

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Monday, August 12, 1974
9:00 a. m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: First I thought I would run through things which have happened.

You are speaking in Michigan on Monday or Tuesday.

The President: Al and I must decide on VFW, American Legion or both.

Kissinger: I had agreed to go to the American Legion on Tuesday.
I should cancel if you are going to talk to them.

The President: If you are going to talk to them, I should go to the VFW.

Kissinger: There shouldn't be a basis of comparison between our
addresses. I'd be glad to cancel.

The President: Months ago I had agreed to go to VFW. Now the Legion
has asked. I can go to Chicago and you to Miami.


Kissinger: I would reaffirm your foreign policy in my speech.

The President: We must be sure our speeches are in agreement. I had
an interesting afternoon yesterday and will discuss it with you later.
It's better one-on-one than in group meeting.

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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NSC MEMO, NSC 68, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/9/04
BY WA, NARA, DATE 2/25/07



Kissinger: You had a positive response from Sadat to your letter. He wants to come in November. There was also a warm response from Syria, which is even more surprising. Now they have agreed to send their Foreign Minister next week. Could you have a lunch for him?

The President: Okay.

Kissinger: Could we have a lunch for three for Fahmy? Then we could have the office meeting just twenty minutes before.

The President: Okay.

Kissinger: The Japanese want to reconfirm your trip. It would be a good move to make this your first foreign policy announcement. No date -- just the trip.

The President: Will it be all right to go?

Kissinger: You never can guarantee, but this is the best time.

The President: It has to be after Thanksgiving and before the 15th.

Kissinger: You might want to go elsewhere also, but not too many places. Maybe Korea. You would receive a big welcome, but could be a bad reaction here if their repression continues.

[Mrs. Ford calls.]

The President: The Hussein dinner will be on Friday, not on Thursday.

Kissinger: The guest list is flexible. We will note the "musts" on the list.

The President: How about a lunch by Betty.

Kissinger: I suggest Nancy, so Mrs. Ford doesn't set a precedent.

[The call ends.]

Kissinger: There are many places you could go -- the Philippines, Indonesia, South Vietnam.



The President: My quick reaction would be South Vietnam and Indonesia.

Kissinger: You can't go to Thailand. The PRC is difficult. There has been no return visit. They asked Nixon back, but dropped that with Watergate.

The President: Japan is firm and we will talk about the others.

Kissinger: On Cyprus, the Turks have accepted that they will settle for general commitment rather than specifics, but the total is sizeable. They will put it in Geneva as their proposal, but maybe Callaghan should. He is trying to hit a home run and take sides. I learned to stay out and let all the parties jockey. A Turkish military intervention becomes less likely as time goes on and we are dragging things out.

The President: Did I read that Greek and Turkish Cypriot troops are withdrawing?

Kissinger: No. There has been some fighting and the Turks have agreed to eventual withdrawal.

The longer Callaghan is tough, the better our position with the Turks becomes. The Turks have already favorably compared the US with the UK. This is interesting because we have been cutting back Turkey's options.

The President: I read your Cyprus book. Tasca's cables are interesting.


Hartmann has taken in all the stuff for my speech from the Departments and I would like to go over the foreign policy parts with you.

Kissinger: Any time.

The President: I will look it over first. Probably around lunch.

Kissinger: I am free until 4:00 p.m.

On the Middle East problem -- you will be seeing a number of Middle East ministers over the coming weeks. The actors: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan are the principals. Then other Arabs. Then the Soviet Union. Then the Europeans and Japan. Our job is to find a policy which relates all those problems to each other.



First, after 1967 I operated on the basis of the historical illusion that the Arabs were militarily impotent, and U.S. support was firm. Rabin told me, "We never had it so good." That was true as long as they could defeat the Arabs and we supported them. I had a misconception of our strategy. Between 1967 and 1974, Egypt and Syria were essentially Soviet satellites. In Egypt we had a low-level Interests Section and in Syria we had nothing. Our strategy during this period was . . . we always try to have a simple strategy but complicated tactics. We like complicated tactics, not for their own sake because we want the other parties committed first so we can sell our support to keep things fluid. We try to create a need for an American role before we give it -- to ensure that both parties are ready. That we changed last spring. This was good strategy except with the Soviet Union, where we have to be simple, direct, and clear. In the Mideast before the October War, we tried to create such frustrations that the Arabs would leave the Soviet Union and come to us. We didn't want the impression that Soviet pressure produces results -- that it had to be us. The Soviets could give only arms.

