




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20320122

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

22 January 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000182DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Bandar Ahmad Mubarak al-Jabri
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Handhallah al-Makki, Handhallah al-Jiddawi, al-Zabri
- Place of Birth: Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 16 April 1979
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000182DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 18 November 2005.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and a possible weapons trainer. Detainee reportedly trained recruits at al-Faruq Training Camp stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee is affiliated with several significant extremist personalities. Detainee served on the front lines in Afghanistan (AF), probably against

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
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coalition forces. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value.

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- (S//NF) A senior al-Qaida member photo-identified detainee and stated detainee was present in Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001.
- (S//NF) Yasim Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), identified detainee as best friends with Khalid Hasan Husayn al-Barakati al-Sharif, ISN US9SA-000322DP (SA-322). Detainee and SA-322 were in the same group in Tora Bora, AF.

4. (S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee studied Islamic Religion at the Riyadh Imam Muhammad Bin Sa'ud University and the Jamiat-e-Umm al-Qura University in Mecca. Detainee attended Muslim Brotherhood¹ activities sponsored by the Saudi Administrator of Education, a religious program for students during summer break. Just prior to joining jihad, detainee had no steady job, no wife, and lived at home.²

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In March 2001, after viewing several media accounts about Russian abuses against Chechen women and children, detainee answered the fatwa issued by Shaykh Ibrahim Arbaysh and Shaykh Hamoud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi to support the Chechen rebels.³ While detainee was still in college, his family wrongfully

¹ Analyst Note: The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, is the name of a world-wide Islamist movement.

² IIR 6 034 0765 02, IIR 6 034 1001 04

³ Analyst Note: Shaykh Hamoud Bin Uqla al-Shuaibi, deceases, variant, ash-Shu'aybi, religiously justified al-Qaida's attack on the US in September 2001 and gave religious legitimacy to the suicide attacks against Israel (IS)

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accused him of sexually assaulting the maid. Out of anger and because detainee was extremely upset, he sought to escape his family and Saudi Arabia.⁴ Detainee contacted Ali Mahmoud who organized travel arrangements to Afghanistan for training.⁵ Ali Mahmoud directed detainee to stay at Mahmoud's friend Said's (NFI) house in the Wazir Akbar Khan district of Kabul.⁶ In June 2001, detainee, using falsified documents, traveled to Kabul, AF, via Damascus, Syria (SY), Tehran, Iran (IR), and Herat, AF.⁷ In Damascus, detainee met another recruit of Ali Mahmoud's, Abd al-Rahman Abdullah al-Harbi (NFI), who was from Jeddah, SA. The two traveled together to Kabul, AF.⁸

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee went to the Markez Aseel Training Camp to receive paramilitary training on AK-47s, PK machine guns, handguns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and movement drills.⁹ Azam al-Yemeni led the camp and Shaykh Abu Waleed al-Palestine provided religious instruction.¹⁰ Markez Aseel trainees were all foreign fighters, the majority of whom were destined to join the jihad in Chechnya.¹¹ Detainee traveled to Kandahar, AF, in August 2001, for treatment of severe asthma attacks. Detainee stayed at the al-Ansar Madafa.¹² Detainee then traveled overland to Quetta, PK, stayed at an Arab guesthouse for a few days, and then continued to Ra's al-Khaymah, United Arab Emirates (UAE).¹³ Detainee stayed for two months with Jasim Ahmad al-Yaqubi in Ra's al-

carried out by Palestinians. In October 2001, UBL cited al-Shuaibi when he spoke of his justification for killing Jews and Christians. See al-Qaida's Intellectual Legacy 1-DEC-2003.

⁴ >TD-314/00296-02

⁵ IIR 6 034 0703 02, Analyst Note: Detainee also stated he stole the money he needed to travel for jihad from his mother. See TD-314/00296-02. Ali Mahmoud is a known al-Qaida recruiter who facilitated the travel of several individuals from Saudi Arabia to Chechnya through Afghanistan.

⁶ IIR 6 340 6109 02, Analyst Note: The Wazir Akbar Khan area was the former Kabul diplomatic district taken over by the Taliban and al-Qaida for quarters and training.

⁷ IIR 6 034 0367 02, IIR 6 034 0674 02

⁸ >IIR 6 034 0367 02, Analyst Note: In IIR 2 340 0122 02, detainee conversely stated that he met al-Harbi in Saudi Arabia, who approached and recruited detainee to attend a training camp in Afghanistan. Detainee traveled with al-Harbi to the camp, and arrived in April 2001. See also IIR 2 340 6111 02, IIR 6 034 0674 02.

