



SECRET // NOFORN // 20310707

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CC

7 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000158DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Majid Abdallah Husayn Al-Harbi
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Majid Abdallah Husayn Muhammad Al Samluli Al Harbi, Muhammad Al Abbas, Abu Abdullah, Majed Al Abdali, Abu Al Abbas Al Badawi
- Place of Birth: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 26 June 1980
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000158DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) **Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). **If a satisfactory agreement can be reached that ensures continued detention and allows access to detainee and/or to exploited intelligence, detainee can be Transferred Out of DoD Control (TRO).** JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) on 21 January 2005.

b. (S//NF) **Executive Summary:** Detainee is assessed to be a jihadist who traveled to Afghanistan for training under a common Al-Qaida / extremist cover story. Detainee admits traveling with known Al-Qaida members, learning to fire a weapon and admits being at the

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20310623

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Al Farouq training camp and the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan (AF). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **MODERATE** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value.

4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) **Prior History:** After high school, detainee attended college for two years in Jeddah, SA, studying computer sciences.¹ Detainee attended the Al-Malik Saud Mosque in Jeddah.²

b. (S//NF) **Recruitment and Travel:** While visiting the mosque, detainee met Bandar Al-Harbi (no relation) who was associated with Jama'at Tablighi (JT).³ For approximately two months, detainee and Al-Harbi would meet regularly at the mosque. On one occasion, Al-Harbi approached detainee and convinced him to go to Pakistan to conduct missionary work with JT. Detainee agreed and traveled from Jeddah to Riyadh, SA. He then traveled to Karachi, Pakistan (PK), via Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). In Karachi, detainee did as he had instructed by Al-Harbi, and took a taxi to the Hotel Dubai. After approximately three days, JT member Mohammed Akbar met detainee at the hotel and took him to a mosque in Lahore, PK, named Sheik Bura (NFI).⁴

c. (S//NF) **Training and Activities:** Detainee resided at the mosque in Lahore for approximately three months, during which time he conducted missionary work in various villages. Shortly after detainee arrived at the mosque, Abu Ghanim (a Kuwaiti) and Abu Abdullah (a Saudi) arrived.⁵ During late September or early October 2001,⁶ the Imam of the

¹ IIR 6 034 0425 02; also referenced in 000158 KB 13-FEB-2002, IIR 6 034 0846 02, IIR 4 201 0760 05, 000158 302 19-FEB-2002, TD-314-00684-02

² 000158 SIR 07-AUG-2002

³ Analyst Note: JT is a Tier 2 Counter-terrorism NGO target, defined as those targets which have demonstrated the intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.

⁴ 000158 SIR 07-AUG-2002; also referenced in 000158 302 19-FEB-2002, 000158 MFR 07-AUG-2002, 000158 MFR 08-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0846 02, IIR 6 034 0651 02, TD-314-00684-02

⁵ 000158 SIR 07-AUG-2002, 000158 MFR 07-AUG-2002, 000158 MFR 08-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0651 02, IIR 6 034 0846 02, TD-314-00684-02

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mosque, Mohammed Elias, issued a call for JT members to go to Afghanistan and fight.⁷ Abu Ghanim and Abu Abdullah decided to travel to Afghanistan to train for jihad. They recommended detainee receive weapons training and guaranteed him that they would likely stay away from the front lines. Detainee agreed to join them, but only as a missionary and not a fighter. The three of them then traveled from Lahore to Quetta, PK, and then on to the border. At the border, the trio got out of their vehicle and took motorcycles across the border. On the other side, they met back up with the same car and traveled to Kandahar, AF. In Kandahar, the trio was taken to a guesthouse. Abu Ghanim and Abu Abdullah traveled to a training camp for three days of training and detainee stayed in the house for five days.⁸ Detainee heard that the guesthouse was called Madafta Al-Arabee.⁹ At the end of the five days, Abu Ghanim told detainee that all the Arabs were being ordered out of Kandahar. Detainee traveled to Khowst, AF, with Abu Ghanim, Abu Abdullah, Abu Omar (NFI), Abu Mohammed (NFI) and two other unidentified men. When they arrived in Khowst they went to a guesthouse known as the House of the Pakistanis (NFI). Detainee stayed in this location for approximately thirty days, during which time Abu Ghanim taught him how to shoot the Kalashnikov. At the end of thirty days, Abu Ghanim and another individual told detainee that they had to leave. Detainee left with them and went to the home of an unidentified Afghani for approximately twenty days. While at this house, detainee realized he had lost his passport. Detainee decided to leave Afghanistan and head back to Saudi Arabia via Pakistan. Abu Ghanim arranged for an Afghani guide for detainee.¹⁰ It took the detainee and his guide ten or eleven days, on foot, to travel to the border.¹¹