We didn't expect the October War.

The President: But wasn't it helpful?

Kissinger: We couldn't have done better if we had set the scenario.

The President: Even the heavy Israeli losses helped, didn't they?

Kissinger: Once the war started, we helped Israel stabilize the situation. But it was not without a cost they couldn't sustain. Their casualties were enormous and had enormous impact. But they restored the situation and reversed some Arab cockiness -- but the Arabs know Israel can't stand attrition.

The most moderate Arabs are the Jordanians. The most consistently moderate are the Egyptians. They almost broke with the Soviet Union and will be bellweathers to future progress. The most erratic are the Syrians. For them -- radicals -- to sign a document with Israel was a monumental event.

The other players -- Saudi Arabia. Faisal is a kook but a shrewd cookie. He is in a position where all Arabs come to him.



The President: Is it him or his advisors?

Kissinger: It is him. He used to be the Foreign Minister. He has a standard pitch on Jews. The first time I went, his speech to me was that all Jews are bad. They are cowards, who are mentioned unfavorably in the Koran. The second time I went, he pointed out he recognized the difference between Jews and Zionists. The third time, the Foreign Minister said he didn't consider me a Jew but a human being. [Laughter] You might consider inviting him next year.

The President: Has he ever been here?

Kissinger: The second time over. With Nixon. On the left, there is Libya and Iraq. Algeria is a key. We will try to use your accession to restore diplomatic relations.

Then the Soviet Union. They lost Egypt and they are in trouble in Syria. It is becoming a movement in Iraq. Egypt was an enormous commitment of prestige and they have suffered badly.

It is not true that they started the October War -- they opposed it but didn't try to stop it. The problem was they supported the Arabs but not enough. They tried to work a line between supporting the Arabs and not antagonizing us. We can't let Israel win the next war too heavily. Soviet intervention would be almost inevitable.

Europe is fearful of oil pressures and is eager to restore their former position in the Middle East. Right now they are in check because they are afraid if they interfere with American policy things will go bad and the embargo will be imposed again.

The Arabs' demand is for the 1967 frontiers. Israel considers that these would be the end of Israel. The country was only 12 kilometers wide in some places. Almost all of Israel would be under SAM coverage.

The Palestinians' rights are undefined and Jerusalem very complicated.

The basic strategy has been this: Israel can't stand and we can't handle dealing with all these issues at once. That is what the Soviet Union wants. That would guarantee a stalemate and a war. We must move step by step, which will make further steps possible. Israel says another



Golan move is the last one. That is impossible but it is very difficult. To keep that last, we must move with Jordan or Egypt.

I have the instinct Rabin wanted to pull with Nixon what he did in 1971 -- produce a stalemate with abstract proposals and rely on American public opinion. They don't mind the Arabs being with the Soviet Union as long as it is not extreme. From 1967 to 1973 the situation was ideal for Israel. The Arabs can't make peace because they don't know how to settle the Palestinian issue. Israel can't either, because Jerusalem would burst their domestic structure. But they would like Sadat to formally end belligerency. Egypt can't do it, but maybe they can take the appropriate steps without a formal statement.

The President: Such as?

Kissinger: No blockade; Israeli cargo permitted through the Suez Canal.

The President: How is the Suez clearance going?

Kissinger: It can be completed by the end of the year. Sadat wants our advice on whether to hurry or delay. A delay is not worth it.

The Soviets want Geneva to open quickly. We don't because the Soviet Union will try to maneuver us into being Israel's lawyer. The last time, we opened and closed quickly, but it will be tougher the next time. So we want to set something up beforehand. But we can't humiliate the Soviet Union. We have to open Geneva by November, but keep it in a low key.

I told Dinitz that Rabin should ask to see you. They don't want to, because they are afraid you will pressure them to move and they don't want to. We can't stall till hell freezes over, like Israel wants.

The President: What is your timetable?

Kissinger: If Sadat knows what he will get, he will wait. Your talks with Sadat will be important.

The President: Should I see Rabin before or after I see Sadat?

