6.6 47961 62.211.73.232 80 | ce IP Source Port Destination IP Destination IP Destination Port Application 3.6.6 48667 62.64.54.11 80 IRC 3.6.6 50296 192.116.224.11 80 IRC 3.6.6 51451 62.181.292.20 80 IRC 3.6.6 47961 62.211.73.232 80 IRC | ce IP Source Destination IP Destination IP Destination IP Destination IP Port Application Type/Cor 3.6.6 48667 62.64.54.11 80 IRC N/A 3.6.6 50296 192.116.224.11 80 IRC N/A 3.6.6 51451 62.181.292.20 80 IRC N/A 3.6.6 47961 62.211.73.232 80 IRO N/A | ce IP Port Destination IP Destination Port Port Application Type/Cor Flags 3.6.6 48667 62.64.54.11 80 IRC N/A S,P,A 3.6.6 50296 192.116.224.13 80 IRC N/A S,P,A 3.6.6 51451 62.181.292.0 80 IRC N/A S,P,A 3.6.6 47961 62.211.73.232 80 IRC N/A F,S,P,A | ce IP Port Destination IP Destination Port Destination Port Application Type/Cot Flags Flags 3.6.6 48667 62.64.54.11 80 IRC N/A S,P,A F,S,P,A 3.6.6 50296 192.116.224.13 80 IRC N/A S,P,A S,A 3.6.6 51451 62.181.292.0 80 IRC N/A S,P,A F,S,P,A 3.6.6 47961 62.211.73.232 80 IRC N/A F,S,P,A F,S,P,A | ce IP Joint Port Destination IP Dot Port Application Type/Cot Flags Destination of Flags Galactic Point Source Point Source Flags Galactic Point Source Point | ce IPJoint of PortDestination IPDestinationApplicationType/CorFilagsJoint of PortDestination IP3.6.64866762.64.54.1180IRCN/AS,P,AF,S,P,ABest EfforClass 13.6.650296192.116.224.1380IRCN/AS,P,AS,ABest EfforClass 13.6.65145162.181.209.2080IRCN/AS,P,AF,S,P,ABest EfforClass 13.6.64796162.211.73.23280IRCN/AF,S,P,AF,S,P,ABest EfforClass 1 |

IRC on port 80?

QFlow enables detection of a covert channel.



Irrefutable Botnet Communication

Layer 7 data contains botnet command and control instructions.



Problem Statement

- Monitoring of privileged and non-privileged users
- Isolating 'Stupid user tricks' from malicious account activity
- Associating users with machines and IP addresses
- Normalizing account and user information across diverse platforms

Required Visibility

- Centralized logging and intelligent normalization
- Correlation of IAM information with machine and IP addresses
- Automated rules and alerts focused on user activity monitoring



QRadar SIEM Use Case: User Activity Monitoring

| Offense 283 | 4 🐻 Summary 🌰 Attackers 💿 Targets 🏠 Categories 📄 Annotat | ions 💷 Networks | Events 🔍 F | ows | Rules | Acti | ons 🔻 📥 Prin | it <table-cell></table-cell> | | | |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----|----------|------|--------------|------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Magnitude | | | Relevance | 3 | Severity | 5 | Credibility | 3 | | | |
| Description | Single Host preceded by Login Failures Followed By Success preceded by Login failure to a disabled account. preceded by Authentication: Repeated Login Failures | 36 events in 6 categories | | | | | | | | | |
| Attacker/Src | 10.103.7.88 (dhcp-workstation-103-7-88.acme.org) | Start | 2009-09-29 10:33:34 | | | | | | | | |
| Target(s)/Dest | 10.101.3.10 (Windows AD Server) | Duration | 4m 51s | | | | | | | | |
| Network(s) | IT.Server.main | Not assigned | | | | | | | | | |
| Notes | Windows Authentication Use Case Demo data to demonstrate failures, login attempt to disabled account, etc. This attack is o | Vindows Authentication Use Case Demo data to demonstrate event-only Windows Authentication use case, including login ailures, login attempt to disabled account, etc. This attack is comprised of : - Event(s): Multiple authentication attempts from | | | | | | | | | |

Authentication Failures

Perhaps a user who forgot his/her password?



| Brute F | orce H | assw | /ord |
|---------|--------|------|------|
| Attack | | | |

Numerous failed login attempts against different user accounts

| | | Username | (| Source IP Unique Count) | Destination IP (Unique Count) | Event Name (Unique Count) | Log Source (Unique Count) | Category (Unique Count) | Event Count (Sum) | Count 🕶 |
|---|--|----------|----|----------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|---------|
| | | Tom | 1 | 103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 | Multiple (4) | WindowsAuthSe | Multiple (4) | 19 | 13 |
| | | dsmith | 10 | 103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 | Multiple (4) | WindowsAuthSe | Multiple (3) | 7 | 7 |
| | | bjones | 1 | .103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 | Logon Failure | WindowsAuthSe | Host Login Failed | 1 | 1 |
| - | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | • | | |
|---|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| | Event Name 🔺 | Log Source | Source IP | Destination IP |
| (| Host Login Succeeded - Event CRE | Custom Rule Engine-8 :: qradar-vm | 10.103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 |
| | Nost Login Failed - Event CRE | Custom Rule Engine-8 :: qradar-vm | 10.103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 |
| | Host Login Failed - Event CRE | Custom Rule Engine-8 :: qradar-vm | 10.103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 |
| | Remote Access Login Failed - Event CRE | Custom Rule Engine-8 :: qradar-vm | 10.103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 |
| | Remote Access Login Failed - Event CRE | Custom Rule Engine-8 :: qradar-vm | 10.103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 |
| | Suspicious Pattern Detected - Event CRE | Custom Rule Engine-8 :: qradar-vm | 10.103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 |
| | Suspicious Pattern Detected - Event CRE | Custom Rule Engine-8 :: qradar-vm | 10.103.7.88 | 10.101.3.10 |

