



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330609

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

9 June 2008


MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9TI-001095DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Jumma Jan
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Zain Ulla Bidden,
Zainulabidin Mirajof
- Place of Birth: Qurghonteppa, Tajikistan (TI)
- Date of Birth: 1978
- Citizenship: Tajikistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9TI-001095DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 3 March 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an admitted member of the Taliban who probably served as a Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and Taliban commander. Detainee has strong ties to al-Qaida, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).¹ Detainee is

¹ Analyst Note: The HIG is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) Priority 2 counter terrorism (CT) target. NIPF Priority 2 CT targets are defined as issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the Combatant Commanders or DNI EXCOM Principals, not already identified as Priority 1. This includes terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries

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REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
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suspected as being a participant in the planning and execution of an attack against US and Jordanian forces at Mazar-e-Sharif airport, AF. Detainee is linked to a narcotics network that supported extremist activities in Afghanistan. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Included corroborating reporting indicating detainee was a high level commander for the Taliban.

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended formal schooling through the sixth grade. In 1992 or 1993, detainee's family fled Tajikistan for Afghanistan due to ethnic fighting. Detainee's family settled at the Bag Shirkat Refugee Camp in Afghanistan.² Taliban members did not recruit or reside inside the camp, but Tajik mujahideen, who fought against the Tajikistan government, actively recruited refugees.³ From 1995 to 1997, detainee worked inside the refugee camp selling firewood and as a self-employed brick maker.⁴ In 1997, detainee's father told him to attend religious training in Pakistan (PK). Detainee traveled with several individuals selected by refugee group leader Said Abdullah Nuri.⁵ Upon arrival in Karachi, PK, detainee attended the Abu Bakr Sadiq Madrassa inside the Jadid refugee camp for one year. Detainee then attended the Dar al-Yasinun Koran Madrassa, an

that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests. The IMU is also an NIPF Priority 2 CT target.

² 001095 KB 02-FEB-2004, Analyst Note: In 1992, a large number of Tajik civilians settled in Afghanistan to escape the Tajikistan civil war. Refugee camps became breeding grounds for Tajikistan-based extremist organizations. For more information see 000188 SIR EXT 11-JUN-2002.

³ 001095 SIR 10-OCT-2005

⁴ 001095 KB 02-FEB-2004

⁵ 001095 SIR 22-DEC-2005, Analyst Note: Said Abdullah Nuri is assessed to be Ustad Zaid Abdallah Noori, a former United Tajik Opposition (UTO) leader and Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) chairman. Reference: Muhideen Kubiri Bio.

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official Pakistani madrassa, for two years.⁶ While at Dar al-Yasinun Koran Madrassa, detainee studied religious issues and Pashtu under Imam Qari Mustafa Qul.⁷ Detainee met IMU leader Qari Tahir Jan Uldash while attending the Dar al-Yasinun Koran Madrassa. Qari Tahir Jan Uldash was handing out humanitarian aid inside the refugee camp.⁸ In early 2000, detainee contracted tuberculosis (TB) and returned to Afghanistan. Detainee traveled to Kabul, AF to receive treatment from an individual named Dr. Ayubi.⁹

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In mid 2000, after receiving treatment for TB, detainee met a long-time friend, Aziz Ullah Khoja. Khoja, a Taliban cook, took detainee to the Taliban for employment.¹⁰ Detainee remained with the Taliban for the next eleven months as a driver for Commander Ghuli, a Mazar-e-Sharif area commander.¹¹

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In 2001, after Commander Ghuli's death, detainee began working for Haji Rasheed as a taxi driver, while simultaneously sharecropping poppies on Rasheed's land.¹² Detainee did not work for the Taliban after Ghuli's death. Detainee's reasons for leaving the Taliban were that Ghuli's replacement, Said Rasool was a homosexual and the Taliban constantly beat detainee.¹³ Detainee denied fighting the US during the opening months of Operation Enduring Freedom, since it was poppy season and he was working in the fields.¹⁴ In August 2002, Afghan security forces arrested detainee on theft charges. Detainee was later released after being questioned and fingerprinted.¹⁵ From October 2002 to January 2003, detainee grew opium in a field near Chemtal, AF.¹⁶ In January 2003, detainee attempted to return to Tajikistan but was unable to do so. Detainee drove a tractor for a month before finding employment as a taxi driver in February 2003.¹⁷ In June 2003, detainee harvested and processed the crop of poppy yielding about 4.3 kilograms of heroin. Detainee sold 3 kilograms for 2,900 Afghanis to pay a dowry to detainee's fiancée's father.¹⁸

⁶ 001095 SIR 10-OCT-2005, 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005, Analyst Note: A variant of Dar al-Yasinun Koran is Daroul Ulam Yasin al-Koran.

