

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
EO 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MRB 81-63; #1  
date rev 9/10/04; OSD et al 8/25/11; NSS et al 3/6/12  
date MARA Date 3/22/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Friday, August 8, 1975  
9:30 - 10:40 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office  
The White House

SUBJECT: Soviet grain deal; economic summit;  
Middle East; PFIAB



Kissinger: The Soviet Union has been very quiet on the Middle East.

The President: I can talk to Meany.

Kissinger: It may be too early. Let me talk to Dunlop first.

I talked to Shultz about the economic summit. I think it best for George to see Schmidt, Wilson, Giscard next week to get their concrete ideas. It would show you giving it quick attention and allow George to assess whether we should pursue it. If it looks good, we could have the private meeting and then the summit. From a non-economic view, I think it has merit in showing action. I know Treasury fears they will try to euchre you into something unfavorable. But I doubt that, and why would you agree? I think you are getting the image as the leader of the Western industrial world.

For your press conference today, I would not be optimistic or pessimistic. Say the negotiations are proceeding and that that's a hopeful sign, but you don't want to predict the outcome. If you get too optimistic, you will trigger the bastards in Jerusalem.

[Gets map out].

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

As you can imagine, Israel pocketed every Egyptian concession. They refused a two-kilometer move of the Egyptian line, but would agree to some move forward if there were equal compensation elsewhere. I said no.

They agreed to give up on the southern warning station and move it into Israeli territory. But they want Egypt to give up one of its stations. They insist on six American stations. I don't think we can justify it. Nancy thinks you would be crazy to do it but certainly crazy to do it without Congressional support. We could put a station by Umm Khisheiba to monitor access. We could maybe put one at the Mitla and claim it's a tactical warning station. I think you have to give up on Israeli support. The way they talk about you and me, there is no hope. I think they feel they have to get you out of the White House.

The President: They can't do that.

Kissinger: I agree, and if they do it openly, it will be an asset to you. Nancy thinks if you cut off aid to Israel, you would be a national hero.

Should we get the Congressional leaders to Vail before I leave, or wait until we have an agreement?

The President: I think it is better to wait until we have an agreement.

Kissinger: [Some discussion of PFIAB meeting]. The topics will be the weakness of strategic estimates, Soviet wiretap activity, and more emphasis on economic intelligence. They are overdoing the strategic estimate bit, but they could be improved. On the wiretaps, DOD is foot dragging. You may want to direct accelerated action here.



Ballance report -

✓ P/K 8 Aug 75

(talking about grain)

K The SV has been very quiet on N.E.

P I can talk to Wang.

K It may be too early, but we talk to Sunday 1st.

I talked to Shetty about a new summit. I think best for George to see Schmidt, Welton, Casimir next week to get their comments & views. It would show you giving it your attention & allow George to assess what whether we should pursue it. If it looks good, we could have a private party & then a summit. From a non-secular view I think it has merit in showing action. I know some fears they will try to lock you into something unpalatable. But I doubt that & why would you agree? I think you are getting a image as a leader of a Western union world.

For your press today, I would not be optimistic or pessimistic. Say negotiate proceeding & that a hopeful sign, but you don't want to predict outcomes. If you get too optimistic you will trigger a host of in Jews.



(Gate independent)

As your firm is engaged, I predicted they'll be concessive. They agreed & 2 have more of a E line, but would agree to some more forward if there were a good compensation structure. Good well.

They agreed to giving up on a Smith Commission & move it into the treaty. But they want E to give up one of its.

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MR 01-062: #1

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By dal NARA Date 3/23/12

8 million for NSTA

They insist on 6 OS stations. I don't think one can justify it. Nancy thinks you would be crazy to do it but certainly w/o Cong. support. OS could put a station by Univ. Kishito to monitor deceler. We could maybe put one at Brattle & claim it technical warning station.

I think you have to give up on I suggest. The way they talk about you & me, there is no hope. I think they feel they have to get you out of NSTA

P They can't do that

K I agree & if they do it openly it will be one credit to you. Nancy thinks if you cut off aid to I you would be a little hero.

Should we get Cong. leaders to Paul W. & leave or wait until we have an agreement

P I think it better to wait til we have an agreement.

K (Some discussion of PFIAB mtg.) Topics will be <sup>weakness</sup> ~~strength~~ of that estimate, low winter activity, & more emphasis on low until they overbore that estimate but, but they could be improved.

On a winter, DOD is particularly. You may want to divert accelerated action here.

