

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

20 July 2006

TO: WAHAB, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAHAB, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was on a list of personnel who had a Casio watch in his possession on 1 May 2003.

2. Terrorism experts have said a Casio watch is a signature component of bombs made by militants trained in Saudi millionaire Usama bin Laden's terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Islamic militants are routinely trained by Usama bin Laden's operatives to wire Casio watches to explosives.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was captured on 10 February 2003 at a checkpoint north of Lejay, Baghran District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan based on suspicion that the detainee was one of a number of men who had just engaged United States Forces.

2. The detainee fired from ambush positions and employed a high volume of small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire in an effort to kill as many United States personnel as possible.

3. The detainee and all men captured at the checkpoint were wearing olive drab green jackets and all suffered from hearing loss due to their firing activity. United States Special Forces observed the enemy as they stopped at the top of the mountain, appeared to cache their weapons and then maneuvered down the mountain.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAHAB, ABDUL**

4. An individual has repeatedly tasked the detainee with transporting money from his village to Baghran.

5. The individual was a Taliban sub-commander.

6. The detainee's brother fought for Jamaat-e-Islami in the jihad.

7. Jamaat-e-Islami is a political party in Pakistan made up of Islamic extremists. The party's leader has a relationship with Usama bin Laden.

8. The detainee was captured with a Taliban Commander who attended a meeting of senior Taliban officials to discuss military operations against the Afghan Interim Administration.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. Based on photo comparisons and possible drug activity, the detainee may have been a former general commander of Taliban forces in southwest Afghanistan and was possibly a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commander at one time.

2. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama Bin Laden. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

3. Initially, the detainee thought he had been detained as a result of his involvement within the local narcotics trade.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed he did not know any of the other men who were in his taxi when he was captured.

b. The detainee stated that none of the people in the taxi possessed or disposed of weapons.

c. The detainee denied assisting anti-coalition forces against United States military personnel.

d. The detainee states he has never used a Kalashnikov rifle. The detainee has seen people carrying Kalashnikov's, particularly the Karzi government soldiers.

e. The detainee stated that he has not seen anyone in military combat. The detainee stated that he does not know anyone who fought for the Taliban and claimed he was not aware of a conflict.

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f. The detainee said he would not attack Americans.

g. The detainee denies that he was a member of the Taliban and insists he was nothing more than a farmer.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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000302

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 October 2006

TO: BISMULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BISMULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. A source stated that the 40-man unit is a part of the Taliban and receives money and weapons from al Qaida.
    2. A source stated that the detainee had been a member of the Taliban for six years.
    3. A source stated that the detainee provided some tactical information for the 40-man team and used a short-range radio and a long-range satellite telephone to communicate.
    4. Leaders of a terrorist organization directed the detainee to find the local Afghans that were helping the Americans and kill them. The detainee was augmented with 25 armed personnel and three trucks from a known Taliban supporter. The detainee traveled the streets of a city in Afghanistan at night, asking questions about the Americans and those who spoke to them.
  - b. Connections/Associations
    1. A source stated that the detainee worked for the Commander of the 40-man assassination group on the terrorist team.
    2. A known Taliban supporter tried to get the detainee released because he had a lot of information on the former Taliban.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BISMULLAH**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee claims he has never had any association with the Taliban.
  - b. The detainee denied having any affiliation with the 40-man team and denied knowing the commander of the 40-man team. The detainee stated that the Commander of the 40-man team was his enemy and so was the Taliban.
  - c. The detainee claimed that he had no knowledge of the Taliban in his region.
  - d. The detainee claims he has never used his employment to provide any service to the Taliban.
  - e. The detainee stated that he had no reason to watch Americans or tell anyone what Americans do because he considers the Americans his friends.
  - f. The detainee claims he has never provided armed guards for any Taliban tasking.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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000904

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 August 2006

TO: KARIM, BOSTAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, BOSTAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee departed Khowst, Afghanistan during the Russian invasion. The detainee lived at a Thbai refugee camp in Miram Shah, Pakistan for approximately 10-13 years. While living in Miram Shah, Pakistan, the detainee aided the Mujahedin against the Russians and their supporters.

2. The detainee stated that around November or December of 2001 he and other Tablighs' went to an al Qaida run hospital and helped the wounded fighters. The detainee indicated this was the only time he helped out al Qaida.

3. The detainee said that helped 8-10 Arabs at a hospital in Proja near Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee went alone and fed fruit to the Arabs.

4. A source reported that the detainee provided lodging for him and made arrangements for him to get to the Pakistan border.

b. Training

The detainee said that while he was at the Sroobi Compound, near Tanai, Afghanistan he participated in target practice.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, BOSTAN**

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a member of the organization Jamaat al Tabligh for approximately seven years prior to his capture.

2. A source said that on 1 January 2001 Jamaat al Tabligh members provided assistance to unarmed Taliban Arab fighters. The Jamaat al Tabligh members smuggled Taliban Arab fighters across the border from Zormat, Afghanistan to Lahore, Pakistan. They also provided housing in Lahore, Pakistan to the source.

3. A source said that it was common knowledge that Jamaat al Tabligh was responsible for assisting foreigners to flee Afghanistan.

4. The detainee belonged to the Tanai tribe in Afghanistan. The detainee served with the Mujahedin during the Russian Afghan War while he was a refugee in Miram Shah, Pakistan. The detainee's uncle is a very well known Mujahedin commander for a known leader in Hezb I Islami. The detainee spent time at a Mujahedin command post known as Srobai.

5. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb I Islami Gulbuddin, HIG, as a faction of the Hizb I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.

6. On 21 July 2002, American Forces raided the detainee's partner's Mulani Village compound in Khowst Province, Afghanistan. The raid netted 23 active Italian and Russian anti-tank mines and seven empty mine shells. The detainee's partner was in possession of a notebook containing instructions on rigging command-detonated mines.

7. A source said that a partner of the detainee had been directed by unidentified al Qaida Arabs in Pakistan to carry out command detonated mine attacks against American Forces operating in the area of Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee worked with a partner to plan their attacks.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee's partner said he became indebted to the detainee after losing 50,000 Rupees. In return for the debt, the detainee asked the partner to store some land mines at his home. Three days before the partner's arrest, the detainee drew some schematics in a notebook on how to detonate the mines. The detainee told the partner the purpose of the land mines was to kill people that the detainee disliked.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, BOSTAN**

2. Pakistani Police apprehended the detainee at the checkpoint in Khurgi, Pakistan on 13 August 2002. The detainee was apprehended along with another person and did not have identity papers. The pair had in their possession a Thuraya Satellite Telephone, 2,700 American Dollars, 3,600 Pakistani Rupees and 70,000 Afghan Rupees.

3 The detainee said that approximately fifteen years prior to his capture, he attended the Sorbai compound near Tanai, Afghanistan. The detainee was there for guard duty and did not participate in any fighting. The detainee attended this compound approximately four or five times and for approximately ten days to two weeks at a time. After attending the compound each time, the detainee returned to his home in Pakistan.

4. The detainee's palms were significantly scarred. A doctor's examination of the detainee's hands determined that the scars would be consistent with a blast injury that occurred when something burst or exploded while held by the hands.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he had never been to a terrorist training camp, trained on weapons, participated in any fighting in Afghanistan, or knew anyone that was affiliated with the al Qaida or Taliban.

b. The detainee denied having ever worked with explosives while at Sroobi compound near Tanai, Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 June 2006

To: WAZIR, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF WAZIR, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee became more interested in learning about Islam after attending meetings with the Jamat Tabligh Group at the Takhtabika Mosque in Khowst, Afghanistan. He eventually began going on 40-day outings to Jamat Tabligh Centers and ultimately went on a four month outing to the Riwind Center of Tabligh in Lahore, Pakistan. The Riwind Center is the headquarters of the Jamat Tabligh.

2. Jamat Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

3. The detainee conducted Islamic Tablighian teachings five years ago in the Yaqubi District of Khowst, Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee was taught to shoot the Kalashnikov rifle by his brother.

c. Connections/Associations

At the time of capture the detainee was traveling with a known al Qaida bomb maker who the detainee had known for 5 years.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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a. At the time of capture the detainee was going to purchase 25 pairs of tires and 20 large batteries. He was captured with \$2,700 United States Dollars and a satellite phone.

b. The detainee stated he and his brother used the satellite phone for the tire and battery business.

c. The detainee stated he passed the satellite telephone to the person he was traveling with because the detainee believed the Pakistani police would ask for a fine if they saw the satellite telephone and he did not want to pay any fines.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 June 2006

TO: KHAIL, HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIL, HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brother was identified as a senior lieutenant for a former Taliban Commander.

2. The detainee's brother has a well known car dealership in Zormat, Afghanistan where he also keeps an arsenal including Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices.

3. The detainee has been identified as a al Qaida/Taliban facilitator.

4. The detainee's telephone number and name were associated with a Taliban cell.

b. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. In mid February 2002, al Qaida fighters in the Paktia province of Afghanistan were providing payments of 3,000 United States Dollars to the detainee. The payments were intended to ensure that the detainee provided support to al Qaida and facilitate the departure of al Qaida family members from Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was identified as a military commander that led a 12-man unit of former Taliban and al Qaida members who were planning to attack United States and Afghan Transitional Administration facilities using guerilla warfare techniques in September 2002.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAIL, HAFIZULLAH SHABAZ**

3. The detainee admitted he did fight against the Russians. The detainee also stated that he participated in several fights under the command of a village elected commander.

4. The detainee released three suspected al Qaida without an investigation.

5. The detainee held a meeting at his residence in Zormat, Afghanistan with an extremist cell leader.

6. The detainee distributed arms for an ambush against his replacement. The detainee also gave out money to those who agreed to fight on his behalf. The detainee issued weapons to volunteers including rocket-propelled grenades, Kalashnikov rifles and at least one anti-aircraft gun.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he does not know why the Americans detained him and that he had helped them in the past by giving them information about al Qaida.

b. The detainee denied having any military training and he claims he was never served in the military.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 April 2006

TO: MATIN, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MATIN, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In the fall of 1998, the detainee traveled from Mansehra, Pakistan to Sheberghan, Afghanistan to look after his family's property holdings.

2. While on a trip to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan the detainee stayed at Sharifuddin's house. The detainee claims he knew Sharifuddin through his father.

3. The detainee's stay in Afghanistan coincided with the three to four month break between school sessions at Mansehra.

4. While the detainee was staying as a guest, either Sharifuddin or his nephew would ask the detainee to write items such as letters and receipts in an unofficial capacity for Taliban government matters.

5. Sharifuddin had the detainee arrested. The detainee was accused of taking bribes.

6. The detainee was eventually released from jail.

7. Once the detainee was released from Afghanistan, he went back to Pakistan and did not return to Afghanistan until several years later.

8. During the spring of 2002, the detainee was on a trip from Pakistan via Kabul to Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan to verify his family's land holdings. The detainee was injured when something exploded at a bazaar he was at in Mazar-e-Sharif.

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ISN 1002

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MATIN, ABDUL**

9. The detainee was injured from the explosion at Mazar-e-Sharif so a friend drove him to his home. His friend saw that the detainee's foot was broken. His friend took the detainee to a hospital to try to get it X-rayed but could not and instead his friend sent the detainee to Kabul. The friend drove the detainee to a Taliban Intelligence Office and the detainee was turned over to the police.

10. The detainee was transferred from a prison in Kabul, Afghanistan to a prison in Sheberghan, Afghanistan.

11. The detainee's second jail term lasted over one year.

## b. Connections/Associations

1. Sharifuddin was the head of the Estakbarat for the northern part of Afghanistan, and his office was located in Mazar-e-Sharif.

2. The detainee's name was part of a list of names of Sheberghan prisoners affiliated with the Taliban and al Qaida and was deemed a continuing threat to Coalition Forces.

3. A source has identified the detainee as the Deputy Chief of the Estakbarat in Mazar-e-Sharif.

## c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claims that his family owned warehouses, several stores, and hotels in Sheberghan, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's family's land and property was taken when the Soviets occupied Afghanistan. Once the Taliban regime was removed, his family's land and property was redistributed back to the people.

3. The detainee has stated that he graduated from high school in 1992 and then became a teacher and taught school in the Mansehra area.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims that he was not involved with the Taliban in any way.

b. The detainee has stated that he does not hate Americans; he just wishes to be released and to be given a specific time he will leave Cuba.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MATIN, ABDUL**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 June 2006

TO: BAHAZADA, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA SOHAIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAHAZADA, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA  
SOHAIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee attempted to obtain a United States travel visa using several different names.
    2. A Hezb-E-Islami Gulduddin member approached the detainee for information about operations, future events, identification and personnel related to the Camp Serenity and the Karzai Protection Detail based at Camp Aegis.
    3. The detainee gave a Hezb-E-Islami Gulduddin member a list containing the names of security personnel assigned to the Karzai Protection Detail and the serial numbers of the weapons they used.
    4. The Hezb-E-Islami Gulduddin member noticed the recently developed set of photographs in detainee's car. The photographs were taken by the detainee in December 2002 during the opening of an American camp. As the Hezb-E-Islami Gulduddin member reviewed the photographs, he pulled out several photographs and kept them.
    5. The detainee met with the Hezb-E-Islami Gulduddin member on the street and provided him with a computer disk containing the digital images of personnel involved with security at an American camp.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAHAZADA, MOHAMMED MUSTAFA  
SOHAIL**

b. Connections/Associations

Three men identified the detainee as an active source for the Hezb-E-Islami Guldiddin terrorist organization through a member in that organization.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that the Hezb-E-Islami Guldiddin member threatened his family should the detainee fail to provide him with the information he requested.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee claims that the confession regarding him providing classified information is false and coerced.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 July 2006

TO: TUKHI, AMINULLAH BARYALAI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TUKHI, AMINULLAH BARYALAI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee remained in Herat, Afghanistan for approximately three years after the Taliban took over before finally fleeing to Meshad, Iran. The detainee and his wife lived illegally in Iran for the first two years, after which the Iranian government allowed illegal Afghan refugees to become legitimate by officially registering.

2. During the detainee's time at the University of Herat, the detainee was in a student political organization called Basij, a group created to fight against the Taliban. One faction of the Basij group had weapons to fight the Taliban, but the detainee was not involved with this faction.

3. The detainee ran a fabric store in an Afghan market area of Meshad, Iran. After two years, the Iranian police forced him and several other Afghan refugees to close their stores. The detainee was unemployed for about two months when he bought an automobile to use as a taxi so he could earn a living.

4. While the detainee was living in Meshad, Iran and still operating the fabric store, a friend asked the detainee to help two individuals get to Afghanistan, to which the detainee agreed.