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) As detainee and the guide reached the top of a mountain, the guide pointed detainee in the direction of a village on the other side of the border. Detainee walked toward the border alone.¹² In the village a local pointed detainee out to the Pakistani authorities. The Pakistani authorities detained him because he did not have the proper documents.¹³ (Analyst Note: Actual events place detainee in a group of individuals who crossed in the Nangarhar Region of the Afghan - Pakistani border on 14 December 2001. The group felt secure

⁶ 000158 302 19-FEB-2002, 000158 MFR 07-AUG-2002, 000158 MFR 08-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0651 02, IIR 6 034 0846 02

⁷ IIR 6 034 0895 04, 000158 302 19-FEB-2002, TD-314-00684-02

⁸ 000158 SIR 07-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0846 02, IIR 6 034 0895 04, 000158 302 19-FEB-2002, 000158 MFR 07-AUG-2002, 000158 MFR 08-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0651 02, TD-314-00684-02

⁹ 000158 SIR 03-JUL-2002

¹⁰ 000158 302 19-FEB-2002, 000158 MFR 07-AUG-2002, 000158 MFR 08-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0846 02, IIR 6 034 0651 02; Abu Ghanim teaching detainee how to fire a weapon referenced in 000158 302 10-APR-2003, IIR 6 034 0102 02; detainee's passport loss referenced in IIR 4 201 2352 05, IIR 4 201 2351 05, TD-314-00684-02, 000158 FM40 30-JUN-2003

¹¹ 000158 SIR 03-JUL-2002, 000158 MFR 07-AUG-2002, 000158 MFR 08-AUG-2002

¹² 000158 MFR 07-AUG-2002, IIR 4 201 0823 05, 000158 MFR 08-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0846 02, IIR 6 034 0651 02

¹³ IIR 4 201 0817 05 IIR 4 201 2351 05; IIR 4 201 0823 05, 000158 302 10-APR-2003

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enough with their Pakistani host that they were convinced to surrender their weapons. The host then informed the group that the Pakistani forces were aware of their presence so they had to move fast. The group gathered in a mosque where they were immediately surrounded by Pakistani forces and hauled away in large trucks. An individual attacked a guard leading to a struggle in which six Pakistani guards were killed and some prisoners were able to escape.)¹⁴ Detainee was transferred from Pakistani to US custody on 30 December 2001 in Kohat, PK.¹⁵

b. (S) Property Held:

- 6000 Pakistani Rupees
- \$400 US Dollars¹⁶ (\$300 USD not held by JTF-GTMO)

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 09 February 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Taliban recruiting methods via mosques
- Biographic data on possible members of the Taliban recruiting support network

6. (S//NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account: Detainee provides a common cover story to explain why he was in Afghanistan and why Pakistani authorities captured him. Key aspects missing from his account are his relationship with Abd Al Rahman Al Hataybi, ISN US9SA-000268 (SA-268), his training at Al Farouq, his assessed travels from Al Farouq into the Tora Bora mountains with other trainees and his true capture story. Detainee has information that he is hiding but does not appear to be a key player in the Afghan jihad network or Al-Qaida.

7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a jihadist who traveled to Afghanistan for training under a common Al-Qaida / extremist cover story.

¹⁴ IIR 7 739 3396 02

¹⁵ TD-314-00845-02

¹⁶ TD-314-00684-02 and 000158 FM40 27-MAY-2004, Analyst Note: According to detainee he was captured with 6000 Pakistani Rupees and \$400 USD. JTF-GTMO only holds \$100 USD for this detainee.

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Detainee admits traveling with known Al-Qaida members, staying at Al-Qaida guesthouses and can be placed at the Al Farouq training camp as well as in the Tora Bora mountains of Afghanistan. Detainee is on the Saudi Ministry of Interior General Directorate of Investigations' (Mabahith) list of high priority detainees. Detainee's brother has contacted one of the former Bahraini individuals held at JTF-GTMO.