⁹ IIR 2 340 6111 02, Analyst Note: Markez Aseel was located in Dar ul-Aman, AF, just southeast of Kabul, AF. Detainee has provided several conflicting dates for his recruitment, departure from Saudi Arabia, and arrival at training.

¹⁰ IIR 2 340 0122 02, IIR 6 034 0674 02, Analyst Note: Azam al-Yemeni is assessed to be Abu Malek Dhahak al-Yemeni.

¹¹ IIR 6 034 0067 02, IIR 6 034 0367 02, IIR 6 034 0765 02, TD-314/50575-01, Analyst Note: During the timeframe detainee was at Markez Aseel, Abu Malek Dhahak al-Yemeni was also present at the camps of Afghanistan instructing and seeking new recruits for the Chechen jihad.

¹² Analyst Note: Al-Ansar Madafa is probably the al-Nebras Guesthouse, an Arab safe house used by al-Faruq trainees.

¹³ Analyst Note: The guesthouse in Quetta was probably the Daftar Guesthouse, a Taliban guesthouse frequented by jihadists traveling into and out of Afghanistan.

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Khaymah while receiving medical care.¹⁴ In October 2001, detainee returned to Afghanistan for heavy weapons training that included mortars, artillery, and anti-aircraft weaponry. Detainee did so in an effort to be more desirable to a unit in the Chechen movement.¹⁵ Detainee learned mortar operations while serving as a crewmember at a mortar position protecting the main road to Kabul. Detainee served under the command of al-Hadrami manning a mortar position on the secondary line of defense just north of Kabul for two weeks.¹⁶ Detainee attempted to flee Kabul when the Northern Alliance (NA) entered the city.¹⁷ Detainee stayed in hiding for approximately three weeks awaiting an opportunity to escape to Pakistan. In mid-December 2001, detainee traveled to the Tora Bora Mountains and manned a defensive position with six other men.¹⁸

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) After five days with no activity, detainee, along with approximately twenty others, walked for five days toward the Pakistani border. At the border, Pakistani authorities engaged the group and the majority fled back to Tora Bora. Detainee and three others (Majid Afas Radhi al-Shimri aka (Nasr al-Din),¹⁹ ISN US9SA-000181DP (SA-181, Transferred); Jabd al-Rahman Ma'ath Thafir al-Umari aka (Abdul Rahman al-Amri) aka (Abu Annas); ISN US9SA-000199DP (SA-199); and Muhammad Husayn Qahtani aka (Abd al-Wahid),²⁰ ISN US9SA-000200DP (SA-200) continued across the border where the Pakistani Army captured them. Pakistani officials transferred detainee on 31 December 2001 from Kohat, PK, to the Kandahar Detention Facility and placed detainee in US custody.²¹

b. (S) Property Held:

- Money:
 - 13,667 Pakistani Rupees
 - 31,000 Afghan Afghani
 - 3,000 Lebanese Mille Livres

¹⁴ Analyst Note: Detainee originally met Jasim Ahmad al-Yaqubi when al-Yaqubi and his friend Muhammad Husain al-Mahdi visited Mecca. See IIR 6 034 0674 02. Al-Yaqubi had been in the UAE military and was the head of the Shaykh Ziad Mosque in Dubai, UAE. See TD-314/24244-05.

¹⁵ IIR 6 034 0674 02

¹⁶ IIR 6 034 0674 02, Analyst Note: The secondary line was approximately 1 kilometer from the first line. Al-Hadrami is assessed to be al-Qaida commander Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami. Al-Hadrami was the commander of all Arab (al-Qaida) troops in the Kabul region.

¹⁷ Analyst Note: Kabul fell on 13 November 2001.

¹⁸ IIR 6 034 0674 02

¹⁹ TD-314/00685-02, Analyst Note: Al-Shimri variant (Mahed al-Shamari).