Host Compromised

All this followed by a successful login. Automatically detected, no custom tuning required.



Problem Statement

- Validating your monitoring efforts against compliance requirements
- Ensuring that compliance goals align with security goals
- Logs alone don't meet compliance standards

Required Visibility

- Application layer visibility
- Visibility into network segments where logging is problematic



QRadar SIEM Use Case: Compliance Monitoring





| Event Name 🔻 | Log Source | Source IP | Source Port | Destination IP | Destination Port |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
| Compliance Policy Violation - C | Flow Classification Engine-5 : | 10.103.12.12 | 1482 | 10.101.3.30 | 23 |
| | | | | | |

Compliance Simplified

Out of the box support for all major compliance and regulatory standards.

Unencrypted Traffic

QFlow saw a cleartext service running on the Accounting server.

PCI Requirement 4 states: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks



Problem Statement

- Malicious activity against 'targets of <u>choice</u>'
- Privileged or knowledgeable users internal to the network
- Fraud patterns that are 'low and slow' by nature
- Associating suspicious patterns across network, security, application and host layers in the infrastructure

Required Visibility

- Ability to take and normalize telemetry across many diverse sources
- Correlation of host and asset profiles with IAM infrastructure
- Integration of 3rd party intelligence sources

QRadar SIEM Use Case: Fraud & Data Loss Prevention

Magnitude Potential Data Loss? Description Potential Data Loss/Theft Detected 10.103.14.139 (dhcp-workstation-103.14.139.acme.org) Attacker/Src Who? What? Where? Target(s)/Dest Local (2) Remote (1) Network(s) Multiple (3) Data Loss Prevention Use Case, Demonstrates QRadar DL Notes authentication Attacker Summary Contails Who? Magnitude User scott An internal user dhcp-workstation-Description 10 103 14 139 Asset Name 103.14.139.acme.org 0 Vulnerabilities MAC Unknown Location NorthAmerica.all Asset Weight 0 Username What? Source IP Event Name Log Source (Unique Count) Category (Unique Count) (Unique (Unique Count) Count) Oracle data Authentication Failed 10.103.14.139 OracleDbAudit @ 10.101.145.198 Multiple (2) Misc Login Failed Misc Login Succeeded 10.103.14.139 OracleDbAudit @ 10.101.145.198 Misc Login Succeeded scott DELETE failed 10.103.14.139 OracleDbAudit @ 10.101.145.198 ecott System Action Denv SELECT succeeded OracleDbAudit @ 10.101.145.198 10.103.14.139 scott System Action Allow Misc Logout 10 103 14 139 OracleDbAudit @ 10.101.145.198 | scott Misc Logout Suspicious Pattern Deted 10.103.14.139 Custom Rule Engine-8 :: gradar-vn N/A Suspicious Pattern Detected Remote Access Login Fa 10.103.14.139 Custom Rule Engine-8 :: gradar-vn N/A Remote Access Login Failed QRadar Has Completed Your Request Where? Go to APNIC results Navigate 1 ► Information DNS Lookup [Querying whois.arin.net] Resolver Actions Gmail

[whois.arin.net]

OrgID:

City:

OrgName: Google Inc.

GOGL

Address: 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway Mountain View

TNC Recommendation

Port Scan

Asset Profile Search Events

Search Flows



Problem Statement

- Integration of asset information into security monitoring products is labor intensive
- Assets you don't know about pose the greatest risk
- Asset discovery and classification is a key tenet of many compliance regulations
- False positive noise jeopardizes effectiveness of a SIEM solution

Required Capability

- Real-time knowledge of all assets on a network
- Visibility into asset communication patterns
- Classification of asset types
- Tight integration into predefined rules



QRadar SIEM Use Case: Network and Asset Discovery

| Port | Risk / Severity | Last Seen | First Seen |
|------|-----------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 514 | 1 | 2009-09-29 20:00:12 (Passive) | 2009-09-28 02:30:11 (Passive) |
| 7676 | 1 | 2009-09-29 21:30:12 (Passive) | 2009-09-28 02:30:11 (Passive) |
| 7777 | 1 | 2009-09-29 20:00:12 (Passive) | 2009-09-28 02:30:11 (Passive) |
| 7778 | 1 | 2009-09-29 20:00:12 (Passive) | 2009-09-28 02:30:11 (Passive) |
| 8009 | 1 | 2009-09-29 20:00:12 (Passive) | 2009-09-28 02:30:11 (Passive) |

