

THE BEE.

CFFICIAL GAZETTE OF STATE AND CITY.
PRINTED BY JEROME BAYON.
"THE UNION must be preserved."

TUESDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 6, 1838.

The report of the committee of vigilance inserted today, was excluded yesterday solely from want of room. It is pleasant to find the gentlemen of the Antislavery society laboriously diligent in the duties they have assumed; and that they are successful in their efforts.

The Washington guards organized themselves last evening by choosing C. F. Hickey, as captain; R. C. Paffey, as 1st lieutenant; and Mr. Gould as 2d. They had subsequently a grand promenade through the streets, in company with many of their friends; and put a friendly and convivial touch to our part of the city. A generous contribution in favor of the poor was made.

We perfectly coincide in opinion with the experienced editor of the Louisiana Journal, on the prematurity of supporting any candidate for next governor, at the present period; as important elections for the state legislature, and for president and vice president, must precede that of governor of the state; and as some may be candidates whose names are not now before the public, and whose claims may deserve support. Still it is not improper that the alleged pretensions of any candidate presented with his own consent, should be canvassed; that justice may do to the public as well as the individual.

We are pleased that he coincides with us that local prejudices or party politics should not be considered essential qualifications in favor of any candidate; though we believe that predictions should legitimately be exercised in favor of some among many candidates, when other merits are equal to those of rivals.

If the Journal supposes that we advocate a legislative caucus, because we hinted that such was in contemplation for the preliminary consideration of the claims of gentlemen who may deserve the suffrages of the people for governor, we must advise it: for we decidedly do not think that such a convention is necessary or would be useful within the ensuing two years.

The inhabitants of Natchez and Adams county in Mississippi singularly embittered against that project of a railroad hence Nashville; and enjoy themselves in the fond design of making Natchez a port of entry. What will not infatuated folly attempt!

A ship was lately towed up to Natchez, amid the roar of drums, and the whistling of fife—and was only 12 days from New Orleans! Yet she was welcomed as a glorious visitant and certain pioneer; but unfortunately had to depart with a little ballast and much merchandise.

Courage, brave Natchez! yet will and still have the right again to say, if ye endeavor to prevent internal improvements, because your interests are not chiefly promoted.

The WIFE AND WOMAN'S ANSWER is the title of a novel in 2 volumes, by the Hon. Mrs. Norton, granddaughter of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, and the most of her fanciful productions abounds in interesting incidents, although too easily watched. Her style is bold, simple and never easy or elegant; but her writings still appeal to the affections, which they capture and delight.

The work is published by the Harper's of New York, and sold here by Mr. C. H. Bancroft.

MASHIMPOLEES in ENGLAND, or the confessions of a prime minister. This is the most sarcastic and accurate of all the works which we have recently read of those which pretend to comment on the political institutions, local customs and conventional regulations of Eng and the subjet. It is master of his subject; and unsparingly "shouts folly & lies." It is supposed to be a sequel to "Tour of a Gentleman Prince," but though inferior to that work in style, it is greatly superior in information, irony and imagery.

He that would wish to acquire an accurate and thorough insight into "ways and means" of London life, should purchase or peruse this work.

It can be had at the bookstore of Hatchette and Co., Chars street.

The elections in Maine have resulted in favor of the republican candidates. Dunlap is re-elected governor of that state.

He thinks that by selecting the worst part of the swamp for the first operations of the company, skepticism would be removed; and greater benefit afforded. Perhaps not, but because greater advantages may not be obtained, shall we not have the author & than our power? Whether is the better judge of the means & scenes of action—the mayor who denies the practicability and utility of the project, or the directors of the company who are desirous to forward the undertaking, who have had surveys taken and plotted of the swamp, who know the end to be obtained, the means to be employed, and the available resources?

The mayor has made another attempt to prevent or frustrate the operations of the draining company; but may he be seen in his last message to the council, inserted in this gazette of yesterday. Formerly he had endeavored to prevent the subscription of the city to the stock of the company; and having failed in that respect, he has now endeavored to circumscribe and shut their sphere of operations—for which the company has already made a contract, to be performed by the 1st of January next.

The mayor thinks that the directors of the company should have selected a portion of the swamp generally inundated, and now the focus of mischievous calculations. It will be remembered that when voting the subscription authorized by the council, he denied or doubted the mischievous effects of disease in the swamp lands, which he saw.

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The mayor does not consider the slender resources of the company for making at first a bold and extended experiment, which might swallow up all their funds without producing the end designed; and be an effectual argument against consecutive attempts to drain other parts of the swamp. The company must render its operations commensurate with its funds, so as to produce the greatest effect at the least cost; and this can evidently be done on the section specified between Rampart street and the bayou St. John—between Carondelet and the Bayou rd. It is idle to say that that space does not require being drained, or that it is dry three fourths of the year; and equally idle to think that the corporation could effect the same, soon and efficiently by their own mode; as that contemplated by the company. It is also incorrect to think that the operations of the company will be obnoxious to the corporation in any respect: for 1st, the draining will be effected in three months, and the former and latter apprehensions of 1st, land be made in that time, making the enhanced value depend only on the operations done, equally on the increased value by the lapse of time:—2dly, the corporation will have to pay only half the difference in the values of both appraisements, which would be much less in amount than the appropriations necessary to draw the way to the cemetery, and the bayou, where the corporation can establish a wharf for the conveyance of goods, boats and lumber for the use of the city.—3dly, the corporation may render navigation on the canal, which would be of immense advantage to the city, in having a sheet of water wide beside the city.

