THE BEE.

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NEW ORLEANS:
TUESDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 9, 1838.

☞ A proclamation of the president of the United States for a sale of public lands in this state, will be found on the first page.

☞ The express did not arrive yesterday. Three days' mails are now due—our dates from New York being only to the 28th ult., while they should be to the 1st inst.

CANADA.

Some of the Canadian papers, in the interest of the toria-tical party, allege that Lord Durham has suggested to the ministers a novel plan of governing the British colonies in North America, which plan, should it be permitted to go into effect, will be the most powerful to the independence of the province. The plan, as disclosed in the newspapers, is to give the provinces a federative form of government, the general concerns to be intrusted to an assembly of delegates from each province, who are to fix the salaries of governors, judges, and all other officers.

The Prince Edward Island Gazette goes farther, and asserts as that the plan embraces a union of the five provinces—Upper and Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island—and that New England is to have the option of joining or not—each province to retain its own local legislature and governor, and each province attached to the union, whether large or small, to send six members to represent them in the general assembly, which shall legislate on all matters common to all, the governor general to have a veto on all bills originating in the general assembly, as the governors of the respective provinces have on all bills originating in the local legislature, and each of the provinces to have the privilege of sending two members to represent it in the British house of commons.

Should the system of government, or any similar system be adopted, persons are now living who will see the whole of North America independent of the British crown. There is no example in history of a people deprived for a long series of years of rights and privileges which they have once enjoyed. They may be deprived of them through superior force for a year, or for a generation, or for a century, but they are always wrenched back again by the people, and with interest. If the British provinces once possess the forms of free government, the substance will not be very distant, and they would soon constitute one of the most powerful maritime states in the world. The dominion would compel not many of the inner Europe born in America, their populous not for the most part be substituted to the roughest scenes of ocean adventure.

The notion of representing the provinces in the house of commons is not a new one. It originated with Adam Smith, who urged it upon the attention of the British government at the commencement of the war of the American revolution. But it was to no purpose. Even had it been adopted by the government of Great Britain, and an offer made to the colonies that they should be represented in parliament on condition that they laid down their arms and submitted to be taxed by the mother country, it would have been rejected on this side of the water with disdain. The dazzling picture of independence was before their eyes, and they never could have abandoned it. If the offer of representation had been made when the minority first thought of taxing the colonies, probably it might have been accepted. But the assertion of an unqualified right to tax excited the wrath of the people and in the end of which they began to dream of separation from the country of the mother country.

The plan of reconciliation proposed by Adam Smith made its appearance in print in the year 1775, and was very similar to its details to that which is now said to have originated with Lord Durham for the government of British North America. It is to exhibit "a system which should detach itself from the interests contended for. Great Britain should at once relax a monopoly which imposes on her the necessity of what it purchases dearer than it sells cheaper—the necessity of what it purchases dearer than it sells cheaper—the expence of the empire, in consequence of its being supposed to be taxes, and on compensation additional to the same freedom of trade with the whole as objects at home, the number of its representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its contributions might afterwards augment; a new method of acquiring imperial revenue, a new and more dazzling object than war, taxation, or debt to be looked to in future, might, perhaps, be found in the present disposition of the people. Instead of falling over the whole provinces to be levied in what may be called their own way, by the authority of their own assemblies, it might be better to let each province contribute in proportion to its own produce and consumption, which might be easily and with little interference collected by the officers of the customs. The fund destined for defraying the whole expence of the administration, exclusive of the military establishment, might be left to arise as before from the duties of customs and excise. The military establishment might be supported by an additional tax upon the consumption of the provinces in proportion to their wealth and ability."

NATIONAL BANK.

The protective, or American system, as it was unjustly termed by Mr. Clay, proved a source of loud and reiterated complaint to all those sections of the union oppressed by its onerous and partial provisions. It was nevertheless perseveringly maintained by the federal party, until the very throes of dissolution was threatened with dissolution. Then, and not till then, was it abandoned. There are few men south of the Potomac, and not a very large number north of that river, who would be willing to assist in the revival of the stupendous system of oppression that resulted from the practical operation of the high tariff policy; and most assuredly southern politicians would pause and ponder before giving their adhesion to any doctrine, the tendency of which would be to resuscitate this pernicious evil. Yet by the unwise and unthinking advocacy of a national bank, we are infallibly laying the foundation of a new protective system.

If we create a national bank and give it the use of the public funds, it must evidently be the interest of such an institution and of all its partizans, to augment as much as possible the available means upon which it bases its banking operations. By increased taxation, by a system of duties productive of revenue more than sufficient for the purposes of government, immense surpluses will be accumulated and of course lodged in the bank. Its banking facilities, and of a consequence its gains will be increased. A national bank, therefore, while it would constitute the natural, necessary and powerful ally of the advocates of the tariff, extravagant expenditures, a strong government and federal principles, would become the direct foe to all those sections of the union whose interests and political views lead them to desire the amplification of our government, and the annihilation of all unjust and unequal systems of taxation. This view of the subject has been elaborated by Mr. Calhoun in the lucid and powerful manner which distinguishes the arguments of that statesman. He has proved beyond a doubt, that the certain effect of the union between the government and the banks, whether that alliance be consummated through the agency of a national institution, or by means of a league with the state banks, is to throw the entire weight of the banking system on the side of high duties and taxes, unnecessary expenditures and large surpluses, and that because the greater these, the greater the profits of the banks, when united with the government, but when separated, the less. Consolidation, executive power and patronage, a disregard to the rights of the states are the inevitable consequences of such a league. Are southern politicians prepared to give it their sanction?

It is a cardinal maxim in a republican government not to concentrate too much power in any individual. The most beautiful feature in the democratic doctrine is, questionless, the extensive diffusion of power which it contemplates. By this dissemination it becomes weakened. Each co-ordinate department retains a certain proportion, but yet not enough to prevent any flagrant abuses of the trust confided. But the principles of the federalists tend to consequences entirely the reverse. The establishment of their favorite project, a national bank, would undoubtedly place the whole monetary resources of the government at the unrestrained disposal of the head of that institution. Now if the consolidation of power be fraught with peril, there is no mischief so pervasive and irreparable as that capable of being wrought by a bold and dishonest man, possessed of unlimited pecuniary resources. All experience admonishes us of this incontrovertible fact. How sedulously therefore should we guard against the possibility of such an occurrence. Human nature is but fallible, and we fancy that neither Mr. Biddle, Mr. Gallatin or any other individual is beyond the influence of the usual motives that operate on cupidity and ambition. Suppose, for instance, observes a logical and profound reasoner, that the government should select any one bank as a contract to give him the exclusive advantage of having its notes received on the face of the government, and to give him the use of the public money from the time it was collected till it was disbursed; is there a man so dull as not to see the immense advantage it would confer on him, compared to the rest of the community; that it would give him to a vast extent, a control over the exchanges, the credit and commerce of the country, and through them, over all classes of the people. Undoubtedly, and once possessed of the universal power, it would be a difficult to modify and check its action, as it would be to wrest it from the holder. There are but two methods of preventing the abuse of power—the one certain, the other problematical and partial. The most efficacious mode is not to confer it. In this there is no difficulty. But there are periods of dire necessity when extraordinary recourse must be had to extraordinary means. Instead of calling on the people for contributions to meet any public exigency, it might be better to let the banks meet such calls