Server Discovery

To discover servers (assets) in your deployment based on standard server ports, select the desired role in the Server Type drop-down list box and click 'Discover Servers'.

| Server Type: | Database Servers ▼ ● All ○ Assigned ○ Unassigned |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Ports: | 1433, 1434, 3306, 66, 1521, 1525, 1526, 1527, 1528, 1529, 1571, 1575, 1630, 1748, 1754, 1808, 1809, 2481, 2482, 2484, 3872, 3891, 3938 <u>Edit Ports</u> |
| Server Type Definition: | Edit this BB to define typical database servers. This BB is used in conjunction with the Default-BB-FalsePositive: Database Server False Positive Categories and Default-BB-FalsePositive: Database Server False Positive Events building blocks. <u>Edit Definition</u> |
| Network: | Select an object |
| | |

| | | | Discover dervers | | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|----------------|-------------------|--|--|--|
| Matching Servers: | | | | | | |
| Approve | Name | IP | Network 🔺 | | | |
| | | 10.101.139.151 | Asia.Bridges.all | | | |
| | Patient Records DB | 10.101.139.156 | Asia.Bridges.all | | | |
| | | 10.101.144.76 | Asia.Holloway.all | | | |
| | | 10.102.150.115 | Business.Staff | | | |
| v | CRM Database | 10.101.145.198 | IT.NetServers | | | |
| | | 10.101.145.237 | IT.NetServers | | | |
| | CRM | 10.101.3.32 | IT.Server.main | | | |
| | | 10.101.146.10 | IT.other | | | |
| | | | | | | |

Automatic Asset Discovery

Creates host profiles as network activity is seen to/from

Passive Asset Profiling

Identifies services and ports on hosts by watching network activity

Server Discovery

Identifies & classifies server infrastructure based on these asset profiles

Correlation on new assets & services

Rules can fire when new assets and services come online

Enabled by **QRadar QFlow and QRadar VFlow**



- Intelligent offense management
- Layer 7 application visibility
- Identifies most critical anomalies



- Highly scalable
- Analyze logs, flows, assets and more



Easy deployment

- Rapid time to value
- Operational efficiency



QRadar SIEM Summary

QRadar SIEM delivers full visibility and actionable insight for **Total Security Intelligence.**



Providing complete network and security intelligence, delivered simply, for any customer

Q1Labs.com

Thank You!

Zenith Systems (Q1Labs/IBM Partner) Business Centre, William Nicole Rd Fourways, Johannesburg email: sales@zenithsystems.co.za





| Time | Торіс | Speakers |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 9:05am - 9:45am | Security Stream Kickoff-Security and compliance Overview and X Force | Joe Ruthven and Sukhdev Singh |
| 9:45am - 10:25am | Threat | Lekgale Mokota |
| 10:25am - 10:40am | Break | |
| 10:40am - 11:10am | Q1 Labs Security Intelligence Strategy and Roadmap – How to use Security Intelligence for detecting threats and exceeding compliance mandates | Murray Benadie |
| 11:10am - 11:40am | Driving Effective Application Security in the Enterprise: An End to End Approach to Addressing One of the Biggest Threats to a Business | Sukhdev Singh |
| 11.40am - 12:10pm | Identity Intelligence: Enabling Secure Cloud and Mobile Access | Kevin Mckerr (Puleng) |
| 12:10pm - 12:15 pm | Closing and Questions | |
| 12:15pm | Lunch and Networking | |





Security Intelligence. Think Integrated.

Driving Effective Application Security

Sukhdev Singh CISSP, CISSM, X Force Expert, Certified Enterprise Architect ... Technical Leader, Growth Markets, IBM Security Systems







Products Services


Application security challenges: vulnerabilities

In 2011, 41% of security vulnerabilities affected web applications

- Down from 49% in 2010
- Lowest percentage seen since 2005







Source: IBM X-Force® Research and Development

Source: IBM X-Force® Research and Development





The Myth: "Our Site Is Safe"

We Have Firewalls and IPS in Place

Port 80 & 443 are open for the right reasons

We Audit It Once a Quarter with Pen Testers

Applications are constantly changing

We Use Network Vulnerability Scanners

Neglect the security of the software on the network/web server

We Use SSL Encryption

Only protects data between site and user not the web application itself

Over the past 20 years, we have invested much resources and efforts in network and infrastructure security.





BUSINESS TIMES SINGAPORE 04 AUG 2010 Cloud attracting hackers, warns security body

It says fog in the cloud can be cloak for criminals to hide

Reports by RAJU CHELLAM

BEWARE of the fogs that the clouds conceal. Since have overridden security concerns. In some cases, the business has bypassed internal functions altogether and contracted directly with cloud suppliers."

