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HEADQUARTERS USMACV

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FIGURES LAST: FROM OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER. DRAW LINE UNDER FACT AND INITIAL IN RIGHT BORDER.
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NO.	TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT
1	Dir Plans 63-1	D/O Ops	11-7-64	Request you incorporate this paper with plans you are preparing. <p style="text-align: right;"><i>A/10</i> F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operations</p>
Attached: Memo fr D/I, 5 Jul 64, subj: Operations in Germany with Political and Psychological Significance w/paper attached.				

3. These propaganda programs must work the front line troops against the homeland, and the homeland against the fronts. The troops in the trenches must not think that their air cover is defending the homeland, and the homeland must not think that it is making sacrifices because the Luftwaffe is assisting at the fronts. Proper use of large-scale propaganda can tangibly prove to the German people that they are defenseless.

4. The recommended program does not propose to deal with German morale in the conventional manner. Its intent is not to inculcate gloom and despondency by conventional approach; it is not based on any reprisal consideration. This program follows the principle of avoiding, when possible, unrestricted civilian bombing. The warning to evacuate women and children is in line with this principle. This program should undermine and discredit the Nazi government to the German people; dislocate through evacuation civilian populations, and prove by tangible evidence that Germany is defenseless. It might be possible to designate refugee places that will not be attacked for the time being in each area.

5. It is suggested that both HFF, as well as visual, bombing be considered.

6. The present predicament of Germany should be borne in mind in consideration of the above. After almost five years of unrelenting war, Germany finds itself torn from the stimulation of victories, facing defeat on all fronts. The heartaches and discouragements that oppress the German people at this time must be carefully considered. This program would, therefore, move into action with the German military, political, and psychological stage poised to receive it.

George C. Rodland

GEORGE C. RODLAND
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Director of Intelligence

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7 July 1961

SUBJECT: Operations in Germany with Particular Political and Psychological Significance.

TO : Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tait, HQ, Staff, A.C. 727, U. S. Army.

The enclosed study briefly outlines USAF's appreciation of the opportunities and possibilities offered by the introduction of a combined political and psychological warfare campaign into our present bombing operations against Germany.

F. A. MILLER,
Major General, USAF,
Deputy Commander, Operations

1 Goal:
Operations in Germany with Political
and Psychological Significance.

*Review Sent
11/10/61*



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OPERATIONS IN GERMANY WITH PARTICULAR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE

1. The purpose of this paper is to outline a series of operations against Germany which should have the effect of:

- a. Tangibly proving to the German people that they are defenseless.
- b. Discrediting the Nazi government.

2. Headquarters, USSTAF, is making a study of targets in Germany which will be selected with particular reference to their political and psychological effect and which will form a part of the strategic bombing program. In this study, the Psychological Warfare Division of USSTAF and USAF are collaborating. Attached is an incomplete list of targets which indicates the general nature of targets being considered so far. Selection of these psychological and political targets is to be based upon the following considerations:

a. That the targets cover Germany - particularly those areas which have not as yet felt the full weight of the air offensive.

b. That their destruction will have a cumulative effect with the other strategic air objectives.

c. That they are of such nature as conspicuously to represent the past strength of Germany and hence their destruction would be symbolic.

3. White Propaganda campaigns, involving full weight leaflet and radio programs will be initiated to inform the German people that:

a. Certain of these targets will be bombed on a certain date in the order of about three days from the first White announcement. Weather considerations will, of course, govern the timing.

b. That women, children, the aged and infirm should be evacuated from the vicinity at once. Where possible, refuge places can be designated which will not be attacked for at least the time being.

4. Black Propaganda programs will be initiated to the German people which will attribute to the German authorities statements stressing the German policy of defense, ridiculing the White threats of attack and the recommended evacuations contained in the White campaigns. These Black programs should be heartening and reassuring to the German people; they should ring with conviction and be prepared in a manner difficult for Goebbels to deny without admitting the purposes of these operations. As these Black programs develop, all manner of subtleties can be injected, such as contrasting the behavior of the authorities with that of the civilians in the threatened localities. The purpose of these Black programs should be to discredit the government when our blows fall.