⁷ 001095 HANDNOTE 11-JUL-2003, 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005

⁸ 001095 HANDNOTE 06-JUL-2003

⁹ 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005

¹⁰ 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005

¹¹ 001095 KB 02-FEB-2004, 001095 HANDNOTE 11-JUL-2003, 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005

¹² 001095 HANDNOTE 11-JUL-2003, 001095 HANDNOTE 23-JUL-2003, 001095 SIR 31-JAN-2005, 001095 SIR 29-SEP-2005, Analyst Note: Detainee was not driving Ghuli when Ghuli's jeep hit a landmine in early 2001.

¹³ 001095 HANDNOTE 24-JUL-2003, 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005

¹⁴ 001095 HANDNOTE 11-JUL-2003

¹⁵ 001095 HANDNOTE 06-JUL-2003, 001095 HANDNOTE 11-JUL-2003

¹⁶ 001095 HANDNOTE 06-JUL-2003

¹⁷ 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005

¹⁸ 001095 HANDNOTE 23-JUL-2003, 001095 HANDNOTE 06-JUL-2003, 001095 FM40 09-SEP-2003, 001095 HANDNOTE 27-AUG-2003

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5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) On 6 July 2003, after several months of surveillance, US Special Forces (USSF) arrested detainee near Said Ghulum Agha's house in Mazar-e-Shariff.¹⁹

b. (S) Property Held:

- List of names printed on Taliban intelligence letterhead
- Memo notebook
- Toyota key
- Money:
 - 10,440 Afghanis²⁰
- Itemized list of auto parts
- Several pieces of paper with foreign and English writing
- Note with references to opium and personal accounts:
 - "Hassan Bye's account is clean/even – 3850 grams"
 - "Malim Sakhi Dad's Account – 20m 750 grams"
 - "Farooq Bye's account – 3200 grams. Opium clear"
- Various personal items including a vial of Penicillin, box of matches, writing pen, cigarettes, mirror, pocket calendar, empty photo album, envelopes containing photographs, business cards, shoes, pair of coveralls, handkerchief, tank top, pocketed vest, pair of pants, and a shirt
- Though not held at JTF-GTMO, detainee reported he held four rolls of film when captured²¹

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 21 November 2003

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Biographical information on Said Rasool, Mazar-e-Sharif-based Taliban commander
- Biographical information on Haji Rasheed
- Drug-related activities and key figures
- Ingress and egress routes into Afghanistan

¹⁹ 001095 SIR 29-SEP-2005, 001095 HANDNOTE 30-AUG-2003, Analyst Note: Said Ghulum was the Assistant Commander of the 53rd Division, Afghan Army, stationed in Sherberghan, AF. Detainee and Ghulum had been friends for over nine years. Reference 001095 HANDNOTE 30-AUG-2003.

²⁰ Analyst Note: 10,440 Afghanis was approximately equivalent to \$244 US on conversion date 6 July 2003.

²¹ 001095 SIR 30-DEC-2005

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6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Multiple allegations link detainee to hostile actions against US and Coalition forces, but detainee continues to deny any association with these actions during his time in Afghanistan. Detainee admitted to being a driver for the Taliban and of his involvement in narcotics trafficking in the Kunduz, AF and Mazar-e-Sharif regions. However, detainee denied engaging in hostilities with US and Coalition forces. Detainee has been cooperative with interrogators over the past two years divulging extensive information regarding the opium trade and his extremist associates involved. No reporting suggests detainee participated in combat or acted as a combatant prior to 2003. Detainee suggested someone had planted the list of names printed on Taliban intelligence letterhead associated with detainee's pocket litter, which is considered highly unlikely.²²

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an admitted member of the Taliban who had direct ties to senior Taliban members. In 2003, detainee was identified as a HIG commander who conducted explosives training with HIG personnel. Detainee was affiliated with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (UZ) extremist personnel active within Afghanistan and is suspected of participating in the planning and execution of an attack against US and Jordanian forces at Mazar-e-Sharif airport. In addition, detainee had ties to the northern Afghan narcotics networks.