The result? Corporate security functions are battling

has suffered an online atta

with the personal data of

WORLD

TODAY FRIDAY JUNE 38, SERP 48

TODAY - FRIDAY 11 JUN 2010 - SINGAPORE

Website flaw lets hackers access iPad user's data

SAN FRANCISCO - A group of harkers said on Wednesday that it had obtained the email addresses of 114,000 owners of 3G Apple Pads, including those of military personnel, business executivos and public figures, by exploiting a security hale on the website of American telecommunications COMPANY ATRT.

to minimise its importance. The nackets exploited at itsecure way that AT&Ps website would prompt iPed use is when they tried to log into their AIST accounts through the devices,

The site would scoply users' entail addresses, to make log timcareer, based on the ICC-ID. The company said that it had



Mr Michael Kleeman, a communications network esupin at the University of California, said ATNT should aswer have stored the "oformation on a publicly accessible websity. But he added that the damage was likely to be limited.

"You could be theory "ind cut where the divice is,"

> a security strated computing. TUE MAR 03 09 MYPAPER

world international

Hackers break into Nasdag Web service SINGAPORE Monster attack steals user data

'Suspicious files' detected on exchange's Directors Desk, where 300 firms share info with directors

NEW YORK: Hackers broke into a Nasdag service that handles confidential communications for some 300 corporations, the company said - the latest vulnerability exposed in the computer systems that Wall Street depends on. 1000

TODAY @ PCWORLD

credentials. IMF Hacked; No End in Sight to Security Horror Shows

By Ian Paul, PCWorld Jun 12, 2011 2:22 PM



The recent online intrusion into International Monetary Fund servers may have been the work of malicious hackers working for a foreign government, according to online reports.

The IMF is reportedly reluctant to disclose where it believes the attacks came from Crephic Diego Aquine since 187 of the world's 194 nations (as recognized by the U.S. Department of State)

are members of the fund. The hack's perpetrators obtained a "large quantity of data," including e-mail and other documents during the intrusion, according to Bloomberg,

Glitch spills UBS clients' info

Wealthy customers saw details of others' online accounts, but bank says number affected is small

Asked how many dients tere affected, all she cald was the "mus limited screen time figure a summing a small TECHDECAL MICH #

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ing to the incident and her inplumented measures to prevent a similar operations in the for-

Mr Too Yels Gans, shief onrevent Data Security System Schuttons, said each socide-tal lealo of confidential informathen could had to "unharrissing

tion role for hash". sore (5tA5) and the Hong Kong Monttory Authority (IEEMA). Asked phone what MAS cious activities," he sold would be duing, its spoke

said this 'we us following with the bans", but dial not club-



nce Agence (C1A) a day so

ped up their affacks worldwide, apting dosens of Malacsian state-

inked websites yesterday after striking it the website of the US Central Intelli-

The incidents are part of a wave of re-

US job website Monster. COTHE STRATTS TIMES FRIDAY, JUNE 17 2011 PAGE ASS

stolen, says a security firm KL govt websites

hundreds of thousands of a Hackers attack

A computer program was us wata uniter linders have

access the employers' sectioned up

the website using stolen loc med and



🗂 June 2, 2011 | 🛅 Filed under: GAMES NEWS | 🤰 Posted by: adel

MEANY CHILE

on Wednesday, Cl

ed that hackers stole the

matten of more than 300

said on Sunday it was in

Playstation Network, The hacker organisation which took over a website of PBS NewsHour final week end has returned to a initial adore - hacking Sony.

LulzSec voiced Thursday it hacked servers during Sony Pictures as well as Sony BMG. The organisation posted what crop up to be a stolen e-mail addresses as well as passwords of about 50,000 consumers who'd purebred for a single of 3 Sony promotional sweepstakes: final year's "Seinfeld - We're Going to Del Boca Vista!" giveaway, a Jan competition Sony conducted with AutoTrader, as well as a Sony competition to foster a movie Green Hornet.

The bank also reported the inrickent to the banking authors' stitutions for clients and reputs tion here and in Hong Kong: the identity Authority of Singa-

Intertianal loakages are more serious as the data... (could be) used for more multi-

Roungedurphicanalog



prime_news

THE STRAITS TIMES WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 19 2009 PAGE 46

2009:

Hacker accused of stealing 130 million credit card numbers

WASHINGTON: A former government informant known online as "soupnazi" stole information from 130 million credit and debit card accounts in what federal prosecutors are calling the largest case of identity theft yet.

Albert Gonzalez, 28, and two othermen have been charged with allegedly cording to the authorities.

Gonzalez and the Russians, identified as "Hacker 1" and "Hacker 2", targeted large corporations by scanning the list of Fortune 500 companies and exploring corporate websites before setting on to identity vulnerabilities. The goal was to sell the stolen data to others. servers in California, Illinois, Latvia, the Netherlands and Ukraine.

"The scope is massive," Assistant US Attorney Erez Liebermann said yesterday in an interview.

Last year, the justice Department charged Gonzales and others with backing into retail companies' computers with

2012:

A new mixed attack type

YOU HAVE BEEN

HACKED !

Up to 1.5M credit card numbers stolen from Global Payments

Payments processor believes no names, addresses, or Social Security numbers were stolen in the security breach.



by Steven Musll | April 1, 2012 7:10 PM PDT



As many as 1.5 million Visa and MasterCard accounts may have been compromised by the recent Global Payments security breach, the payment processor announced this evening.