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3. These Propaganda programs must work the front line troops against the homeland and the homeland against the fronts. Troops in the trenches must not think that their air cover is defending the homeland, and the homeland must not think it is making sacrifices because the Luftwaffe is assisting at the fronts. It is important that these operations and propaganda programs tangibly and visually prove to the German people that they are defenseless.

4. The purpose of these operations and Propaganda programs is not to increase further class and classism by conventional means. They are not based on reprisal considerations. It is rather to bring about certain definite actions by the German people while instilling strong convictions through tangible proof.

5. This step is being made in appreciation of the predicament Germany is in today. After almost five years of exhausting war Germany finds herself torn from the circulation of victories and faces defeat on all fronts. The psychological and political aspects of the hardships and discouragements that oppress the German people at this time can be capitalized upon by these attacks. These operations would have into action with the German military, political and psychological stage pieces to succeed it.

6. Operational details concerning this plan will be worked out by the Eighth Air Force, utilizing the Combined Operational Planning Committee to the extent practicable.

F. L. ABBINSON,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Deputy Commander, Operations

2 Data
Type of Target:

N-T. sent

MEMORANDUM
DEFENSE AGAINST STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations

RAF 674 005
40 833, USA Army
8 July 1944

SUBJECT: Operations in Germany with Political and Psychological Significance.

TO: Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander, USAF.

1. The purpose of this Memorandum is to recommend a series of operations against localities in Germany which should have the effect of:

- a. Tangibly proving to the German people that they are defenseless.
- b. Miscrediting the Nazi government.
- c. Misleading populations through affecting evacuation of German localities.

2. It is proposed that:

a. A selection be made of German towns and cities, after consultation with the Target Section and the Psychological Warfare Section of the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, Psychological Warfare Division, USAF, and certain allied agencies; these selected localities to have industrial, political or military significance. They need not be metropolitan centers.

b. That White Propaganda campaigns, involving full weight leaflet and radio program, be initiated to inform the German people that:

- (1) Targets of military significance in the selected localities will be bombed on a certain date, not later than three days from the first White announcement, or as soon thereafter as appropriate weather permits.
- (2) That women, children, the aged and infirm should be evacuated at once. Where possible, refuge places can be designated which will not be attacked for at least the time being.

c. That Black Propaganda programs be initiated to the German people which will attribute to German authorities statements stressing their power of defense, ridiculing the White threats of attack and the recommended evacuations contained in the White campaigns. These Black programs should be heartening and

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Mem fr. EC/ops, Sr, USAF, 2 July 1944, to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander, SHAEF, subject Operations in Germany with Political and Psychological Significance (cont'd)

reassuring to the German people; they should ring with conviction and be prepared in a manner difficult for Goebbels to deny without admitting the purposes of these operations. As these Black programs develop, all manner of subtleties can be injected, such as contrasting the behavior of the authorities with that of the civilians in the threatened localities. The purpose of these Black programs should be to discredit the Nazi government when our blows fall.

3. These Propaganda programs must work the front line troops against the homeland and the homeland against the fronts. Troops in the trenches must not think that their air cover is defending the homeland, and the homeland must not think it is making sacrifices because the Luftwaffe is assisting at the fronts. It is important that these operational and Propaganda programs tangibly and visually prove to the German people that they are defenseless.

4. The recommended operations and Propaganda programs do not propose to deal with German morale in the conventional manner; their intent is not to inundate further gloom and despondency by conventional methods; they are not based on reprisal considerations. Their purpose is to bring about certain definite actions by the German people while instilling strong convictions through tangible proof. The objectives are practical objectives; circulation of civilian populations, discrediting the government, proving by tangible means that Germany is defenseless.

5. It is believed that these operations and programs offer a wide variety of collateral opportunities which, in themselves, will have additional significant value.