Kissinger: Israel wants after, but that's tougher. We wanted to complete Jordan first, but a cable today showed that is not possible. The problem



in Jordan is the Palestinians backed by the radical states. Israel is afraid that a Palestinian state would be radical. Yet the Israeli Government needs the Religious Party to govern and their religion says they must have all of Israel to govern. So a new election must be held if any territory is to be given up, and the government is afraid of the results.

We are trying to get Israel to negotiate with Jordan and give back some of the West Bank. Then we can say the issue is between Jordan and the PLO. Then we can stay out of the triangle -- Jordan, Israel and Arafat.

I made progress with Allon on a scheme which might work. If Egypt will wait, we are in grand shape. If Egypt has to go first, we are okay, if Egypt will keep the Palestinians quiet. If they want simultaneous negotiations, we are in trouble.

If there is a blow-up, Europe and Japan would support the Arabs. There should be no illusions about that.

If you could go with Jordan first, the negotiations would give us a 3-4 months breather.

On Syria, Israel can't give up all the Golan, but it can be more flexible. The problem is the settlements they have right up to the line. We use your newness to delay.

This is the context of Israeli supply. Defense can't use the Israel-Arab process to put the monkey on your and my back.

The President: It is better if the problem is logistics rather than political.

Kissinger: Yes. You can control the taps.

The President: Allon told me about their shortage of military equipment. Is that true?

Kissinger: Yes. But we have tanks in storage in Europe. Supply is our big card now.

They have a \$5 billion authorization they would like you to put in all at once to draw on over the next three years.

The President: I think we should hold them off until we see their attitude. That is a hole card we control. I'm not sure Congress would jump at something like this with the current inflation.



Kissinger: There would be an explosion in the Arab world with the \$5 billion they proposed. It should be done in the context of ongoing negotiations and getting back Arab territory. We got the FMS to go through that way.

The critical issue is Egyptian military equipment. The Soviet Union is turning them off. If that continues, the military will have to turn out Sadat or go back to the Soviet Union. We are trying to get others to give parts to Egypt, but sooner or later we have to face up to it. We have had talks on equipping them through Saudi Arabia. The first step would be to send it to Saudi Arabia and let Egyptian troops train in it. The legal problem would come up if equipment filtered to Egypt.

Saudi Arabia is willing to use 200 million for Egypt and DOD has broken out a package which makes sense.

The President: What are they talking about?

Scowcroft: F-4s, TOWs. I will bring a list tomorrow.

Kissinger: The thing we have going with the Arabs is that we deliver and we treat them gentler than the Soviet Union.

With Fahmy you can avoid getting into this or talk. If you talk, I recommend a sympathetic approach, but point out that it presents bureaucratic problems and you need to get control first. At present, DOD would leak.

The President: I agree. What would be the DOD position?

Kissinger: Clements would agree. Schlesinger would agree on the surface but his actual position would depend on his political assessment. Brown is okay. Ellsworth I can't assess.

The President: Ellsworth is a team player -- first class.

Kissinger: There is no philosophical objection by Schlesinger but he would try to shift responsibility out of DOD.

If you could indicate sympathy, but say we have a big problem with the bureaucracy and Congress.



First, the sales to Saudi Arabia are no problem. But before they give it to Egypt you would have to tell Congress.

Even Israel should be willing to go along, because we could control resupply.

The President: I would think it would be better for us than the Soviet Union to control their resupply.

Kissinger: Yes, but it will be traumatic for them and all hell will break loose here.

To cut Egypt off will certainly force Egypt back to the Soviet Union.

The President: Domestically, it will depend on Egypt's willingness to make a reasonable settlement with Israel.

Kissinger: Sadat is wise. He has to make tough statements because he has his own constituency. We have a fine relationship with him. Israel has had exercises to scare them. The Egyptian Chief of Staff got intemperate with me and Sadat calmed him down. He is relaxed about it now.

The President: Is he a good leader?

Kissinger: Egyptians aren't great soldiers like the Israeli soldiers. But he is a decent, competent military leader.

The Middle East is the worst problem we face. The oil situation is the worst we face. We talk again. But we can't afford another embargo. If we are faced with that, we may have to take some oil fields.

The President: Like the Gulf and Iran.

Kissinger: Not Iran. I oppose Simon because Iran wouldn't join an embargo.

The President: How do we do it without contingency plans?