Credit card numbers may have been exported, but no customer names, addresses, or Social Security numbers were accessed, the company said in a statement. The company believes the



HACKERS ARE NOW ATTACKING SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS

Applications can be <u>CRASHED</u> to reveal source, logic, script or infrastructure information that can give a hacker intelligence

- Applications can be <u>COMPROMISED</u> to make it provide unauthorized entry access or unauthorized access to read, copy or manipulate data stores, or reveal information that it otherwise would not.
 - Eg. Parameter tampering, cookie poisoning

Applications can be <u>HIJACKED</u> to make it

perform its tasks but for an authorized user, or send data to an unauthorized recipient, etc.

Eg. Cross-site Scripting, SQL Injection



April 5, 2010 3:32 PM PDT Exploits not needed to attack via PDF files by Elinor Mile 📮 9 con 77 retweet f Share 23 DF Worm Demo - No JavaScript Required Provided by sudosecure.net Using Launch PDF Feature to Infect Existing PDF JavaScript is Disabled in Acrobat Reader open "empty.pdf", just a normal PDF file. verify JavaScript is Disabled open evil "ownit.pdf" Prompted by Acrobat Reader, we control displa - Must Click Through to work Reopen "empty.pdf" - PDF has been modified with Launch Object dire user to sudosecure.net ALL DONE!

Jeremy Conway created a video to show how his PDF hack works





Malware on Web Applications

Malware can be delivered in many ways:

E-mail, IM, network vulnerabilities...

Today, Malware is very often delivered via Web Applications:

- Aims to infect those browsing the site
- Installed via Client-Side (e.g. Browser) Vulnerabilities & Social Engineering

Malicious content can be downloaded:

- From the web application itself
- Through frames & images leading to other websites
- Through links leading to malicious destinations

Legitimate Sites Hijacked to distribute Malware!

McAfee, Asus, US Govt Staff Travel Site, Wordpress.org, SuperBowl, ...



http://news.enc

April 6, 2007 4:35 PM PD 1

Asus Web site harbors threat

Postad by Jor's Evers

It is not euch a Good Friday for ASUStak Computer

The main Web site of the Talwanese hardware maker known for its Asus brand been rigged by hackors to serve up male cue self-were that ettempts to exploit a expensional Treay.

The aller kers added an invisible frame, a su-called if a ne, in the fram page of bit the site, a victim's provider will slently connect to another Web site that thes to in

Read Write Web

Hans Products Twenth Deal of RAW Andrews

McAfee: Enabling Malware Distribution and Fraud

Written by Little Davis / Hoy 3, 2005 10, 47 PM / 29 Convents

McAfee: Widely recognized as one of the leading providers of online security software for both home and business, appears to be strugging to secure its own Web sites, which at the time of writing this post, allow anyone with enough tech savvy to coverity do whatever they want on, and with, the site.

During tests this weekend, we discovered the company who claims to "keep you safe from identity theft, credit card fraud, spyware, spam, viruses and online scams," has several cross-site scripting (VSS) vulnerabilities and provides the bad guys with a brilliant - albeit ironic - launching pad from which to unleash their attacks.

Why a Vulnerability on a McAfee Site is of Consequence

It can't get much worse than this. This is not "yet another embarrassing incident on the Web." not by a long shot.



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Attackers use directory traversal attacks to read arbitrary files on web servers, such as SSL private keys and password files.

http://web.ebay.co.uk/ **interview and a set of the set**

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Home > Business Centre > Changes in 2008 > Changes to Pricing

Do not remove the following line, or various programs # that require network functionality will fail. 127.0.0.1 localhost.loca localhost :: 1 localhost6.localdomain6 localhost6 # Management server 10.3.194.141 car-man.ebaydevelopment.co.uk car-ma Production database vip 10.3.164.17 PRODDB.ebaydevelopment.co.uk PRODDB # Serverfarm - BDN 10.3.166.11 eby-prwb11.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb11 10.3.166.12 eby-pr-wb12.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb12 10.3.166.13 eby-pr wb13.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb13 10.3.166.14 eby-pr-wb14.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb14 10.3.166.15 eby-pr wb15.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb15 10.3.166.16 eby-pr-wb16.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb16 10.3.166.17 eby-pr wb17.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb17 10.3.166.18 eby-pr-wb18.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb18 10.3.166.19 eby-pr wb19.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb19 10.3.166.20 eby-pr-wb20.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb20 10.3.166.21 eby-pr wb21.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb21 10.3.166.22 eby-pr-wb22.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb22 # Serverfarm - eE 10.3.166.31 eby-pr-wb31.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb31 10.3.166.32 eby-pr-wb32.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb3 10.3.166.33 eby-pr-wb33.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb33 10.3.166.34 eby-pr-wb34.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb3 # Do not remove the following line, or various programs # that require network functionality will fail. 127.0.0.1 localhost.loca localhost :: 1 localhost6.localdomain6 localhost6 # Management server 10.3.194.141 car-man.ebaydevelopment.co.uk car-ma Production database vip 10.3.164.17 PRODDB.ebaydevelopment.co.uk PRODDB # Serverfarm - BDN 10.3.166.11 eby-prwb11.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb11 10.3.166.12 eby-pr-wb12.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb12 10.3.166.13 eby-pr wb13.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb13 10.3.166.14 eby-pr-wb14.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb14 10.3.166.15 eby-r wb15.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb15 10.3.166.16 eby-pr-wb16.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb16 10.3.166.17 eby-r wb17.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb17 10.3.166.18 eby-pr-wb18.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb18 10.3.166.19 eby-r wb19.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb19 10.3.166.20 eby-pr-wb20.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb20 10.3.166.21 eby-r wb21.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb21 10.3.166.22 eby-pr-wb22.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb22 # Serverfarm - et 10.3.166.31 eby-pr-wb31.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb31 10.3.166.32 eby-pr-wb32.ebaydevelopment.co.uk eby-pr-wb3 10.3.166.33 ebv-pr-wb33 ebavdevelopment coluk ebv-pr-wb33.10.3.166.34 ebv-pr-wb34 ebavdevelopment coluk ebv-pr-wb3



