

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY State New 3/28/04, RMC New 12/16/04
BY dal NARA DATE 9/18/12

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Gen. John A. Wickham, Jr., Military Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, December 5, 1973
8:05 a.m. - Breakfast

PLACE: The Pentagon

Secretary Schlesinger: Let's talk about the Cambodian Air Force
improvement plan. It will require help from CIA and State.

What about the hotline to Peking?

Secretary Kissinger: Early warning too?

Secretary Schlesinger: It can be added to this plan easily.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's add the warning element. But hold it close.
It would start a war if it got out.

Secretary Schlesinger: Can I tell Carrington about the British Ambassador
in Egypt?

Secretary Kissinger: It wouldn't do any good.

Secretary Schlesinger: The French are getting into giving arms to the
Saudis and we have to move out.

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Secretary Kissinger: No problem. I just don't want Clements and Moorer going over.

We must not overwhelm them with an ardent embrace. Why don't I raise this when I am in Jidda? Clements just can't be low profile. I suspect he has something else in mind when he gets there.

Secretary Schlesinger: He is enthusiastic.

Secretary Kissinger: We shouldn't have anyone running around there in light of these messages. [He had given Schlesinger the messages earlier.]

It is important what we say to Yamani. I think they are afraid of being left alone with the radicals.

The abject behavior of the Europeans has had just the opposite effect. The Japanese told the Arabs not to give us oil. They're giving the Arabs all kinds of aid.

Secretary Schlesinger: It's too bad we can't get the oil turned on for us first.

Secretary Kissinger: I probably will go to Algeria also. I'll have to drop two hours off Cairo.

Show Jim the President's letter to Faisal. Yamani is bright but not influential. He must not know what Fahd is doing.

Secretary Schlesinger: Clements is inclined to apologize to the Saudis.

Secretary Kissinger: The Europeans have nothing to offer the Arabs. They have no threats. Try to keep Clements under control, but you see Yamani so if Clements goes off the reservation, you can straighten it out.

Tell Yamani that they are blowing their best opportunity. The U.S. is now willing to do something in the Middle East.

Let me tell you about Sadat. I was gloomy when I went there. I told him that Nasser was a fool because he confronted the United States. I said, "You can get the October 22 line if you want a brawl, but then the Israelis



will be able to mobilize opposition." He finally bought it, then fell off last week. I wrote him, and he fell off again. We'll have a tough time with the Israelis at the conference.

Secretary Schlesinger: Less than you would think. Israel realizes they had a hard time strategically.

Secretary Kissinger: I think we should increase a presence in the Indian Ocean.

Secretary Schlesinger: I want to withdraw the amphibious group to refit.

I think we should think about putting 5-6000 Marines in Bahrein.

Secretary Kissinger: They will never agree.

Now about Europe.

I will be very tough at NATO. I will say we are for European unity and NATO but things are tough. The energy crisis proves our point -- we can operate alone, they can't. We will make no other proposal.

Heath gave two statements. In the second speech he said if the Europeans hadn't been united they couldn't have withstood the United States. Heath knew every detail of our plans except the timing. He says we object to negotiating with the Dane. That is crud. We object to an instructed delegate.

Secretary Schlesinger: The biggest problem is with the U.S. -Soviet nuclear war agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: You tell Carrington we are fed up because Brimelow drafted the nuclear agreement and then didn't back it. The French want a statement about the nuclear agreement in the declaration. I refused because it indicates a question about it.

There should be no difference between the Nine and NATO. Why should they be different as a group than their initial positions?

We should stand back to back on this though. They have to understand we are tough.



Secretary Schlesinger: My theme has been that we take NATO security seriously and they must take it seriously.

Secretary Kissinger: The French theme that we have to defend Europe no matter what is crap.

Will you send me a message of what you pick up?

Secretary Schlesinger: They are contradictory -- they say we are bound to protect them but that we are deserting them.

Secretary Kissinger: I sent Walters to Galley. I told the Ambassador that after leaning over backwards, we would reluctantly have to take them on. They said we screwed them on nuclear cooperation. We don't want to let loose yet, but if we give them negative guidance, is that increaseable?

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, but we can give it out bit by bit.

That is crap that they turned on us because of a refusal on negative guidance. It was the other way around.

Secretary Kissinger: I regret about the French because theirs is the only serious defense effort. Once the Europeans face the defense problem it will drive them against the Soviet Union. Once the Europeans realize they can't get our cooperation if they attack us.