6. The above recommendations are made in appreciation of the predicament Germany is in today. After almost five years of exhausting war Germany finds itself torn from the stimulation of victories and faces defeat on all fronts. The heartaches and discouragements that oppress the German people at this time indicate as never before the desirability of psychological and political attack. These operations and programs would now come into action with the German military, political and psychological stage poised to receive them.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS.

That the operations and Propaganda programs recommended in this memorandum be approved in order that USAF might implement them through the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, and those Propaganda agencies necessary to their accomplishment.

F. L. AUSTON
Major General, USAF
Deputy Commander for Operations.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Office of the Director of Intelligence

AIF Sta 586
AFO 633, U.S. Army
3 July 1944

MEMORANDUM:

Op. in W. Europe

TO: Major General F. L. Anderson

SUBJECT: Operations in Germany with Political and Psychological Significance.

1. The purpose of this Memorandum is to recommend a series of operations against Germany which should have the effect of:

- a. Tangibly proving to the German people that they are defenseless.
- b. Discrediting the Nazi government.

2. a. Dislocating populations through effecting evacuation of German towns and cities.

2. It is proposed that:

a. Selection of German towns and cities be made after conferences with Psychological Section of this Directorate of Intelligence, agencies associated with USA, SHAEF, and the Director of Operations, USSTAF. These selected localities should have industrial, political, or military significance. They need not be metropolitan centers.

b. That White Propaganda Campaigns, involving leaflets and radio, be initiated to inform the German people:

(1) That targets of military significance in these localities will be bombed on a certain date, or as soon thereafter as appropriate weather permits.

(2) That women, children, the aged and infirm, should be evacuated at once.

c. That Black Propaganda Programs be initiated to report the German case, attributing to German authorities statements stressing their power of defense, ridiculing the White threats of attack, and the recommended evacuations contained in the White Campaigns. The Black Propaganda Program should be heartening and reassuring to the German people. They should ring with conviction and be prepared in a manner difficult for Goebbels to deny, without admitting the objectives of these operations. Subtleties such as contrasting the behavior of the authorities in the threatened areas with that of the civilians can be later injected. Naturally, the purpose of this Black Program will be to discredit the government as our blows fall.

Loss to Brig. Gen. (Colonel) Fr. Col. Widder, 6 July 1944, (obj) Memorandum dated 5 July 1944 presented by Col. Hughes (cont'd)

factors play no real or practical role in war!

5. Para 1.(b) brings up a number of reasons which might cause failure to these missions. It is believed that there is no military objective worth going after that does not present problems and hazards. Some risk is attached to every mission. Some chance of failure is always present. It is not believed that the hazards of the proposed announced bombardment of Germany are so great as to cause us to run away from the task - and this statement is not made recklessly.

6. Para 1.(c) is not quite clear as to meaning, but in principle it appears to make an effort to again discredit the importance of morale as a basic factor to a nation engaged in total war. If this paragraph suggests that the proposed bombardment plan is merely trying to put a new name on an old military idea, that intention is false. It is not believed that the subject operational plan is the old attack on morale with a new name. It is felt that the plan has fresh elements of power and originality contained in it, and is susceptible to important development and the accumulation of considerable force.

7. Para 2.(a) is characteristic of Colonel Fuchs, and is a most laudable expression of the character and ideals which prompt the Colonel's logic. This statement is made with sincerity and is not to be considered tainted with one speck of cynicism. No American would willingly participate in any fight if he could avoid it without applying the hazards of Guesensberry's rules. It is regretted to engage in operations that would cause the harassment and slavery of civilian populations. This whole war, from that point of view, is deplorable. It is pointed out, however, that you cannot always use the hazards of Guesensberry's rules against a nation brought up in traditions of unprecedented cruelty, brutality, and disregard of basic human decency. As stated in the basic plan, this program is not a reprisal. Nor is it a new way to kill women and children. This program is, however, a method by which fundamentals may be pressed home to the German people, fundamentals which, when accepted, will end the war. It should be stated with great firmness that if this program should shorten the war by one day, and in so doing save a few British and American lives on the fighting fronts or elsewhere, the price paid by the enemy should not, and should not be a factor of either moral or practical consideration. These air forces are not over here just to play cricket. Our Number One responsibility is to get on with winning the war, to shorten it as much as we can, and by so doing, save allied lives.