Don't Try This At Home



application hacking

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iPhone application hack

Allson Sheridan of the NosilaCast Podcast hosted at podfeet com shows off the App. Tapp. application installer for the iPhone. Her favorile two ...

by nosilacast | 2 years ago | 27,965 views



Hacking Internet Banking Applications

Source: video hits org The general public sentiment is that the banks, having always been the guardians of our money, are expert at safeguarding ...

by pefilm | 2-years ago | 19,386 views



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by DeonteDerek | 2 months ago | 207 views



Hack This Site Application 2 [HD]

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"application hacking" results 1 - 20 of about 3,090

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Change homescreen and Add up on facebook at www.facebook.com...phone 3gs 4.0 4g

Why do hackers attack Apps?

Because they know you have firewalls

 So they need to find a new weak spot to hack through and steal or compromise your data

Because firewalls do not protect against app attacks!

- Very few people are <u>actively aware</u> of application security issues
- Most IT security professionals, from network & sys-admin side, have little experience or interest in software development. Programmers have little experience or interest in security or infrastructure.
 - IT security staff are also often overworked and are focusing on other issues

Because web sites have a large footprint; cloud makes it even bigger.

Because they can!

- Many organizations today still lack a software development security policy!
 - Many applications especially legacy ones still in use, were not built defensively
 - Applications today are hundreds of thousands of lines long
 - It is a nightmare to QA the application, and requires discipline
 - So many people, even if aware, will skip or procrastinate this tedious process
 - Additional loss of control when outsourcing development work











Issues Affecting Application Development

No developer goes to work with the intention of writing bad code.

 Developers are often <u>not trained</u> or experienced in secure coding techniques, and have never needed to worry about this before

• Developers face pressures of demands for quality and functionality, and are often short on timeline, resources, information, budget, quality assurance tools investment.

Plus heavy demands on outsourcing parties







3 Reasons why Hacks WORK

- 1. Weak Software
 - Buffer Overflows
 - · OS/Application Vulnerabilities
- 2. Weak Configuration
 - Default Configurations
 - Weak Passwds
 - Failure to Harden
- 3. Weak People
 - Malicious CODE
 - Social Engineering
 - Insider Threat





Why should customers be doing application vulnerability scanning?

What is missing with point solutions?

- Vulnerability scanners
 - Traditional vulnerability scanners don't cover web applications
- Penetration testing
 - Effective at finding vulnerabilities but not scalable for ongoing tests
 - Not focused on remediation
- Network firewall and IPS
 - Generic Web application protection (if any) so most custom web applications not covered
 - Most IPS solutions focus on exploits as opposed to web application vulnerabilities
- Web application firewall
 - Expensive point product to deploy and manage
 - Can be effective, but difficult to deploy, tune and manage
 - Building policies can be as time consuming as remediating the vulnerability

Why are Web applications so vulnerable?

- Developers are mandated to deliver functionality on-time and on-budget but not to develop secure applications
- Developers are not generally educated in secure code practices
- Product innovation is driving development of increasingly complicated software

IBM Security Framework









Organizations need to take a proactive approach to Application Security

- Embed and integrate security testing early in the development lifecycle to support agile delivery demands
- Adopt a Secure by Design approach to enable the design, delivery and management of smarter software and services
- Bridge the gap between "Security" and "Development" through joint collaboration and visibility, enabling regulatory compliance





Security Testing Within the Software Lifecycle





Security Testing Within the Software Lifecycle







Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities with AppScan







Cost is a significant driver

80% of development costs are spent identifying and correcting defects!*







During the BUILD phase \$240/defect



During the QA/TESTING phase

\$960/defect



Once released as a product \$7,600/defect + Law suits, loss of customer trust, damage to brand

"National Institute of Standards & Technology Source: GBS Industry standard study Defect cost derived in assuming it takes 8 hrs to find, fix and repair a defect when found in code and unit test. Defect FFR cost for other phases calculated by using the multiplier on a blended rate of \$80/hr.



