

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 January 2008

To: ABD AL WAHAB, ABD AL MALIK

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABD AL WAHAB, ABD AL MALIK

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he attended a religious studies school in Sanaa, Yemen called al Farqan. While attending the school, the detainee heard scholar lecture about helping the Taliban's mission. The detainee stated he met with the speaker privately and asked if he should go to Afghanistan to help the Taliban. The speaker encouraged the detainee to go to Afghanistan and teach the Koran. The detainee stated he decided to travel to Afghanistan and take his pregnant wife with him.
 - 2) The Farqan Institute was a meeting and recruiting ground for jihadists, including former students who were USS COLE attack suspects.
 - 3) The detainee stated he left Yemen with his pregnant wife approximately June 2000 for Karachi, Pakistan and stayed in the home of Mohammed Iqbal. The detainee stated Mohammed Iqbal was a friend of his father.
 - 4) The detainee stated he was in Karachi, Pakistan for approximately two and a half months waiting for his wife to give birth. The detainee stated Mohammed Iqbal's son Ahmed attempted to recruit the detainee to fight with the Mujahedin in Kashmir, Pakistan. The detainee stated he told Ahmed Iqbal he would not fight, but he would accept the training, which would take place in Mirpur, Pakistan.

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- 5) The detainee stated Ahmed Iqbal then took him and his family to Quetta, Pakistan to a Taliban guest house. The detainee stated the man who ran the guest house then took the detainee and his family to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he and his family were taken to another Taliban guest house, then to another Taliban member's house. The detainee stated he and his family stayed in Kandahar, Afghanistan for approximately two months. The detainee stated he then went on to Kabul, Afghanistan while his family stayed behind at the Taliban member's house.
- 6) The detainee stated he arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed at a Taliban guest house. The detainee stated he stayed in Kabul for approximately four months. The detainee stated the man who ran the Taliban guest house acted as an interpreter when the detainee taught. The detainee stated he and the interpreter then went to Loghar, Afghanistan to teach the Koran for approximately two months. The detainee stated he and the interpreter then went to Khowst, Afghanistan to teach the Koran. The detainee stated the Americans started to bomb Afghanistan at this time, so he returned to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he returned to Khowst, Afghanistan after approximately 20 days to retrieve his property.
- 7) The detainee stated he was unable to return to Kandahar, Afghanistan because the Northern Alliance was in charge of the road. The detainee stated he was told he should travel to Pakistan. The detainee stated he met a guide who would take him to the border outside the city of Khowst, Afghanistan.
- 8) The detainee was one of Usama Bin Laden's bodyguards prior to al Qaida's flight from Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002.
- 9) The detainee was a bodyguard in Afghanistan in July 2000.
- 10) The detainee was identified as having been a bodyguard for Usama bin Ladin. The detainee was identified as having a close relationship with Usama bin Ladin since the detainee had been with him for a long time.
- 11) The detainee was one of six bodyguards who accompanied Usama bin Laden in the regions of Khowst, Tora Bora, or Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 12) The detainee was a guard in Tora Bora with Usama bin Laden. The detainee was in Kandahar, Afghanistan in late 1999 or 2000, and the detainee had been in Afghanistan prior to 1999.
- 13) The detainee was identified as always being at Usama bin Ladin's side.
- 14) The detainee swore bayyat.

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- 15) The detainee was one of seven individuals who had been ready to be martyrs for the Southeast Asia part of 11 September 2001 operation.
 - 16) The detainee wrote a letter dated 30 August 2000 addressed to Usama Bin Laden asking for permission to fight on the Kashmir front and for forgiveness if he has not lived up to expectations.
 - 17) The detainee was an al Qaida fighter and also worked in al Qaida guest houses and offices.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he traveled with Ahmed Iqbal from Karachi, Pakistan to Islamabad, Pakistan then on to Mirpur, Pakistan. The detainee stated they then walked to the training camp. The detainee stated the trainers of the camp were with the Pakistani Army. The detainee stated the training lasted for ten to thirteen days.
 - 2) The detainee stated he and fifteen others attended a two week aquatic operation training session on the border of Kashmir and Pakistan in August or September 2000. The detainee stated this session was to prepare jihadists to fight in Kashmir. The detainee stated the training session entailed the operation of boats, swimming, and under water and surface transportation of explosives and weapons.
 - 3) The detainee arrived at a training camp in Khaldan, Afghanistan in 1995 and stayed until 1996. The detainee received weapons, explosives, artillery, and machine-gun training. The detainee remained in Afghanistan following completion of training.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee was identified as having had a job at the Media Center which was run by a senior al Qaida operative.
 - 2) The detainee introduced Usama bin Laden to his fourth wife, who was from the same town as the detainee.
 - 3) The detainee arranged Usama bin Laden's marriage to a Yemeni bride.
- d) Intent
- 1) The detainee wrote a last will and testament in Jalalabad, Afghanistan on 24 September 2001. The detainee exhorts Muslims to fight for the cause of God and to remember the persecution of Muslims in places such as Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Indonesia, the