- (S//NF) Detainee admits traveling to Afghanistan and residing in at least one Al-Qaida associated guesthouse. He probably attended Al Farouq and then fled Afghanistan with others captured with senior Al-Qaida operative, Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi, ISN US9LY-000212.
 - (S//NF) Detainee stated that in late September or early October 2001, he traveled to Kandahar and resided in a guesthouse named Madafta Al-Arabee for five days.¹⁷ (Analyst Note: Madafta Al-Arabee loosely translates into the Arab House. The Arab House in Kandahar was also known as Al Nebras. Jihadists used Al Nebras as a stopping point en route to training or the front line. Information obtained from other individuals held at JTF-GTMO indicated that the standard wait-period at Al Nebras before traveling to Al Farouq for training was five to seven days.)
 - (S//NF) In approximately September 2001, while in Kandahar at what is assessed to be Al Nebras Guesthouse, Bandar Ayyidh Humud Al Utaybi, ISN US9SA-000332DP (SA-332), stated that he gave his passport to an individual by the name of "Abbas" for safekeeping. SA-332 identified Abbas as a trustworthy man at Al Nebras who taught the Koran. SA-332 described Abbas as being in his late thirties or early forties, black beard and mustache, medium build and of Yemeni or Saudi decent.¹⁸ (Analyst Note: One of detainee's aliases is Muhammad Abbas, barring the age variation, SA-332's description fits detainee. Detainee has admitted to being in Kandahar at Al Nebras during the same timeframe purportedly to conduct Dawa. It is assessed that detainee is probably the Abbas who took SA-332's passport for safekeeping.)
 - (S//NF) Variations of detainee's name and alias appear on Al-Qaida associated documents. (Analyst Note: Some of these lists are indicative of an individual's residence within Al-Qaida, Taliban and other extremist guesthouses; often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to training, the front lines, or abroad. Trust accounts were simple storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that were used to secure the individual's personal valuables until completion of training or another activity.)
 - ◆ (S//NF) A variation of detainee's name, Majed Abdullah Al Harbi, was found in a document listing 324 Arabic names, aliases and nationalities. This

¹⁷ 000158 SIR 03-JUL-2002

¹⁸ 000332 302 27-JUL-2002

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document was recovered from raids on safehouses associated with suspected Al-Qaida in Karachi, PK. Majed Abdullah Al Harbi was associated with the alias Abbass Mohammad Al and the statement "has possession of a Saudi passport, ATM card, paper (NFI) and drivers license."¹⁹

- ◆ (S//NF) A variation of detainee's name, Majid 'Abd Allah Husayn Al-Harbi, was found on a document entitled "Asra.doc" recovered on a hard drive associated with senior Al-Qaida operative Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM). Majid 'Abd Allah Husayn Al-Harbi was associated with the alias Al-'Abbas, and phone numbers 0096653609561 and 0096626231763.²⁰

- ◆ (S//NF) During the joint raids conducted with the Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) against Al-Qaida associated safehouses in Rawalpindi, PK, on 1 March 2003, a file titled "Taha.doc," was recovered from computer media. A variation of detainee's name, Maajid Bin 'Abdallah Bin Husayn Al-Harbi, and alias, Abu-Al-'Abbas Al-Badawi, and the statement "to inform Majdi at 053609561 and 053609561" was found in this document. The document was a listing of names of mujahideen who arrived in December 2001 to fight in Afghanistan but who did not complete training and were subsequently arrested by Pakistani authorities.²¹

- (S//NF) Detainee admitted traveling with two confirmed Al-Qaida members in Afghanistan after US bombings began. He also stated that he stayed in a house he knew to be Al-Qaida sponsored and that he received firearms training from someone he knew to be a member of Al-Qaida.²² (Analyst Note: It is unknown which two Al-Qaida members detainee traveled with or the house to which he references. His identification of being trained by someone he knew to be Al-Qaida could be a reference to Abu Ghanim or to trainers at Al Farouq.)

- (S//NF) Detainee claims to have resided in the House of the Pakistanis for approximately thirty days before traveling to an unidentified village where he stayed for twenty days.²³ (Analyst Note: The approximate two months that he spent in Khowst and an unidentified village were probably spent fleeing with the other individuals from Al Farouq and participating in hostilities when required.)

