




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300603

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

3 June 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-001032DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdul Ghafaar
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Abdul Ghafaar; Abdul Karim
- Place of Birth: Safi, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 1 January 1958
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-001032DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health and has no known allergies. He has an enlarged prostate and takes Hytrin for this condition. He has no travel restrictions. Detainee has a history of trauma to his left eye, and has had several tooth extractions.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends detainee be Retained in DoD Control (DoD).

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 20 March 2004. Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Retained in DoD (DoD).

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a member of an Anti-coalition Militia (ACM) led by a man named Satar, which consisted of numerous Taliban and Hezb-e-

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REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
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Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) members. Detainee is the suspected bodyguard of Satar, who is responsible for the execution of a Western International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) worker. As Satar's suspected bodyguard, detainee had access to senior network leadership and helped to directly support terrorist activities. Due to detainee's extremely uncooperative and deceptive nature, the extent of his involvement and history with Islamic militant extremist networks is not yet known. It is assessed that the detainee probably had knowledge of, and participated in, the ICRC operation. He is assessed to be affiliated with Taliban/ACM leaders, to include Mullah Satar and Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund, and he is a likely operative for future hostilities or supportive functions. His probable links to senior network leadership, including Satar, and his presence on a compound holding weapon caches and ammunition may have made him privy to sensitive operational information. Detainee probably is a key member in a terrorist network. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S) Prior History: Detainee was an Afghan farmer, who for two years prior to his capture, worked for Haji Borjan Akha cultivating wheat, corn, potatoes, onions, and a spice called zidah in the Khajor village, Shawali Khot District, Kandahar province of Afghanistan. Previously, he cultivated crops for other landowners.

b. (S) Training and Activities: Detainee was a tenant farmer prior to his arrest and claims to have no training or military experience. Detainee heard on the radio about an ambush attack on ICRC personnel six hours from Khojar, AF.

c. (S) Capture Information: Detainee was captured on 21 April 2003 in the Safi Village, Shah Wali Kot District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. Detainee was in his house when he heard helicopters outside. He went outside to check on his goats. Detainee states he laid down where he stood near a dry riverbed as soldiers began to approach him. (Analyst Note: Capturing forces state that detainee was running away and was caught after stopping in the riverbed. This is confirmed by Predator footage of the capture.)

d. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO:

e. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Local and tribal political issues

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- Duties at the Great Assembly
- Potential attacks against the U.S. and coalition forces

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S//NF) At detainee's time of capture, it was suspected by US Special Forces capturing units that the detainee was a bodyguard and driver for ACM leader Satar. Additionally, it is assessed that the detainee had knowledge of, or participated in an ambush on an ICRC convoy, on 27 March 2003. It is also assessed the detainee is affiliated with Taliban/ACM leaders. (Analyst note: Mullah Satar was a Taliban commander in Northern Afghanistan.)
 - (S) Detainee was captured after US forces raided a compound suspected of housing an individual named Satar, one of the suspected leaders of a cell responsible for the execution and ambush style attack on an ICRC convoy which resulted in the death of one Western ICRC worker, Ricardo Munguia on 27 March 2003. Detainee's veracity is undetermined concerning his association with Satar, his actions during the raid and his actions at time of capture.
 - (S) Gut Mullah Satar (aka Satar) and Abdul Hakim (aka Taliban Commander Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund) were both named among the list of leaders calling for the execution of Westerners and responsible for the group of ICRC attackers. The group totaled approximately sixty and consisted of Taliban and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) personnel who had been trained for one month in explosives, bomb-making and techniques on how to assassinate. (Analyst note: The HIG is a Tier 1 counterterrorism target. Tier 1 targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.)
 - (S//NF) A Pashtu letter found on an unknown man captured in Afghanistan on 12 May 2002 appears to mention two of the names involved with the ICRC attack on 27 March 2003. One of the names is Abdul Ghafar, believed to be the detainee, and the other is Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund.
 - (S//NF) Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund (aka Mullah Abdul Hakim) is reported the leader of the group on the ground for the 27 March 2003 ambush of the ICRC workers. (Analyst Note: If the Abdul Ghafar mentioned in the Pashtu letter is the

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SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-001032DP (S)

detainee, it establishes a history with Taliban Commander Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund dating back at least ten months prior to the ICRC ambush.)

