



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330114

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

14 January 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ahmad Muhamman Yaqub
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Ahmed Muhammad, Abdul Jabar, Hamad Muhammad Hamad, Hamat, Sorgol
- Place of Birth: Artush, China (CH)
- Date of Birth: 1 May 1978
- Citizenship: China
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9CH-000328DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall fair health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 1 March 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee was a leading member of Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan (AF).¹ Detainee traveled to Afghanistan for training and was reported to be subordinate to senior Usama Bin Laden (UBL) lieutenant

¹ The ETIM is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 2A counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 2A targets are defined as terrorist/extremist groups, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated intention to attack US persons and interests and are taking action to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330114

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330114

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi, aka (Abdul al-Hadi al-Iraqi), ISN US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026) supporting the Taliban. Detainee also associated with senior ETIM members at the ETIM training camp in Tora Bora where detainee admitted receiving weapons training and then served as a weapons instructor. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora and was captured with over 100 al-Qaida and Taliban fighters led by LY-212. Detainee has exhibited continuing support for the ETIM which poses a continuing threat to the US and Coalition interests. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) **Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Updated reporting indicating detainee's membership in the ETIM

4. (U) **Detainee's Account of Events:**

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) **Prior History:** Detainee was a farmer in China, working on the land his father owned. Detainee became frustrated with the Chinese government because they had different "rules" for ethnic Uighurs and detainee could not grow the crops he desired. The Chinese government also persecuted Uighurs, but detainee did not personally experience any persecution.²

b. (S//NF) **Recruitment and Travel:** In November 1994, detainee and fifty other Uighurs traveled from Artush, to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (KG). Fifteen days after the group arrived in Bishkek, representatives from the Chinese government asked the group to return to China. Detainee's brother, Bilal Muhammad Yaqub, urged detainee to stay in Bishkek for an additional three months. After six months, detainee's brother advised detainee not to return to China but to travel to Egypt (EG), and attend school. Detainee left Bishkek in May 1995 and traveled to Kazakhstan (KZ), where he stayed for one month. Detainee then traveled to Turkey (TU), where detainee stayed for three or four days, before continuing to Cairo, EG.

² TD-314/37006-02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

When detainee arrived in Cairo, he immediately went to the Chinese Embassy to extend his passport expiration for two years. During his twenty-three months in Egypt, detainee learned a little Arabic. In June 1997, detainee returned to Bishkek, and remained there for three and a half years. One of detainee's neighbors, Salah al-Din, was a vendor from Turkmenistan who sold cloth in the bazaar. Salah al-Din told detainee about a camp in Afghanistan that trained Uighurs.³

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee told Salah al-Din he wanted to get into better physical shape and receive "military" training. In November 2000, Salah al-Din provided detainee with Iranian and Pakistani visas and a plane ticket from Bishkek to Iran (IR). From Iran, detainee traveled to Afghanistan via Mashhad and Zahedan, IR, to Quetta and Peshawar, Pakistan (PK). After crossing the border into Afghanistan, detainee stayed at the Uighur house in Jalalabad, AF, and then continued to the Uighur training camp located in Tora Bora. Detainee stayed at the Uighur camp for ten months. The local Afghans thought the camp was a "Chechen" camp, but were never corrected because it allowed the group to remain unidentified. Detainee described the camp as a place where one could learn about the Koran, Uighur culture, national identity, and weapons. Detainee chose to train on the AK-47, hand guns, and a bolt action rifle. Detainee denied the Uighur movement was involved with the Taliban or al-Qaida. Detainee trained for two months before becoming sick, at which time detainee traveled to Kabul, AF, for medical treatment. In February 2001, detainee traveled to Rawalpindi, PK, where he received treatment for an additional two months. Upon returning to the Uighur camp in Tora Bora, detainee became a weapons trainer at the camp for one month. Abd al-Haq was in charge of the camp and Abdul Muhsin was in charge of the camp when Abd al-Haq was absent.⁴

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) In November 2001, the US and Coalition bombing campaign destroyed the Uighur camp and detainee and seventeen other Uighurs left Tora Bora and crossed the border into Pakistan. Detainee claimed they stayed in a small village from 16 November 2001 until 15 December 2001. On 15 December 2001, the villagers told detainee and others to go to the Americans so their village would not be bombed.⁵ On 20 December 2001, the group was arrested by Pakistani security forces and transferred from Kohat, PK, to US custody on 5

³ TD-314/37006-02, Analyst Note: Variations of Salah al-Din include Salahuddin and Salahudin.