Kissinger: DOD is doing that along with other contingency plans. It would be helpful if you said to Fahmy that an oil embargo would face you with a difficult situation.

The President: Let's talk Wednesday morning about Fahmy's strategy.



Kissinger: Great, and I'll talk oil strategy then.

Our energy actions are going well. The key elements of our proposal -- even oil sharing -- are being accepted. I'll brief on this Wednesday also.

In October we should get the key producers together to talk next steps -- not military action. One thing would be to get Europe not to buy beyond a certain price and have a sharing program to help out in case of any selective boycott. The key element is Project Independence.

The President: It seems to have languished.

Kissinger: Sawhill doesn't have the power to push it. The best way to get a handle on all this is through Project Independence. You are in a great position to get allied cooperation which is unprecedented since the 40's.

The President: I want an updating on Project Independence. Part of the problem is Congress.

Kissinger: There is too much bureaucracy involved.

The President: Also Scoop and ERDA and getting all the agencies working together. We are playing a funny game.

Kissinger: We tentatively scheduled a lunch for Wednesday, but Thursday is better.

The President: You want me?

Kissinger: We better have you unless it will be a failure.

The President: I got involved in the Kudirka case. They wanted me to talk to Nixon.

I talked to John Dean -- someone told me to. Dean told me to write a letter to Dobrynin.

Kissinger: May I suggest the following: They will turn down a formal proposal. But when Dobrynin comes back, I will do it quietly as a personal request.



The President: That would be most helpful.

Kissinger: If it doesn't get into their bureaucracy.

We have great opportunities with the Soviets now.

The President: Dobrynin never answered and I didn't follow up.

Kissinger: We have a channel privately and not in writing. I think we have a good channel with the Soviet Union on everything. They are waiting for a specific proposal on SALT. I think they will want to settle in '75.

The President: That would help the election in '76.



P-HAR 12 Aug 74

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY WJ, NARA, DATE 3/25/04

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

state review 3/1/04

with chairs
it w/ you later.

K - I know there things which have
happened.

Your speaking on Arabization
on Monday or Tuesday

P - At + I must discuss on VFA
on to a host

K - I had agreed on front lines
I should come if you going
to talk to them

P - If you going, I should go
to UFW to talk to them

K - Shouldn't be a basis of marginalism
business on address.
I be glad to come

P - How many I had agreed to
go to UFW. Now they
has asked. I come
to Chicago + you to
Miami. Marsella



K - I would mention your F-Pair
P - We must be sure our efforts
are in agreement
Had interest of them better ^{4/1/74} ~~be~~ ^{done}
on our changing way.

K - You had position require from
Salat. ^{higher level} ~~the~~ wants to come in Nov.
Was ^{refuse} ~~also~~ from Syria. ^{what some company} Now they
has agreed to send ^{FBI} ~~someone~~
next week. Could you have a
book for him?

P - OK

K - Could we have lunch for 3 per
Fahmi. Then for a city post
20 min before.

P - OK

K - Japs want reception your
trip. It would be a good time
to make this your 1st F-Pair
ment. No det - just time.

P - Will it be all right to go?

A/Es. When can you enter, but

~~Hossein announced today~~

* Wed at 11:30 - in meeting
Japan before and after
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this best time

P. Have to be after Thanksgiving &
before 15th

K You might want to go elsewhere
too, but not too many places.
Maybe Kuala. Big ^{welcome} ~~welcome~~ but
small has had reactions of their
expressions continues.

(Mrs Ford calls)

Hossein dinner Fri w/ on
Thurs.

K Guest list for Fri. we will write -
"invites" on the list

P How about lunch by Betty

K ^{I suggest} ~~Should be~~ money to ^{Wm Ford dinner} ~~that set~~
president

(Call ends)

K May places you would go. Phil,
Indonesia, SRI

P My pick reaction would be
SRI & Indonesia

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K Good. I will go to Tehran. PRC
diff. No return visit. They asked
N back, but dropped that w/
Washington.

P Japan firm, & will talk about
costs.

K On Cyprus, Turks have accepted
that they will settle for ^{control} ~~control~~
rather than 1 once, but total
is seized. They will put in
Geneva as this proposal, but maybe
Callaghan should. He is trying to
but have run + takes sides. I
don't want to stay out + let a pack
go.