The Need to Scale Security Testing







Integrating Vulnerability Scanning and IPS





More Intelligent Insight into Web Application Threats

- Correlates vulnerability data with actual attacks
- Understand which attacks have a high probability of success
- Increased insight helps in tuning IPS Web protection module
- Prioritize vulnerability remediation efforts based exposure

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| | HTTP_Unity_UploadServelet | Attack failure (bloc | ked by Proventia appliance) | | | |
| | HTTP_Unix_Passwords | Petected event | | | | |
| | HTTP_URL_BackslashDotDot | P Detected attack [v | uin not scanned recently) | | | |
| | HTTP_URL_dotpath | Detected event | | | | |
| | HTTP_URL_Many_Slashes | Attack failure (bloc | ked by Proventia appliance) | | | |
| | HTTP_URL_repeated_char | 2 Detected event | | | | |
| | HTTP_URL_Repeated_Dot | Petected attack (v | uin not scanned recently) | | | |
| | HTTP_URLscen | Detected event | | | | |
| | HTTP_Webplus | Attack fallure (bloc | ked by Proventia appliance) | | | |
| | HTTP_Windows_Executeble | Attack failure (bloc | ked by Proventile appliance) | | | |
| | SQL_Intection | Attack likely succes | aful (vulnarable) | | | |
| | XPath Intestion | Attack likely succes | eful (vulnerable) | | | |





THINK- Proactive Security

What are you currently doing around application security? How are you addressing Web application attacks?

Would you like to reduce the attack surface related to Web application attacks by finding and fixing them at the source?

Would you like a way to engage your developers to help them create more secure applications and reduce your overall risk?

Would you be interested in finding out more about Web vulnerabilities in your environment so you can work towards fixing them, and also have better information to tune the Web protections within your IPS platform?





Benefits



AppScan – find and fix vulnerabilities to minimize risk and exposure

Intrusion Prevention – block Web application attacks in real-time while vulnerabilities are being found

QRadar solutions to raise visibility and insight even further





- Black Box vs White Box
- Dynamic vs Static





Differences Between DAST and SAST Approaches

| | Static Analysis | Dynamic Analysis |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Scan input | Source code | Live web application |
| Assessment Techniques | Taint analysis & pattern matching | Tampering with HTTP messages |
| Where does it fit in the SDLC | Application development | Anywhere in the SDLC where you have a live app (dev, QA, deployment) |
| Results and output | Results are presented by line of code | Results are presented as HTTP messages (exploit requests) |





How Black Box Scanners Work

Stage 1: Crawling as an honest user







How Black Box Scanners Work

Stage 1: Crawling as an honest user Stage 2: Testing by tampering requests



"Hacker in the Box"



Black-box Analysis

- Accuracy
- Code coverage
- Source free
- HTTP awareness only
- Multi-component support
- Requires deployed application
- Few Prerequisites
- Works as a remote attacker

White-box Analysis

- Over approximation
- Code/path coverage
- Limited to given code
- More than HTTP validations
- Support per language/framework
- No need to deploy application
- Support partial applications
- Integration/deployment issues
- Challenges for each type of analysis differ!







Who can benefit: Application Security Testing and Risk Management

| | Penetratio | on Testing | Vulnerability (Risk) Management | Secure Development |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | Security consultants | Small Security Teams & Security Auditors | Enterprise Security Teams | Security (development is the user and influencer) |
| Use case | Clients recognize they don't have AppSec expertise and engage consultants for "assessment" which typically includes penetration testing of deployed applications. Consultants want a tool to automate testing and allow them to concentrate on more advanced testing/attacks that are not easily automated. Compliance (PCI) is often the original driver for assessment | Client has 1-3 headcount dedicated to AppSec. Teams often get started after a consultant's assessment. Client seeks to do its own testing rather than rely on consultants for annual pen-test. Compliance (PCI) is often the original driver | Client has an AppSec team to manage application risk across the lifecycle. Testing focused on production apps and pre-production audit Risk management plan includes: • Inventory of applications • Scheduled, recurring scans of all applications • Monitoring and tracking of vulnerabilities and resolution • AppSec feeds into Enterprise Security Intelligence | Client's security team has convinced development execs to include security testing in one or more phases of SDLC: • Coding • Build • QA/Test • Pre-production security test Objective to build secure applications, minimize risk & reduce remediation costs |
| Buying criteria | Advanced security testing Coverage of latest web applications (AJAX, Flash, web services) Reports that summarize findings for clients | Ease of use (easy scan set up) Reports that summarize findings for compliance or be given to development organization for remediation Advanced security testing with high confidence in the results | Central control with view of application risk across enterprise Advanced security testing with precise results ALM integration Application coverage: ERP, mainframe, cloud, mobile Integration with other security solutions: SIEM, WAF, etc. | Precise results with few false positives Language support: COBOL, C++, Objective C, ABAP, etc Ease of use for non-security users Integration with development processes – IDE, defect tracking, test plans, etc. |
| Offering | AppScan Standard | AppScan Standard | AppScan Enterprise AppScan Source | AppScan Enterprise AppScan Source |











| Time | Торіс | Speakers |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 9:05am - 9:45am | Security Stream Kickoff-Security and compliance Overview and X Force | Joe Ruthven and Sukhdev Singh |
| 9:45am - 10:25am | Threat | Lekgale Mokota |
| 10:25am - 10:40am | Break | |
| 10:40am - 11:10am | Q1 Labs Security Intelligence Strategy and Roadmap – How to use Security Intelligence for detecting threats and exceeding compliance mandates | Murray Benadie |
| 11:10am - 11:40am | Driving Effective Application Security in the Enterprise: An End to End Approach to Addressing One of the Biggest Threats to a Business | Sukhdev Singh |
| 11.40am - 12:10pm | Identity Intelligence: Enabling Secure Cloud and Mobile Access | Kevin Mckerr (Puleng) |
| 12:10pm - 12:15 pm | Closing and Questions | |
| 12:15pm | Lunch and Networking | |