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Philippines, Burma and Tajikistan. The detainee also praises Usama Bin Laden's jihad against America and encourages support with their lives and money.

e) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee stated he traveled for eight days through the mountains from Khowst, Afghanistan toward Pakistan in the company of about 30 Arabs. The detainee stated each claimed to be studying the Koran in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was captured and detained in a Pakistani prison.
- 2) It was suggested to the detainee that the best thing he could do was to tell the United States forces that he was in Afghanistan to teach the Koran and for Dawa.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee stated Mohammed Iqbal's son Ahmed attempted to recruit him for the Mujahedin, but the detainee refused to join.
- b) The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to spread the word of God by teaching the Koran.
- c) The detainee denies any role in arranging a wedding for Usama Bin Laden.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 January 2008

To: ISMAIL, ALI HAMZA AHMED SULEIMAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAIL, ALI HAMZA AHMED SULEIMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a) Commitment

- 1) The detainee stated that while in Saudi Arabia, he was excited by lectures and books regarding the jihad in Afghanistan, which led the detainee to commit to joining the fight against the communists. The detainee met with an individual who had been in Afghanistan for the jihad against the communists. The detainee and the individual eventually traveled to Afghanistan together.
- 2) The detainee stated he returned to Afghanistan in 1999 to help the Taliban oust the Northern Alliance.
- 3) The detainee stated that in 1999 when he returned to Afghanistan, he met with a travel facilitator, in Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee gave his passport to the facilitator who in turn returned the passport to the detainee with a visa stamp for Pakistan. The facilitator gave the detainee a plane ticket from Yemen to Pakistan and 150 United States Dollars for travel expenses.
- 4) The detainee stated he departed Yemen for Karachi, Pakistan. Upon his arrival to Karachi, the detainee took a bus to Quetta, Pakistan per the facilitator's instructions. In Quetta, the detainee stayed at a Taliban guest house, which was also used as a medical center for the injured Taliban. The next day, the detainee took a bus to Kandahar, Afghanistan and went to a Taliban guest house. Per the facilitator's instructions, the

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detainee requested that he be taken to an Arab facility. The detainee was then taken to an al Qaida facility near the Kandahar airport.

- 5) The detainee stated he met personally with Usama bin Laden one night in 1999 after a week of training camp. During this meeting, the detainee swore he would fight and die for Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated that when asked by Usama bin Laden to do something, one does it to the best of one's ability without asking questions.
- 6) The detainee stating that during a conversation with Usama bin Laden in which the detainee pledged baayat to Usama bin Laden, the two discussed the state of the Islamic world, Palestine, and oppression by the United States. The detainee stated he extended his hand and Usama bin Laden grabbed it. The detainee told Usama bin Laden that he, the detainee, would be with Usama bin Laden in the cause of the Lord. Both the detainee and Usama bin Laden shared the same beliefs on all the topics they discussed during this meeting.
- 7) The detainee stated he joined al Qaida because he supported Usama bin Laden's jihad against the Jewish Crusade Alliance represented by America and Israel, and the desire to expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula.
- 8) The detainee stated he fought on the front lines near Kabul, Afghanistan, then agreed to help interview incoming al Qaida recruits.
- 9) The detainee stated he specifically remembers two Arabs that he interviewed and later recognized both Arabs as 11 September 2001 hijackers.
- 10) The detainee was identified as being in charge of procuring and distributing supplies such as clothing, food, ammunition, weapons, and passports. The detainee was also identified as a director of guesthouses in Kandahar, Kabul, and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 11) The detainee stated Usama bin Laden assigned the detainee to work in the media center. Although bin Laden paid the detainee, the detainee stated he was prepared to work for Usama bin Laden for nothing.
- 12) The detainee stated he was the "Computer Man" for Usama bin Laden and al Qaida, and was in charge of producing all media related propaganda, including Usama bin Laden's tapes and statements.
- 13) The detainee stated he created the video depicting the attack on the USS Cole. The video was made for release to the media and was intended for a worldwide audience.