Only the French have the guts to stand up against us -- but they don't have de Gaulle, a special relation to the Soviet Union, etc. But I would like to back them down without breaking them.


Secretary Schlesinger: I am planning to extemporize mostly.

Secretary Kissinger: I have refused to give a lead-off speech at NATO.

Secretary Schlesinger: Remember that most of the countries are for us.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. I want our friends to go to the French to say look what you have done to us. I will have bilaterals only with the ones who have been good.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would not see the Germans.



Secretary Kissinger: If Scheel asks, I will have to, but only then.

Secretary Schlesinger: Jackson-Nunn: If OMB can do its job, the German offset already covers the deficit. But we have to keep Treasury and Commerce in line.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's draw a NSSM on offset. Have an SRG on it. Work it out with Jim.

Secretary Schlesinger: The balance of payments impact is not so dependent on where the forces are.

I do not want acquisition policy in the interagency process.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we will do it directly with you.

Secretary Schlesinger: NSSM-171. It is based on Dulles' view of China.

Secretary Kissinger: Let's review it, but we can't expose one real reason for our forces in Asia, that is, China policy.

Secretary Schlesinger: We need to have a long word with Canada. They are doing nothing in NATO, nothing in NORAD, free import of cars.

Secretary Kissinger: What do we want?

Secretary Schlesinger: We want them to put a brigade back in NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: They'll never do it. But I believe in putting our policy on reciprocity. But there we have to have objectives which are attainable. You can take a run at the brigade but he has domestic problems.

Secretary Schlesinger: That was Trudeau's decision.

Secretary Kissinger: Politicians always go after the incremental 10 percent and lose their whole constituency. The whole European political scene is this. This is Brandt's problem. Only the British have been firm and they are the same now.

Did you give Mahon the cuts?



Secretary Schlesinger: I got that money back.

Secretary Kissinger: I just don't want SALT-related items jeopardized.

Secretary Schlesinger: Only Trident, and we don't need it. Zumwalt agrees. We are fat.

McClellan said he would cut us \$3 billion but would agree to a supplemental for that much.

I want to fly an SR-71 over Cuba rather than a U-2 because we don't need the protection.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay.

Brezhnev said, "Can't we stop deploying new systems?" If we are willing to pay Trident, we need a price which is commensurate. I don't think they will give up MIRV testing.

Secretary Schlesinger: We shouldn't air the price we pay throughout the community.

Secretary Kissinger: Let Lodal circulate his papers. It is useful, but not my view.

Secretary Schlesinger: Trident is an albatross.



Robert - complete group

Huang Hsun protection

HAK/Schlesinger

5 Dec 73

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


- S - Counterforce Air Force improvement plan. Will require help from CIA & State. Not time to Pecking
- K - Early warning too?
- S - Can be added to this plan easily.
- K - Lets add a warning element. But hold close. Would start a war if it got out.
- S - I would like to meet Khabir. Can I tell Cunningham about But amb in E.
- K - Wouldn't do any good
- S - French are getting into Arsons & Somalia & but have to train out
- H - No problem - I just don't want Elements/Moran going over. We want character from them or an architect service. Why don't I recall this when I am in judge. Elements' part can't be done properly. I suspect he has something else in mind when he gets there
- S - He is enthusiastic.
- K - Shouldn't have anyone running around there in light of these things (check given 5 the messages)

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AUTHORITY State Sec 319104; RAC Sec 1216104

BY dal NARA, DATE 9/18/12



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K - It is important what we say to Yamani
I think they are afraid of being left alone w/c
radicals.
The object behavior of C.E. was what had
just - opposite effect.
Japan (they about paying high price, terrorism
talking about me, pay and to assets.
S - Too bad we can't get oil turned on for us
first


K - I put go to Algeria obs. hop 2 hours off
(Cairo)?

John Show Jim Pass letter to Faisal
Yamani bright but not influential. He
must not know what Fakhed is doing.

S - He ~~is~~ ~~is~~ Clements is anxious to
apologize to Sanchez. ~~was~~

K The Emirs have nothing to offer Arabs.
They have no interests.
They get help Clements under control, but
you see Yamani so if Clements goes
off the reservation, you can straighten
it out.

Tell Yamani that they are blowing their
best opportunity; US is un-willing
to do something in ME
Let me tell you about Sadat. I was gloomy
when I was there. I told him that



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Nelson was a fool because he expected
the US. You can get 220 at least if
you want a haul, but then the I will
be able to motivate opposition. He finally
bought it, then fell off last week, I wrote
him + he fell off again. We'll have a
tough time w I at camp.