Turkish mil. intervention becomes
less likely as time goes on & we are
dragging things out

P Pd 2 said that G & T Cyprus temp
are w/drawing.

K No. There - has been some

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slighting + Trucks have agreed
to essential w/ demand.

Karger Callaghan is tough, & better
own position w/ Trucks because Trucks
have already favorably compared VSW
OK. Interestingly because we have been
writing back Truck options.

P I need your Cyprus book.
Tosca ^{copies} also interesting.

Hastings has taken in all stuff
for my ^{spreads} from Dept + I would like to go over
FP part w/ you

K Any time.

P I must be it was 1st. Probably
around lunch.

H I see til 4 p

On ME problem - you to allow
of ME countries even every
week.

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The actors: I, E, Squire, John
amphibians. Then other
Arms. Then SV. Then E, for
One part is getting which relates
all these parts to each other.

|| I first:

April 67 I spent on basis of
historical ^{stitch} relations - Arms too vital.
important, US suggest form - Rabin
told me "we never had it so good."

True as long as they could defeat Arabs
& not suggested them. I had mission-
ception of ~~arms~~
10 re shipping. Bet 1962 + 74 E +

Squire were essentially Sec & athletes.
In E we had low level interests
reaction & in Squire we had nothing.

One strategy during this period was:
"Always try to have simple strategy
but complicated to discuss & like

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^{not for ourselves}
 complicated tactics, because we
 would either justify ourselves or let us
 we can sell our support. Key
 things found. We try to ^{create} ~~make~~ need
 for it before we give it -
 ensure both parties are ready. That
 we did last spring. This one
 just starting. Forget W/SU where
 we ^{found the} ~~found~~ almost x check.
 In ME ^{high octane} ~~high~~ held to control and
 function. Arabs would leave SU
 & come to us. We didn't want a
 impression that Saw pressure
 produced results - that it had
 to be us. Saw could give away
 arms.

We didn't expect it set work.

P Best would it help!

K We could not have done better if
 we had set seen in's.

~~Interest helped - P comment~~

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P - Even the heavy I ~~was~~ helped, didn't they?
 K - Once was started, not helped
 I ~~think~~ ^{think} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~not~~ ^{not}
 They ~~can't~~ ^{can't} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~not~~ ^{not}
 security at ~~moment~~ ^{moment} & deal
 enormous ~~ing~~ ^{ing} it. But they ~~rested~~
~~for~~ ^{for} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~remove~~ ^{remove} ~~some~~ ^{some} ~~Arab~~
~~enquiries~~ ^{enquiries} - but Arab ~~know~~
 can't stand ~~attribution~~ ^{attribution}.

Most ~~muslim~~ ^{muslim} ~~Arabs~~ ^{Arabs} ~~one~~ ^{one} ~~just~~ ^{just} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ
 most ~~unstructured~~ ^{unstructured} ~~muslim~~ ^{muslim} ~~are~~ ^{are} ~~E~~ ^E
 They almost ~~like~~ ^{like} ~~W/SU~~ ^{W/SU} & will be
~~fall~~ ^{fall} ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~purpose~~ ^{purpose} ~~most~~ ^{most}
~~enatic~~ ^{enatic} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~expensive~~ ^{expensive} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~seize~~ ^{seize} ~~radicals~~ ^{radicals}
 & ~~dream~~ ^{dream} ~~with~~ ^{with} I was a ~~monumental~~ ^{monumental}

Other ~~players~~ ^{players} - SA - Fiscal
 a ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~keep~~ ^{keep} ~~but~~ ^{but} a ~~deba~~ ^{deba} ~~threat~~ ^{threat}
~~coke~~ ^{coke}. He is in a ~~position~~ ^{position}
 where all ~~Arabs~~ ^{Arabs} ~~come~~ ^{come} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~him~~ ^{him}
 P Is it him or ~~advisor~~ ^{advisor}
 K It is him. Use it to be ~~FAN~~ ^{FAN}

They could also international
unpleasantly in a Row.

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He has standard pitch on Jones -
1st - ^{his speech to members} Congress, Mr. Jones had - ~~He~~
2nd - ^{the present point} to the Congress, first 2 years
→ 3rd - ^{the present point} to the Congress, first 2 years
You might ^{consider} ~~have~~ ^{be} ~~in~~ ^{the} ~~meeting~~
from next year
P E are here here?