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- 14) The detainee was identified as the director of the USS Cole video. The video was a propaganda ploy to recruit jihadist youths. The video was filmed primarily at al Farouq training camp.
 - 15) The al Farouq training camp provided a general program that consisted of a fundamental or basic course lasting 40 days. This course consisted of a basic review of relevant military topics. A different topic was covered each week, providing the trainee with fundamental military skills in light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography, and explosives.
 - 16) The detainee stated that after he produced the USS Cole video, Usama bin Laden gave the detainee his personal laptop computer.
 - 17) The detainee stated he started traveling with Usama bin Laden approximately two months after the bombing of the USS Cole.
 - 18) The detainee stated he voluntarily assisted the Taliban with computer programming issues.
 - 19) The detainee stated that after being in charge of the al Qaida Media Office, he agreed to be Usama bin Laden's Public Relations Secretary.
 - 20) The detainee stated he was with Usama bin Laden on 11 September 2001 and the following weeks. The detainee was never far from Usama bin Laden.
 - 21) The detainee was identified as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards and as the leader of a group of thirty Arab fighters who were apprehended together while attempting to cross into Pakistan.
 - 22) The detainee stated he was part of the al Qaida leadership, and stated he was part of Usama bin Laden's security detachment at one time.
 - 23) The detainee stated he would kill his own son if his son ever chose to leave the Muslim religion for another.
 - 24) The detainee stated Usama bin Laden was the detainee's leader and the detainee would continue following him.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he attended the Sadah Training Camp near Peshawar, Pakistan, where he trained on Kalashnikov rifles, various Russian machine guns, RPGs, anti-aircraft guns,

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basic infantry skills, and guerilla warfare.

- 2) The Sada training camp was mandatory training for all fighters entering Afghanistan to fight the Russians. The camp provided general training in special operations, tactics and weaponry.
 - 3) The detainee stated he attended an al Qaida training camp in Aynak, Afghanistan to receive basic and tactical training.
 - 4) The detainee stated he taught a number of military programs at the Mes Aynk training facility.
 - 5) The Aynak camp was identified as having been moved from Khowst, Afghanistan to Kabul, Afghanistan and subsequently its name was changed from Aynak to al Farouq.
 - 6) The detainee was identified as having been well trained at three well known al Qaida training camps. The detainee was also identified as having been in charge of creating false documents such as passports, visas, and Mujahedin videos.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he was recruited by a high ranking member of al Qaida.
 - 2) The detainee stated he attended the wedding of one of Usama bin Laden's sons to the daughter of another senior al Qaida leader.
 - 3) The detainee was identified as playing the role of Master of Ceremonies at weddings and celebrations.
 - 4) The detainee was known to have worked for a senior member of al Qaida.
 - 5) The detainee stated he traveled with Usama bin Laden's convoy.
 - 6) The detainee stated that while volunteering for a Taliban sponsored magazine, he befriended a high ranking Taliban official.
 - 7) The detainee stated he knew the four pilots from the 11 September 2001 attacks, as well as all others who were involved.
 - 8) The detainee stated he met a senior al Qaida leader on two different occasions.

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- d) Intent
 - 1) The detainee stated he would kill Americans at the first opportunity he had upon his release from prison.
 - 2) The detainee stated he vows to fight Americans and Jews to the last moment.
 - 3) The detainee stated he would kill a Jew if given the opportunity, in accordance with Usama bin Laden's 1998 fatwa.
 - e) Other Relevant Data
 - 1) The detainee was a jihadist in Afghanistan.
 - 2) The detainee stated he is a terrorist, an al Qaida member, and an enemy of America.
 - 3) The detainee stated it is legitimate to kill all Americans.
 - 4) Detainee justified the killing of innocent civilians on 11 September 2001.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he never took an oath to al Qaida.
 - b) A senior al Qaida operative attempted to recruit the detainee on three occasions, however, each time the detainee was not convinced because he did not believe in the killing of innocents, which al Qaida said were collateral damage. The detainee adamantly denied knowing any of the 11 September 2001 hijackers.
 - c) The detainee stated he does not know of any martyrdom missions, past or future, directed against the United States or its interests. The detainee does not condone these types of missions and he has never, and would not ever, consider participating in one.
 - e) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or its interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

09 January 2008

To: ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABU GHANIM, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee spent eight to nine months in a Saudi Arabian jail beginning in January 1988. The arrest stemmed from an attempt to smuggle Saggar Missiles in Saudi Arabia with al Qaida associates.
 - 2) The detainee stated he fought in the Yemeni Civil War during the mid-1990s where he trained on Kalashnikov rifles and learned basic combat skills.
 - 3) The detainee stated he was fighting in Yemen to please God.
 - 4) The detainee stated that in the mid-1990s, following the Yemeni civil war, he traveled via various means from Sanaa, Yemen to Bosnia via Syria, Turkey, and Croatia. The detainee stated that while in Bosnia, he learned basic infantry skills, trained using the Kalashnikov rifle, RPGs and the PK machine gun. The detainee stated he trained for less than a month while in Bosnia.
 - 5) The detainee stated he funded his travel to Bosnia from the sale of items obtained while fighting in the Yemeni civil war and traveled with his brother-in-law and others.