- (S//NF) On the same reporting, Mullah Satar was also listed as one of the other leaders of the group on the ground, establishing a link between detainee and both leaders, Mullah Satar and Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund.
- (S) Road Pass No. KDR-5/1/98, which was filed with the Consulate General of Pakistan, gives permission to Haji Abdul Ghafar, suspected to be detainee, to travel to Pakistan for multiple visits with Haji Adul Satar. (Analyst Note: The road pass was valid through 6 December 2001, indicating an established history with Satar dating back at least fifteen months prior to the ICRC attack.)
- (S) Capturing forces at the raid believe detainee may have stashed a satellite phone belonging to Satar just before detainment; however, the phone was never found despite extensive searches.
- (S) US forces reported detainee was running away from the house and attempting to hide when finally captured in a nearby dry riverbed.
- (S) Detainee was captured in the Safi Village, Shah Wali Kot District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. Additional reporting indicates that leaders from the group that conducted the attack on the ICRC, stayed in caves in the same Shah Wali Kot District, while the fighters stayed in the Kandahar towns of Gumbad.
- (S) The detainee was captured in a raid that resulted in the discovery of numerous weapon caches, thousands of rounds of ammunition, communications equipment, and precious stones.
- (S) Detainee had two watches in his property box while in Bagram, one gold and one with a black band; however, detainee denies possessing two watches and states he only wore one watch with a white band to determine when he could use the irrigation system for the crops. (Analyst Note: This could be an attempt to conceal the fact that detainee had two watches that may have had an operational significance.)

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's behavior is passive aggressive, often harassing guards and failing to comply.

6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.

- (S) Detainee may have extensive knowledge in regards to an Afghan Anti-Coalition Militant (ACM) network led by a man named Satar, to include its activities and associations. Detainee may have also been privy to other Taliban leaders involved with

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
SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AF-001032DP (S)

the ACM network to include Mullah Abdul Hakim Akhund. Detainee remains uncooperative and deceptive.

b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- ACM Network
 - Operations
 - Association to Leadership
 - Taliban associates and affiliations
 - HIG associates and affiliations
 - Weapons caches
 - Ammunition acquisition
 - Training activities and courses
 - Acquisition and use of precious stones

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 20 January 2005, and he remains an enemy combatant.


JAY W. HOOD
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

JTF-GTMO Assessment Afghanistan/Pakistan Detainee's

29 March 2004

ISN: US9AF-001032DP

Health Assessment: ISN 1032 has a history trauma to his left eye, and has had several teeth extractions. He is currently in good health.

Background and Capture Data: Forces on a compound in the town Haji, Afghanistan. US Forces suspected the compound was being utilized by a key leader of HIG network. At the beginning of the raid a Predator recorded the detainee fleeing the compound and followed him, as he hid in a dry creek bed. Detainee was located and arrested and after being questioned concerning his affiliations, he was transported to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba on 17 July 2003 because of his affiliations as a member of the HIG.

Date of Capture: 5 April 2003

Risk Level: High

Risk Assessment: Detainee, as a confirmed member of HIG is suspected of being a bodyguard and driver working for a subject named Haji Abdul Sattar. This subject is a key leader in the HIG and is believed to have been responsible for the murdered western International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) workers, in Afghanistan in 2003. Detainee remains highly dedicated to Jihad against the US in Afghanistan. Based on information collected and available to Joint Task Force Guantanamo detainee is assessed as being a key member of the HIG.

Intelligence Value: Medium

Exploitation Requirements: The detainee has refused to cooperate and has told numerous convoluted and misleading stories to protect Satter and himself. Detainee is believed to have knowledge concerning the murders and in his capacity 21

Recommendation: operations. Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention.

CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources

REASON: E.O. 12958 Section 1.5(C)

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