²⁰ TD-314/00685-02

²¹ IIR 6 034 0674 02, IIR 6 034 0765 02

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- 500 Saudi Riyals
 - 50 Syrian Pounds
 - 103 Egyptian Piastres
 - 2 Passport Photos of Arab Males
- Miscellaneous personal items including: a piece of paper with Arabic writing, business cards, commercial radio and headphones, watch, flashlights, keys, and a wallet.

c. (S) **Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 14 January 2002

d. (S//NF) **Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- Aseel Camp personalities and activities
- Khwaja Ghar Camp personalities and activities
- Training specifics on mortars, artillery, air defense weapons, heavy machineguns, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers

6. (S//NF) **Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Detainee's story is littered with omissions, false leads, and conflicting data. Detainee omitted his involvement as a probable al-Qaida weapons trainer dating back before 2000. Detainee failed to identify his affiliations with several significant al-Qaida and extremist personalities. Detainee's timeline becomes extremely fragmented shortly before and after 11 September 2001, which leads to the conclusion he is withholding information about his activities during that time frame.

7. (S//NF) **Detainee Threat:**

a. (S) **Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) **Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and a possible weapons trainer. Detainee has significant associations to senior al-Qaida and extremist personalities, and probably engaged in hostile actions against coalition forces. Detainee's post-capture activities and actions, as well as his pocket litter, identify a fervent follower of extremist views and philosophies.

- (S//NF) Detainee admitted traveling to Markez Aseel, AF, to receive training.²²
(Analyst Note: Markez Aseel is a reference to an old camp located in the suburbs of

²² TD-314/44118-04

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Kabul. In 2000, the training staff and trainees at Markez Aseel merged with other abandoned camps at an old copper mine near Kandahar, AF, and became known as al-Faruq #2, Gharmabak Ghar. After 11 September 2001, in anticipation of coalition attacks, al-Faruq #2 was closed and moved to the Kabul suburbs where the Malik Training Center was establishing. Detainee's admission and possible slip using the old name of Markez Aseel is a probable attempt to cover his true role as an al-Qaida weapons trainer at al-Faruq.)²³

- (S//NF) During late 1999 or early 2000, al-Qaida operative and Libyan Islamic Fighter Group (LIFG)²⁴ member Sufian Ahmad Mahmud Abu Zaydan reported detainee was a trainer at al-Faruq. Zaydan's training included topography, weapons, and explosives.²⁵ (Analyst Note: It is unknown if the training Abu Zaydan received was provided by detainee at al-Faruq.)
- (S//NF) Ahmed Muhammed Haza al-Darbi aka (Abu Huthayfah) aka (Abd al-Aziz) aka (Abd al-Rahman al-Janubi), ISN US9SA-000768DP (SA-768), claimed, Handalah al-Makki, one of detainee's alias, was part of a group of al-Qaida personnel who were regularly present in Kandahar, AF, between 1998 and 2000. SA-768 added detainee was a close associate of Salim al-Sharif.²⁶ (Analyst Note: SA-768 is probably referring to senior al-Qaida facilitator Salim al-Sharif, cousin of Fahd Umar Abd al-Majid al-Umari al-Sharif, ISN US9SA-000215DP (SA-215). Salim al-Sharif worked directly for Usama Bin Laden (UBL), and reportedly made all of the arrangements for the Arab fighters' exodus from Kabul to Tora Bora.²⁷ Al-Sharif was also the emir of the operations center in Tora Bora and is linked to moving SA-7 shoulder launched missiles from Yemen (YM) to Saudi Arabia and handled financial matters for the Kabul region.²⁸)
- (S//NF) Yasim Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), claimed detainee informed him about a training camp in Kandahar, AF, which offered "special training." Detainee told YM-252 he visited the camp a number of times for a month or two and then returned home to Saudi Arabia.²⁹ (Analyst Note: This camp is probably al-Faruq, which was at one time located just outside of Kandahar.)

²³ TD-314/38289-03, TD-314/35802-03

²⁴ Analyst Note: LIFG is a Tier 1 Counterterrorism target defined as those terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.

²⁵ TD-314/53595-04, Analyst Note: The report does not specify what topics Handalah taught.

²⁶ TD-314/37810-03, Analyst Note: SA-768 departed Afghanistan in early 2001 for final operational attack planning involving small boats against oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz.