5. The detainee rented an automobile and drove the two men to the Iranian-Afghan border town of Tiabet, Iran.

6. One of the men was the National Director of the Non-Governmental Organization al Wafa and, from the fall of 2000 to the fall of 2001, smuggled Arabs and Russians through Iran into Afghanistan to fight.

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ISN 1012

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TUKHI, AMINULLAH BARYALAI

7. The Non-Governmental Organization al Wafa was believed to have had connections to Usama bin Laden and Afghan Mujahedin.

8. From the fall of 2000 through the fall of 2001, the National Director of al Wafa contracted the detainee to transport Arabs and Russians from the town of Mashad, Iran to the town of Zabol, Iran, located on the Afghanistan border.

9. The detainee stated that he transported a total of 16 Arabs and 14 Russians during the year he worked for the National Director of al Wafa. The detainee dropped the individuals off in Zabol, Iran, where they met an Afghan who smuggled them across the border into Afghanistan.

10. The detainee knew the individuals he smuggled were al Wafa members.

11. The detainee was forging documents to facilitate the escape of al Qaida members during the Taliban era.

12. The detainee stated that he was arrested in Meshad, Iran by Iranian authorities because he was stopped at an Iranian security checkpoint one day after his Afghan refugee card had expired.

13. The detainee was transferred from Iranian to Afghan custody in April 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he is not al Qaida or Taliban, and in fact he fled his country to escape the Taliban.

b. The detainee denied ever helping Arabs or Russians obtain false or fraudulent documents to cross the Afghanistan border.

c. The detainee regretted becoming involved with the National Director of al Wafa.

d. The detainee admitted that the smuggling was a mistake he committed only because of greed.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 March 2006

TO: MOHAMMED, HUSSEIN SALEM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, HUSSEIN SALEM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee wanted to leave Yemen and go to Europe because he sought a western society where there would be more opportunity and tolerance. He did not have an exact destination in mind.

2. The detainee hoped to be granted political asylum when he arrived in Europe.

3. The detainee planned to go to Europe via Pakistan because it would be easier to get a visa in Pakistan rather than Yemen.

4. The detainee says he did not join the Tablighi, but had planned to claim Tablighi membership in order to receive the same discounts they received.

5. Jama'at al Tablighi is a Pakistan-based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

6. The detainee traveled to Sanaa, Yemen, bribed a guard at the embassy, and got a visa to Pakistan. The detainee told them he was Tablighi. The detainee also got a passport while he was there. While in Sanaa, the detainee went to a travel agency and bought a round trip ticket, again claiming that he was Tablighi.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000319

ISN 1015

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, HUSSEIN SALEM**

7. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan, by himself. He spent four days in Karachi, then took a train from Karachi to Lahore, Pakistan to get to the Tabligh headquarters.

8. At the Tabligh center the detainee met a facilitator who recommended that the detainee stay in Pakistan and travel to Europe with the Tabligh on a missionary journey because it would be cheaper.

9. The detainee stayed at the Tabligh Center for two and a half months waiting for the Tabligh to go to Europe, but did not go on any missionary journeys with the Tabligh.

10. The facilitator told the detainee that Arabs had been blocked from travel to Europe following the 11 September 2001 attacks, but that he could smuggle people to Europe. The facilitator said they would travel through Iran to Turkey and then to Greece.

11. The facilitator took the detainee to the Pakistan/Iran border. Once there, the facilitator arranged the detainee's travel into Iran.

12. The detainee and the facilitator crossed the Pakistan/Iran border and traveled into Iran. They ultimately arrived in Mashhad, Iran, stopping in Tehran, Iran, along the way.

13. The facilitator rented a house in Mashhad, Iran, where he and the detainee stayed for approximately one and a half months. The detainee felt that the facilitator might be fooling him after the detainee had paid him to travel to Europe. The detainee told the facilitator that he was going to go back to Pakistan and then Yemen. The facilitator then said they would leave the next day for Europe by going back to Tehran first.

14. The facilitator took the detainee to Tehran. While there, two Iranian policemen approached them. The facilitator told the police that he was Iranian, but the detainee did not speak Farsi, so the facilitator had to tell him that the policemen wanted to see his passport. The detainee was arrested and taken to a police station in Tehran.

15. The detainee was eventually turned over to American custody in Kabul, Afghanistan.

## b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met some Tabligh members who told him to come to the Tabligh headquarters in Pakistan.

2. A senior al Qaida operative recalled seeing the detainee once in Afghanistan during 2000 or 2001.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, HUSSEIN SALEM**

3. A senior al Qaida operative recalled giving someone who looked like the detainee approximately 2,000 United States Dollars in early 2001.

4. The detainee was seen at al Qaida guest houses in Afghanistan. The detainee was described as an old junior al Qaida member who had been around for some time but was not a senior or al Qaida leader.

5. The detainee's name appeared on a list of 254 Arab nationals who were deported or repatriated from Iran as suspected al Qaida or Taliban members in roughly the December 2001 to February 2002 timeframe.

6. The detainee was among ten al Qaida and Taliban-associated individuals that Iran transferred to Afghanistan in 2002. All of them lived in Afghanistan during the Taliban era. Iran returned some of them to their country of origin. However, the detainee remained in Afghan custody.

7. The detainee assisted the son of a senior al Qaida leader in acquiring a falsified Yemeni passport.

## c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was unable to provide any plausible explanation for why he was in possession of over 1,000 United States Dollars.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he considers the U.S.S. Cole bombing a crime because there were innocent people in that place who should not have been killed.

b. The detainee stated that he has never been involved with anything criminal and this could be verified with his government. The detainee denied being involved with al Qaida in any way.

c. The detainee called Usama bin Laden a big problem.

d. The detainee claimed that he hated al Qaida more than the interrogator does.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000921

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 June 2006

TO: HUWARY, SOUFIAN ABAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUWARY, SOUFIAN ABAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee admitted to fighting against Russian forces in Chechnya as part of the Chechen jihad.

b. Training

1. The detainee studied accounting and successfully graduated with top grades in 1989.

2. The detainee attended a four-month basic training in the Algerian Army where he was trained on the Kalashnikov and Seminov rifles.

3. The detainee maintained an Algerian maritime crewmember license but never finished his masters license training.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was jailed for associating with a known Algerian terrorist.

2. The detainee was identified by an al Qaida operative who lived in Duisi, Georgia. The operative claimed he was well acquainted with the detainee.

3. The detainee lived in a small house in Duisi, Georgia with Chechen fighters and their families.

4. The detainee was asked by a Chechen leader to go and fight. The detainee believed the Chechen leader to be a great leader and soldier who the Russians would never find.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000922

ISN 1016

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HUWARY, SOUFIAN ABAR**

5. The detainee assisted Chechen fighters in the Panski Gorge, Georgia and was captured in Georgia along with others in a sting operation.

### d. Intent

The detainee stated that the people behind the war are the Jews. He believes the Jews are working on an agenda to control the world and that when the Muslims are defeated that the Jews will turn on the Christians.

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee speaks French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic and English. The detainee has been to France, Afghanistan, Russia, Chechnya and Georgia as well as many countries in Africa.

2. The detainee was caught numerous times by authorities in France for not having any travel papers. The French eventually deported the detainee back to Algeria in the summer of 1996 following an arrest in Germany for not having travel papers.

3. The detainee spent 2 years in prison in Algeria from 1998 to 2000.

4. The detainee stated that the Spanish bombings happened because Spain did not remove its troops from Iraq. The detainee feels they brought it on themselves.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee does not blame America for his detainment. The detainee believes that America was attacked and had to respond accordingly. The detainee does not blame the American government for how it responded.

b. The detainee stated that he was arrested in Georgia and had no part in any activities within Afghanistan or America.

c. The detainee said that he has never been to Afghanistan or a Zarqawi training camp.

d. The detainee stated he has no interest in the ideas of Usama bin Laden or al Qaida and he could not be persuaded to join their cause.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 May 2006

TO: AL-RAMMAH, OMAR MOHAMMED ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-RAMMAH, OMAR MOHAMMED  
ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. One year before the detainee was arrested, his uncle convinced him to dedicate himself to Islam. His uncle scared the detainee by telling him about heaven and hell. The detainee attended various mosques after that time.

2. The detainee performed Dawa for three months in Sanaa, Yemen after his religious awakening. The detainee attended the Dawa mosques in Sanaa and Hededa, as well as the al Hada and B'ar mosques.

3. The detainee decided he wanted to go to Chechnya and fight against the Russians after watching a film that depicted Muslims in Chechnya being killed by Russian troops.

b. Training

1. The detainee was present in Omalo, Georgia on three occasions for weapons training. The first time, the detainee was provided with training on handguns, Kalashnikov rifles, and an unknown type of small crew-served weapon. This training was done for thirty minutes per day over a three-day period.

2. The detainee received weapons training at al Khair Camp, a private training camp, in Qargha, Afghanistan.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000024

ISN 1017

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-RAMMAH, OMAR MOHAMMED ALI**

3. The detainee trained in al Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was fighting in Chechnya prior to 11 September 2001.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was believed to have been a member of Abu Malik's Jamaat, while in Pankisi Gorge.

2. The detainee was a member of a suicide paratrooper unit that was known as a "Kamikaze unit".

3. The detainee witnessed the ambush that killed Khattab.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was fine before he began practicing Islam. The detainee's problems began afterwards. The detainee did stop dealing drugs and chasing women after his religious awakening, but since it has caused him problems, he no longer wants to follow Islam.

2. The detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Turkey, and then on to Georgia to conduct Dawa using a legitimate passport in his true name. The detainee traveled at the suggestion of his uncle using 10,000 United States Dollars, which his uncle had given him.

3. The detainee spent a month at Wadi Valley receiving teaching on how to give support to Chechnyan refugees and then traveled to Wadi Esefahan.

4. The detainee began Dawa there, but fell ill. The detainee was transported by helicopter back to Wadi Bankish where he was treated and recovered in a week. The detainee returned to Dawa once he recovered.

5. The detainee was captured in a violent road ambush by Georgia Security Forces in Duisi, Georgia on 28 April 2002.

6. The detainee was captured with two explosives detonators in his possession.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan or ever hearing of al Qaida until he was a prisoner here.

b. The detainee said he had nothing against Americans.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-RAMMAH, OMAR  
MOHAMMED ALI**

c. The detainee insists he never heard the word terrorism and never heard of al Qaida before his arrest.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 June 2006

TO: GUL, CHAMAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, CHAMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. When the detainee was a teenager, the Russians invaded Afghanistan, destroyed his village, and forced him to flee to Pakistan, where he lived in a refugee camp. While living in the camp, he joined an Islamic party.

2. While the detainee was in the camp, the son of the leader of the Islamic party came to recruit men to fight the Russians. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan and learned to shoot a five-round bolt-action rifle. After training, the detainee went into Hazra, Afghanistan, for one or two months at a time to fight.

3. Three groups existed during this time: the Harakat Inqilab, the Nejat Meli, and the Mahaz Meli. Together these groups formed the Itihad Saygana. The detainee belonged to the Mahaz Meli but occasionally helped the Harakat Inqilab.

4. For the first few years of the fighting, the detainee was a simple soldier, but after a few years, he became a commander of about fifteen fighters.

5. The detainee claims that his involvement with the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin started in mid-1990 to early 1991. He joined the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin for six months as a commander. During this period the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin was fighting the Northern Alliance.

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ISN 1021

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, CHAMAN

6. Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

7. The detainee was accepted into the Northern Alliance and instructed to remain in the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin in order to report on their activities, movements, and operations.

8. The Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin had three of its members, the detainee and two others, working as intelligence collectors. They were operating in Kabul and collecting information about the Afghan government and possibly United States forces. They used vehicles with Kabul Police Department license plates for traveling.

9. The Kabul Chief of Police has strong ties with weapons and drug smuggling activities. The detainee was also a major player in these operations.

10. The detainee and two other Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin members were all well-known associates that were heavily involved in the drug trade and other illegal activity. One of these men is responsible for over 1,000 murders as a Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin leader.

11. The detainee was a Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin field general.

12. The detainee worked as an intelligence informant for the Afghanistan Information Ministry. He was offered a job collecting information due to his personal relationships with Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin and Taliban commanders.

13. While employed with the Afghan Information Ministry, the detainee was tasked with collecting information about Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin commanders in various Afghan districts. He received his intelligence collection tasks from a deputy of the Afghan Information Ministry.

14. The detainee commanded a unit of approximately 40 soldiers and held the rank of brigade general during a three-month campaign fought against Taliban/al Qaida forces in Afghanistan during the spring of 2002.

15. Al Qaida, Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin, and the Taliban held a meeting in Peshāwar, Pakistan during February 2003 to discuss future plans on how the three groups could regain power in Afghanistan. During the meeting, many anti-United States and anti-Karzai conversations took place.

16. The detainee was present at a meeting between members of al Qaida, the Taliban, and the Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin in Peshāwar, Pakistan.

17. Dyncorp hired the detainee and his men to guard shipments of equipment between Herat, Afghanistan and Kabul, Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

000928

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, CHAMAN**

18. Site #1 was the housing and office compound for the Karzai Protection Detail. Site #3 was the Afghanistan communications center.

19. The detainee intended to place a bomb at Site #1 or Site #3 during the grand opening ceremony for the radio network station at Camp Serenity. The main target for this attack was President Karzai, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, and other high-ranking Afghani officials.

20. On 16 February 2003, an important Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin member gave explosives and instructions for their use to the detainee and another Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin member. The two planned to organize attacks on vehicles used by foreigners on the road from Kabul, Afghanistan, to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

21. The detainee was captured on 10 April 2003.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin was founded as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin's founder ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. He offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.

2. The Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin founder traveled to Iraq to meet with Saddam Hussein. The two discussed issues involving the planning of Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin attacks against United States forces in Afghanistan and abroad.

3. The detainee was a personal friend of Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin's founder.

4. The detainee and the Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin founder's friendship ended when the latter became Vice President of Afghanistan and refused to allow the detainee to become the governor of Lowgar Province, Afghanistan. As a result the detainee stated that he secretly joined forces with the Northern Alliance while still maintaining membership within the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin.

5. The detainee was the assistant to the direct subordinate of Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin's founder. The Afghan Minister of Defense indirectly gave money to the detainee in exchange for information on the Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin's founder. The direct subordinate of Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin's founder was not aware that the detainee was betraying the Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin.

6. The field commander for al Qaida terrorists located in Muzaffarabad (original document spelling: Mazaferabad), Pakistan personally showed the detainee bombs devised by al Qaida terrorists that use a white powdered explosive packed into Pepsi cans. The detainee visited the field commander on numerous occasions.

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, CHAMAN**

7. Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin and al Qaida were responsible for a suicide car bomb attack in Kabul, Afghanistan on 7 June 2003 against the United States Embassy, International Security Assistance Forces, the United Nations headquarters, and a shopping area used heavily by foreigners. The leader of the group involved was a Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin commander.