K Second time - Oscar with N
On left of Frank. Algeria
a key. Will try to use your accession
to set us dip. up.

Then SO, last E, entrance
in Syria. Being more
I say. E was constant of
pressure they have suffered
badly

But they will then they started
it was - I say of passed it
but didn't try to stop it

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* But was they suggested on Feb
but not enough. They tried to
work a deal between my party -
Arens + not antagonizing us.
* ~~But~~ ~~we~~ ~~can't~~ ~~let~~ ~~I~~ ~~win~~ ~~with~~
war - Sir intercession would
~~be~~ ~~almost~~ ~~impossible~~.
Euro - transfer of Oil reserves,
Leys, Austria their former
position in A.E. Right now
they in UK because they
opposed if they vote as I am
fearing they will go back + embargo
will be logical again.

On the demand is for 67 parties
I envision those would be end
of I. ^{in some places.} ~~has~~ ~~enough~~ ~~only~~ ~~12~~
with a ~~close~~ ~~all~~ ~~it~~ ~~would~~ ~~be~~
under S.A.M. example. Rules
rights independent + freedom
very emphatic.
Booze strategy - I can't

NE Group Thompson

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stand & we can't handle dealing
w/ all that mess at once - that
what SO wants. That would
generate statements & more.
We ^{must} make step by step - which
will make further steps possible.
I say SO has more but one. That
is possible but it is very difficult.
To keep that but, we must move
w/ Jordan or E.
I have instructed Rubin wanted to
pull on N what he did in 71, produce
statements w/ abstract proposals &
rely on US push again. They don't
warrant Arabs w/ SO as long as not
attitude 61-73 set a deal ~~proposed~~.
Arabs can't make peace & understand
how to settle the Palestinians.
I don't enter because Jerusalem
would be a threat their domestic situation

NE Group Thompson just list

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that they would like to ^{formally} ~~start~~ end talking. I can't, but
maybe they can take appropriate
w/o formal statement.
P. Soch ~~is~~? ...
K. We should, I suppose than say
P. ^{is sure clearance?} ~~There's that~~ ~~isn't it~~?
It can be completed
in 1/2 year or 1 year. So let's write
and check whether to bring or
delay. Delay not worth it.
So we can't ~~be~~ to agree quickly.
We don't, because SO try to increase
no into being I know - but
that we expect & expect quickly, but
try in next time. So we would
set something up beforehand.
But we can't know what SO think
to get clearance by New, but keep
in low key.



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I told Dinty Rubin should come to see you. They don't want to be case they fear you will pressure them to move & they don't want to. We can't start to look for you like I want.

P What is your timetable?

V If Sadat knows what he will get he will wait. You talk w/ Sadat would be important

P Rubin before or after Sadat?

K I want after, but that tough. We wanted to complete Jordan 1st but absolutely should not possible. Part in Jordan is paleo, backed by radicals ^{states}. I press paleo state, which would be radical, yet I don't need Rad. Party to gain & religious say they must have all ^{first} to gain.

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So now the time must be held on any term, given up, & great fears & results.

We trying to get I to nego. w/ Jordan & give back some w/ Bank. I have we can say a issue is left of I. Then we can stay out of through Jordan, I, & Arabat.

I would pay w/ all on what on a home which might work. If E will wait, we in good shape. If E has to go 1st, well if E will keep Poto quiet. If they want simult. nego, we in trouble.

If a bump, E not pay would support Arab. No illusions about that.

If could go Jordan ^{first} then would find 2-4 more members.

On Sept 1st, can't give up all Baran, but can be more movement.

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Rest is settlements ~~as~~ under
line. We want your resources
to delay.

This is context of I supply. Def
cant use I-A process to put a
boundary on your & my bank.

P Better if prob is logistic rather
than pol.

K Yes. You can control a log.

P ~~Can~~ told me about ~~of~~ shortage
of military equip.

K Yes. But we have tanks in storage
in E. Supply is a big
lead now.

They have a 5 bid authority
they would like you to put in all
~~about~~ ^{about} 10 chairs or over ³ years.

P I think we should hold them off
til we see their attitude. I had
a book and we control.
Not sure they would pass at



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~~Something~~ like this, w/ current
inflation.