Considering the petition preferred by the company to any man connected with the immediate interests of the corporation, the city council is in justice bound to them, by the fact that the good faith of the company, to the counteract any immediate operations on the section selected—any suggestion of the mayor to the contrary notwithstanding.

Amidst the prospect for the benefit of Louisiana and New Orleans would be to effect a good road between Santa Fe and Jonesborough on the Red river—which would direct the course of the far trade from St. Louis to New Orleans by the Red river. The distance between Jonesborough and Santa Fe is about 300 miles; and when the rail shall have been removed above Natchitoches, the Red river will be navigable to Jonesborough.

Now for a fair trading company in New Orleans, that her merchants may monopolize the trade of the west!

Though the cotton crops of the state do not equal expectations, still they are not bad as was apprehended; and we may expect that our planters in general will be enabled to export nearly as much cotton this year as last: for there were more plantations during the present than the latter season. Even if the quantity does not equal, the quality exceeds that of the previous year—another fact to console our planters: for they will obtain a good price for their produce.

The sugar crop will be 5 or 6 weeks later this season than last, but not deficient.

Generally speaking the quality and quantity of the cotton and sugar crops of Louisiana for 1838, will be about on a par with those of 1834; although the anticipations formed of what crop will not be realized in consequence of the continued rains during the summer.

We regret to hear that the ears on the Corriveau Railroad were very badly damaged on the evening of Sunday: but the fault is attributable exclusively to the indecisive state of the engine, who is in consequence discharged. The

directors of the company will hereafter be more vigilant in their discipline on the route; and endeavor to give satisfaction to all who wish to enjoy the advantages of so pleasant a drive as that to Carrollton.

country debt, and although large, very much encumbered with heavy debts to be immediately provided for. The house of Clark was well represented in his engagements, and their own interests were well consulted; but the house of that old friend, imperiously required of them to make every exertion to effect an advantageous settlement of his debts; but was not long after they entered upon their duties, when he died, and it was impossible for him to effect a liquidation with the persons with whom he had been engaged, without sacrificing the interest of the creditors and their heirs. That they immediately communicated to Mr. Clark, that they had been engaged to him, and that he was dead, and that his estate was in their hands, and that they were compelled to prevent such a catastrophe, they were compelled in the month of March following Mr. Clark's death, to seek a refuge in the law, without sacrificing the interest of the creditors and their heirs. That they immediately communicated to Mr. Clark, that they had been engaged to him, and that he was dead, and that his estate was in their hands, and that they were compelled to prevent such a catastrophe, they were compelled in the month of March following Mr. Clark's death, to seek a refuge in the law, without sacrificing the interest of the creditors and their heirs.

At the expiration of this period I find by referring to a statement of the affairs furnished to Mr. Clark made up to the 30 June 1817, that the undischarged debts amounted to \$16,000, and that the amount due to him, including the whole of the debts of Clark, and the amount due to him, including the debts of his wife, were \$10,000, and that the balance due to him, including the debts of his wife, were \$6,000, and that he was entirely engaged in endeavoring to effect a settlement.

Since then the business has principally devolved upon me, and no effort have been spared to close it, but several suits have been filed in the court of admiralty to restrain the execution of all which the legal heirs have been legally informed.

We find that the millions you speak of had over extensive possessions, and that the value of your total assets I have gone through, and saved up from what I consider infinitely more injurious, the oprobrium with which it is attempted to tarnish my reputation.

With respect to the debts I used to have been promised, I am told that all of them are now paid off, with the exception of those upon which I have a secret book from Mr. Clark and myself; it is not therefore to be presumed that they are paid off.

In confirmation of what I have said respecting Mr. Clark's estate, I refer you to Daniel Wm. Cozzi, Esq., of Philadelphia, who has connection with Mr. Clark, and the interest he had in the settlement of his affairs, furnished him with the fullest information of them; also to Joseph Clark, Esq., of Philadelphia, the successor of Mrs. Clark, the mother, to whom I have given up the entire care of the management of the property of those whom I have been engaged to represent.

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Richard Relf,
First Judicial District Louisiana.

Richard R. Keene,
Second Judicial District Louisiana.

The new trial is granted for these reasons:—

1. The application of the judge in the course of the trial which made his decision in the cause, that the opinion in the probate court did not coincide with his own, and that he inferred by the inferences or intuitions it might be supposed to convey was not a ground of action, and that the suit might have been stayed by an exception which may have had no force, but which was not made.

Whether the paper was or was not fictitious was a matter of fact which the jury should have been left to decide, and not to infer from the opinions or expressions from the court which interferred with their exclusive decisions on that point which were improperly drawn.

2. The want of any proper issue in the cause, and more especially the conduct of defendant in, at one stage of the trial, in refusing to let the plaintiff have his evidence, and then charging the plaintiff with the suppression of the evidence of Clark's will, and at another time implying that the evidence which he had given was fictitious.

3. The want of any proper issue in the cause, and then charging the plaintiff with the suppression of the evidence of Clark's will, and at another time implying that the evidence which he had given was fictitious.

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