²⁷ IIR 6 034 0150 04, TRRS-04-11-0334

²⁸ TRSS 4-11-0334, IIR 6 034 0077 03, 3-OO-28922-02, IIR 6 034 0150 04, IIR 6 034 0393 02, IIR 6 034 0263 02

²⁹ 000252 SIR 14-JUN-2004

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- (S//NF) Khalid Sulayman Jaydh al-Hubayshi, ISN US9SA-000155DP (SA-155, Transferred), stated that detainee told him detainee traveled to Afghanistan for training so he could join the Chechen jihad.³⁰ (Analyst Note: During the summer of 2001, while detainee and SA-155 resided at the al-Nebras Guesthouse, SA-155 stated he became aware of “special training at the Kandahar airport.” Some of the specialized training known to be conducted at the Kandahar airport compound dealt with explosives, chemicals, and poisons.³¹)
- (S//NF) Known al-Qaida facilitator Ali Mahmoud organized detainee’s trips to and from Afghanistan. Services included obtaining forged visas and passports, procuring airline tickets, establishing contacts at several guesthouses, and providing specific procedures for passing through airports customs and country borders.³²
- (S//NF) Detainee utilized an established network of guesthouses and safe houses in his frequent travels.
 - (S//NF) Detainee stayed at the house of Ali Mahmoud’s friend Saif, an established layover point for al-Qaida personnel in Kabul; the al-Nebras Guesthouse, al-Qaida’s quarters for trainees leaving and entering Kandahar, AF, area training camps; and the Daftar guesthouse in Quetta, PK, which was the al-Qaida house used by jihadists entering and exiting Afghanistan through Pakistan.³³
 - (S//NF) Analysis of floppy disks recovered in raids on safe houses in Karachi, PK, on 10-12 September 2002, revealed a document titled “Passports.doc,” which contained a variant of detainee’s name and alias.³⁴
 - (S//NF) Analysis of computer media recovered during raids of al-Qaida safe houses in Rawalpindi, PK, and Karachi, PK, on 1 March 2003 and 10-12 September 2002, respectively, revealed a listing of al-Qaida mujahideen and their “trust accounts”, which contained a variant of detainee’s name.³⁵
 - (S//NF) A variation of detainee’s name was also found on a file titled "Asra.doc," which was recovered from computer media associated with Khalid Shaykh Muhammad aka (KSM) aka (Mukhtar), US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024), seized

³⁰ TD-314/26931-02

³¹ >IIR 6 034 0341 06

³² IIR 6 034 0674 02, IIR 6 034 0367 02, IIR 6 034 0765 02, IIR 2 340 6109 02, IIR 6 034 0703 02, IIR 6 034 0461 04, IIR 6 034 0367 02, 000182 SIR 12-MAY-2004

³³ IIR 6 034 0674 02, IIR 6 034 0367 02, IIR 6 034 0765 02, IIR 2 340 6109 02, IIR 6 034 0703 02, IIR 6 034 0461 04, IIR 6 034 0367 02, 000182 SIR 12-MAY-2004

³⁴ TD-314/42895-02, paragraph number 42

³⁵ TD-314/47683-03, paragraph number 42, Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual’s residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses, often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts, also referred to as safety boxes or safety deposit boxes, were storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that guesthouse administrators used to secure the individual’s personal valuables, such as passports and plane tickets. These items were entrusted to the guesthouse until completion of training or other activity.

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- during joint raids conducted with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) in Pakistan on 1 March 2003.³⁶
- (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida lieutenant Walid Salih Bin Attash aka (Khallad) aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014), photo-identified detainee and stated he did not know the individual's true name, but only his alias, Hanzallah. Khallad stated he knew detainee because detainee was a member of Khallad's mother's tribe, the al-Harbi tribe. Khallad claimed it was easy to recognize people from this tribe because they usually had similar facial features. Khallad claimed detainee arrived in Kandahar in 2000. Khallad further noted seeing detainee often in Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001.³⁷
 - (S//NF) Through detainee's training, recruitment, and activities, he possibly associated with other senior al-Qaida and extremist personalities.
 - (S//NF) Abu Malek Dhahak al-Yemeni aka (Abu Dhahak) aka (Azam al-Yemeni) led the Markez Aseel Training Camp which detainee attended.³⁸
 - (S//NF) Abu Malek Dhahak al-Yemeni served as Ibn Khattab's representative in Afghanistan, and was also a senior trainer at al-Faruq Training Camp. Ibn Khattab was the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In addition to monitoring Ibn Khattab's equipment in Afghanistan, Abu Dhahak facilitated the movement of Arabs to Georgia and Chechnya.³⁹
 - (S//NF) Abu Waleed al-Palestine served as a religious instructor during detainee's time at Markez Aseel.⁴⁰
 - (S//NF) Al-Palestine had direct, but strained relations with UBL as the two disagreed over the philosophy of using suicide bombers. Al-Palestine was associated with the Kandahar and Khalden Training Camps, and traveled regularly to London, England (UK) to meet with Shaykh Abu Qatada, a radical Islamic cleric who fled Jordan and found asylum in England.⁴¹
 - (S//NF) The name "Abu Sultan" was found among detainee's pocket litter. Detainee stated that Abu Sultan was an Arabic speaking Pakistani who volunteered to introduce detainee to the Harakat al-Mujahideen (HUM).⁴²
 - (S//NF) HUM is a Pakistani extremist group known to help al-Qaida members escape from Afghanistan. HUM has close affiliations with Jaish-E-Mohammed (JEM).⁴³