8. This Hezb-E Islami Gulbuddin commander was the detainee's assistant.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that the Taliban and the Hizb-E Islami Gulbuddin founder were his sworn enemies.

b. The detainee stated that he liked the United States and he fully supported the United States and Karzai government in Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated that he did not and would not help the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin.

d. The detainee stated that the United States was the reason why he moved back to Afghanistan after 20 years and he hopes the United States stays long enough to stop the tribal wars.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 July 2006

TO: HAFIZ, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAFIZ, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was affiliated with the death of two individuals in Kabul, Afghanistan and worked for the Taliban 40-man militia group under a known Taliban commander.

2. On 22 April 2003, the detainee, a suspect in the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker in Afghanistan, was seized along with his personal phonebook and a Thuraya Satellite phone. All but one phone number listed in the memory of the phone is listed in the personal phonebook found on the detainee.

3. The detainee's satellite phone has been linked to the International Committee of the Red Cross murder.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as having been present at the Taliban military headquarters in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee participated in a paramilitary band related to Taliban Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.

3. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long established ties with Usama bin Laden and is listed in the Department of Homeland Security's Terrorist Organization Reference Guide.

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000931

ISN 1030



## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAFIZ, ABDUL**

c. Intent

The detainee admitted he knew that the phone in his possession contained telephone numbers of individuals who were enemies of the United States.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. When the detainee was queried regarding his knowledge of the International Committee of the Red Cross worker's murder he stated he did not know where "he" was killed. The detainee was then advised that he was not provided information regarding the International Committee of the Red Cross worker's gender.

2. The detainee said that his mental instability and memory gaps may have made his previous statements inconsistent.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he did not use the satellite phone and he does not know how to use a telephone.

b. The detainee denied all knowledge regarding the murder of the International Committee of the Red Cross worker. The detainee advised that if the United States Government had proof that he was involved in the murder, then he should be shown that proof. The detainee said that he should otherwise be sent back to Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 August 2006

TO: GHAFAR, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFAR, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A source stated that the detainee operated out the of the Farooqi mosque in Quetta, Pakistan and was responsible for providing logistical support to a group of Taliban fighters, including the provision of weapons and ammunition. The group used a small taxi and minibus to bring food and supplies from Pakistan.

2. The Consulate General of Pakistan in Kandhar issued a national Road Permit, valid up to 12 June 2001 for the purpose of multiple visits to Pakistan via Chaman, Afghanistan and back. The vehicle was owned by the detainee and Haji Abdul Sattar.

3. It is believed that Haji Satar led a group of Taliban Forces and instructed them to kill westerners in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee talked about how he went to a bazaar in Kandahar City to get his tooth pulled. The detainee talked about how he left his home in a truck that was driven by a relative of the detainee's land owner. The detainee stayed at a hotel for free.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000933

ISN 1032

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFAR, ABDUL

5. The detainee stated that the truck acted like a taxi cab and drove around to other villages picking up and dropping off people before it made its final stop at the Wuliswal Hotel in Kandahar City, Afghanistan. The next morning the detainee went to the bazaar and visited a dentist. After the detainee had his tooth pulled, he went back to the hotel to have lunch. The detainee could not leave because the truck was supposedly getting fixed and was not drivable. The detainee was sitting outside in a veranda/pavilion like area where a group of between 30-40 people were eating lunch.

6. The detainee stated that one of the group members stated that he noticed a Red Cross caravan entering the bazaar.

7. The detainee remained at the hotel for another three to four hours. Once the truck was fixed, he returned home when it was dark.

8. Regarding the murder of the Red Cross worker, an Afghan official noted that one of the vehicles used by the Taliban, but left behind at the scene, belonged to the Second Corps. The official explained that, while the perpetrators arrived at the scene in the vehicle, they were unable to get it started when preparing to depart.

### b. Training

1. The detainee was questioned about his military service, he replied that he had none. The detainee stated that he was too young to enlist in the military when there was a proper government and he did not serve in the military under the Taliban because he was the only male in his family.

2. The group who conducted the Red Cross attack was made up of men exclusively from the Barakzai and Alokozai tribes. The group was trained for a one-month period in explosives, bomb-making, and techniques on how to assassinate.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is from the Barakzai tribe.

2. The detainee stated that he has spent three or four years farming land that belonged to a wealthy landowner from the next village.

3. According to a non-government organization worker, Gut Mullah Satar, who perhaps is missing a lower limb and walked with a limp, was the leader of a group of men in the attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross. The group stayed in caves in Takht Ghar mountains in Shah Wali Kot area, Afghanistan, while the main fighters stayed in the Kandahar province. Satar used satellite phones for communication.

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFAR, ABDUL**

4. After the detainee was shown Gut Mullah Satar's photograph, he stated that he has never seen Satar before nor knew his name prior to the Americans telling him in Baghran.

5. Haji Satar had been killed by United States Forces, but he was implicated in the March, 2003 murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When the detainee was asked if he was a driver for an important person before his capture, he denied the claim. The detainee stated he had never even been in the front seat of a vehicle, much less knew how to drive one.

b. When the detainee was asked if he was the man who killed the International Committee of the Red Cross worker, the detainee denied having shot a rifle more than three times in his life. The detainee was asked if he had attacked the Americans while they raided Mullah Satar's compound. The detainee replied that he had not.

c. The detainee claimed that he is not a Taliban or al Qaida supporter and knows no one actively involved.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000335

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 June 2006

TO: MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was an Itihad-e-Islami regimental commander and is suspected of involvement in a planned attack on the governor in Sayyed Karam, Afghanistan.

2. Ittihad-e-Islami is a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic organization whose aim is to attract Wahhabi sources from the Middle East.

3. The detainee admitted to attending a meeting with known Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin members in the past.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he worked with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leader against the Soviets, when all of the Afghan warlords worked together to get rid of the Russians.

2. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States Forces to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

3. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leader, the Taliban Supreme Leader and Usama bin Laden agreed to unite their forces.

4. The detainee admitted that he had a very close association with a member of the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Taliban and supporter of al Qaida.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR**

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was conscripted into military service for one year.
  2. The detainee fought in the jihad against the Russians.
  3. The detainee fled to Peshawar, Pakistan due to the failure of the initial jihadist efforts. The detainee stayed there from 1979 to 1981.
  4. The detainee rejoined the jihadist efforts against the Russians in Afghanistan. The detainee along with other Mujahedin would depart the camp in the spring to fight the Soviets and return to Duaba, Pakistan in the winter.
  5. During in-fighting within the Mujahedin, the detainee fought within the Itihaad-e-Islami directing his efforts within the Gardez, Afghanistan district.
  6. In 1986, the detainee began taking over operational control of field elements. The detainee had approximately 80 to 100 Mujahideen under his control.
  7. In or about 1997, the detainee left Pakistan to fight with the Alliance in the Panjshir Province of Afghanistan. The detainee fought for approximately three years in many battles that the Alliance was defeated.
  8. The detainee obtained a job with the Afghan government in the Border Patrol under the Ministry of Interior where he held the United States equivalent rank of Colonel and was in control of a company of approximately 80 to 100 infantrymen.
  9. The Corps Commander for Paktia, Khowst, Lowgar, Paktika and Ghazni, Afghanistan agreed to give the detainee a command if he could recruit 300 men to serve under him.
  10. While the detainee was recruiting, the detainee was arrested. The detainee spent one month in jail.
  11. The detainee was identified as someone who performed duties as a guard at the Gardiz fuel depot as well as the vehicle checkpoints on the road from Khost, Afghanistan to Gardiz, Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee states that he has not fought against, or assisted anyone else who fought against, any United States Forces.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR**

- b. The detainee states that he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.
  
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**000038**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

01 June 2006

To: GUL, NASSER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, NASSER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was traveling in Pakistan with a friend when the friend pointed out the location of the Patkia, Afghanistan Province Leader's house to the detainee.

2. The Patkia, Afghanistan Province Leader has met with senior Taliban Leaders.

3. The same friend of the detainee provided weapons to security guards at the fuel depot.

4. The detainee was captured in the home of a suspected Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin Commander.

5. Present at the capture location was an American made bolt-action-rifle with scope and high quality match grade ammunition.

6. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its effort to force United States Troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

b. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured on 5 May 2003 in a suspected Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin safe house.

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ISN 1037



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, NASSER**

2. In April 2003, the detainee moved from Pakistan to Gardez, Afghanistan, to work security at a fuel depot. The guards also manned vehicle checkpoints on the road from Khost, Afghanistan, to Gardez, Afghanistan.

3. The fuel depot consisted of one building to store weapons and ammunition, the main center warehouse which was an old gas station, and four living quarters buildings. There was one rocket launcher with ten to twelve rockets and one heavy machine gun at the fuel depot.

4. The detainee was identified as having knowledge of a grenade attack against a United States military vehicle in Kabul City, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he came to Afghanistan because he wanted a better life for himself and his family.

b. The detainee denied any association with the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, or any other terror groups. He also denied ever being contacted for recruitment to any type organization.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 July 2006

TO: RAZAK, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAK, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed that he fought against the Russian-backed Afghanistan governments in the Kandahar, Afghanistan area beginning in the late 1970's.

2. The detainee said that by the time of Afghanistan President Najibullah, he had stopped fighting and began to work in commerce. When the Taliban later gained control, the detainee was asked to join the Taliban.

3. During ARB 1 proceedings, the detainee said that as the Taliban Minister of Commerce, he oversaw a fleet of only 70 to 80 vehicles, since most were looted.

4. The detainee was identified as one of the three Taliban commanders responsible for the murder of an International Committee of the Red Cross worker on 27 March 2003.

5. An Afghan official stated that the detainee had been arrested for orchestrating the murder of the International Committee of the Red Cross worker on 27 March 2003.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Mullah Omar called a meeting in Kandahar. During this meeting, the detainee argued for a single tax option that would be fairer for businessmen. The detainee stated that Omar ended up using his suggestions.

2. In 1999, Omar asked the detainee to be the Taliban Minister of Commerce.

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ISN 1043

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZAK, ABDUL

3. The former Taliban Kabul Corps Commander, who had served as advisor to the former Taliban Defense Minister, was named military leader by Mullah Omar.

4. The detainee, who was the former Taliban Minister of Commerce, was appointed as one of the military leader's deputies.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. Afghan Military Forces captured the detainee in April 2003 during an encounter between Afghan Military Forces and anti-Afghan government forces. The detainee was turned over to United States Forces on 24 May 2003.

2. The detainee stated that when he was detained by Afghan military forces, he provided them with his brother's name instead of his real name. The detainee stated that after his arrest, the soldiers took him to see the local mayor.

3. The detainee stated that his uncle gave him a Kalashnikov rifle and assisted him to avoid being captured. The detainee stated that four or five military members caught the detainee and insisted that because he had a weapon he had to meet with the commander.

4. The following primary factor favors release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he does not want to go back to being the Minister of Commerce in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee said he wanted to go back to what he was doing before he was appointed to that position, which was private finance, such as trading of oil or fruit.

b. During ARB I proceedings, when questioned about the International Committee Red Cross worker's murder, the detainee stated he was in the custody of the governor of Kandahar, 60 or 70 miles away. The detainee stated the governor of Kandahar, Afghanistan told him Mullah Satar killed the worker and was hiding in the mountains.

c. During ARB I proceedings, when questioned why the detainee was arrested and sent to Cuba and the other officials weren't, the detainee stated that he was not from their tribe. The detainee stated that Defense Minister, Public Works Minister and former governor of Kandahar, Afghanistan were arrested, among others, but were released because of their tribal affiliations.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**  
**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

9 August 2006

TO: KAMIN, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMIN, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he was recruited by an al Qaida cell leader.
2. The detainee traveled over the Afghanistan/Pakistan border with the deputy of a known al Qaida leader.
3. The detainee received money from a known cell leader for procurement, storage and distribution of weapons, explosives and mines.
4. In the six months prior to his capture, the detainee had made seven weapons transactions.
5. The detainee stored twelve mines at his home for almost a month.
6. The detainee stated that he aided in purchasing eight Russian-made rockets. The detainee stated that he wore women's clothing to conceal the rockets as he aided in transporting the rockets.
7. The detainee stated the rockets were buried so they would be safeguarded until future use.

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**000943**

ISN 1045

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KAMIN, MOHAMMED**

8. The detainee stated that he was captured as he was attempting to deliver a letter and a Global Positioning System to a senior al Qaida operative. The Global Positioning System was utilized in the surveillance of a coalition compound.

9. The detainee stated that he worked for the Taliban as well as al Qaida.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated that he was formally trained in military tactics by al Qaida operatives. The detainee spent varying amounts of time at madrassas that taught basic and advanced military skills to persons interested in engaging in jihadist-type behavior.

2. The detainee spent a day training in Pakistan where he fired AK-47's, pistols, rockets and PK machine guns.

3. The detainee stated that he spent a full day learning how to transform mines into improvised explosive devices. A trainer taught the detainee how to modify the mines and at the end of the day, the detainee and the trainer successfully tested one of the mines.

### c. Connections/Associations

The detainee was at a senior al Qaida member's home for approximately 40 days shortly before his capture.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that if he is released he wants to go back to teaching the Koran and care for his handicapped father.

b. The detainee stated that he realizes that he was manipulated by his peers to dislike Americans. The detainee was told that the Americans and the Coalition Forces were anti-Muslim.

c. After his capture, the detainee led an Afghan Army Unit to the buried location of the rockets that were originally intended to be used on the attack of a coalition force compound.

d. The detainee stated the Americans are not as bad as he was led to believe.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 March 2006

TO: AZIMULLAH (LAST NAME UNKNOWN)

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIMULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In late May 2003, the detainee was a part of a foiled reconnaissance mission coordinated by an al Qaida Southern Afghanistan Regional Commander who is also known as a facilitator.

2. The detainee was a Madrasa student in Afghanistan for most of his life, including the timeframe during the Taliban rule.

3. The detainee was at the Lakan Madrassa located in Lakan, Khowst Province, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee acted as a guide for a group that had weapons, surveillance equipment (cameras and binoculars) and radios.

2. One of the individuals the detainee was with as part of the group used a video camera to take pictures of checkpoints and the airport.

3. The detainee was arrested for aiding personnel in operations against the Salerno Fire Base.

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ISN 1050

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIMULLAH**

4. The detainee was captured after the group that he was traveling with was engaged in a gunfight with the Afghan Militia Force.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was deceptive and combative in his answers, while trying to claim that he was being honest and cooperative.