- (S//NF) Assessed Al-Qaida member Mus'ab Omar Ali Al-Mudwani, ISN US9YE-00839DP (YM-839), who was at Al-Farouq during the same time period as detainee, reported that the Al Farouq Emir and Tora Bora Commander, Abd Al Qadoos, instructed trainees to depart Al Farouq and travel to Kabul. When the

¹⁹ TD-314-40693-02 (Detainee is #216)

²⁰ TD-314-13174-03

²¹ TD-314-48336-03 (Detainee is letter L)

²² 000158 SIR 20-APR-2004

²³ 000158 302 19-FEB-2002, 000158 MFR 07-AUG-2002, 000158 MFR 08-AUG-2002, IIR 6 034 0846 02, IIR 6 034 0651 02
Abu Ghanim teaching detainee how to fire a weapon referenced in 000158 302 10-APR-2003, IIR 6 034 0102 02

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group arrived in Kabul, Abd Al Qadoos ordered the group to travel to Khowst because it was safer.²⁴

- (S//NF) Detainee was captured with a large group of individuals including senior Al-Qaida operative Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi, ISN US9LY-000212.
 - (S//NF) Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi was a senior Al-Qaida trainer - most notably in charge of the Khalden training camp - who when captured by Pakistani authorities, refused to leave the area until all those held in the mosque were taken with him. (Analyst Note: It is unknown exactly what the relationship between detainee and Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi is; however, the significance of Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi's stand against the authorities cannot be overlooked.)²⁵
 - (S//NF) A variation of detainee's name, Majid Abdullah Hussein Al-Harbi, and alias, Abu-'Abbas al-Badawi, was included in a document recovered from a computer server hard drive found in a suspected Al-Qaida safehouse in Islamabad, PK naming seventy-eight suspected Al-Qaida associates detained by the Pakistanis.²⁶ (Analyst Note: The listings in the following various publications are probably from the same source - the translated Al-Qaida document that was possibly sent to the publications prior to the computer recovery.)
 - (S//NF) A variation of detainee's name, Majed Abdullah Hussein Al-Harbi, and alias, Abu Al-'Abbas Al-Nieroubi, was also found on a hand-written version of this document, which identified sixty-eight associates detained by the Pakistanis.²⁷
 - (S//NF) London Al Quds also published a variation of his name, Majid Bin-Abdallah Bin-Husayn Al-Harbi, and alias, Abu-Al-Abbas Al-Badawi, in an article identifying Arab fighters "betrayed" by Pakistani locals. These Arabs were turned over to the Pakistani government and held until transfer to US custody in Afghanistan.²⁸ (Analyst Note: The London Al Quds Al Arabi publication is a London-based independent Arab Nationalist Daily with an anti-US and anti-Saudi editorial line and which tends to generally be pro-Palestinian, pro-Iraqi regime, and sympathetic to Usama Bin Laden (UBL).)
 - (S//NF) A variation of his name, Majid Abdullah Hussein al-Harbi, and alias, Abu 'Abbas al-Badawi, was found on a recovered document, associated with the Islamic Observation Center (IOC) in London, United Kingdom (UK), listing names of seventy-six associates fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. (Analyst Note: The IOC is a known conduit of UBL's and Al-Qaida's

²⁴ IIR 6 034 0310 03

²⁵ TD-314-52609-05

²⁶ IIR 7 739 3268 02 (Detainee is #4)

²⁷ IIR 7 739 3245 02 (Detainee is #4)

²⁸ GMP20020111000090_FULL (Detainee is #12)

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message. It is highly probable that this listing is the same as the document listing seventy-eight associates mentioned above.)²⁹