8. Para 2.(b) is not clearly understood. It is not known what is meant by "the doctrine on which the air forces have been built and trained". It is understood that air power is the striking force and that it should be used wherever that striking force can effectively act. It is bringing this war to an end. The effectiveness of this air force is helping to bring about a successful outcome of this war is particularly dependent upon the importance of the target systems attacked by the air forces. It is believed that every target system should be carefully considered with an open mind, regardless of whether or not it has been thought of or actually attacked before. There is no rigid doctrine confining the use of air power to a restricted and limited set of target systems. The selection of targets must follow an orderly evaluation of the requirements attending the selection.

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Memo to Brig. Gen. McDonald Fr. Col. Weicker, 6 July 1944, subj: Memorandum dated 5 July 1944 presented by Col. Hughes (cont'd).

Priorities so arrived at must be established without prejudice or antagonism. A target system either deserves a high or a low priority, depending upon the military requirements and expediences of the time.

9. Para 2.(c) is not concurred in, because it suggests that the direction of this Air Force is not capable of resisting importunities and distractions. It is true that we have not always viewed with enthusiasm the wishes of other headquarters, nor do we always see eye to eye with the logic behind directives under which the Strategic Air Forces have occasionally operated. But it certainly must be stated that we would be in an unenviable position indeed if we did not consider any new ideas because they might prove to be dangerous abstractions, and therefore alien to our interests.

10. As to PVT versus visual bombing, it was felt proper that this Directorate of Intelligence should raise the question of the two possibilities. The disposition the Commanding General or the Commanding General, Ops, will make of this whole matter lies entirely within the domain of their own authority.

MONELL F. HEDDEN

Colonel, U.S.A.

Deputy Director of Intelligence.

POLITICAL CONTROL AND PROPAGANDA

1. Appreciation of Germany's present position. Germany is currently faced with advancing enemies on all sides. The establishment of the new Western Land Front has been a success, contrary to the intensive pro-Nazi German propaganda that the invaders would be destroyed on the beaches. The West's offensive on a broad front is making steady gains. The forces in Italy face one another along a line very near to the last defensive line in Italy. Finally, the Strategic Air Offensive is directed against a system of targets in Germany, the ultimate destruction of which inevitably will lead to the stoppage of the German war machine.

2. Effect on German People. The three classes in Germany: the Party Control, the Military Leadership, and the Mass of the People, can be expected to react differently in the existing situation. Their reactions will be different because of differences in information available to them and in selfish interests. The interests of the Party Control are best served by a continuation of the conflict. The interests of the best informed class, the Military Leadership, are best served by the continued power of the armed forces, or the retention of the potential of that power by its non-destruction. It can therefore be expected to continue its attempt to defeat Germany's enemies until that continuing becomes obviously impossible, then to direct its efforts to the salvage of the maximum strength of the armed forces.

The interests of the Mass of the People, the least informed class, are best served by not being killed and by the perpetuation of Germany as a modern industrial power.

3. Lines of action. In the light of the above appreciation, three

lines of action are indicated:

a. Convince the Military Leadership that continuation of this unequal struggle can end only in the destruction of the German Military strength now and forever.

b. Convince the Mass of the German People that continuation of this war is more of a burden that they can bear and can end only in the deaths of more of them and finally in the destruction of the German Nation.

c. Discredit the Party Control.