⁴ TD-314/37006-02, Analyst Note: Variations for Abd al-Haq include (Abdul Haq), (Shaykh Abd al-Haq) and (Abdul Hak). Abd al-Haq was a reported leader of the Uighurs in Tora Bora. Haq was in charge of the Uighur training camp in Tora Bora, and ran a guesthouse in Jalalabad. Abdul Muhsin was a weapons trainer and second in charge of the Uighur training camp in Tora Bora. When the US-led bombing campaign began, Muhsin attempted to evacuate the camp. Muhsin's body was later found, and buried. See IIR 6 034 0421 03 for more information.

⁵ TD-314/37006-02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

January 2002.⁶ According to other JTF-GTMO detainees captured with detainee, when the bombing began in Tora Bora, they abandoned the camp and stayed in the caves in the mountain. They fled Afghanistan four to 10 weeks later with about 100 other fighters and hid in a mosque where Pakistani authorities captured them.⁷ The accounts of these detainees indicate detainee and the other Uighurs fled Afghanistan with a group of al-Qaida and Taliban fighters led by UBL appointed military commander in Tora Bora, Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212). The group crossed the Afghani-Pakistani border in the Nangarhar region in mid-December 2001. Their Pakistani contact convinced them to surrender their weapons and gathered the group in a mosque where Pakistani forces immediately arrested them.⁸

b. (S) Property Held:

- 2,500 Pakistani rupees (PKR)⁹
- A small gray paper with Arabic writing¹⁰

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 3 May 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Training and training facilities at the Uighur, East Turkistan party training camp in Tora Bora
- Uighur safe house in Kabul

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's account of events is misleading with significant information omitted. Detainee's trip to Egypt seems to have occurred with little thought or planning. Detainee states he went directly to the Chinese Embassy when detainee arrived in Egypt. Given detainee's claims of Chinese government persecution of the Uighurs,

⁶ 000328 INITIAL SCREENING 06-JAN-2002, TD-314/00845-02, Analyst Note: Detainee is in paragraph I1; The following Uighurs were captured and detained with detainee: ISN US9CH-000250DP; ISN US9CH-000277DP; ISN US9CH-000280DP; ISN US9CH-000281DP; ISN US9CH-000282DP; ISN US9CH-000285DP; ISN US9CH-000289DP; ISN US9CH-000295DP; and ISN US9CH-000320DP. Detainee was also captured with the following detainees who have been transferred out of US custody: ISN US9CH-000279DP; ISN US9CH-000293DP; ISN US9CH-000283DP; US9CH-000260DP; and ISN US9CH-000276DP.

⁷ >IIR 6 034 0314 03, IIR 6 034 0443 03, 000277 SIR 09-Dec-2003, IIR 034 0332 03, 000278 SIR 02-Dec-2002, 000281 KB 13-Jun-2002, IIR 6 034 1372 03

⁸ >IIR 7 739 3396 02, Withdrawal from Tora Bora

⁹ Analyst Note: In January 2001, 2500 PKR is approximately \$43.60 US.

¹⁰ Analyst Note: Paper appears to have detainee's name in Arabic and "B 2500/=" in English

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

this would be highly unlikely. The Chinese Embassy in Cairo would have checked detainee's visa status and perhaps had Egyptian authorities extradite him back to China. Detainee stated he did not think any group ran the Uighur camp in Tora Bora; however, several other detainees who were captured with detainee stated it was an ETIM camp supported by al-Qaida. Detainee was identified as meeting with high-ranking al-Qaida member IZ-10026, yet detainee claims he never met anyone from al-Qaida.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a leading member of ETIM and was subordinate to IZ-10026 supporting the Taliban. Detainee occupied an al-Qaida guesthouse and was associated with senior ETIM members in Afghanistan. Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora and was captured with over 100 al-Qaida and Taliban fighters led by LY-212. Detainee admitted receiving weapons training and then served as a weapons instructor at the ETIM training camp in Tora Bora. Detainee has exhibited continuing support for the ETIM which poses a continuing threat to the US and Coalition interests.

- (S//NF) Detainee is a leading member of the ETIM and was subordinate to senior UBL lieutenant IZ-10026 supporting the Taliban in probably 2000.
 - (S//NF) Haytugan Bakberganovich Abahanov, ISN US9KZ-000526 (KZ-526, transferred), reported detainee was a member of the ETIM. KZ-526 stated he knew detainee since 2000 when he met detainee in Afghanistan.¹¹
 - (S//NF) Detainee resided in caves in Tora Bora along with numerous other ETIM members with whom he was captured.¹² When asked about his feelings prior to joining the ETIM, detainee did not deny joining the ETIM.¹³
 - (S//NF) Abdul Zahir, ISN US9AF-000753DP (AF-753), identified detainee as a leader in the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT). AF-753 stated detainee was subordinate to IZ-10026 and detainee and his troops resided at the al-Qaida Ashara Guesthouse (Guesthouse 10) in Kabul. AF-753 also stated the IMT group fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance in order to receive militant training