³⁶ TD-314/13174-03³⁷ >TD-314/36178-04³⁸ IIR 6 034 0674 02, IIR 6 034 0045 06, TD-314/53595 04³⁹ TD-314/53595-04⁴⁰ IIR 6 034 0045 06⁴¹ IIR 6 034 0045 06⁴² IIR 6 034 0765 02

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- (S//NF) Due to similarities in name and timelines, Abu Sultan may possibly be Fahed Abu Sultan, ISN US9SA-000130DP (SA-130), assessed to be a member of al-Qaida who served as a logistics officer in UBL's former 55th Arab Brigade who supported the Taliban.⁴⁴
- (S//NF) Detainee and SA-199 were captured together in Pakistan. SA-199 had extensive military experience including training by the US on the operation of the Dragon anti-tank missile system. SA-199 fought on the front lines against the NA.⁴⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee probably engaged in hostile activities against coalition forces.
 - (S//NF) Detainee served under al-Hadrami as a front line mortar operator.⁴⁶ Abd al-Salam al-Hadrami was a known al-Qaida recruiter in Yemen. Al-Hadrami also served as a subordinate commander to Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi in UBL's former 55th Arab Brigade in Northern Afghanistan.⁴⁷
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted manning a mortar squad at a house in Khwaja Ghar, AF.⁴⁸ (Analyst Note: Khwaja Ghar was the primary area of operations for UBL's 55th Arab Brigade in northern Afghanistan.)
 - (S//NF) YM-252 identified detainee as a front line fighter. YM-252 stated detainee fought for, and stayed at, the home of Taliban leader Hamza al-Qaiti.⁴⁹ In early October 2001, Hamza al-Qaiti directed all Arab fighters to depart the area. Local fighters split into two groups, one headed toward Khwaja Ghar, AF, and the other toward Kabul, AF. (Analyst Note: Hamza al-Qaiti's house and area of command was near Taloqan, AF, located approximately 30 miles east of Konduz, AF.⁵⁰)
 - (S//NF) YM-252 photo-identified detainee as the best friend of Khalid Hasan Husayn al-Barakati al-Sharif, ISN US9SA-000322DP (SA-322). Detainee and SA-322 were in the same group in Tora Bora, AF.⁵¹ While in Tora Bora, SA-322 took charge of the group when the previous commander, Abu Abdel Aziz al-Qureshi aka (Salih), departed.⁵²
- (S//NF) Detainee's personal actions and pocket litter reflect his commitment to the extremist Islamic ideology.

⁴³ IIR 6 034 0765 02, Analyst Note: HUM and JEM are Tier 1 Counterterrorism Targets defined as those terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.

⁴⁴ >000111 FM302 22-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 0015 04

⁴⁵ 000199 KB 15-FEB-2002

⁴⁶ 000182 FM40 2-MAR-2002⁴⁷ TD-314/29279-02

⁴⁸ 000182 FM40 2-MAR-2002

⁴⁹ Analyst Note: Variant spellings include: Hamzah al-Qati, al-Gaiti, al-Giati, and al-Gaeti.

⁵⁰ IIR 6 034 0702 03

⁵¹ >000252 FM40 31-May-2005(b)