4. Analysis of Lines of Action.

a. The first requisite for the realization that German military forces expect win is continuation and intensification of the currently applied pressure. Only such pressure can spotlight and exploit growing weakness. Any relaxation of that pressure will serve to belated the inevitability of the result. In this connection, Military Leadership can be expected to be least impressed by inadequacies of material.

b. Prior to any capitulation upon any conviction of the German People that disaster is inevitable, it would first be necessary for them to acquire such a conviction and then to be able to do something about it. Because of the rigid party control, expression by the people is difficult and action even more difficult.

c. The act of discrediting the Nazi control should not present a difficult task, in fact their own propaganda is now beginning to assist in that, but as previously expressed, the very rigidity of that control is designed for continuity in spite of lack of popular support.

5. Methods of Implementation of Lines of Action.

a. Due to the necessity for maintaining and intensifying the pressure on the Military Leadership, the only changes appropriate with respect to the successful major current program are increases in their efficiency and magnitude

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and, with respect to the Strategic Air Offensive, a greater use of psychological features. For example, by a judicious use of leaflets and radio, the front line troops can be worked against the homeland and vice versa; front line leaders must not be allowed to think that their primary air cover is defending the homeland but must instead be demanding a greater share for their respective areas. The result will be accentuation of their plight and creation of internal differences within the military leadership.

b. Action taken directly against the German People can be in the form of:

(1) Destruction of their towns and cities with the resultant heavy casualties. This method has been tried and so far has failed. However, there are hundreds of small towns against which bombing has not been tried extensively and it is possible that action against these might be more successful than against the larger Metropolitan centers. Unquestionably it would be a clear indication to the people of their defenselessness, as previously discussed, however, their powers of expression may be so stifled as to nullify the effort. Attached as Exhibit "a" is a list of 116 towns which come within this category.

To embark on such a program would subject the U.S.-British High Command to the possibility of serious repercussions. Except for the unfortunate incidents in the Baltics and relatively few other incidents, the day bombing effort has been directed against military objectives. It is obvious that the night bombing can be directed only at areas, but the world knows that the day bombers can hit selected military objectives and has been led to believe that only such objectives will be attacked. A change from this policy might profoundly affect enemy, neutral and friendly world opinion. It would play completely into the hands of the German propagandists.

The reactions in the Balkans in comparing the U.S.-U.K. policy with the Soviets is a case [redacted] the German people

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themselves, it might well be a warning and serve to stiffen their resistance.

(2) Action against true military objectives over a widespread area. If such a program provided for steps to minimize civilian casualties, maximum psychological advantages could be obtained with minimum psychological disadvantages. The defenselessness of the people could be accentuated by a leaflet and radio program advising them of our intent to visit them at a stated time. The objectives will not be selected for their position in an integrated strategic system but they will be selected rather for their geographic location and for their impact upon the every day life of the mass of the people. Points of German industrial strength are appropriate targets for such an attack as well as important power sources, major transportation bottlenecks, etc. Attached as Exhibit 107 is a list of typical targets of this character. Of paramount importance in this form of attack is the necessity to so direct it that the spirit of defenselessness will develop into one of futility and finally into one of an active hatred of the Nazi regime and a desire to get out from under it, rather than into a spirit of hatred and resistance against the attacker. Black propaganda programs can be used to great advantage by attributing to the German authorities all comments stressing the German power of defense, ridiculing the white threats of attack and the recommended evacuations contained in the white campaigns. These black programs should be heartening and reassuring to the German people; they should ring with conviction and be prepared in a manner difficult for Goebbels to deny without admitting the purposes of these operations. As these black programs develop, all manner of subtleties can be injected, such as contrasting the behavior of the authorities with that of the civilians in the threatened localities. The purpose of these black programs should be to discredit the government when our blows fall. It is important that these operations and propaganda programs tangibly and visually prove to the German people that they are defenseless.

