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Tuesday Morning, March 18, 1856.

The NORTHERN MAIL came through yesterday with the latest dates.

EXTRA SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE.

We are greatly cramped for space, but we cannot let the opportunity to glance, without expressing our indignation, at the late Extra session of the Legislature. The pretence for such a measure is frivolous beyond conception. The Revised Statutes forsooth! As if, after having thrown statutory wisdom to the winds, and abandoned the old and hopeless confusion into which we have been thrown by many abortive attempts, we ought to treat the present Legislature, beyond all doubt the freshest which has assembled in Louisiana, just the work of digestion and codifying. The Revised Statutes are the boast of the Senate and House, who have done them, and the well aimed efforts of the present and enlightened labor of a new Legislature from down the people, approached with public confidence, and prepared to adopt it. The people have no confidence in the ability of the General Assembly now acting as Extra Rouge. But if they had, is this an opportune moment for the introduction of experiments which as many eminent jurists have declared, if adopted, would be fatal to the whole system? Are the Revised Statutes so gigantic a monument of juridical genius, that even the idlers, traders and incapables of the present Legislature can please, as to certain points, as accurate cohesion, and ever it is not so obscure? We do hope and trust that Governor Slidell will act him the first against the schemes of political intriguers to deplete still further the well nigh exhausted treasury of the State, and that no subterfuges will induce him to lend a willing ear to a proposition fraught with nothing but mischief, and which will lead to nothing but a profligate and criminal waste of the public money. The Executive has already more than the request of assents of good citizens by his firmness and independence, in the Penitentiary question. Let him afford a still happier illustration of these admirable qualities by defeating this abominable project for an extra session—a project uncalled for, undesired, and which there are not twenty stable citizens of Louisiana who will sanction.

THE OSTEND CONFERENCE.

INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS.—The New York papers—the *Times* and the *Herald*—publish copious extracts from the correspondence between the Department of State and Mr. SOULE, relative to the acquisition of Cuba, and likewise the joint despatch of Messrs BUCHANAN, MASON, and SOULE, in reference to the proceedings of the Ostend Conference. The correspondence is extraordinarily voluminous, filling some two hundred pages.

The first letter is from Mr. MARCY to Mr. SOULE, dated July 09, 1854, and in reply in regard to the policy of the U. S. Government towards Cuba. He points out the importance of the Island to the United States, the dependence of the latter upon it for the supply of many domestic articles, and the consequences of her passing into the hands of a first class power. He takes a rapid survey of the relations of Spain to Cuba affairs, showing that protestations by any European power would be dangerous to our best interests, and that in case of collision with the United States, such protecting power would be in as good condition to make use of that Island to annoy us, as it would be in case of actual possession. He then examines the characteristics of Cuba, shows no dependence upon our maintaining our duty as a neutral power towards her. Mr. MARCY says our Neutrality Laws are now as strong as they can be made without unjust interference with the rights of the citizens—that every proper effort will be made to enforce them in case of invasion of Cuba. But necessarily, in such a connection, many abstruse subjects of depth will leave our shores to join their own troops in the effort to revolutionize the yoke of Spain, pledged to do so by the avowal of the Spanish Government that this government is disposed to enforce its laws. Mr. MARCY then goes into a brief history of the Cuban project against the Island, and Mr. SOULE is instructed to purchase if he can, but not to go beyond a certain price, which is not stated. Should he find that he cannot buy it, he is to ascertain whether it can be had by force, and if so, what amount of money will be required. He is to ascertain whether the Spanish Government would be willing to sell, and may be authorized to offer a sum not exceeding ——— dollars. The price is not stated, in order that, although he should be authorized to offer a large sum, he may not be obliged to do so, if he can get it for less. He is to ascertain the sum at ——— dollars.

The policy is stated, in one opening, to be made to depend upon the question whether the Island is more valuable to Spain than to the United States. Considerable space is then occupied in the discussion of this question, in which the "paradise of the Indies" is described as the finest country on the face of the earth, and the United States are said to be deeply interested in all our proceedings relating to it, as it is destined to be the controlling power of the world.

We shall perhaps find it in the interest of peace to examine the time had arrived when the United States of Spain are as much involved in the affairs of the United States in the neighborhood of the Islands, and what the relative power they severally possessed as both as these.

Upon these considerations we suggest that a failure, should it possibly through the machinations of foreign powers who possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter.

We should be glad to state some of the reasons which have brought us to the conclusions and for the sake of clearness we shall specify them under three distinct heads.

First—United States ought, if practicable, to acquire Cuba with as little delay as possible.

Second—The probability is great that the Government and Cortes of Spain will prove willing to sell it, because they can more easily promote the highest and best interest of the Spanish people.

In relation to the first proposition, the report sets forth the geographical position of Cuba, showing how important to the U. S. would be its acquisition, and adverts to the system of monopolies recently introduced into the Island by Spain, and to the consequent decay in acquiring the Island dominion of the United States. Allusion is made to the African slave trade, and the impossibility of its suppression by the Spanish Government, and the commercial advantage to other nations which would inevitably follow a dissolution of the world. Similar arguments, and a history of the political and commercial connection between Spain and Cuba, &c.

Touching the second point, the report argues that the time when the United States would be willing to pay for Cuba, would inevitably be a time when Spain, from her feeble resources, and internal embarrassments, would be unable to carry on her foreign dissensions. Cuba [illegible] to the Spanish exchequer, but to the [illegible] of a source of profit.

The report goes on to show that the opportunity which the people of Cuba have with Europe for the sale of their products, and the [illegible] under which they labor, are such as to compel the [illegible] to sell. Her present [illegible] to the [illegible] of the Island, and hopeless confusion into which her affairs have been thrown by many abortive attempts, we ought to treat the present [illegible], beyond all doubt the freshest which has assembled in Louisiana, just the work of digestion and codifying. The Revised Statutes are the boast of the Senate and House, who have done them, and the well aimed efforts of the present and enlightened labor of a new Legislature from down the people, approached with public confidence, and prepared to adopt it. The people have no confidence in the ability of the General Assembly now acting as Extra Rouge. But if they had, is this an opportune moment for the introduction of experiments which as many eminent jurists have declared, if adopted, would be fatal to the whole system? Are the Revised Statutes so gigantic a monument of juridical genius, that even the idlers, traders and incapables of the present Legislature can please, as to certain points, as accurate cohesion, and ever it is not so obscure? We do hope and trust that Governor Slidell will act him the first against the schemes of political intriguers to deplete still further the well nigh exhausted treasury of the State, and that no subterfuges will induce him to lend a willing ear to a proposition fraught with nothing but mischief, and which will lead to nothing but a profligate and criminal waste of the public money. The Executive has already more than the request of assents of good citizens by his firmness and independence, in the Penitentiary question. Let him afford a still happier illustration of these admirable qualities by defeating this abominable project for an extra session—a project uncalled for, undesired, and which there are not twenty stable citizens of Louisiana who will sanction.

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