2. The detainee changed portions of his story, especially in relation to his capture.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has never had any military service and was never taught to use the Kalishnikov.

b. The detainee denies ever swearing Bia-at to any person or organization. He denies having ever been involved in any jihad. In addition, the detainee stated he does not know of any fatwas that have ever been issued by any Eman.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 May 2006

TO: RAHMAN, MAHBUB

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, MAHBUB

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he crossed the border from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

2. The detainee is reported to have gone to the Shinkay Madrasa on or about 31 May 2003.

3. The detainee is reported to have been at the Shinkay Madrasa during the previous Ramadan (prior to May 2003).

4. The detainee was reportedly present at a meeting with an Arab who was responsible for a reconnaissance mission on Salerno base. The detainee was reported to have been aware that he was helping the Arab with that mission.

5. Shinkay Madrasa was known to have been a location of anti-coalition movement training and anti-Afghan government training. In addition, attacks against Afghan government posts were planned and based from the madrasa.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The Arab who led the reconnaissance mission to Salerno base is a known al Qaida member.

2. On or about 27 May 2003, the Afghan man whom the detainee had met in Pakistan met with a known al Qaida facilitator to discuss the mission to film Salerno base.

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000347

ISN 1052



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAN, MAHBUB**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied ever meeting the Arab responsible for the mission to collect intelligence on the Salerno airbase. The detainee denied that he participated in that mission.
- b. The detainee denied conducting surveillance operations against Salerno base.
- c. The detainee stated that he is not presently, nor has he ever been, affiliated with al Qaida.
- d. The detainee stated that he supports the new Afghan government and fully believes America's presence within Afghanistan is important to achieving peace within his country.
- e. The detainee stated that if released he would like to return to school and finish his high school education, and he hopes to one day attend college and learn English. He stated that he believes knowing English will help him obtain a well paying job.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 November 2006

TO: PARACHA, SAIFULLAH A

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PARACHA, SAIFULLAH A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In approximately 1999, the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan to meet with Usama bin Laden and to offer al Qaida the services of his media company.

2. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 with a group of men, which included a terrorist facilitator.

3. A senior al Qaida operative stated the detainee agreed to a plan to use the detainee's textile business to smuggle explosives into the United States. The plan was to place the explosives in the containers that the detainee used to ship women and children's clothes.

4. The detainee assisted a senior al Qaida operative in choosing homes in Karachi, Pakistan to use as safe houses and residences for al Qaida families.

5. The detainee provided shipping regulations regarding the United States to a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee was sympathetic to the extremist cause.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee claimed he put 20,000 United States Dollars into a falsified bank account for a senior al Qaida operative for investment purposes.

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UNCLASSIFIED

ISN 1094

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PARACHA, SAIFULLAH A**

2. The detainee's production studio produced al Qaida videos. The detainee had a large network of contacts that was given to him by Usama bin Laden to acquire videos from al Qaida.

3. The detainee's son is in the custody of the United States being held in New York.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. During discussions with a senior al Qaida operative about the pending war in Iraq the detainee displayed strong anti-United States sentiment. The detainee commented that nuclear weapons should be used against the United States troops because thousands could be killed at once. The detainee suggested the weapons could be acquired from other countries, such as China.

2. Sources identified detainee as a high-ranking member of anti-coalition forces. The detainee was captured with documents that contained significant intelligence information.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed that he only wanted to use Usama bin Laden as a voice for his company to help Christians and Muslims understand each other better. The detainee stated he had no intention of letting Usama bin Laden use his media company as a voice for terrorism.

b. A primary reason for one of the detainee's trips to Afghanistan was to contribute to the establishment of a school for girls.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 April 2006

TO: JAN, JUMMA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, JUMMA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee fought with the Taliban. When Coalition Forces entered the country, the detainee took his forces to the Takar province. The detainee returned to the Chemtal area upon the fall of the Taliban and lived with several Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commanders in the area.

2. The detainee stated he used to be a driver for the Taliban.

3. The detainee was one of the main planners for a rocket attack that targeted a forward logistics compound, a hospital, and VIP's using the airport to depart Mazar-e-Sharif following the 21 March New Year celebration.

4. The detainee has been implicated as the leader in an assassination attempt on the life of a high ranking Afghan official. The assassination was to be effected by the use of several 50 kg bombs placed on the roadside. The detainee supervised the placement of the devices. The detainee has also been involved in the purchase, construction and storing of mines.

5. A person with access to a senior al Qaida official claims that the detainee was tasked to incite internal rebellions in two countries as part of the second phase of the 11 September 2001 attacks.

6. The detainee is reported to be a former Taliban commander. He was injured twice in battles against the forces of the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan leader Ahmed Shah Masood.

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ISN 1095

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, JUMMA

### b. Training

The detainee was a known high-ranking Taliban member and was actively training people in the use of explosive devices.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was identified as a Chechen Commander.
2. The detainee meet with a former Taliban commander in late June 2003.
3. Another detainee identified the detainee as the leader of a Taliban compound that housed one hundred Taliban soldiers.
4. The detainee reportedly acted on the orders of the former commander of a known terrorist organization.

### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee claims that two months prior to his capture he was obtaining opium from poppy, even though this is illegal.

### 4. The following primary factors for release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- b. The detainee claims that he never swore bia-at to any person or organization.
- c. The detainee claims that he never participated in jihad.
- d. The detainee claims that he never received any military training or attended any training camp.
- e. The detainee claims that he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000352

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 February 2006

TO: ZAHIR, MOHOMMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHIR, MOHOMMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee provided handwritten lists of names of people involved in Taliban/Anti-Coalition Movement activities and provided descriptions, locations and type of activity information on these people.

2. The detainee worked in the Division of Logistics building under senior Taliban members. The detainee was originally given a job as a clerk and later he was demoted to working in the office kitchen and cleaning up around the office.

3. During the Ramadan period of 2001, the detainee traveled back to Iran to work in construction. The detainee worked in Iran for about six months before returning to Afghanistan. When the detainee returned from Iran he went back to work at the Ghazni Police Department.

b. Training

The detainee indicated that he had fired a Kalashnikov and a shotgun and fought 5-6 years in the Mujahadin.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee admitted he worked for the Taliban Minister of Intelligence.

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000353

ISN 1103

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHIR, MOHOMMAD**

2. The detainee was captured with a fax from a newspaper in Iran. The fax was requesting that Qari (Ahdmedullah) interview Usama Bin (Laden) and included a list of questions related to 11 September 2001.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee has made several trips to Iran using three different routes.
2. The detainee was captured in July 2003. A search of his property turned up two Kalashnikov magazines, two grenades, a high frequency radio, small amounts of ammunition, a canister with Cyrillic writing on it suspected to be uranium and an electronic organizer.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee stated he has not been associated with the Taliban since his conscription first ended.
  - b. The detainee stated he never plotted against coalition forces or the new government in Afghanistan.
  - c. The detainee's surviving brother lived in the same house as the detainee and works as a clerk at the Khowgazni Electrical Cooperative for the new government.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 August 2006

TO: RAHIM, MOHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee served as a Mujahedin foot soldier from 1985 to 1989.
    2. The cooperative logistics company the detainee worked at in Kabul, Afghanistan, was owned by the Taliban government and was closely associated with Taliban Intelligence. The company provided logistical support directly to the Taliban government. The detainee held the title of Chief of Logistics and there were approximately nine employees working in the Kabul office, including the detainee.
    3. The detainee was responsible for purchasing items as directed by Mohammad Ibrahim. Ibrahim would have a list of items to purchase and would present the list to the detainee.
    4. Mohammad Ibrahim was the Divisional Commander of the Logistics Division under the Taliban Ministry of Intelligence.
    5. The detainee worked with an employee of the company who had authority to write checks for the company. This employee also worked directly for the Taliban Intelligence in Kabul, Afghanistan.
    6. The detainee said the records found in his possession, which detailed purchases, acquisitions, distribution of food supplies, warehouse information and distribution of money were records he kept when he worked for the Taliban as Chief of Cooperative Development. The detainee said he was responsible for these records and took them home after the fall of the Taliban so that he would never be accused of embezzling or mispending money.

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ISN 1104



# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED**

7. The detainee attempted to export gems from Afghanistan to Germany. The revenue was to be used to finance al Qaida.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was a former companion of Usama bin Laden during the jihad against the Russians and was among a group protecting Usama bin Laden at his last meeting at Tora Bora.

2. The detainee was entrusted by Usama bin Laden to exfiltrate his guard forces from Afghanistan back to their countries of origin. Shortly before Usama bin Laden's departure from Tora Bora on 16 January 2002, Usama bin Laden and his companions spent the night in a house belonging to an Afghan, an acquaintance of the detainee.

3. Near the end of February 2003, Taliban leaders held a meeting at a nomad camp site in the mountains between the town of Daychopan, Zabul Province, Afghanistan and Mian Nasheen. The meeting was attended by the detainee, referred to as Mullah Mohammad Rahim. Three new groups were formed and each group was assigned a commander during the meeting. One group was comprised of 13 Taliban soldiers and was commanded by the detainee. The detainee's group had an unknown number of RPGs and AK-47 assault rifles.

4. Taliban members were armed with mines when they traveled to the meetings.

5. The detainee attempted to align himself with other Taliban to continue the anti-United States/Coalition/Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan campaign.

### c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that leaders from Quetta, Pakistan gave him several satellite phones with long-range capabilities.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he has lived his whole life in the same house. Other than one trip to Pakistan during the jihad against Russia, the year of travel unknown, the detainee stated that he has not traveled outside of his village. The detainee stated that he went to Pakistan to have eye surgery.

b. The detainee stated that he never purchased any weapons for himself or anyone else.

c. The detainee denies having any weapons other than the one Kalishnakov that was seized from his house. The detainee claimed that the Kalishnakov was the property of the government and legally in the possession of his brother from whom it was seized. His brother had the weapon because of his service as a soldier for the city. The Karzai government had said they would give 200 United States Dollars to those in Afghanistan who turned in their weapons to the

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHIM, MOHAMED**

government and the detainee's brother had planned to turn the Kalashnikov in and collect the 200 United States Dollars.

d. The detainee denied knowing any locations of weapons caches and/or Taliban or al Qaida personalities.

e. The detainee stated that his office did not have access to telephone lines and that he was not equipped with radios. The detainee stated that the Taliban used radios, but that his office did not have communications equipment.

f. The detainee gave a detailed account of extortion Taliban officials used against their employees and Taliban Intelligence officials that worked in the logistics office.

g. The detainee stated that he does not know anything about al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

26 March 2006

TO: HAJI HAMIDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAJI HAMIDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was a member of the Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin for 10 years.

2. In November 2001, the detainee attempted to recruit and organize supporters for the Shah and the Mahaz-e Melli in Kabul. The Northern Alliance arrested the detainee because of these efforts; however, the detainee escaped.

3. The detainee was arrested by the Taliban and placed in jail due to his affiliation with the Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin. He spent 23 months in jail before escaping to Pakistan.

4. The detainee secretly recruited and organized members of the Mahaz-e Melli group. Consequently, rumors were spread throughout Kabul accusing the detainee of being involved with the Taliban and al Qaeda.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin was founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar as a faction of the Hezb-I Islami party in 1977. It was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets and has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden.

2. The detainee was captured in August 2003, in Kabul, in a home owned by an al Qaida financier.

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000958

ISN 1119

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAJI HAMIDULLAH**

3. The detainee was identified as an Iranian intelligence officer. The reliability of the source is not determined.

c. Intent

A source named the detainee as the commander of 30 men, with ties to the Taliban, planning an attack on an Afghan National Directorate of Security unit near Kabul.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee states that the only reason he worked for the Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin was that they would provide food and money for the member and their families.

b. The detainee claimed he is friendly to the United States and turned to the Islamic faith as being a reason not to kill.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000959

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 August 2006

TO: YAKUBI, MOHAMMED MUSSA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKUBI, MOHAMMED MUSSA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

- a. Training

The detainee was shown how to fire the AK-47 and RPG at the police check post where he worked.

- b. Connections/Associations

1. On 30 August 2003, the detainee's brother was apprehended at the detainee's home for suspected involvement in attacks on United States Forces. Found on the detainee's brother was a Thuraya satellite phone number associated with the detainee's name. A mortar and rifles were found in the detainee's compound. The brother also had in his possession an identification card from the Hezb-e Islami.

2. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin is a Terrorist Organization founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after he fled Sudan in 1996. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.

3. The detainee advised that his boss was the commander of all police forces in Gardez, Afghanistan.

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000360

ISN 1165

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKUBI, MOHAMMED MUSSA**

4. Reporting indicated that former Gardeyz, Afghanistan police chief held a party at his compound in Gardeyz, Afghanistan during which a private meeting was held to establish an agreement to assist al Qaida operatives in Shahi Khowt, Afghanistan and the surrounding area.

c. Intent

1. According to reporting, the detainee was directly responsible for an improvised explosive device attack on 4 June 2003.

2. On 4 June 2003, a Coalition Forces convoy was the target of an improvised explosive device attack. The improvised explosive device detonated near a Coalition Forces convoy traveling southeast along the Gardez-Khowst highway in Afghanistan. The only person injured was small local boy who received shrapnel wounds and was admitted to the Gardeyz, Afghanistan hospital.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee advised the first time he heard about al Qaida was after being taken into custody. The detainee states that al Qaida are bad people and blames them for ruining his country.

b. The detainee stated that if released, he would like to return to his family in Gardez, Afghanistan.

c. The detainee related he is glad the Americans entered Afghanistan. The detainee stated the American presence has been extremely beneficial to his country.

d. The detainee denied possessing prior knowledge of the improvised explosive device attack near the bridge in Khowst, Afghanistan.

e. The detainee further denies any intention of selling or providing either the rocket-propelled grenades rounds or miscellaneous ammunition to anti-Coalition Forces.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 September 2006

TO: BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that a charity organization brought them to a guest house. The detainee believed the group that helped them was called the Egyptian Jihad Group and was operated by an al Qaida operative. The detainee stated the individual was the second-in-command for al Qaida.

2. Al-Jihad also known as the Egyptian Jihad Group is an Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970s. It merged with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. The primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack the United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

3. The detainee advised that Usama bin Laden visited the guest house and indicated he had some contacts with Usama bin Laden at various dinner functions as well as handling one of Usama bin Laden's weapons. The detainee indicated he did not share a close relationship with Usama bin Laden, but early on as a youth, he observed a relationship between Usama bin Laden and his father.

4. The detainee stated while in Peshawar, Pakistan, he joined the al-Khalafa group, which was dedicated to overthrowing the Pakistan government.

5. The detainee admitted he decided to kill two individuals because one person embarrassed a guest in the detainee's home.