- (S//NF) Detainee is an admitted member of the Taliban who probably served as a Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and Taliban commander.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted working as a driver for the Taliban in 2000.²³
 - (S//NF) On 6 July 2003, after six months of surveillance, USSF apprehended detainee based on information from a vetted source (Source #1). Source #1 identified detainee as "Jumma Jan." Also on 6 July 2003, an additional source (Source #2), viewed a photograph of detainee and positively identified him as "Jumma Jan." Source #2 said Jumma Jan was a ranking Taliban member and a current HIG commander, who trained HIG personnel in the use of explosives.²⁴
 - (S//NF) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeab, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), identified detainee as being in charge of a group in Tora Bora. YM-252 added detainee worked for the Taliban and the Arabs, and he was on the front line in

²² 001095 SIR 30-DEC-2005

²³ 001095 HANDNOTE 27-AUG-2003

²⁴ 001095 HANDNOTE 07-JUL-2003, Analyst Note: Variants of Jumma Jan include Jama Jan and Juma Jan.

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- Jalalabad and Mazar-E-Shariff. He described detainee as a radical Tajik refugee who was in charge of Tajiks, Turks, Uzbeks, Chechens, and Azerbaijanians.²⁵
- (S) On 22 March 2003, unknown assailants attacked the US Army Forward Logistics Element (FLE) at the airport in Mazar-e-Sharif, as well as the co-located Jordanian hospital. Source #2 verified detainee's leadership role in the attack.²⁶
 - (S//NF) In mid-March 2003, a group of four Taliban commanders met in Chemtal to plan an attack against US and Coalition forces. The attack was to coincide with the 21 March 2003 Persian New Year celebration. Group members included Maulawi Shamsal Haq, detainee, Fazel Jan, and Qarim Boy.²⁷
 - ◆ (S//NF) During the planning and the execution of the operation, the group was supported by Said Rasool, a Pashtun Taliban commander, and stayed in a safe house owned by Haji Musa, a local Taliban commander. Qarim Boy and Said Rasool organized the purchase and pre-attack placement of eleven to fourteen rockets in the mountains surrounding Mazar-e-Sharif. The plan called for placing rockets in three different launch points that would target the FLE, the co-located Jordanian hospital, and VIPs using the airport to depart Mazar-e-Sharif following the Persian New Year celebration.²⁸
 - (S//NF) In April 2003, USSF planned a series of five raids in the Chemtal area designated to seize HIG and Taliban commanders, weapons, and recently harvested opium. Pre-operational planning against a compound owned by local HIG commander, Mullah Zabit Musa (possibly identifiable with Haji Musa), identified a possible priority target, a Chechen named Jumma Jan. The USSF operation consisted of a series of five raids against Chemtal area Taliban and HIG commanders. Intelligence sources indicated Jumma Jan, Fazel Jan, and Shamsal Haq were moving periodically between three of the five targeted compounds. The three individuals were linked to planning terrorist operations and providing technical expertise in bomb making.²⁹ (Analyst Note: Detainee denied being involved with any military or paramilitary training or operations. Detainee also denied being involved in the production and distribution of improvised explosive devices (IEDs)).³⁰
 - (S//NF) Detainee associated with significant Taliban personalities during his employment as a Taliban driver.

²⁵ > RFI RESPONSE R-GTMO-0672-08 ISN 252

²⁶ 001095 HANDNOTE 07-JUL-2003

²⁷ TD-314/17139-03, TD-314/18028-03, TD-314/20422-03, Analyst Note: Maulawi Shamsal Haq was a Pakistani Taliban commander who previously served as a Mullah Muhammad Omar bodyguard. Jumma Jan was described as a Chechen commander and IMU member, and Fazel Jan is identified Uzbeki IMU member.