- (S//NF) A variation of detainee's name, Majid Bin 'Abdullah Bin Hussain Al-Harbi, and alias, Abu-Al-Abbas Al-Badawi, and the statement "contact Mejdī 'Ali at 053609561 or 026231763," was published in a seventy-nine page document on the AlNeda internet site on 20 July 2002. The document contained information regarding the capture of Taliban and Al-Qaida fighters who crossed the border in the Nangarhar Province, AF, after coalition strikes began.³⁰
- (S//NF) Prior to the Saudi delegation visit in 2002, Mabathith provided information on thirty-seven detainees whom they designated as high priority. Detainee was twenty-fourth on that list.³¹
 - (S//NF) Mabathith stated detainee left Saudi Arabia en route to the UAE on 19 July 2001. They further stated that detainee was watch-listed for his trip to Chechnya with a decree date of 21 February 2002.³²
- (S//NF) Detainee was possibly involved in potential future operations. A variation of detainee's alias, Abu Al-'Abbas, was found on a 92-page document (NFI) containing various topics pertaining to Al-Qaida operations from personnel, weapons, equipment, training and official correspondence, to what seems to be future mission assignments. Abu Al-'Abbas was associated with Abu Aamer and listed under the title "Third Group."³³ (Analyst Note: Abu Aamer is probably Abdul Rahman Nashi Badial Hataybi, ISN US9SA-000268DP (SA-268)).
 - (S//NF) According to assessed Al-Qaida member Mohammed Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), detainee and SA-268 are friends and they studied electronics together.³⁴ YM-252 further stated that detainee and SA-268 were recruited at a technical center or College of Electronics in Jeddah where they were studying electronic techniques, telephone equipment and instrumentation.³⁵ (Analyst Note: Detainee admits attending such a school and being convinced to travel to Pakistan while visiting a mosque during that timeframe.)

²⁹ TD-314-09853-02, Analyst Note from <http://www.iict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=699>

³⁰ IIR 7 739 3396 02

³¹ TD-314-27540-02, Analyst Note: This is a combined document of the following message id's: TD-314-27540-02, TD-314-27541-02, TD-314-27542-02, TD-314-27543-02, TD-314-27544-02, TD-314-27545-02. Detainee is listed as letter F on Part 4 of 6.

³² TD-314-27540-02, Analyst Note: This is a combined document of the following message ID's: TD-314-27540-02, TD-314-27541-02, TD-314-27542-02, TD-314-27543-02, TD-314-27544-02, TD-314-27545-02. Detainee is listed as letter F on Part 4 of 6.

³³ AFGP-2002-901191

³⁴ 000252 FM40 28-MAR-2005

³⁵ 000252 FM40 11-MAR-2005

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- (S//NF) YM-252 stated that detainee and SA-268 both trained at Al Farouq and then went to Tora Bora.³⁶ YM-252 also stated that while in Tora Bora he joined a group having tea, which included SA-268 and Majd Abdallah.³⁷ (Analyst Note: It is probable that Majd Abdallah is detainee.)
- (S//NF) Assessed Tora Bora Commander, Hamud Dakhil Hamud Said Al Jadani, ISN US9SA-000230DP (SA-230), photo-identified detainee as an individual who followed Abu Musab Al-Suri. SA-230 stated he heard detainee talking and he spoke the same ideas as Al-Suri.³⁸
 - (S//NF) Al-Suri was not involved in Al-Qaida, but wanted his own followers. Al-Suri had some problems with Al-Qaida and with UBL, often criticizing their behavior and way of thinking. Al-Suri's ideas were often not in agreement with Al-Qaida, and Al-Qaida leaders believed Al-Suri was an enemy of Al-Qaida and several other Arab groups in Afghanistan. Al Suri started a camp named the "Camp of Al-Ghuraba" (variant: Al Ghoraba) located near Kabul, to train the Arabs. The camp taught electronic networking, and remote-controlled explosive devices were prepared during training.³⁹ (Analyst Note: Detainee's background in electronics combined with Al-Ghuraba's electronic training possibly corroborates SA-230's reporting.)
- (S//NF) Detainee admits working with, and for, the JT.⁴⁰ (Analyst Note: The JT is an apolitical movement that focuses on spirituality, social work, and teaching "correct" Islamic practices to fellow Muslims – in essence a Dawa organization. The organization neither preaches violence nor does it sanction militant Islamic groups. However, some followers of extremist groups have also participated in JT activities. Dawa is an Islamic dedication or donation that includes religious instruction. This communal duty entails either organized efforts by missionary groups to spread the faith or personal testimony from a Muslim to those around him or her to join the religious community. JT is a Tier 2 Counterterrorism NGO target.)
- (S//NF) Detainee's brother has contacted one of the former Bahraini detainees held at JTF-GTMO.⁴¹ (Analyst Note: It is unknown which of the Bahrainis the detainee's brother was in contact with; however, all released Bahrainis have returned to nefarious activity. If detainee's brother is forming and strengthening extremist ties, this increases detainee's risk for release.)
 - (S//NF) On 23 December 2005, Muhi Al-Din Mahmud Muhi Al-Din Khan, a known Al-Qaida member, was observed entering a mosque in Manama, BA. Three