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000362

ISN 1452

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI

6. The detainee admitted to having killed an individual in 1995, which he indicated alienated many members of al Qaida. The person was suspected as Usama bin Laden's commercial representative in Pakistan and a member of al Qaida.
7. The detainee stated he enlisted a Pakistani and an Afghan to assist him and another individual in tracking down two individuals. The detainee stated they learned the person was in Peshawar, Pakistan at his home. On 10 January 1997, the person opened his door and the detainee fired one shot from his Makarov pistol, striking the person in the head. The detainee told the Pakistani and Afghan to kill the other person, which they did.
8. The detainee acknowledged knowing the individual and stated the person was the top al Qaeda representative in Pakistan. The detainee stated he denied being directly involved in the murder of this person. When told that he had previously admitted to the murders, the detainee stated the information had been taken under duress and the only reason he had admitted to the murders while in Kabul, Afghanistan, was because he had been threatened.
9. The detainee stated he joined a group called Hillafah to which he was elected as the group's leader because he spoke Pashtu and was able to pass himself off as Afghani. The group was disbanded approximately one year later when the detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities. The detainee stated he was approximately 23 or 25 years old at the time and spent approximately one year in jail. After serving this sentence the detainee was deported to Afghanistan.
10. The detainee stated he stayed in Jalalabad, Afghanistan for two to three nights during which time an individual introduced him to various members of the Taliban. The detainee stated they showed favor to him and gave him a place to live in Kabul, Afghanistan.
11. The detainee stated the Taliban gave him room and board in Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately four months.
12. The detainee stated the Taliban Foreign Minister subsequently recommended the detainee for a job as a translator after learning he spoke both Pashtu and Arabic.
13. The detainee stated he was eventually given a job by the Taliban Foreign Ministry. The detainee said he was in Afghanistan for approximately one month before receiving this job during which time he returned to Pakistan and moved his family from Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he worked at this position for approximately four to five months before the United States bombing campaign began. The detainee stated that he then fled Afghanistan and returned to Pakistan with his family.
14. The detainee wrote a ten-page report on al Qaida and other Islamic groups in Afghanistan for the Taliban Deputy Minister of Intelligence.



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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI**

15. The detainee acknowledged he was engaged in the selling of used carpet, a business enterprise he shared with an Iraqi with Canadian citizenship. This carpet business was a good source of income, which netted between 1,000 to 1,500 United States Dollars a month. The detainee purchased used carpets and rugs from local homeowners and then would resell them in either Peshawar, Pakistan or as far away as Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee stated he started this carpet business right after the fall of the Taliban and was living in Peshawar, Pakistan conducting the business until his arrest.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated they spent about one to two weeks in Peshawar, Pakistan then went to the Sadaa Training Camp on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated he attended the Sadaa Camp several times between 1986 and 1991. The detainee stated the Sadaa Camp was mandatory for all fighters before entering Afghanistan to fight against the Russians. The detainee further stated the training conducted in the camp was primarily general combat skills but after serving in Afghanistan you could take specialized training.

3. The detainee stated the five men spent about one month training at the same camp and stayed in the same tent. Training consisted of anti-aircraft guns and small arms, such as the Kalashnikov, AK-47, rocket-propelled grenades and the Pakistani machine gun. The detainee claimed that during the training he fired each of these weapons and then used them on the front line.

4. The detainee stated that after the training was complete he and the rest of the group went to the front line in Zazi, Afghanistan. After three to six months on the front line, the detainee received training on the Stinger missile, but he never fired it. At this time, the detainee stated he was 12 years old.

5. The detainee stated there was a three-day training course in improvised explosive devices held in Peshawar, Pakistan in November 2002. The detainee listed names who were there, why the course was cancelled sooner than scheduled and what equipment was used. Also, the detainee stated there was discussion on the use of poisons with explosives.

6. The detainee stated an impromptu discussion took place on methods to attack United States Forces stationed at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. One of the methods would involve poisoning the food destined for the base while it was in the port of Karachi, Pakistan. The other method involved placing improvised explosive devices on fuel trucks that supplied the bases. The improvised explosive devices would be placed on the trucks while they were in Peshawar, Pakistan before they crossed into Afghanistan. The detainee stated they additionally discussed attacking United States forces in Konar Province, Afghanistan; Jalalabad, Afghanistan; and Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. These attacks would be with bombs.

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7. The detainee stated that he had spent a month at the Khalden Camp in Afghanistan getting ready to return to Algeria for jihad.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. A senior al Qaida operative knows the detainee.

2. The detainee stated he was a foot soldier for Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin and fought against two individuals after the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan. The detainee stated Hezb I Islami Gulbuddin believed these individuals were being backed by the Soviets after the Soviets were defeated.

3. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

4. The detainee was questioned about his role and membership in al Khalifa and again the detainee stated he was not a member but was sympathetic towards the goals of the organization. The detainee acknowledged knowing the leader of a local group that stayed in his home along with other al Khalifa members. The detainee stated they stayed in the home in Peshawar, Pakistan and he may have had up to twenty men, women and children pass through his house at any given time. Some of these individuals remained in the home up to six months.

5. The detainee stated that in 1999, he was a member of the Armed Islamic Group in Pakistan. The detainee stated the group was training in the Jaluzi Camp near Peshawar, Pakistan. Al Qaida sponsored this camp. The Algerian group, Armed Islamic, was there to train and then return and conduct jihad against the Algerian government. The detainee claims Usama bin Laden and two others placed three well-trained al Qaida operatives in this group to enhance their experience level as well as their training. The detainee stated he was not allowed to return to Algeria and conduct jihad due to his language skills being needed in Pakistan and Afghanistan more than they needed fighters in Algeria.

6. The detainee stated that he met Zarqawi in 2000 or 2001. Zarqawi was in prison with a good friend of the detainee in Pakistan in 2000. Zarqawi was told to go to Kabul, Afghanistan to see the detainee about giving him a place to stay for a while.

7. The detainee stated he had never met Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi. In 2000, the detainee was pressured by a long time friend to provide lodging for al Zarqawi in Kabul, Afghanistan since al Zarqawi was short of funds. Al Zarqawi and another individual had recently been released from a Pakistani prison. Al Zarqawi had been jailed because he did not have

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI**

appropriate identification. The detainee stated his wife objected to al Zarqawi staying with them, so the detainee rented a house for him instead.

8. A senior al Qaida operative stated that he has known the detainee since 1986, when he met and traveled with the detainee's family from Algiers to Pakistan. This individual stated that the detainee was considered dangerous and untrustworthy, despised by many in the Arab community and was believed to have had some role in the 1996 murder of Peshawar, Pakistan-based al Qaida officer, Asad Sindi.

9. The detainee stated he had met a suspected al Qaida member two months before the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The detainee recalled only seeing this individual twice in 1987 and then again for a one-time event in 1990. The detainee was questioned as to the allegations he attacked several churches in Islamabad and Punjab, Pakistan, in 2002 and that this suspected al Qaida member may have provided financial support. The detainee denied knowing this suspected al Qaida member or destroying the churches. The detainee also denied the receipt of financial support from this suspected al Qaida member for an attack against the Pakistan President and related he had never heard of such a thing.

10. The detainee stated while in Kabul, Afghanistan he attended a nightly feast during Ramadan that was hosted by a person with a position in the Ministry of the Interior. The Taliban Foreign Minister also attended the feast.

11. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was a Taqfiri, which was a group of religious fanatics who were known to purge and kill their own members. This individual also stated the detainee had joined the front line with Hezb-Islami Gulbuddin leader in 1996.

12. The detainee was asked if he was a member of Takfer Wael Hagra and al Khalifa. The detainee stated he could not recall if his membership was in 1989 or 1999, but thought it was before he went to prison in Pakistan. When asked about al Khalifa, the detainee stated that it was the same thing, but then attempted to explain the difference. The detainee advised he believed in the group, but never was a member and never a leader.

13. Another individual stated the detainee was a very violent person with little contact except for his close friends and those affiliated with Takfer Wael Hagra, also known as El Kalae. According to this individual they have no problem killing others.

14. The detainee stated he was part of the Jamaat Islami of Algeria while in Pakistan and not Jamiat Islami. The detainee stated the main mission of Jamaat Islami of Algeria was to fight the Algerian government and to kick the French out of the country. The detainee stated he was proud to be part of the group for one-and-one-half years.

15. The detainee stated he later became a member of a group called Khilafah, not Hillafah, which consisted of approximately 25 members of Arab, Pakistan and Afghan descent.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL-JAZA'IRI**

The detainee stated the main mission of Khilafah was to unite all Muslims under one leadership structure.

16. The detainee claimed to have been a member of the Armed Islamic Front (GIA).

17. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group began its violent activity in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front - the largest Islamic opposition party-in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991.

18. Another individual claimed the detainee was a member of Hizb ul-Mujahideen, who resided in the board area of Peshawar, Pakistan.

19. An individual stated he heard that the detainee was responsible for the 17 March 2002 attack on a church in Islamabad, Pakistan and the 24 December 2002 attack on the Chuwanwali Church in Punjab, Pakistan. This individual stated he only met the detainee once at which time this individual passed the detainee 300,000 Pakistani Rupees to support the detainee's cell in Punjab and fund an attack against the Pakistan President.

20. Another individual stated that the detainee was a facilitator and handled money for Usama bin Laden and al Qaida. This individual claimed the detainee was the courier of money between Usama bin Laden, al Qaida and another individual in Afghanistan.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that any information taken from him while imprisoned at Bagram, Afghanistan, was taken under duress and was not true.

2. The detainee was told that the information he was providing did not match the testimony and evidence given by others, the detainee stated that unless he was treated better and incentives given to him, he would not cooperate.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee expressed distaste for al Qaida and said he did not like them. The detainee stated he began talking to a foreign government about one month after the Taliban fell.

b. The detainee stated he worked for a foreign service agency for one-and-one-half years. The foreign service agency gave the detainee financial support in return for information on the whereabouts and activities of al Qaida members.

c. The detainee claimed al Qaida used him and others as test subjects for testing of poisons and toxins. The detainee stated he was telling new arrivals not to trust al Qaida.

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## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HAMLILI, ADIL HADI AL- JAZA'IRI

- d. The detainee stated he had no association with Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin.
  - e. The detainee was asked if he or al Khalifa were engaged in the overthrow of the Pakistan government and assassination attempt on the Pakistan President, the detainee stated he was not involved.
  - f. The detainee denied he had any involvement using his carpet business as a means to assist in the attack on the Sheraton Hotel.
  - g. Detainee does not consider himself aligned with any particular sect of Islam, just a Muslim.
  - h. The detainee stated he never swore bayat to Usama bin Laden.
  - i. When asked if released if he would assist any organization to make bad things happen to America the detainee replied no. The detainee stated he would return to his family in Algeria and not help anyone do anything anymore.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2006

TO: AL KAZIMI, SANAD YISLAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KAZIMI, SANAD YISLAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated that in 1994 he was arrested for destroying tombstones. When asked why he did this, the detainee advised a fatwa had been issued by Sheik Muqbil al Wadi, stating it was illegal, according to Islamic law, to have tombstones above ground.
    2. The detainee stated he was advised to join the Chechnya jihad. The detainee was told that he would need to go to Afghanistan first in order to receive training and be provided with a letter of introduction.
    3. The detainee stated he had contacted an al Qaida operative because he wanted to go to Afghanistan to be involved in the jihad.
    4. The detainee stated he came to Afghanistan to be killed in a way which honored Allah or to survive fighting in Afghanistan and to also receive the financial security al Qaida would bestow on him upon his return.
    5. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan via the Karachi-Quetta-Qandahar route using the passport that an al Qaida operative had obtained for him.
    6. The detainee stated he had to say, under oath, that he would fight with Usama bin Laden against those aggressors from the Jews and Christians, under the law of God. The detainee further stated this was not just an oath, but also a covenant that he was bound by.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000969

ISN 1453

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KAZIMI, SANAD YISLAM**

7. The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan planning to become a bodyguard and he was very surprised and honored when he got the job.

8. The detainee stated he was willing to die for Usama bin Laden at the time he was his bodyguard.

9. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee went to Pakistan around June 2001 for medical treatment and returned.

10. The detainee stated he left Kandahar, Afghanistan with an entourage of three vehicles, with his family in his vehicle. The detainee further stated that after 30 minutes the group stopped, the husbands gave their wives money and then the husbands returned to Kandahar to rejoin the fight.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he had been in special operations in Yemeni Army and was in the reserves from 1989 to 1994.

2. From 1989 to 1990 the detainee attended the Sawaydya training camp in the Alidal Province and had two months of special forces training at al Houdqeda training camp in Yemen where he served with the Ali Nasser unit. The detainee's rank was equivalent to a first lieutenant.

3. A source stated the detainee went to Afghanistan with the help of an individual and trained in al Qaida camps there where he was later selected by Usama bin Laden to be a bodyguard.

4. The detainee stated he got to al Farouk at the end of May or the beginning of June and went through the basic training which lasted for 45 days. The detainee stated that the training focused on weapons, such as the Kalashnikov rifle and the Beka, and other areas, such as topography, camouflage, formations and mountain tactics.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee learned about the bodyguard work through Usama bin Laden's private secretary and requested additional training.

2. The detainee stated that he first met Usama bin Laden in August 2000 when he was interviewed for the job.

3. The detainee stated about October 1999 he contacted an al Qaida operative and gave him money to get a passport to Afghanistan.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL KAZIMI, SANAD YISLAM**

4. The detainee met an al Qaida operative in Afghanistan and the al Qaida operative was trusted by Usama bin Laden.

5. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee knew a Saudi-based al Qaida operative.

### d. Intent

A source stated the detainee was very militant, an extremist and a violent individual with strong opposition to foreign government.

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claimed that he did not know what the senior al Qaida operative was planning to do with the explosives when detainee was asked to case the road for the presence of security and roadblocks.

2. The detainee stated he was never asked to purchase the explosives and that he did not know who was going to provide the explosives.

3. The detainee stated he was relieved when the senior al Qaida lieutenant was arrested soon after this, as he had not wanted to pursue the explosives transporting operations. The detainee further commented that the senior al Qaida lieutenant was crazy.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he was not interested in helping the senior al Qaida operative and was just trying to do the least amount of work possible while taking the money.

b. The detainee stated that he never heard of the senior al Qaida operative planning an attack against Port Rashid, United Arab Emirates.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 September 2006

TO: ALI BIN ATTASH, HASSAN MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BIN ATTASH, HASSAN  
MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee's family had been close to Usama bin Laden since the early 1980's. It was not uncommon for Usama bin Laden to be at the detainee's father's house and the detainee had often been to the Usama bin Laden family home in Jeddah. The detainee's entire family, with the exception of his mother, two sisters, and his youngest brother, has participated in jihad.

2. The detainee was always eager to join the jihad. The detainee was very involved in al Qaida and first traveled to Afghanistan in 1997.

