

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel  
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel  
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Office  
of the Prime Minister

President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, September 10, 1974  
3:40 - 4:08 p. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

President: We are most grateful that you have come. It is nice to have this chance of renewing old friendships. It means much to have an old friend come back to help solve some of the problems which we both have an interest in.

Rabin: Thank you very much. I am very glad to be here and see you. I want to discuss our problems with you frankly. I am coming from a country which has had a traumatic experience. We went through a war in which we were caught by surprise. There was no one to blame but ourselves. The war ended in a way which left many questions. In retrospect many thought the war should have continued. This was the only war in which we didn't gain years of tranquility through destruction of the enemy. After the war we cooperated because we thought there might be some more to gain. Before, people said you succeeded too well; it destroyed their self-respect. So this time it was thought it might be different. The disengagement agreements are a beginning. We took the risk with the Syrians on the chance that it would lead to peace.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 16 NARA, DATE 3/9/04  
State Rev. CW 3/9/04

We are watching closely. There is a difference between Egypt and Syria in the way the disengagement is carried out. Egypt obeys both in letter and in spirit.

President: I am glad to hear it.

Rabin: Basically Egypt keeps the military part and the civilian part of the agreement. They are trying to reconstruct the cities and reopen the Canal. I can't fault them.

But Syria is completely different. They didn't like UNDOF and now they are making a real effort to bring about a change in its role. Instead of having a buffer zone, they are trying to do something different.

As a result of the disengagement, Israel was ready to take risks with its security for peace. We were promised by President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger arms for these risks so we could defend ourselves. It's a real problem. I hope we will find a solution. Golda gave it as one of the reasons for the disengagement agreement, and now what have we got?

President: I thought it was an impressive story of the disengagement negotiation. Dr. Kissinger brought back a favorable reaction of the Israeli role.


In our talks, let's lay our cards on the table. We hope to meet these military demands which are part of the commitment. We don't want another war -- as you don't. We want Israel to be strong and capable of defending itself. Israel has the backing of the United States. It is a matter of how much you need and how much we can make available. We have constraints but we will keep the commitment that was made about your strength and your survival.

I have enjoyed working with your Ambassador. He has been very helpful. He told you of the commitment for the M-48's. That was done to clear the decks for our talk.

Rabin: Thank you.

Dinitz: We appreciate your clearing the decks.

President: It was partly a bureaucratic confusion.



Rabin: Let me tell you what we face. Egypt doesn't get major items, but Syria gets an unlimited supply. It has over 30 MIG-23s, the best in the Middle East. The A-3, with 90 mm. guns, is the lowest-grade tank in the Middle East. We destroyed 1100 Syrian tanks -- now they have more. Egypt is about back to its pre-war level. Their forces are bigger than NATO. We are not talking about matching them, but enough to enable us to meet an attack.

The stronger Israel is the better the chance for peace, and we are ready to move toward peace.

The Arabs believe that with this threat, diplomacy, and the oil thing, they can achieve what they want. We don't seek a war. As long as disengagement holds we will obey it, but we will not stand for violations. We thought the purpose of disengagement was to give an opportunity to move to peace. But none but Jordan talk to us. We offered Hussein four options; he didn't seem ready for any of them. It showed that since the disengagement he felt there should be unilateral withdrawal, and he had hardened his position. I can't say we have found common ground to move ahead. On certain grounds we have found common grounds. We both see the same way on the PLO and on having no third state between us. Both are opposed to terrorism. But beyond that, there is no common ground.

We offered an overall settlement. But he said he couldn't be the first. We offered principles of a settlement to carry out in stages. No withdrawal from the Jordan River. Leave Jerusalem open. We offered a functional division of responsibility. We offered condominium.

Kissinger: He was worried he might have left a favorable impression.

Rabin: We spent three hours on it. He wasn't negative.

Kissinger: He was afraid he might have done that. He didn't want that impression.

Rabin: We at least can sit and talk. It shows that on our side we are willing to work things out. With Egypt there may be something possible. With Syria I am more than doubtful.

President: We all know Syria is the toughest.



Kissinger: The Prime Minister and I will have breakfast together and will be together most of the day. We will review and narrow things down for you. He is seeing Schlesinger.


Rabin: The trouble with Schlesinger is he always has to get a new instruction before he can move. We haven't even asked for anything new. I wouldn't deny we are disappointed with him.

President: Our people are committed to the survival and security of Israel. We can talk frankly: Look at the diplomatic and military situation.