¹¹ >000536 SIR 13-MAY-2005

¹² IIR 6 034 1213 03, 000281 KB 13-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0719 02

¹³ >000328 SIR 06-Aug-2004

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

from the Taliban, and Taliban assistance in freeing the IMT from Chinese oppression. Abu Muhammad was the leader of this group.¹⁴

- (S//NF) Analyst Note: It is assessed AF-753 mis-identified the ETIM as the IMT in his identification of detainee. The confusion may have been due to similarities in the facial structure of members of the ETIM and IMT, coordination between the ETIM and IMT, and ill-defined lines of separation between the central Asian groups operating in Afghanistan.¹⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee reported one of the Uighur camp commanders, Abd al-Haq or Hassan Mahsum, was possibly aka (Muhammad).¹⁶ CH-278 reported Hasan Mahsum was Abu Muhammad, who he further identified as a member of the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP).¹⁷ (Analyst Note: The Muhammad/Abu Muhammad discussed by detainee, CH-278, and AF-753 is assessed to be the same individual.)
- (S//NF) GZ-10016 reported Abu Muhammad, leader of a group of Turkistani mujahideen, was working with al-Qaida to target Chinese in Turkmenistan.¹⁸ Abu Muhammad was also reported to be in close and regular contact with Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and had established relations with the Taliban and IMU between the years 2000 and 2002.¹⁹
- (S//NF) Other JTF-GTMO detainees identified detainee as the Uighur leader in Tora Bora.
 - (S//NF) CH-279 identified detainee's alias, Hamat, as the leader of the Uighurs in the Tora Bora caves. CH-279 stated detainee would leave the cave to obtain food for the group and noted their cave contained two or three Kalashnikovs.²⁰ (Analyst Note: Detainee derived his leadership from the established leadership position he held at the Uighur camp.)

¹⁴ >IIR 6 034 0305 03, IIR 6 034 0312 03, IIR 6 034 0243 03, Analyst Note: In May 2005, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) changed its name to Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT) and the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG, a splinter group of the IMU) changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in order to broaden the scope of their objectives and recruiting pool. The IJU and IMU are NIPF Priority 1B CT targets. Priority 1B targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests.

¹⁵ >TD-314/21150-01, IIR 6 034 0838 02

¹⁶ >000328 302 23-JUL-2003, Analyst Note: Variants of Mahsum include Makhsum and Mahsen.

¹⁷ >000278 302 11-Jun-2002

¹⁸ TD-314/28460-03

¹⁹ China Reexamining ETIMs Terrorist Links 4-OCT-2002

²⁰ >000279 302 12-Jul-2003

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

- (S//NF) ISN 295 identified detainee's alias, Hamad, as the individual who led the other Uighurs into the mountains at Tora Bora where they stayed in a cave for about two months.²¹
- (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces in Tora Bora.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted fleeing to the caves in Tora Bora after the US bombing campaign began. Detainee stated he stayed there for about a month before fleeing to Pakistan with Arabs.
 - (S//NF) Analyst Note: There are distinct discrepancies in the capture statements from the Uighur detainees. Examples include time spent in the caves in Tora Bora ranging from four weeks to two and a half months. Another is a common claim that they did not see any Arabs at the caves until they fled, while CH-281 reported seeing a steady influx of Arabs into the caves in Tora Bora. Several detainee's reported they used hand signals to communicate with the fleeing Arabs while another reported Afghans placed the Uighurs with the Arabs and third detainee stated he asked the Arabs if the Uighurs could join them. Many report they and the Arabs were not carrying weapons, while CH-280 stated he joined the fleeing Arabs because some were carrying rifles. Lastly, most claim they had no weapons in Tora Bora, but CH-279 reported the caves they occupied in Tora Bora had food, supplies, and Kalashnikovs in them. It is assessed the Uighur caves were part of the defensive lines established by UBL and his commanders in Tora Bora, the Uighurs were armed in Tora Bora, and fled Tora Bora with the remaining extremist fighters led by LY-212.
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted receiving militant training and then served as a weapons instructor at the ETIM camp located in Tora Bora.²²
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated he chose to train on the AK-47, hand guns, and a bolt action rifle. Detainee trained for two months and became a weapons trainer at the camp for one month.²³
 - (S//NF) CH-277 identified detainee's alias, Hamad, as a Kalashnikov assault rifle instructor at the Uighur training camp in Tora Bora.²⁴ CH-295 also identified detainee's alias, Hamad, as a weapons instructor at the Uighur camp.²⁵