3. The detainee stated he traveled from Saudi Arabia to Yemen and then to Pakistan where he stayed at a guest house. The detainee then traveled to the Khalden Camp in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee, along with another al Qaida operative, produced the film of the USS Cole attack with the money and at the personal direction of Usama bin Laden.

5. The detainee assisted in providing timing devices needed for an operation involving the hotels in Karachi, Pakistan.

b. Training

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000972

ISN 1456

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BIN ATTASH, HASSAN MOHAMMED**

1. The detainee was raised with Takfiri jihad radical beliefs. In 1997, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan where he received basic military-type training in the Khaldan camp. The detainee stated he joined al Qaida and was treated well within the organization and became a trusted member of al Qaida and was close to senior al Qaida members.

2. The detainee took bomb-making classes in Khowst, Afghanistan, at the Khalden and Jihad Wahl camps. The detainee was trained to make a bomb using TNT and C-4. The detainee was shown how to make remote detonators out of the game cartridges in Sega games.

3. The detainee received training on weapons at the Khalden camp. The detainee did not attend all the training, estimating that he attended less than fifty percent of the classes.

4. According to a source, the Khaldan camp was used to train Taliban and al Qaida fighters.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee said he saw Usama bin Laden about three times in the year 2000. The detainee related he had seen Usama bin Laden in the mosque, but did not talk to him.

2. The detainee worked directly with a senior al Qaida operative, who was in charge of Usama bin Laden's cadre inside Pakistan. The senior al Qaida operative was responsible for coordinating and facilitating travel for al Qaida and Mujahedin fighters, raising money through charitable organizations and providing al Qaida operatives and Mujahedin with false documents including passports, stamps and visas.

3. In August 2001, a senior al Qaida operative ordered the detainee to travel back and forth to Kandahar, Afghanistan every two months and bring money to support his operation. Usama bin Laden approved the request, but asked the detainee to tell the al Qaida operative not to spend a lot of money.

4. The detainee stated that in April 2001, al Qaida had begun planning a terrorist operation against shipping in the Straits of Hormuz. In April 2001, a senior al Qaida operative, at the suggestion and with the financial backing of Usama bin Laden, began implementing a terrorist operation against United States naval vessels and United States oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz.

5. The detainee established a number of e-mail accounts to communicate and coordinate with other al Qaida members. The detainee also admitted he sent letters confirming plans to carry out major operations in Yemen including targeting oil tankers in Yemeni ports, which would have completed the plan to attack ships in the Straits of Hormuz.

### d. Other Relevant Data

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALI BIN ATTASH, HASSAN MOHAMMED**

1. The detainee was arrested on 11 September 2002 in a safe house. The detainee was arrested with a senior al Qaida operative.

2. The detainee's family had made significant financial contributions to al Qaida and their jihad activities.

3. According to an individual, the detainee's older brother was a senior lieutenant and a big supporter of Usama bin Laden and ordered his subordinates to follow the guidance of Usama bin Laden. All the brothers of the detainee worked for Usama bin Laden.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee indicated he did not know what the remote detonators he was asked to transport would be used for.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000974

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 September 2006

TO: SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that joining jihad and dying in the process of helping Muslims was a better way to die.

2. The detainee traveled to Bosnia for jihad and arrived there in February 1995.

3. The detainee went to the front lines after training and was placed as a guard. The detainee was not engaged in fighting, he just protected the position. The detainee left Bosnia for Yemen in February 1996, two months after a cease-fire.

4. The detainee heard Muslims were dying in Ogaden in Africa, so in 1996 he traveled to Kenya. The detainee tried to get into Somalia but was warned it was unsafe for Arabs in Ogaden, so the detainee returned to Yemen.

5. The detainee traveled to Arakan in March 1997 because he heard Buddhists were killing Muslims. The detainee was in Bangladesh for a month trying to get into Arakan, now known as Rakhine, but couldn't so he flew back to Yemen.

6. The detainee received three video cameras from an individual to send to Afghanistan for combat footage to be used in recruitment and to raise money.

7. A source stated the detainee briefly served as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.

8. A source stated the detainee was responsible for the physical storage of al Qaida cash and had authority to distribute funds without prior approval.

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UNCLASSIFIED

ISN 1457

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI

9. The detainee stated he always used couriers to bring money from donors in Saudi Arabia to himself in Karachi, Pakistan for extremists and their families.

10. A source stated the detainee is believed to have sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden.

11. The detainee stated he was a Mujahedin and that he facilitated travel for al Qaida members but he was not al Qaida. The detainee said he never pledged bayat.

12. The detainee stated he was against swearing bayat and having allegiance to any organization, including al Qaida, because it limited their personal freedom and would prevent them from going to Chechnya to fight.

#### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he arrived in Bosnia and attended training with the Bosnian Army in the Mujahed Battalion for forty days. The detainee said they taught physical training and weapons, such as the Kalashnikov rifle and hand grenades. The detainee also said his training ended March or April 1995.

2. The detainee flew to Pakistan on 18 August 2000 with the purpose of receiving training in Afghanistan for jihad in Chechnya.

3. The detainee traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan to take a class on electronics. The objective of the class was to learn how to make remote controls for explosives. The class was six months long but he dropped out early.

4. The detainee stated that he has never received explosives training.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee said he participated in weekly group luncheons from August 2000 through May 2001 with Usama bin Laden in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee traveled with Usama bin Laden and his bodyguards to Kandahar, Afghanistan in December 2000.

3. The detainee stated he knew several Usama bin Laden guards from Yemen and that he had facilitated their travel to Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated that while he was in Kabul, Afghanistan, he found out Usama bin Laden stayed at the same house that he did, called the Bayt Allam. The detainee said the house belonged to the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI**

5. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an extremist group active since the late 1970s. The group merged with bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but retained some capability to conduct independent operations. The primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.

6. Egyptian Islamic Jihad is under a United States terrorism sanction. Executive order 13224 blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.

7. The detainee stated he came into contact with Usama bin Laden at a house in Kabul, Afghanistan the week after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Usama bin Laden then fled to the mountains.

8. The detainee said he never spoke to Usama bin Laden personally about arranging travel for al Qaida, but he did talk to an assistant of Usama bin Laden.

9. The detainee stated that when he was in Afghanistan, he interacted with people affiliated with al Qaida, as well as other members of the Mujahedin. A general fund was used to pay for expenses for the Mujahedin while al Qaida members' expenses were paid for out of a separate fund. Money for al Qaida members did not come through the detainee but rather through others depending on the orders of Usama bin Laden.

10. The detainee stated he saw three of the 11 September 2001 hijackers while he was with Usama bin Laden in March 2001.

11. The detainee acknowledged he was a friend of one of the suicide bombers involved in the bombing of the USS Cole.

12. The detainee received money from two individuals to facilitate the travel of those wanting to travel to Afghanistan for training. The detainee helped get visas, passports, airline tickets and money to travel.

13. The detainee stated he received money from two wealthy Saudis. The detainee received cash on about 20 occasions during November 2001 and January 2002. The total amount received was more than one million United States Dollars. The money was used to help Mujahedin fleeing Afghanistan.

14. Reportedly, the detainee was selected by a senior Usama bin Laden operative to organize the mechanics and logistics for a planned attack on the American Embassy in Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee obtained small amounts of TNT over several months and stored it at a safe house.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHARQAWI, ABDU ALI**

15. The detainee said officials were bribed and documents forged in order to get people visas and passports. The detainee was responsible for the Taiz, Yemen area.

16. The detainee moved to Pakistan in April or May 2001 to facilitate travel for those trying to get to Afghanistan.

17. A source stated the detainee was a falcon because he was a key facilitator for the movement of men in and out of Afghanistan. Usama bin Laden was the only authority that could make someone a falcon.

18. The detainee was one of the al Qaida members in Pakistan using GSM telephones equipped with Swiss SIM cards.

### **d. Other Relevant Data**

1. The detainee was raised to view the United States as an enemy of Islam.

2. The detainee stated he was confused about what he wanted to do upon his release. The detainee said there's a part of him that wants to join Zarqawi or Sheik Osama in the fight against the United States. However, another part of him wants to go far away so he can get away from all of the conflict.

3. Reportedly, two airline life vests and a back pack were found at the safe house used by the detainee. Initial testing of these items was positive for explosives.

4. The detainee stated that the 170,000 United States Dollars found at the house he was when captured at was originally kept at another house he believed was under surveillance.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he did not accept Usama bin Laden's claim that American civilians were legitimate targets because they paid taxes and supported the American government.

b. The detainee said Usama bin Laden and al Qaida are against the United States but his support of al Qaida did not put him in opposition of the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 August 2006

TO: ABU RAHMAN, ABDUL RABBANI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU RAHMAN, ABDUL RABBANI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan to learn how to use weapons. The detainee stated that he searched his heart and felt it was right to go to Afghanistan so he could learn about weapons to help liberate his people in Burma.
    2. The detainee had been associated with al Qaida since mid-2000 when his brother recruited him.
    3. The detainee stated he was brought to Kandahar, Afghanistan in mid-2000 and briefly met Usama bin Laden and was then sent to the Khaldan camp near Khowst, Afghanistan for military training.
    4. The detainee stated he remained at Khalden Camp for approximately six weeks before he was told he had to leave the camp for not following instructions.
    5. The detainee stated that after leaving Khalden Camp, he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, via Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed in Karachi for approximately one week and then returned to Kabul, Afghanistan.
    6. The detainee stated that he stayed in Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately three days before traveling to Bagram, Afghanistan where he remained for three months and then later returned to Karachi, Pakistan. During his time in Karachi, the detainee was instructed to go to the hospital on Tariq road in order to visit and help care for wounded al Qaida fighters.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000979

ISN 1460



## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU RAHMAN, ABDUL RABBANI

7. The detainee stated that he cooked at safe houses and eventually began transporting individuals to al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. The detainee would travel to and from Afghanistan and deliver letters and equipment from Pakistan to al Qaida members in Afghanistan.

8. The detainee stated that he was tasked from an al Qaida operations chief with transporting goods to Afghanistan for various al Qaida personnel and said that men would drop off bags of various items for him to carry to Afghanistan.

9. The detainee was provided a salary from an al Qaida operations chief totaling 2000 rupees per month to begin. The operations chief also provided money for the detainee to get married.

10. The detainee stated that around January 2001, he was directed by an al Qaida operations chief to rent a safe house. The detainee found a two-story house near the Karachi, Pakistan airport in a community called, Wireless Gate. The detainee maintained this house for four to five months.

11. The detainee stated that he rented another house around June 2001 in the Rabia City area of Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee operated this safe house until approximately November 2001.

12. The detainee stated that al Qaida personnel worked at a safe house run by the detainee located at Gulshan I-Iqbal, Karachi, Pakistan to edit video tapes and produce video discs from the tapes.

13. The detainee rented a two-story house in the Mehmoodabad neighborhood of Karachi, Pakistan.

14. The detainee rented his final apartment in Karachi, Pakistan where Pakistan authorities conducted a raid on 11 September 2002.

15. The detainee stated that shortly after the safe house at Sonia apartments on Tariq road in Karachi, Pakistan was rented, around early June 2002, an al Qaida operations chief came to the apartment and dropped off a package containing a large number of the electronic devices which the detainee described as small black boxes to be used in attacks.

16. The detainee stated that within one week of receiving the package of devices from an al Qaida operations chief, he was directed to put several of the devices in a bag and to take them to a bus stop in Karachi, Pakistan where he would meet an unidentified man and give them to him.

17. The detainee stated that he was directed to take another bag of the devices to a man who would meet him in the Sabzi Mandi area of Karachi, Pakistan.

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU RAHMAN, ABDUL RABBANI

18. The detainee stated that he provided safe houses and logistical support to al Qaida operatives in Karachi, Pakistan from approximately early 2000 through September 2002.

19. During raids conducted between 9 and 11 September 2002 in Karachi, Pakistan, authorities recovered 22 radio-controlled remote detonating devices from a house in Karachi.

20. An al Qaida operations chief stated that he had discussed conducting car bomb attacks against targets located in the immediate vicinity of the old airport in Karachi, Pakistan with other members of al Qaida. The detainee was part of a cell that was tasked to purchase the cars, conduct further casing of the hotels, and purchase and build the explosive devices.

21. The detainee stated that shortly after the initiation of coalition bombing in Afghanistan, he began making repeated trips to Quetta, Pakistan at the direction of a Karachi, Pakistan facilitator to escort the wives and families of al Qaida operatives from Quetta to Karachi.

22. The detainee has stated that he asked an al Qaida operations chief several times for military work and the operations chief refused, saying that the detainee needed to stay and help the families.

23. The detainee was captured in September 2002, during raids conducted against a series of al Qaida safe houses in Karachi, Pakistan.

24. The detainee stated that after his capture he was kept in Pakistan for two months. The detainee was then moved from Islamabad, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan where he stayed for approximately seven months.

#### b. Training

The detainee stated he was trained on 11 types of weapons at the Khalden al Qaida training camp. These include the AK-47, PK machine gun, ZK-1 mortar and rocket-propelled grenades.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he was introduced to an al Qaida operations chief by his brother.
2. The detainee stated that on four separate occasions, he delivered letters from an al Qaida operations chief in Pakistan directly to Usama bin Laden.
3. The detainee stated he attended meetings to deliver numerous items to Usama bin Laden from an al Qaida operations chief.
4. The detainee stated he worked closely with an al Qaida operations chief to coordinate support to Arabs who were being harbored in safe houses within Karachi, Pakistan.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU RAHMAN, ABDUL RABBANI**

5. The detainee stated that he was instructed by an al Qaida operations chief to live at a safe house in the Defense View neighborhood of Karachi, Pakistan for approximately six months where he lived with a USS Cole bombing planner.

6. The detainee stated that there was no direct supervisor for identifying and transporting individuals between guesthouses. The detainee stated that he worked directly for an al Qaida operations chief.

7. The detainee stated that he harbored three of the 11 September 2001 hijackers briefly at the two-story home in the Defense View area of Karachi, Pakistan.

8. The detainee stated that he has either operated or resided at six different safe houses in Karachi, Pakistan with a senior al Qaida operative.