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6. Retaliation for Pilotless Aircraft Attack. It is difficult to consider air action against Germany at this time of great popular stress brought about by the Pilotless Aircraft campaign, without having the consideration of retaliation injected. The program is of great importance; it is affecting many people probably in a greater degree than the previous Blitzes. It lies within our power, however to determine whether or not it is to be materially effective. The intensity of the campaign can be reduced by the various defensive measures adopted, by the tactical harassment of its launching and supply means, and by strategic attack against its sources of production. The latter is, at the moment, not very practical in view of the obvious ease of its manufacture and the general lack of intelligence concerning it. It can be stopped only by defeating Germany. In any case, retaliatory action will serve both to relieve the pressure now being applied where it is hurting the German, and to prove to him that his campaign is meeting with such success as to justify his intensification of his use in the hopes of a decision in his favor that hope would justify our response which is designed to kill his hopes. The institution of a "blowing out" media campaign as an almost end use campaign of damage and counter-damage.

Conclusions: In view of the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- a. Attacks against the important strategic material objectives, particularly the oil industry and stocks, must be continued and intensified.
- b. Tactical support of the ground action must be continued wherever and whenever a favorable opportunity presents itself.
- c. Existing advantages must be taken of psychological effects to be achieved through inclusion in the strategic bombing program, of targets selected as indicated in paragraph 5 b (2) above.
- d. Counter air force action must be continued as necessary, to maintain air superiority. Excluded from this is any program such Pilotless Aircraft production and supply facilities.

f. It has been proposed that the time is ripe to show the German people that they are defenseless against air attack and that their government and air forces are powerless to protect them. It is argued that they do not already fully appreciate this, and to cause it fully apparent it is necessary to announce by radio and leaflet that a particular town is about to be heavily bombed, and then, within a reasonable number of days, implement the threat by an attack on the town, employing P.F.F. methods. The effect of hopelessness thus expected is to be intensified, and maybe galvanized into some form of action, by a subtle "black" radio campaign which will ridicule the threat, emphasize the strength of the German defenses, and then leave the subsequent obvious discrepancy to speak for itself. To avoid any conflict with attacks on precision military and industrial targets in Germany it is now emphasized that no visual bombing days will be employed in this plan - it will be confined to those days over Germany which are only suitable for P.F.F. bombing, and of course would not have priority over operations in occupied countries in support of the ground armies or against the unpopular flying bomb.

In considering the details of the plan, and before discussing its possible disadvantages, it is desirable to examine some of the premises on which it is based.

g. Is it a fact that the German people do not believe that the U. S. day bombers cannot hit any town they may select? When the most heavily defended city in Germany, its capital, has obviously been deliberately hit on several occasions, is it a fair conclusion that the people of Erfurt will expect greater defensive effort to be made on their behalf than of Berlin? It is true they will feel threatened and the more favored ones may leave the city, but how much more catastrophic is that than scores of episodes and evacuations which have already happened? Every city in the north expected, and yet, heavy attacks for months on end, while these "secret" attacks may have been possible owing to darkness, is not it already obvious that ours in daylight are usually possible owing to our strength and fighter escorts? What German would deny it?

g. Is the second premise, that the threat will be successfully implemented - a reasonable number of days, sufficiently sure to justify advertising to the world a projected operation? A failure, from whatever reason, to implement the threat successfully would surely backfire. Are there some reasons why it might not succeed.

1. weather at bases or en route.
2. a protracted spell of visual weather either over Germany or the occupied countries.
3. a military "crisis" (real or synthetic.)
 - a. a German "crisis".
5. failure to actually hit the town on P.F.F.

All the above, except two, have already occurred in other higher priority operations. To involve as many as possible of these hindrances would necessitate giving this project over-riding priority over all other employment of the Strategic Air Forces. This is not contemplated, but to save our face we might be forced to do so at some most unfortunate juncture. Once the broadcast was out we would no longer be our own masters.

g. It is stated that this is not another attack on "morale". This news has apparently been discredited. Is, however the war, need this any more concrete than the will of the diep "morale" which has been pursued in Germany and the Balkans for so long? A hope of action by the population of these towns is indeed laid out, but what kind of action is visualized against controls which still appear unshaken, and which will only relax when the final disintegration is already in train from other causes?

II: The plan, apart from a questionable basis, seems to have some very real objections to it.