Kissinger: The Prime Minister has planned every one of the Prime Minister's visits here. They came out all right.

Rabin: That is when I do the planning.

President: I am looking forward to meeting Thursday and to greeting Mrs. Rabin for dinner Thursday night.



P/R abim/Dinatz/Gazit/K

10 Sept 74  
3:40-4:05 pm

Transcribed  
by PRR ✓

~~P~~  
P We must grateful you have come. Nice evening  
old paintings. Always much to have an old  
panel comeback to solve some of problems which  
we both have an interest

last  
page

R I thought you very much. Glad  
to want to discuss problems w/ you personally.  
Coming from a country which has had a horrible  
experience. Went there a year or more ago  
by surprise - no one to blame but ourselves.  
Wasn't in way which left very good  
in respect way thought we should have  
continued. This was only way in which we didn't  
pass years of tranquility then no destruction of  
order. After was we expected because  
we that there might be some need to peace.  
Before people said you you would be well -  
destroyed their self concept. This time thought  
be different. Doing agreements on a bigging  
We took a risk w/ - Syria on chance that  
it would had to place.  
We watching closely. There is if about E+S in  
way being carried out, E stays letter spirit.

P Glad to hear it.  
R Basically E begins a word is condition part of a agreement -  
they trying to reconstruct <sup>with</sup> & reopen word. (not fault  
them)

But Syria completely diff. They didn't like UNOSF  
a now a real effort to bring about a change in  
order. Instead of buffer zone they trying to do it  
diff. too

As result of doing, I was ready to take steps for its  
security for peace. We promised by N & K to arms  
for these work so we could depend ourselves. It's a  
real problem - hope we will find solution. Glad



good it is one of reasons for doing agreement + some what  
I have to get.

P That an impossible story of a doing negot. It brought  
back favorable notion of I role. ~~that~~ In our talks,  
by our case or take, we hope to meet those real demands  
which part of a contract. We don't want another even -  
a year limit - we want I story - say at least of  
depending itself. I has backing of US. It worth  
of how much you need + how much we can  
make available. We have constraints but we  
will keep contract that mark about your strength  
+ survival.

E enjoyed your about, #2 has been very helpful.  
He told you of a contract for M-48's, done to clear  
checks.

R Thank you

D We appreciate clearing checks.

P Partly a humanitarian confusion

R More on M-48's

R What we face - I don't get major items but Syria  
~~don't~~ get unlimited supply. Over 30 May 72, a bet  
in a ME. The A-3, w/ 90 man gun is lowest  
grade tank in ME. We destroyed 1100 Syrian tanks -  
know they have more. I almost back to go war. The  
forces are bigger than NATO. We not talking about  
withstanding them, but enough to enable us to meet  
an attack.

I do strongly I a better a chance for peace & will  
likely to move toward peace

The Arabs believe that by threat, diplomacy, & oil threat  
they can achieve what they want. We don't seek war.  
As long as doing holds we will obey it, but we  
will not stand for impositions. We that doing was  
to see your offer to move to peace, but none but  
Jordan talk to us. We offer 4 options



Hx didn't seem ready for any of them. Samuel thought going  
cheap he felt should be initiated w/ demand & he  
had hardened his position. Can't say we have found common  
ground & more ahead. On certain grounds we have found  
common ground. We both see a future on PLO &  
we 3rd state but no. Bush opposed to terrorism. Not  
beyond that, no common ground.

We offered an overall settlement - said he couldn't be 1st.

~~Example~~ Offered principle of settlement to carry out in stages.  
Offered Jerusalem open & offered fundamental division  
of cap. Offered land demarcation.

R. Hx was worried he might have left favorable impression

R. We spent 3 hours on it. Hx wasn't negative

R. Appear he might have done that - he didn't want that  
impression.

R. We at least can sit & talk. Shows that on our side  
we willing to work thing out. W/E may be something  
possible. W/ Syria & more than doubtful.

P. We all know Syria is important

K. PM & I will have breakfast together + together meet  
4-4 day. We will review + narrow this down for  
you. Sorry Schlesinger.

R. Trouble w/ Schles is he always has to get on  
new instructions before he can meet. We haven't  
yet even asked for anything new. I was kind they  
are disappointed w/ him.

P. Congress are worried to survival & security of I.  
We can talk privately - look at dip + mid int.

K. PM has planned many PNI visits here. They could  
start out all night

R. That when I planning to getting Mrs P for

P. Looking forward to meeting Thurs. & dinner Thurs  
night.