³⁶ 000252 FM40 28-MAR-2005³⁷ 000252 FM40 11-MAR-2005³⁸ IIR 6 034 0343 05³⁹ IIR 6 034 0284 05, TD-314-21668-00, TD-314-12972-03, TD-314-40896-03, TD-314-41672-02⁴⁰ 000158 SIR 30-DEC-2004⁴¹ GUAN-2006-I00204-HT

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other vehicles were observed in the parking lot for the duration of this meeting, one of which belonged to Suleiman Al Khalifa, ISN US9BA-000246DP (BA-264, transferred). Other individuals present at the meeting were 'Adil Muhammad Mahmud 'Abd Al-Khaliq (an extremist with known ties to the Abu Musab Al Zarqawi network) and Yasir 'Abdallah Muhammad Kamal.⁴² (Analyst Note: While the content of this meeting is unknown it is safe to assess that the details were extremist in nature.)

o (S//NF) On 10 April 2006, Abdullah A Al Wida, ISN US9BA-000060DP (BA-060, transferred) was observed arriving at the home of Bahraini Parliamentarian, Sheikh Muhammad Khalid Ibrahim Muhammad for a meeting. Sheikh Muhammad is a known vocal and ardent supporter of Bahraini Sunni extremists. Also present for this meeting was Abdallah Majid Sayyah Al-Nu'aymi, ISN US9BA-000159DP (BA-159, transferred), Al-Din Khan (who met with BA-246 on 23 December 2005), 'Abd Al-Rahman Shihab Ahmad Shihab (who has been linked to Bahraini extremists 'Adil Muhammad Mahmud 'Abd Al-Khaliq and Turki Mubarak 'Abdallah Al-Bin-'Ali), Aish Hassan Muhammad (an employee of the Bahrain telephone company Batelco), and Khalid 'Ali Hamid (an employee of Aluminum Bahrain). Earlier on 10 April 2006, BA-159 was observed at BA-246's home along with Sheikh 'Abd Al-Rahman Sabah 'Attiyatallah Al-Khalifa (an employee of the Ministry of Interior), Muhanna 'Abdallah Fadhul Al-Na'imi (an employee of the Al-Falah school), and 'Abd Al-Rahman Shihab (assessed to be the same Shihab that attended the meeting with BA-060).⁴³

c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: The detainee is assessed as a MODERATE threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and sometimes hostile to the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 25 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 13 February 2006, when he was cross block talking with another detainee while in the recreation yard. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include failure to follow camp rules, assault, damage to property, participating in a disturbance, using provoking words and gestures, failure to follow instructions, unauthorized communications and possession of non-weapon type contraband. The detainee has 3 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault, with the most recent occurring on 15 December 2003, when he spat in the face of the medical officer who was inserting a feeding tube into him. Other behavior notes show that on 22 September 2005, the detainee was teaching other detainees around him about Jihad.

⁴² TD-314-80078-05, Analyst Note: The Al-Qaida member identified in the sourced message is labeled a known Al-Qaida member in TD-314-28384-06.

⁴³ TD-314-28384-06

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8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF-GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 17 May 2005.


b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee traveled to Afghanistan with another individual held at JTF-GTMO. Detainee probably resided in numerous Al-Qaida guesthouses and attended training at Al Farouq. After the events of 11 September 2001, detainee was probably part of the large group of trainees that fled Al Farouq under Tora Bora Commander, Abd Al Qadoos. Detainee was captured as part of a large group of individuals that included senior Al-Qaida operative Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee possibly could provide information on Al-Qaida guesthouses and training, but nothing that cannot be gleaned from other individuals. JTF-GTMO has enough information to identify a large portion of his true activities while in Afghanistan. As a result, he should be able to provide information on recruiters, facilitators, guesthouses, Al Farouq trainers and trainees, the routes for escape, people and events of fleeing from Al Farouq, and the large number of individuals reportedly captured with Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Recruiters
- Facilitators
- Al Farouq personalities and events surrounding fleeing from the facility
- Ibn Al-Sheikh Al-Libi and potentially others held at JTF-GTMO

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 18 October 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Commanding