S - less than you would think. I realize
they had a hard time strategically.

K - I think we should ~~organize~~ presence
in Indian Ocean.

S - I want to w/ ~~some~~ amphib group
to split

~~start~~ I think we should think about
putting 5-6000 Marines in Bahrain

K - They will encourage
them. Ems.

I will be very tough at NATO. I
say we for Ems unity + NATO but
things are tough. The energy crisis
presents our point - we can operate alone,
they can't. We will make another
proposal.



→ Heath statement & S

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~~Heath~~ Heath gave 2 statements
2nd speech he said if there hadn't
been implied they couldn't have w/stood
~~the~~ the U.S.
Heath knew very clearly of our plans
except timing.

Says we object to negotiating w/ a Dome.
That's correct. We object to an
instructed delegate.

S- Biggest part is w/OS-50 nuclear
over agreement.

H- You all complain we are fed up
because Brucelaw drafted a nuclear
agreement & then didn't take it.
French want statement about declass
nuclear agreement in declaration
& request because it indicates a
position about it.

There should be no differences
but 9+ NATO - why should they
be different as agencies than their
inherl. positions.



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K- We should stand back to back on this issue. They have to understand we are tough.

S- My theme has been we take NATO seriously & they must take it seriously.


K- French theme that we have to defend E- in no matter what is says.

Will you send me image of what you pick up?

S- They contradictory - say we are bound to protect them but that we are chastising them.

K- I sent Walters to Gully. I told him that after having our laptops we would ultimately have to take them over. They said we screwed them on nuclear copy. We don't want to lose it, but if we give any guidance, is that irreversible.

S- Yes, but we can give it out bit by bit



→ ISA + ~~Chief~~ ^{John} Foster to Chief of
Mexican Conf.

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S - That is crap that they turned on us
because of refusal on my guidance.
It was ~~other~~ ^{other} way around.

K - I regret about French because
it is only ~~our~~ ^{our} defense effort.
Once Euro face defense part
it will chide them against US
Once the Euro realize they
can't get ~~an~~ ^{an} own copy if they
attack us.


Only French have guts to stand
up against us - but they don't have
all the ~~the~~ ^{the} special relation to SC, etc.
But I would like to back them down
w/o backing them.

^{Henry}
→ Political Counselors at Chief
^{Tome} of Mexican Conference.

S - I planning to ~~strengthen~~ ^{strengthen} mostly.

K - I have refused to give lead-off
speech at NATO.

S - Remind that most of the countries
are for us.



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K- That is right. I want our friends to go to Europe to see how you have done there. I will name individuals only w/ names who have been good.

S- I would not see a German.

K- If Steel asks, I will have to, but only then

S- Jackson - Wm. By OMB can do its job, ~~and get~~ Bureau off set already across a cliff. But we have to keep Treas & Commerce in line.

R- Let's have a NSM on off set
→ I hear an SRG on it. Work it out w/ Jim.

S- BOP impact is not so dependent when a press are

~~have to~~

R- I do not want acquisition policy in interagency process

K- No, we will do it directly w/ you



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→ S - NSSM-171. It is based on
Doubtless view of China.

K - Lets review it, but we can't
expose our real reason for fears
in Asia (i.e. China getting)

S - Used to lay word to Canada, they
doing nothing in NATO, nothing in
NORAD, full of cars.

K - What do we want?

S - Want them to put beyond work
in NATO

K - would not at. But I believe
in putting our policy on
reciprocity. But things we have
to have objectives which are attainable.
You can take a man at a high level
but he has domestic problems.

S - That was Friedman's criticism

K - Politicians always go after
incremental 10% & lose their



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Whole constituency. Whole Euro
political scene is this. This is
Bromate problem. Only Brit
has been here from + they are same
now

K - Did you give that on cuts?

S - I got that money back.

K - I just don't want S&T related
items jeopardized

S - Only Tribut + we don't need
it. Zimmert agrees. We are fat

S - We'll know what we will cut
and I'll be but will agree to a
supplemental for that much.

Want to fly S-R?? over other
systems than V-2 because we
don't need a patent.

K - OK.

K - Bez said can't we stop deploying our
systems. If we willing to pay Tribut
but, we need a price which is commensurate



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I don't think they will pick up MIRV testing.

S - We shouldn't give a price we pay throughout a community.

K - but Laddel circulate his papers. It is useful, but not very much.

S - That is all right.