²¹ 000295 SIR 03-Dec-2002, 000295 Screening Notes 16-Feb-2002

²² TD-314/37006-02

²³ TD-314/37006-02, Analyst Note: Variations for Abd al-Haq include (Abdul Haq), (Shaykh Abd al-Haq) and (Abdul Hak). Abd al-Haq was a reported leader of the Uighurs in Tora Bora. Haq was in charge of the Uighur training camp in Tora Bora, and ran a guesthouse in Jalalabad. Abdul Muhsin was a weapons trainer and second in charge of the Uighur training camp in Tora Bora. When the US-led bombing campaign began, Muhsin attempted to evacuate the camp. Muhsin's body was later found, and buried. See IIR 6 034 0421 03 for more information.

²⁴ >IIR 6 034 0443 03, 000277 SIR 09-Dec-2003

²⁵ IIR 6 034 0410 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee and other JTF-GTMO detainees identified the commanders of the Uighur training camp in Tora Bora as Abd al-Haq and Hassan Mahsum.²⁶ As of May 2005, Abd al-Haq assumed command of ETIM due to the reported death of Hassan Mahsum.²⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee continues to demonstrate support for the ETIM. The ETIM and other extremist Uighur group associate with al-Qaida and the Taliban, and pose a continuing threat to US and Coalition interests.
 - (S//NF) When asked about his affiliation with the ETIM, detainee “stubbornly” refused to answer any questions.²⁸ (Analyst Note: Detainee’s refusals indicate probable continuing support for the ETIM.)
 - (S//NF) In May 2002, the ETIM conducted surveillance against US diplomats and other US persons in Bishkek. Police detained some of the ETIM members in connection with the surveillance. In June 2002, sketches of US embassies in Bishkek and Almaty, Kazikstan, were recovered during a raid on a safe house in Karachi, PK, occupied by IMU-linked ethnic Uighurs. The sketches were reportedly to be used by senior al-Qaida member Mustafa Nazar Setmariam, aka (Abu Musab al-Suri), in attack planning.²⁹
 - (S//NF) Senior UBL lieutenant, Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), described the relationship between ETIM and al-Qaida as a positive one. GZ-10016 further stated al-Qaida financially backed the ETIM. GZ-10016 confirmed al-Qaida participated in the training of ETIM personnel.³⁰ (Analyst Note: It is unknown if detainee received militant training from any al-Qaida members.)

c. (U//FOUO) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant but rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 24 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 21 March 2007, when he participated in mass disturbance. He only has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault occurring on 7 December 2006, when he spit on a guard. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, threatening guards, provoking words and gestures, and attempted assault. In 2006, detainee had a total of 16 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and six in 2007.

²⁶ IIR 2 340 6367 02, IIR 6 034 0838 02, IIR 6 034 0410 03

²⁷ IIR 2 340 6711 02, IIR 6 034 0429 03, Analyst Note: Hassan Mahsum was an ETIM leader and facilitated the immigration of Uighurs from China and Central Asia to Afghanistan.

²⁸ >000328 SIR 07-Mar-2006, 000328 SIR 09-Mar-2006

²⁹ ACIC Terrorist Threat Assessment Kyrgyzstan 01-NOV-2004, KGZ MCS National Military Overview 30-April-2003, Analyst Note: Abu Musab al-Suri was arrested in Pakistan in late 2005 and detained in his native Syria.

³⁰ TD-314/24155-03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 20 February 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee fled China, likely with the help of extremist elements, and traveled through Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan before arriving at the Uighur camp in Tora Bora. Detainee remained in the Tora Bora region throughout 2001 until he was forced to abandon the region. The Tora Bora area was an al-Qaida stronghold and detainee has been directly linked to IZ-10026. Detainee received and then provided militant training at the camp, indicating his seniority, skills, and likely accepted trust by senior members of the ETIM, including Hassan Mahsum and Abd al-Haq.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has information about the structure, composition, training, leadership, and facilitation supporting the ETIM and other Uighur extremist organizations. Detainee probably has information concerning al-Qaida and specifically IZ-10026 and the possible ETIM support provided to al-Qaida military operations.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Uighur Camp in Tora Bora
 - Weapons training, personnel, logistics
- ETIM/IMT individuals
 - Hassan Mahsum
 - Abd al-Haq
 - Abu Muhammad
- Uighur detainees
- Uighur recruitment
- Terrorist recruitment of juveniles
- Improvised explosive devices

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 5 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9CH-000328DP (S)

v/e.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark H. Buzby". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College
October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.