9. The detainee stated that he has met Usama bin Laden approximately 10-12 times.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. A senior al Qaida operative characterized the detainee as being a low-level assistant of an al Qaida operation chief who primarily handled social and travel needs. The senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee was not involved in operations at all.

b. A senior al Qaida operative has stated that the detainee was a simple man who required specific instructions to carry out his tasks. The senior al Qaida operative also expressed certainty that the detainee would not have been privy to operational information.

c. The detainee has stated that he has never sworn bayat to al Qaida.

d. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

e. The detainee has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

f. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 Oct 2006

To: RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD GHULAM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD  
GHULAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee has been identified as a senior al Qaida operative.
    2. The detainee took his brother to the Khalden Training Camp, explaining that it was mandatory religious training. The detainee and his brother traveled by bus from Karachi, Pakistan to a Taliban affiliated guest house in Quetta, Pakistan.
    3. The detainee joined al Qaida while in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1996.
    4. The detainee was a trusted al Qaida supporter who facilitated the relocation of Mujahedin and their families to the tribal areas of Pakistan.
    5. The detainee started his relationship of working with the Mujahadeen, while driving a taxi.
    6. The detainee stated that in the late 1990s he met and began to work for Abu Hafs.
    7. Abu Hafs had the detainee rent a house in Karachi, Pakistan to run as an al Qaida guest house for special people. The detainee used what he described as Mujahedin money. The guests included al Qaida fighters who were sick, wounded, or did not have passports.
    8. When Burmese fighters were at the camps in Afghanistan, the detainee would sometimes translate, including during meetings between the fighters and Usama bin Laden.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000983

ISN 1461

# UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD GHULAM

9. While working for al Qaida, the detainee picked up Mujahadeen from the airport and transported them to various destinations. The detainee also delivered supplies to Afghanistan.

10. In early 2001, the detainee, and senior al Qaida operatives set up a safe house for an al Qaida operative in Karachi, Pakistan to support an operation.

11. The detainee received money for rent to set up and run safe houses from a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee speculated the money came from Mujahedin donations.

12. The detainee said he delivered 20,000 to 30,000 United States Dollars to al Qaida operatives in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee said a senior al Qaida operative provided him the money and the proper paperwork to go to Dubai. The detainee stayed in Dubai for two weeks with the operatives.

13. After 11 September 2001, the detainee operated a safe house used to house sick and injured Mujahadeen and Mujahadeen fleeing from United States forces in Afghanistan. The detainee eventually opened three other guest houses for fleeing Mujahadeen.

14. The detainee stated he facilitated the travel from Karachi, Pakistan of roughly 50 to 60 al Qaida Arabs after the cessation of coalition air strikes against al Qaida/Taliban forces in Afghanistan in December 2001.

## b. Training

1. The detainee received five months of training with weapons, explosives, and tactics at Khalden Camp in Afghanistan. The detainee trained with 11 types of weapons, including the Kalashnikov, PK Machine Gun, ZK-1 Mortar, and the rocket propelled grenades.

2. The detainee stated in 1994 he received initial training for seven months in one camp in Afghanistan and then received two additional months of tactics training in Khalden Camp.

3. In 1999, the detainee trained at the Khaldan Camp with his brother.

4. The detainee stated, while he trained at Khaldan Camp, two al Qaida operatives led and administrated the camp, one was the camp administrator and one served as the military chief. The detainee further stated that the Khalden Camp at the time was a den of the Taliban.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met with Usama Bin Laden and two senior al Qaida operatives at Usama Bin Laden's compound.

## UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD GHULAM

2. The detainee met with Usama bin Laden on six or seven occasions, and they usually talked about developments in Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated he had been in contact with a senior al Qaida facilitator since circa 1998 and stated that he had occasionally coordinated the movement of Arabs between Karachi and Islamabad, Pakistan with this individual.

4. The detainee worked directly for a senior al Qaida operational planner.

5. In 1999, the detainee met with a senior al Qaida operative and secured employment for his brother as the senior al Qaida operative's personal assistant.

6. In March 2001, the detainee took a senior al Qaida operative to several ship dealers in the Karachi, Pakistan port and dock area to look for vessels for attacks against United States interests.

7. On or about July 2001 when Usama Bin Laden moved to caves in the Tora Bora region, the detainee assisted a senior al Qaida operative in obtaining food and construction materials to fortify Tora Bora positions.

8. The detainee quickly became famous within the Mujahadeen circles in Afghanistan and Karachi, Pakistan as a resource for assistance in obtaining goods and transporting people.

9. The detainee's brother-in-law is a Karachi, Pakistan facilitator responsible for assisting a senior al Qaida operative and USS Cole attack planner.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee had six to eight timing devices in his possession when he was arrested.

2. The detainee explained the explosive timing devices were in the process of being transferred to Afghanistan. The detainee offered to hold the devices and transfer them across the border using one of his facilitators. The detainee was arrested before he could execute the plan.

3. Three safe houses rented by the detainee in late 2001 were financed by al Qaida planners. The detainee was responsible for coordinating and executing the movement of single Arab males.

4. The detainee stated he received funding and instructions for his facilitation activities directly from two different senior al Qaida operatives.

# UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD  
GHULAM

5. The detainee had a group of men staying in his apartment for 11 days where he facilitated the manufacture of their fraudulent Iraqi identification cards. The detainee showed the group propaganda videos, including those containing speeches from Usama bin Laden and Abu Musab al Zarqawi. These videos spoke of Muslim unity and the desire to destroy the American infidels. The detainee preached to the jihadists that it was their duty to wage jihad or they would not get into heaven.

6. The detainee stated the United States is the worst terrorist organization in the world. The detainee believes the Muslim world was trying to create a truly Muslim society in Afghanistan, the United States went into Afghanistan to disrupt that plan, and no one invited the United States to come to Afghanistan.

7. The detainee believes any Muslim who works with infidel countries are also infidels.

8. The detainee stated it was God that brought down the twin towers. The detainee further stated he was joyful when he watched the twin towers collapse.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any first hand information regarding planned al Qaida attacks.

b. The detainee stated that he would like to be free again and promised not to return to fighting if he was released.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 August 2006

TO: AL HEELA, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HEELA, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee said he was selected to join the Yemeni Political Security Organization in the mid nineties.
    2. The detainee said he participated in a Yemeni government deportation operation from approximately 1995 to 1999.
    3. The detainee said that he traveled to Germany three times each year since 1996, to procure passports. On each trip the detainee received new and used Portuguese passports.
    4. The detainee said he was directed to use the cover of deportation to facilitate the transfer of Yemeni extremists to Pakistan and Afghanistan. These deportees were to deploy with al Qaida networks to receive training and to prepare for onward assignments.
    5. According to a foreign government service, the detainee was responsible for confiscation of Libyan and Algerian student's passports. These passports were given to people whom the Yemeni Political Security wanted to send to Europe from Yemen.
    6. Yemeni security authorities arrested a known terrorist facilitator for counterfeiting documents and passports for the Mujahedin in Yemen. The detainee arranged to cancel the deportation of the known terrorist facilitator living in Yemen who was arrested. The detainee also provided the terrorist facilitator a forged Iraqi passport.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000987

ISN 1463



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HEELA, ABDUL**

7. The detainee said the Yemeni government assigned him to track key members of Aden Abyan Islamic Army and befriend these individuals.

8. The Aden Abyan Islamic Army, emerged publicly in mid-1998 when the group released a series of communications that expressed support for Usama bin Laden and appealed for the overthrow of the Yemeni Government and operations against United States and other Western interests in Yemen.

## b. Connections/Associations

1. According to a foreign government service, the detainee met with the director of the Nongovernmental Organization al Haramayn in Zeneca, Bosnia sometime during 3 to 13 July 1999.

2. The al Haramayn Foundation is under sanction by United States Executive Order 13224 blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism.

3. The detainee said that he discussed a plan that an acquaintance had developed to attack the British and American Embassies.

4. The detainee said that in April or May 2002, the detainee and the Deputy Chief of the Yemeni Political Service Organization, were paid by the prisoners' family members to release extremists held in Yemeni prisons.

5. According to a Yemeni newspaper, the detainee persuaded an individual to confess the charges against the individual relating to the British Embassy Bombing on 13 October 2000 in Sanaa Yemen. The detainee assured the individual that he would not stay in prison more than six months. The individual said he succumbed because he was with the group and did not want to be branded a coward.

6. The detainee traveled to Italy to participate in the activities of the annual Milan Islamic Cultural Institute summer camp conference.

7. The Islamic Cultural Institute was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais Network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group in Italy.

8. Sami Essid Ben Khemais is under sanction by United States Executive Order 13224 blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism.

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HEELA, ABDUL**

9. The Tunisian Combatant Group, also known as the Jamaa Combattante Tunisienne, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and western interests. Tunisians associated with the Tunisian Combatant Group are part of the support network of the broader international Jihadist movement. According to European press reports, Tunisian Combatant Group members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some Tunisian Combatant Group associates are suspected of planning an attack against the United States', Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

10. The detainee met with the alleged chief of the Egyptian Network, during the summer of 2000 when the Islamic Institute in Milan, Italy organized a camp for Islamic fundamentalists. Wire taps by Italian Police link the alleged Milan al Qaida cell to the 11 September 2001 massacres in the United States. During the wiretaps the detainee said: "Well, I am studying airplanes! If it is God's will, I hope to bring you a window or a piece of a plane next time I see you... We are focusing on the air alone... It is something terrifying, something that moves from south to north and from east to west: the man who devised the program is a lunatic, but he is a genius. It will leave them stunned... we can fight any force using candles and planes. They will not be able to halt us, not even with their heaviest weapons. We just have to strike at them, and hold our heads high. Remember, the danger at the airports. If it comes off, it will be reported in all the world's papers. The Americans have come into Europe to weaken us, but our target is now the sky."

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. A foreign government reported that the detainee was an al Qaida member who traveled to Afghanistan prior to November 2001.

2. The detainee visited a Yemeni prisoner in July 1999 while in Bosnia.

3. The detainee's brother is serving a six year prison term in Bosnia for involvement in a 1997 car bombing in Mostar, Bosnia.

4. A source reported that the detainee's brother had been extremely close to the USS Cole bomber and the failed USS Sullivans' bomber.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said that he did not work for the Yemeni Political Security Organization.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HEELA, ABDUL**

b. The detainee said that Italian newspaper article reporting he had foreknowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks in August 2000 was false because the article stated he traveled to Italy using his diplomatic passport. The detainee said that he never traveled anywhere in Europe using his diplomatic passport.

c. The detainee said that he had no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks and had no desire to participate in or plan any terrorist activity because one day he may be the victim.

d. The detainee said that he never participated in any terrorist action and had nothing but loathing for terrorism as a whole.

e. The detainee said that he never acted in any capacity as a travel facilitator for al Qaida or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 November 2006

TO: BELKACEM, BENSAYAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BELKACEM, BENSAYAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In September 2001 the detainee directed a group of naturalized former Bosnian Mujahedin of Algerian decent and supported himself and several other former Mujahedin families in Bosnia.

2. In September 2001 the detainee planned to travel to join jihadist elements in Afghanistan in anticipation of the United States/Coalition invasion and the detainee encouraged his Algerian friends to do the same. The detainee applied for an Iranian visa in Sarajevo, Bosnia for onward travel to Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was identified and detained by a foreign government on suspicion of terrorist activities.

4. The detainee was identified as the primary al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia.

5. The detainee was known for his ties to the Chechen movement during 1999 and reportedly had a connection to an Usama bin Laden operative.

b. Connections/Associations

1. When the detainee was detained in October 2001, he possessed numerous phone numbers that linked him to Usama bin Laden's operational network in Afghanistan and the global Sunni extremist network.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000391

ISN 10001

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BELKACEM, BENSAYAH**

2. When the detainee was detained in October 2001, he also possessed the number of a Bosnian locksmith who was employed at the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Further investigation revealed that the locksmith was the father-in-law of a known Armed Islamic Group member.

### c. Other Relevant Data

An open source reported that the detainee, also known to be the leader of a group in Algeria, had 3.5 million Marks of Bosnian currency deposited in a bank in Sarajevo, Bosnia, and several other members of the group had millions also deposited in banks. The open source reported that an investigation revealed the High Saudi Committee had on its payroll almost all of the members of the group from Algeria, which had links to international terrorism.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied that he has ever used name Abu Majd.

b. The detainee stated he never associated with any terrorists or anyone who wanted to hurt the United States. The detainee never worked with al Harman or al Furquan, although he has heard of al Furquan.

c. The detainee stated he never had any problems with the police anywhere aside from his arrest in Bosnia in October 2001 for allegedly plotting to attack the United States Embassy there.

d. The detainee denied involvement in a plot to blow up the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The detainee stated the Bosnian Government said that there was no case against him and that he would be sent back to Algeria.

e. The detainee denies ever having a bank account in Bosnia.

f. The detainee denied being involved in the facilitating of fraudulent passports for others; the only involvement he had with fraudulent passports was that concerning his own fraudulent Yemeni passport.

g. The detainee stated he did not know much of anything about the al Farquan and Haramayn organizations, and that he never heard of either organization being extremist. The detainee stated the Saudi High Commission could not be a bad because it was run by the Saudi Royal Family.

h. The detainee stated he knew from the media reports of al Qaida and that Usama bin Laden was the leader, but he never heard of al Qaida operating in Bosnia.

UNCLASSIFIED

000392

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BELKACEM, BENSAYAH**

i. The detainee stated he would swear on the Koran again that he had nothing to do with al Qaida and has been telling the truth throughout his interrogations.

j. The detainee denies any involvement with a Usama bin Laden operative, Bosnian Mujahedin members and other Algerian-Bosnians suspected of involvement with planning an attack against the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000993

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2006

TO: MANFUD, SABIR LAHMAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MANFUD, SABIR LAHMAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. A source stated the detainee was an Armed Islamic Group member who stated that attacks should be carried out against United States troops in Bosnia because he believed the United States was the number one enemy of Islam.
    2. The detainee was attempting to assume leadership of the Armed Islamic Group in Bosnia.
    3. The Armed Islamic Group is an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group is known for frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. This group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs.
    4. The detainee supported the fatwa issued by Usama bin Laden against the United States.
    5. The detainee proposed attacking United States troops in Bosnia to the Shura Council in Zenica, Bosnia.
    6. The detainee expressed a desire to blow up United States soldiers and made threats against the international community in Bosnia.
    7. According to a source, the detainee was a close associate of an al Qaida member and was a suspected Armed Islamic Group member, vehemently anti-Western, and an Islamic extremist.

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UNCLASSIFIED

000994

ISN 10002

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MANFUD, SABIR LAHMAR**

8. In September 2001, the detainee applied for an Iranian visa.
9. Another source stated the detainee is a former Bosnian and Afghan Mujahedin and a suspected Armed Islamic Group member.
10. A source suspected the detainee was involved in 1997 bombings in Travnik and Mostar, Bosnia. The source stated the detainee was involved in a shootout with Bosnian police and when arrested, was in a car with diplomatic plates believed to be assigned to Iran.
11. A source stated the detainee was associated with the al Ber Foundation. The source stated the al Ber Foundation sympathized with Mujahedin. The al Ber Foundation provided Mujahedin with weapons, had established training camps throughout Bosnia and maintained an office in Bosnia, in late 2000.