Security Intelligence. Think Integrated.



pu-leng n. Tswana, rain (used as greeting for good fortune)

A Tswana word that means a place of rain and a symbol of knowledge and wealth.







Identity Management (IdM) describes the management of individual identities, their authentication, authorisation, and privileges/permissions within or across system and enterprise boundaries with the goal of increasing security and productivity while decreasing cost, downtime and repetitive tasks.





Technical

- -User Access
- -Account Provisioning
- -User Authentication
- -Identity Federation
- -Password Management

Business

- -Access to information & resources
 -Unique Customer Experience
 -Channel Convergence
 -Single View of Customer
- -Governance, Risk, Compliance







User Information

Username:

Email:

Password:

Confirm password:

Create User












The data explosion - unwoundTime frameData volume growthIn 2010 - 1200 exabytes of data9x since 2005In 2011 - 1.8 zettabytes of data9x since 2005In 2020 - 35 zettabytes will exist20x per year

I million terabytes = 1 exabyte 1000 exabytes = 1 zettabyte

Data from The 2011 Digital Universe Study: Extracting Value from Chaos, by IDC.









``











In short, if you have the image in your mind that a successful cybersecurity strategy is a moat, your strategies, laws and regulations will fail. A moat does not protect from attacks from within, which constitute nearly 80 percent of all cybercrimes.





















Who has access to what?





RFP

- -Consultant defines requirements + 6 months
- -RFP Send out & Vendor Response + 2 months
- -Evaluation & Testing + 3 months
- -Selection & Contracting + 2 months
- -Rollout + 3 6 9 months
- -Response Time = 15 22 months





A new way is needed!!

- -Packaged Solutions
- -Specific function
- -At a fixed cost and timeframe
- -Delivering immediate countermeasures



 $\sim \frac{1}{2}$



#1 Secure Cloud Apps for Your Employees







#2 Secure Your Client-Facing Apps







#3 Secure Your Partner-Facing Apps







#4 Third Party App Integration







#5 Internal Single Sign-on





Cloud Identity Providers



#6 Social Identity / Client Facing Apps

`<mark>``</mark>





How it fits together ③



1.Who has access to what?2.Sort out my passwords!3.Enable Self Service

[Editor's Pick] Smartphone Users Are Almost 33% More Likely To Become Victims of Identity Theft Then the General Public, in the US

by CHARLES STEPHENS on Mar 21, 2012 - 6:00 am





PRODU

iPhone Reven In-Ap USA



Submitting your Return of Earnings

{is now just a click}

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Business

Six simple ways to prevent identity theft

13 SEP 2010 20:43 - FIONA ZERBST

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Identity theft is far more common than people think and it costs the economy about R1-billion each year.

Identity theft is far more common than people think and it costs the economy about R1-billion each year.

As the white-collar crime of choice, it's fairly easy to pull off.

Ads by Google

Prevent Identity Theft

Prevent ID Theft

Identity Theft Protection

There are about 20 cases reported in South Africa every day, so follow these tips to be safe rather than sorry:

· Safeguard your ID book and passport-if you lose them or they are stolen, report the theft to the police

immediately and register for the South African Fraud Prevention Service's free protective registration service. You will need to supply a case number.

Check and double-check your bank statements and your credit card statements every month and

Your internet should be flying **BUSINESS CLASS!**





Road rage All the news about the e-tolling saga...



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| SA Time: Tue May 22 2012 21:04:23 GMT+0200 (South Africa Standard Time) | | | | | | | | | |

Identity theft 'costing SA millions'

June 4 2008 at 04:29pm

By Natasha Joseph

Identity theft could be costing South Africa more than R1-billion every year, according to a major credit bureau and a national insurance organisation.

The SA Fraud Prevention Service, a non-profit organisation that works to combat fraud, identity theft and financial crime, says it is getting up to 25 complaints daily.

In a statement issued on Tuesday, the Consumer Profile Bureau said that ID theft had become "the white collar crime of choice" because it was "so easy".

Armed with somebody else's personal details and ID number, a fraudster could "open numerous accounts ...and then go on a spending spree", said the bureau's managing director, Fred Steffers.

Steffers said Alexander Forbes Insurance estimated that identity theft-related fraud had cost South African businesses R276-million in the first three months of this year.

Steffers said the "identity theft fraud chain" usually started with the theft of personal documents: credit cards, driver's licences, passports or ID books

Most Viewed

- Girls sell sex for just R25
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- Zuma painting defaced
- Artist: Zuma painting not intended to hurt
- MEC blows credit limit on India trip.













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