⁵² 000252 FM40 31-MAY-2005, IIR 2 340 6150 02

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- (S//NF) Detainee admitted to being an enemy combatant in accordance with policy set forth by the US tribunal process. Detainee admitted returning to Afghanistan post 11 September 2001 on false documents and is assessed to have probably engaged in hostile actions against coalition forces.⁵³
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted being affiliated and allied with the Taliban, and further stated he would have fought for them if needed.⁵⁴
- (S//NF) In the fall of 2004, detainee wrote the word “jihad” in the common area of his bay. Detainee described writing the word as an effort to measure other detainees’ reactions. Detainee used moistened rust to provide the effect of writing the word in blood.⁵⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee’s pocket litter contained two pages with information on HUM titled “Battle against the Non-Believers.”. The notes included Purpose and Objectives of HUM, telephone numbers and names of Pakistani contacts.⁵⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee’s pocket litter contained passport photos of two different Arab males. One was of Muhammad Husain, who detainee met at the al-Huda Mosque in Mecca, SA.⁵⁷ (Analyst Note: Jasim Ahmad al-Yaqubi introduced detainee to Husain, while Yaqubi and Husain visited Mecca, SA.⁵⁸ Possession of photos may be indicative of detainee’s association with document forgers or personal experience at forgery.)⁵⁹
- (S//NF) A Foreign Government Service provided biographic details on Handhallah al-Jidawi, an alias used by detainee. Handhallah al-Jidawi was born approximately in 1975 in Saudi Arabia. Al-Jidawi participated in the Bosnian jihad in 1995 and traveled to Afghanistan following the October 2000 attack on the USS COLE in Aden, YM. Al-Jidawi received military training at the al-Faruq Camp and then went to Kabul, AF, where he stayed at the Hamza al-Qaiti Guesthouse. Al-Jidawi made several attempts to travel to Chechnya to participate in the jihad but was unsuccessful.⁶⁰ (Analyst Note: Based on similarities in stories, detainee may be identifiable with Handhallah al-Jidawi. Further analysis is required to confirm this association.)

c. (U//FOUO) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee’s overall behavior has been semi-compliant and rarely hostile toward the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has eight Reports of Disciplinary

⁵³ 000182 SIR 2-SEP-2004, IIR 6 034 0765 02

⁵⁴ 000182 FM40 2-MAR-2002

⁵⁵ 000182 SIR 1-OCT-2004

⁵⁶ GUAN-2002-000058

⁵⁷ IIR 6 034 0765 02

⁵⁸ IIR 6 034 0765 02, IIR 6 034 0674 02

⁵⁹ GUAN-2002-000058

⁶⁰ >TD-314/02988-03

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Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 24 December 2006, when detainee participated in a mass disturbance by kicking on his bottom bean hole. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include assault, inciting a mass disturbance, damage to government property, threatening guards, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, and possession of non-weapon type contraband. Detainee has one report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault occurring on 28 February 2006, when detainee threw a cup of urine in a guard's face and called him a "stupid donkey." In 2006 detainee had four Reports of Disciplinary Infraction.

8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

- a. (S) Assessment:** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee is of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 18 August 2006.
- b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee is assessed as a member of al-Qaida and was probably a weapons trainer at Markez Aseel and/or al-Faruq between 1998 and 2001. Detainee is assessed to have participated in combat operations in Khwaja Ghar, AF, and Tora Bora during October or November 2001, having direct access to senior leadership in both locations. During detainee's frequent trips to Afghanistan, he stayed at the al-Qaida run al-Nebbras Guesthouse and was identified as staying at Hamza al-Qaiti's al-Qaida affiliated and Taliban supported guesthouse. Detainee utilized a series of unidentified guesthouses and hotels during his travels from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan and through Syria, Pakistan, and United Arab Emirates. Detainee had direct access to travel facilitators and possible access to al-Qaida's document forgery network.
- c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Exploitation of detainee's long-term involvement with Markez Aseel and al-Faruq training camps would generate a long list of bibliographies of past trainers and trainees. Detainee probably has specific information on advanced and specialized instruction, techniques, and procedures on al-Qaida's use of mortars, air defense artillery, and heavy machine guns. Several references from detainee's associates indicate a possibility detainee has information on al-Qaida explosives training, which could prove relevant today for US combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Detainee's frequent travels suggest he could provide specific information on travel routes and facilitators to include names and locations of safe houses, travel facilitators, the document forgery network, and specific instructions on border crossing procedures. Detainee's relationship with Abu Waleed al-Palestine could generate information on al-Qaida's network in the UK and possible insight into religious and philosophical discontent and or issues among al-Qaida leadership. Detainee's links to Abu Sultan and HUM need exploiting to determine the extent of HUM's involvement in supporting al-Qaida and Taliban objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Detainee's

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relationship with SA-199 and SA-200 requires further research to determine any information on use of hand held anti-aircraft weapons and information regarding past terrorist operations. Detainee has provided several conflicting dates and timelines for his travels.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida:
 - Facilitators, travel networks, and forgery network
 - UK cells
 - Relationship with HUM
 - UBL's 55th Arab Brigade structure and personnel
 - Training camps, instructors, attendees, specialized and advanced level training
- Ahmad Muhammad Haza al-Darbi
- Tora Bora operations

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 26 August 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.