²⁸ TD-314/17139-03

²⁹ 001095 HANDNOTE 07-JUL-2003

³⁰ 001095 HANDNOTE 11-JUL-2003, 001095 HANDNOTE 23-JUL-2003

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- (SBU) Detainee was Taliban Commander Ghuli's personal driver for nearly a year. Detainee stated he worked for Commander Ghuli up until Ghuli's death.³¹ (Analyst Note: Commander Ghuli is possibly identifiable with Kunduz provincial Commander Guli. Commander Guli facilitated opium movement in Northern Afghanistan using a network of Taliban and Northern Alliance personnel. Unknown assailants assassinated Commander Guli in early 2001, which is a similar time frame in which detainee indicated Ghuli's was killed.)³²
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted meeting former Taliban Interior Secretary and Taliban V Corps commander Abd al-Razzaq, aka (Mullah Razak), when detainee was Commander Ghuli's driver. Abdul Razzaq was one of the most influential ministers in the Taliban and was also on the Inner Shura council. This council was made up of high-level officials, and provided the Taliban with military direction after the Taliban was defeated by US and coalition forces.³³
 - (S//NF) During the US and Coalition invasion of Afghanistan, Razzaq led the Taliban forces in Mazar-e-Sharif. After the defeat of the Taliban, Abd al-Razzaq transitioned to leading Taliban factions and anti-coalition militia (ACM) forces. Abd al-Razzaq's phone number was found in detainee's pocket litter at the time of detainee's arrest.³⁴ (Analyst Note: Approximately thirty months had passed between Ghuli's death in early 2001 and detainee's capture in July 2003. Detainee's possession of Razzaq's phone number at his arrest indicates a more recent interaction than early 2001.)
- (S//NF) Detainee also admitted meeting Qarim Boy.³⁵ Qarim Boy is reportedly a Taliban and HIG commander associated with planning attacks against US and Afghan forces.³⁶
 - (S//NF) Qarim Boy was also a commander in the Harakat-e-Inqelab Islami, a Soviet-Afghan War-era opposition group whose members historically supported the Taliban regime.³⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee identified Said Rasool as Commander Ghuli's successor.³⁸ Said Rasool is assessed to be an ethnic Uzbek Taliban and HIG commander. Said Rasool had significant ties to narcotics trafficking in the Kunduz region and planned the execution of attacks against US and Coalition-backed Afghan forces.³⁹

³¹ 001095 KB 02-FEB-2004, 001095 HANDNOTE 11-JUL-2003, 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005

³² State 0910616 31-Mar-2000

³³ 001095 SIR 05-JAN-2006, IIR 6 044 7193 03, CENTCOM Bio on Abdul Razzaq

³⁴ IIR 6 044 7193 03, CENTCOM Bio on Abdul Razzaq

³⁵ 001095 HANDNOTE 23-JUL-2003

³⁶ TD-314/36231-03, TD-314/22196-03

³⁷ IIR 6 034 1016 04, TD-314/22196-03

³⁸ 001095 HANDNOTE 24-JUL-2003

³⁹ TD-314/22196-03, TD-314/11881-05, TD-314/34136-05

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- (S//NF) Said Rasool moved large amounts of heroin with the assistance of General Abd al-Dostum and other ranking officials in the Kunduz Province.⁴⁰ Said Rasool headed up an organization called Herakat. Herakat was known as a regional social program, but in reality was a cover organization for the Taliban and the HIG.⁴¹
- (S//NF) Detainee is affiliated with opposition groups based in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which supported the Taliban and al-Qaida.
 - (S//NF) Detainee was selected by Uzbek leader, Abdullah Nuri, from within the refugee camp to attend religious training at madrassas in Pakistan.⁴²
 - (S//NF) When the Soviet Union collapsed, Abdullah Nuri became a major militant religious leader in Tajikistan.⁴³ Abdullah Nuri has a long extremist history to include leadership roles in the Islamic Awakening Movement (NAHDA),⁴⁴ Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party (TIRP), Hizbunadzad Tajik Islamic Insurgency (IRPT), and the IMU.⁴⁵ Additionally, Abdullah Nuri is a known associate of Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and is linked to extremist training camps and narcotic networks in Northern Afghanistan.⁴⁶
 - (S//NF) In 1997, detainee met IMU leader Qari Tahir Jan Uldash in Pakistan when Qari Tahir visited the Abu Bakr Sadiq refugee camp to distribute humanitarian aid. Qari Tahir is identifiable with IMU leader Tohir Jon Abdul Khalilovich Yoldashev.⁴⁷ (Analyst Note: The IMU ran training camps near Mazar-e-Sharif with the full support of the Taliban. UBL, who supplied the bulk of IMU's funding, orchestrated a multilateral alliance between all ACM forces to plan attacks against US targets in the Middle East.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee met Jumna Namanghani during detainee's time as a Taliban driver. Detainee identified Jumna Namanghani as a Tajik IMU leader with very close ties to the Taliban. Jumna Namanghani is assessed to be Jumaboy Khojiyev Namangani, the IMU military commander whom UBL chose to be field commander of the Arab fighters in Afghanistan.⁴⁸
 - (S//NF) Taliban Supreme Commander, Mullah Muhammad Omar directed Namangani to infiltrate IMU forces inside US camps to commit terrorist acts.⁴⁹