1- The Moral Issue. Hypocritically sometimes, fully unaccountably frequently, but yet some the less fundamentally rightly, America has represented in world thought an urge toward decency and better treatment of man by man. Japs may order our prisoners to be shot, but we do grin the shooting of theirs. Hot blood is one thing - reason and the long view is another. As Mr. Lovett stated very strongly the other day, silly as it may seem to some of us realists here, there is definite and very genuine concern in both the Senate, Congress, and the country about the intensity of indiscriminate area bombing, as such. He advised the utmost caution in any such programs and prophesied that there would be real trouble if such action became the announced programs of the U. S. Air Forces. I can think of no way to fan the embers of this fire quicker than by these announced attacks, the announcements being the cue sent for Lovett.

2- The Air Forces.

The doctrine on which our Air Forces have been built and trained, has been and will be a winner of wars, and a solid base for the future safety of America. A deviation from that doctrine for the dubious chance of obtaining the slight possibility of temporary advantage towards the end of a successful war is to my mind fundamentally unsound, and liable to be the opening wedge of a rift which might end anywhere.

3- Sound Planning.

Once embarked on this course the attendant publicity will force us to follow it through. In the necessity to make good our word quickly the P.F.P. idea will be discarded, and it will encroach on visual bombing. Then Crosscom will also not am. that will further cut into visual bombing. Other similar projects will appear, and we will be engulfed in a multiplicity of aims in which the one proven line of successful strategic bombing will be allowed to relax just at the moment when it is becoming decisive.

R. D. Maguire
Colonel
A.C.

July 5th 1944

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TYPES OF DAMS

Nationally Owned Harbors of Industry

1. Leuna, Merseburg
2. I. G. Farben, Ludwigshafen
3. I. G. Farben, Leverkusen
4. Hermann Goering Steel Works, Germany

Transportation Bottlenecks

1. Kiel Canal
2. Vier Jahresburg Ship Lift on Dortmund Ems Canal
3. Niederfinow Ship Lift Hohenzollern Canal

Selected Power and Transformer stations designed to deprive electricity from large segments of the population.

TYPES OF TARGETS

Nationally Famous Monuments of Industry

1. Leuna, Merseburg
2. I. G. Farben, Ludwigshafen
3. I. G. Farben, Leverkusen
4. Hermann Goering Steel Works, Germany

Transportation Bottlenecks

1. Kiel Canal
2. Herriehenburg Ship Lift on Dortmund and Canal
3. Niederfinow Ship Lift Hohenzollern Canal

Selected Power and Transformer stations designed to derive electricity from large segments of the population.

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Col. Williamson

FROM: Col. Taylor

1. I do not quite understand this deal. The Director of Intelligence forwards a plan which was evidently inspired by his deputy. Also attached, is a criticism of the plan by the Chief of his Target Section and finally a rebuttal to the criticism written by the deputy.

2. My comments on the plan are as follows:

a. This plan and variations of it have been circulating in AAF Headquarters in Washington for approximately two years but to my knowledge have never been approved.

b. General Arnold's position on this matter when I last heard it was very definitely that we would never win the war by trying to break the morale of the German people, and would win only by defeating the German military powers.

c. Germany controls the propaganda dished out to the German people much better than we are in a position to do. When it comes to propaganda, counter-propaganda and counter-counter-propaganda, we would be the losers. For example, the Germans could issue an announcement to the people of Cologne, such announcement purportedly coming from the Americans, that we had decided not to bomb Cologne and therefore all the inhabitants could continue to go safely about their business. This would result either in prohibiting our bombing of Cologne if we so desired, or in discrediting us with the people of Cologne as tricksters and liars if we proceeded to bomb Cologne.

d. This plan presents just another vehicle for carrying the U.S. Air Forces into the area (and civilian) bombing program, which we have fought against.

e. This program, if carried out, might be the greatest single diversion to the Combined Bomber Offensive yet submitted.

3. I recommend that the plan be filed with its predecessors.

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