K There would be objection in
Arab world w/ 5 bil proposal. Should
be done in context of ~~the~~ ^{the} getting
back Arab. Country. We got
FOX to support that way.

Current issue is E mid. Egypt.
So is trying to make off. If that continues
mid will have to turn out Saudi
or go back to SO. We trying to get
others to give parts to E, but some
or both we have to pay up to it.

We have had talks on Egypt thru
SA. First step would be to SA
let E buy hardware. legal
partner would come up Egypt federal
to E.

SA willing to use 200 mil &
DoD has broken out a package

Bring E with list tomorrow

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What makes sense.

P What they talking about

F-4, T-28, I bring list tomorrow

K The thing we have going, is we deliver + we treat them gentler than
SU.

W/F show you can avoid getting into his or talk. If you talk, I see, sympathy, ^{two} ^{of} ^{providing} ^{with} ^{present} ^{and} ^{it} presents preservation notes + you need to get control, ^{at} ^{present}, DOD would break.

P Dayton. What would be DOD parts

K Clements would open. ^{Walter} Sch would down surface but actual picture would depend on his subit, assessment - Brown + E Ellsworth can assess

P Ellsworth a team player - 1st class

K No philosophical objection ~~int~~ by Sch but he would try to shift request of DOD

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If you could indicate sympathy, ~~hard~~ ~~to~~ say we have big problem w/ ^{income} ^{money} ^{of} ^{Cong.}

1st sales ~~to~~ SA - no prob. But before give to E, you would have to tell Cong.

E now I should be willing to go along, because we could control supply


P I would think better fee no than SU to control supply

K Yes but would be transmitter fee than + our hell will break loose. have

To cut E off will certainly force E back to SU

P Domestically, it will depend on E willingness to make reasonable settlement w/I

K Samest wise. Ac has to make things



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Statement change he has own
constitency. We have fine
relationship w/ him.
I has had experience to meet him.
E & S got into trouble w/ me & I
calmed him down. He relaxed about
it now.

P Is he good leader

K E would great soldiers - like I Tubman
But he a decent competent and
leader.

Handwritten in a box:
During my trip, Seeloff told Gorman
about I proposal + he said...
I said you can hold out a
for longer longer strategy. A+ excepted +
said will hold on can pay 30 but want pay
any. But if war, I will have over over
in UK hrs. I want to make peace bond
Don't peddle w/ those petty differences

M E the worst part we face.

Out all is worst we face.

We talk again. But we can't

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offered another embargo.
If forced w/ that we may have to
take some out jobs.

P Like Gandy + Jim

K Not sure. I appear similar because
I was worried about you

P How do it w/ a contingency plan?

K DOD doing that along w/ other
contingency plans.

Would be helpful if you said to
Federal oil embargo would force
you w/ dig set.

P Let's talk about a one about Federal
Strategy.

K Good, + I'll talk oil strategy then

One major action going well. The
key element of our proposal - the
strategy is being accepted. I
begin on this w/ oil case.

In Oct we should get keep production



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to get into tank next stage - not
with action. One thing would be
to get car. not to buy long and certain
prices & have some. free to help
out my schedule by with.

Key element is Proj Judges

P Seems to have longish.

K Samhill doesn't have h.p. & push it.

Best way to get a handle on ~~the~~ all this
is Open Proj I. You in great
position to help not very well
improvement since 400

P I want reporting on Proj I
Part of part is Cong.

K There is too much been involved

P Also Scomp + ERDA & getting all
agen in working together. We
playing a funny game.

K We are carefully & check development

wed, but I think better.

P You want me?

K Better have you unless it
won't be finished

P I got involved in Kenidige ^(Latinian) Summer
offer activity. They wanted
me to talk to K

I talked to John Dean - Dean
told me to, Dean told me to
write a letter to Doby.

K Long time past following. They
will turn down a personal report -
we don't eat. But when Doby
comes back, I will do it mostly
as a personal report unofficial

P Would be most helpful

K If it don't get into here break

P We have glad opp of scans work
P Doby was announced & I check
following up.

K We have a chance providing & not
in writing.



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K I think we have good chance
w/ SU on every thing. They
wanting for specific program on
S.A.T. I think they will want
to settle in 25

P T. Hunt would help a lot in
26