⁴⁰ TD-314/11881-05, TD-314/34136-05

⁴¹ TD-314/17139-03

⁴² 001095 HANDNOTE 11-JUL-2003, 001095 SIR 14-SEP-2005

⁴³ IIR 6 936 0044 02, IIR 6 044 1677 03

⁴⁴ IIR 6 105 0078 05

⁴⁵ TD-314/42981-02

⁴⁶ IIR 6 105 0078 05, IIR 6 936 0044 02, TD-314/42981-02

⁴⁷ 001095 HANDNOTE 27-AUG-2003

⁴⁸ IIR 6 873 0204 01, TD-314/38271-01

⁴⁹ CENTCOM INTSUM 01-042

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Jumaboy Khojiyev Namangani was also linked to extremist related activities to include narcotics, IMU training camps, suicide operations, and assassinations.⁵⁰

- (S//NF) The Tajikistan Ministry of Security conducted an investigation on detainee but found no concrete information regarding terrorist actions in Afghanistan or Tajikistan; nor did they find any information with regard to detainee being anti-American.⁵¹

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 22 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 19 October 2007, when detainee failed to follow guard instructions. He has 3 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 29 May 2006, when he pulled a guard's arm into the cell. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, assaults, provoking words and gestures and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 7 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 8 May 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee likely commanded a group of Arabs as part of the Taliban. Detainee spent approximately six years in a refugee camp in Afghanistan which actively recruited Tajik mujahideen. Detainee was chosen to attend a Pakistani madrassa for approximately three years, which likely taught radical Islamic ideology. Upon joining the Taliban, detainee met and associated with senior Taliban members. When detainee left the Taliban, he maintained numerous relationships involved in the northern Afghanistan narcotics network. In 2003, detainee is suspected as having participated in operational planning and execution of hostile activities against US and Coalition forces, and he is believed to have had direct access to Taliban commanders Maulawi Shamsal Haq, Fazel Jan, and Qarim Boy.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee could probably provide information on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan-based extremist recruitment, training, and activities supporting Taliban and al-Qaida operations. Detainee can provide information on the madrassas he studied at in Pakistan to include the curriculum, biographical data on students and instructors,

⁵⁰ TD-314/08901-99, TD-314/40494-00, IIR 6 873 0204 01, IIR 6 034 0770 02

⁵¹ >AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 16-FEB-2005

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and of ideological theories and tendencies. Detainee has steadily provided information regarding narcotics trafficking and can likely provide additional specifics on the location of poppy fields and opium labs, names of traffickers, identification of transportation and distribution networks, and identification of Uzbeki and Tajik contacts providing access to world wide narcotic networks. Detainee's assessed relationships with Abdullah Nuri, Tohir Yuldashev, and Jumaboy Namangani Khojiyev require further investigation. Clarification of detainee's involvement in attacks on US and Coalition interests may lead to information used for identifying current operational networks and weapons caches. Detainee's timeline between early 2000 through 2003 must be substantiated to further refute detainee's claim of non-involvement in hostile actions against US and Coalition interests.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Tajik Camp extremist recruitment of refugees
- Tajik Camp relationships to the Taliban, al-Qaida, and IMU
- Pakistani madrassa personnel and curriculum

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 10 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.