## b. Connections/Associations

1. Reporting states the detainee was assigned to al Hameyn in Bosnia.
2. During his time in prison, one of the detainee's closest acquaintances was a convicted murderer that is listed by INTERPOL as a suspected terrorist.
3. The detainee worked for the Saudi High Commission for Relief from 1993 to 1994 and again from 1996 until 2002.
4. The Saudi High Commission for Relief and al Haramayn has provided financial support to former Arab Mujahedin in Bosnia. The types of financial support included family stipends or travel to Chechnya and Afghanistan.
5. Al Haramayn is directly tied to terrorist activities in the Bosnia-Herzegovina area. They provide shelter and support to persons known to have committed terrorist activities.
6. Based on information received, the detainee's associate had numerous contacts with senior al Qaida facilitators, Islamic Humanitarian Organizations in Bosnia, employees of Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations, and members of the North African extremist network. The detainee's associate was the primary al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia.
7. The detainee had a friend who was under investigation for assisting terrorists.
8. According to a source, the detainee had contact with a person who was a major ideological leader and financial decision maker within the Active Islamic Youth Organization.

## c. Other Relevant Data



# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MANFUD, SABIR LAHMAR**

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Stabilization Forces list the detainee as an individual who is directly linked to terrorist activities or could be linked with terrorist activities in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. According to a source the detainee was a known to be a former Bosnian/Afghan Mujahedin and suspected Armed Islamic Group member.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he has not worked for al Haramayn and knows no one who worked for al Haramayn.

b. The detainee denied being affiliated with al Qaida.

c. The detainee denied knowing anyone affiliated with al Qaida and denied having telephone conversations with anyone and later learning they were affiliated with al Qaida.

d. The detainee denied he ever supported Usama bin Laden's fatwa against United States troops in Bosnia.

e. The detainee denied telephone communications would link him and the other five Algerians, who were also arrested.

f. The detainee stated he did not know anybody in the United States or communicate with anybody in the United States.

g. The detainee stated he never planned to attack the United States embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and had no knowledge of any such attack.

h. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

7 November 2006

TO: NECHLA, MUHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLA, MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he decided to go to Pakistan after reading advertisements for educated individuals to work with different charity organizations.

2. The detainee traveled from Algeria through Tunisia, Moscow, Russia and Karachi, Pakistan before arriving in Peshawar, Pakistan in November 1990.

3. The detainee traveled to Manila, Philippines and was offered a job as an Arabic teacher at a school.

4. The detainee stated he went to Albania in late 1995, married, and returned to Bosnia Herzegovina to take a job in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1998.

5. The detainee claimed in late 1997, when the civil war started in Albania, he asked the Red Crescent to transfer him to Bosnia-Herzegovina because he feared that he and his wife might be killed in Albania.

6. The detainee stated that the Red Crescent paid for his travel from Albania to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7. The detainee is suspected of having links to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist organization.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000397

ISN 10003

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLA, MUHAMMED**

8. The detainee was identified as a supporter of terrorist groups in Africa. The detainee was arrested and charged with threatening the security of United States and British missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The detainee is also wanted by the Algerian government on charges of terrorism.

9. The detainee is a suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group.

10. The Armed Islamic Group is an Islamic extremist group. The group has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages.

#### b. Connections/Associations

The detainee is a former Bosnian Afghan Mujahedin and known to be one of an al Qaida member's closest associates.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan or participating in any form of military training.

b. The detainee stated he does not know if Usama bin Laden ever visited Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and that he has never seen or met Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he wants to burn Usama bin Laden alive if he is ever found for causing him to be detained for the last year.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and denied any knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee stated he was a clean person and that there was no reason for him to be detained.

e. The detainee stated he has always hated terrorists because terrorists had killed his aunt and had killed many of his friends.

f. The detainee stated it would be impossible for him to hurt anyone. He is not a terrorist and that he does not know any terrorists.

g. The detainee claimed he has never been approached by anyone for recruitment into any terrorist organization.

h. The detainee stated he was unaware of any plans to attack the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina until it was brought up in court in Bosnia Herzegovina.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLA, MUHAMMED**

i. The detainee claimed no knowledge of Mujahedin currently active in either Bosnia-Herzegovina or Algeria.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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000999

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

29 November 2006

TO: AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated he worked from 1993 to 1995 in computer repair for the IGASA, an Islamic relief agency in Split, Croatia.
    2. The detainee served in the Bosnian Army from 4 January 1995 until 20 December 1995.
    3. The detainee stated he flew to Sarajevo, Bosnia in February 1995 to apply for Bosnian citizenship.
    4. The detainee stated he was hired in August 1995 by the Qatar Charitable Society in Bosnia as a secretary to the director. The detainee worked in Zenica, Bosnia and performed computer work as part of his duties.
    5. The detainee stated he received an offer and a letter from the Islamic World Relief Organization for a job in Croatia.
    6. The detainee stated he worked from 1997 to 2002 on computers for the Tayyiba Relief Agency in Sarajevo, Bosnia.
    7. The Taibah nongovernmental organization began its work in Bosnia in 1992 immediately after the Bosnian civil war started. Financing for Taibah came through the World Relief Organization. The Taibah leader was believed to be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.

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UNCLASSIFIED

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ISN 10004

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA**

8. The detainee stated he traveled to Germany in 1998 to obtain a visa at the Austrian Embassy, which allowed him access to several European countries.

9. The detainee stated that he traveled with five other individuals to Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia in 1998 or 1999. They traveled in a van owned by Human Relief, an Egyptian-based, nongovernmental organization. The trip was coordinated by an Egyptian who worked for Human Relief.

10. In 1999 the detainee made threats against Stabilization Force personnel in Bosnia. The detainee reportedly exhorted Bosnian Mujahedin to kidnap and kill Stabilization Force soldiers and western civilians when given the opportunity.

11. The detainee planned to travel to Afghanistan in October 2001 as soon as his associate, an al Qaida member, arrived to make receiving arrangements.

12. The detainee was arrested as a suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group in October 2001 by Bosnian authorities.

13. The Armed Islamic Group is an Islamic, extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group is known for frequent attacks against civilians and government workers and uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs.

14. The detainee was identified as a former Bosnian Mujahedin and chief marshal arts instructor for the Bosnian Muj Brigade.

### b. Training

The detainee stated he knows a Chinese/Japanese style of karate and has seventeen years of martial arts experience with fourteen years as a trainer.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he met a worker for the Human Appeal Charitable Organization in June or July 1996, they socialized frequently and the detainee visited the worker frequently at his home.

2. The detainee stated that in 1998 or 1999 he met an Algerian who was working for the Red Crescent. The detainee and the Algerian worked in the same building and socialized regularly.

3. The detainee stated he attended a meeting in 2001 with the Ambassador from the Algerian Embassy in Hungary.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA**

4. The detainee was a close associate of an al Qaida member.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee stated that he was not in Bosnia when the fighting was going on and there was no way he could have been a trainer for the Mujahedin Brigade. The detainee stated he was in Croatia and had certificates to prove his whereabouts.
  - b. The detainee denied having any associations with people who conducted terrorist activities or who were in any way involved with terrorism.
  - c. The detainee stated that at no time did he train the Bosnian Mujahedin in self-defense tactics and techniques.
  - d. The detainee stated he has had nothing to do with terrorism, Usama bin Laden or killing Americans, and that he has no involvement or interest in jihad or fighting.
  - e. The detainee stated the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States were contrary to the teaching of the Islamic faith and against his personal beliefs. The detainee stated that the perpetrators of the attacks were not human. The detainee further stated that any Islamic group who kills people has no right calling themselves Islamic.
  - f. The detainee denies ever encouraging anyone to use weapons of any kind in any situation.
  - g. The detainee denied ever participating in any jihad or that he had participated in any training in Afghanistan.
  - h. The detainee stated he never planned to travel to Afghanistan to take part in the jihad.
  - i. The detainee denied that extremist activities took place at Taibah, and he never participated in extremist activities.
  - j. The detainee stated he was not involved or associated with any extremist groups in Algeria nor did he know anyone who was.
  - k. The detainee stated he did not engage in any of the fighting in Bosnia or Croatia at any time. The detainee stated that he left Algeria for Croatia/Bosnia to work in a legitimate job, not to fight in the war.
  - l. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 October 2006

TO: BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he took a trip to Pakistan from October to November 1990, traveling from Algiers, Algeria, to Tunisia, to Moscow, Russia, and on to Peshawar, Pakistan, via Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated approximately six months prior to his trip, he became more religious and attended a local mosque in his town.

2. The detainee stated he went to Pakistan to help the Afghan refugees and orphans and also worked for the Islamic Hira Institute in Pakistan.

3. The detainee stated he was employed from 1990 to 1993 by the Lejnat Aldawa nongovernmental organization in Bishawar, Pakistan and by the Red Crescent Society in Bosnia from 1997 to 2002.

4. The detainee had Arabic language documents with the letterhead of Lajnat al Dawa al Islamiah in his possession when arrested. The English translation of the document stated the detainee worked for the organization in Peshawar, Pakistan, as an administrator from 1 March 1993, until at least 24 May 1993.

5. A source stated the detainee was a former Bosnian Mujahedin who had planned to travel to Afghanistan.

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001004

ISN 10005

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

### b. Training

The detainee stated his military service was as a border guard in the Algerian Army from 1986 to 1988.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee was known to be one of the closest associates of an al Qaida member in Bosnia.

2. A source stated the detainee had resided in Bosnia in September 2001, was a suspected terrorist with ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, and was also suspected of having links to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist organization.

3. A source stated the detainee was a suspected Armed Islamic Group member.

4. A source described the Islamic Armed Group as an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Islamic Armed Group began its violent activity in 1992.

5. A source stated the detainee was part of a group of detained six Algerian nationals, arrested on suspicion of terrorist activities.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that he left Pakistan in December 1993 and went to Yemen.

2. The detainee stated he left Yemen in July 1994 and went to Tirana, Albania, got a job working at the Abu Dahbi Welfare Organization, and worked there until he left Albania in April 1997. The detainee stated the Abu Dahbi Welfare Organization became the United Arab Emirates Red Crescent, and in April 1997 he was transferred through the United Arab Emirates Red Crescent to Sarajevo, Bosnia.

3. The detainee stated he illegally obtained recognized Bosnian citizenship in September 1998.

4. A source stated when the detainee was arrested the detainee had a photocopy of an article from the Croatian paper Globus detailing an attack against the United States Information Service Office in Pristina, Kosovo, in August 1998.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he had no association with Taliban or al Qaida forces.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR**

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

c. The detainee stated he is not a member of al Qaida or the Armed Islamic Group, nor is anyone he knows.

d. The detainee stated he knows no one in the Armed Islamic Group, nor does he want to. The detainee stated he has heard of the organization in the newspapers and he considers it an epidemic. The detainee indicated he has never been approached by any members of the Armed Islamic Group.

e. The detainee stated he did not support Usama bin Laden's manipulation of Islam to gather support for his actions, and stated he never wished to meet a man who would perpetrate horrific acts against humanity like the terrorist actions perpetrated by Usama bin Laden.

f. The detainee stated, if released, he would return to Algeria or Bosnia to be with his family.

g. The detainee stated, if released, he would not return to a position with a humanitarian organization such as the Red Crescent.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

20 November 2006

TO: AL HAJ, BOUDELLAA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, BOUDELLAA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee left Algeria to travel to Saudi Arabia in 1989 on the Haj. The detainee was not required to obtain a passport because he was traveling as part of a religious delegation from Algeria and was issued a temporary travel pass for the Haj.
    2. The detainee obtained a passport and a visa from the Pakistani Embassy. The detainee traveled to Tunisia, purchased a plane ticket to Islamabad, Pakistan and may have traveled through Bulgaria or Hungary, but does not remember.
    3. The detainee traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan where he got a job with the Islamic Charitable Committee taking care of orphans.
    4. The detainee stated that in 1992 the Islamic Charitable Committee closed its operations in Pakistan and moved to Bosnia. The detainee stated that the Islamic Charitable Committee paid for his plane ticket to travel from Peshawar, Pakistan to Zagreb, Croatia.
    5. The detainee stayed in Zagreb and then Split, Croatia for one day. The detainee left for Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina and then went to Tesujen, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The detainee began work for the Islamic Charitable Committee in Tesujen, Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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ISN 10006

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, BOUDELLAA**

6. The detainee stated that he traveled to the United Arab Emirates for business purposes on three separate occasions. The detainee traveled with four orphans to meet their sponsors at the end of 1997 and again at the end of 1999. The detainee stated he again went to the United Arab Emirates for educational courses related to his work at the end of 2000. The detainee stated all of the trips lasted for approximately fifteen days. The detainee stated in March 2000 he went on a Haj to Saudi Arabia and again visited Saudi Arabia in December 2000 or January 2001 to perform an Umra.

7. The detainee stated that he fought with the Taliban and was recruited in Nejram City, Saudi Arabia.

8. The detainee stated that in 2000 he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan then to the Taliban Center in Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee then traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he would meet with the Taliban.

9. The detainee is a suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group. The detainee was arrested on 21 October 2001.

10. The detainee was in the Tora Bora region with several al Qaida fighters and operatives.

11. The detainee was identified as an Algerian combat instructor who transferred in 1992 to central Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he served in the Algerian military from 1987 to 1989 in administration and in the Bosnian Army from 1992 to 1995 as a cook.

2. The detainee stated he came in contact with an al Qaida trainer and was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle and grenades.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is suspected of having links to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist organization and ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group.

2. The detainee is a suspected member of the Bosnian Mujahedin and associated with known al Qaida elements in the Balkans.

3. The detainee stated he came in contact with an al Qaida fighter, an Egyptian al Qaida leader, an al Qaida operative from Saudi Arabia and a Taliban fighter from Saudi Arabia.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, BOUDELLAA**

4. The detainee is known to be a close associate of a known al Qaida member. This al Qaida member traveled to join the jihadist elements in Afghanistan in anticipation of the United States/coalition invasion and encouraged his Algerian friends to do the same.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied ever being trained as a soldier for Bosnia or Algeria, stating that cooks and administrative personnel did not receive weapons training.

b. The detainee stated that 11 September 2001 was not true Islam.

c. The detainee stated he had never told a lie in his life, not even as a child.

d. The detainee stated he has never thought of committing crimes or hurting Americans. The detainee stated he would not talk to someone who believes in terrorism.

e. The detainee denied supporting terrorism. The detainee stated he was merely an employee of a benevolent organization and knew nothing of support for terrorism.

f. The detainee denied knowledge of any Islamic training camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

g. The detainee denied having any contact with members of Active Islamic Youth, Muslim Youth or any other Muslim organizations other than non-governmental organizations.

h. The detainee claimed no affiliation with al Qaida or any terrorist organization.

i. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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