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- 6) The detainee stated that following training in Bosnia, he fought with the Mujahedin fighters in support of the Bosnian Army until the Dayton Peace Accords were signed on 14 December 1995, after which, the detainee returned to Yemen.
- 7) The detainee was arrested in Bayt Habra, Yemen for stealing Hertz rental cars and spent approximately eight months in a Yemen jail beginning in May 1999.
- 8) The detainee was identified as being arrested in Yemen for renting cars for the purpose of selling parts. The detainee was identified as not being involved in the operation, but was visiting the house that was raided.
- 9) The detainee stated he was recruited while in Sanaa, Yemen to work for the al Wafa Al Igatha Islamia humanitarian relief organization by an individual that later recruited the detainee to work for al Wafa in Kabul, Afghanistan. The recruiter paid for the detainee's travel expenses.
- 10) Al Wafa Al Igatha Islamia has been placed on the Terrorist Organization Exclusion List by the United States Secretary of State. Organizations may be placed on this list if they commit or incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, terrorist activity; prepare or plan a terrorist activity; gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provide material support to further terrorist activity.
- 11) When asked why the detainee previously stated he was a member of al Wafa, the detainee stated he had lied and that he had joined the Taliban, but not al Wafa.
- 12) The detainee stated that six months prior to Ramadan, which commenced on 15 November 2001, he left Yemen and traveled to Afghanistan. The detainee traveled by air from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan and then on to Afghanistan. The detainee stated an in-law of one of his sister's in-laws funded the detainee's travel because the in-law supports jihad and approves of the Taliban regime.
- 13) The detainee stated that after five to six years in Yemen, he traveled to Afghanistan in 2000 or 2001, prior to the United States invasion of Afghanistan, because Afghanistan was an Islamic state. While in Afghanistan, the detainee joined the Mujahedin fighters and fought under the Taliban against General Dostum's forces in the North.
- 14) The detainee was identified as being in Bosnia in 1995 and returning to Yemen in 1996. The detainee was identified as remaining in Yemen until after the USS COLE bombing in October 2000, then traveling to Afghanistan in February or March 2001 in order to avoid

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being arrested.

- 15) The detainee stated that after flying to Karachi, Pakistan, he traveled via various means to Kabul, Afghanistan via Quetta, Pakistan and via Buldak and Kandahar, Afghanistan. While in Kabul, the detainee stayed at a guest house for one day, obtained personal items, then traveled to the front lines.
 - 16) The detainee stated he went to the Duserag, Afghanistan frontline where he was given a weapon. After six to seven months, the detainee then traveled to another position called Garabal. The detainee stayed at Garabal, Afghanistan for eight months and lived in a mud home.
 - 17) The detainee stated he fought with the Taliban while in Afghanistan where he observed the United States bombing campaign in November of 2001.
 - 18) The detainee stated he stayed on the frontlines for one year and left the frontlines when the Americans started attacking.
 - 19) The detainee stated that after the Taliban fell, he went to a guest house belonging to someone he met on the frontlines and stayed for 20 days. The detainee then walked to the Pakistani border where he was captured with about 30 others.
 - 20) The detainee was identified as someone who used to come to the guest houses in Kandahar and Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee was normally seen with a specific group of five or six people, including Usama bin Laden and carried a Kalashnikov rifle. There was a connection between the detainee and Usama bin Laden that included detainee working for Usama bin Laden.
 - 21) The detainee was a body guard for Usama bin Laden.
 - 22) The detainee was a member of al Qaida's guardship.
 - 23) The detainee was identified as someone who joined the Guard Force circa August 2001 and may have gone to Tora Bora, Afghanistan with everyone.
- b) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he is related to an individual involved in the USS COLE attack.
 - 2) The detainee's brother-in-law was the ringleader of a group with ties to Usama bin Laden. The detainee's brother-in-law was arrested in 1999 in Yemen for conspiracy to

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commit terrorism. The group admitted that, although originally loyal to Usama bin Laden, their planned activities contravened a Usama bin Laden order that jihadist refrain from terrorist operations in Yemen, Pakistan, and Sudan.

- 3) The detainee stated he fought with an individual while in Bosnia and that the individual is currently in jail for his connection to the USS COLE bombing.
 - 4) Two individuals captured with the detainee were body guards of Usama bin Laden and three others were at the al Farouq training camp.
 - 5) The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
 - 6) The detainee stated if he returned to Yemen, some of Usama bin Laden's trusted individuals would approach him to inquire about his and others imprisonment with the Americans. The detainee stated he was sure he would be taken to, or put in contact with, Usama bin Laden.
 - 7) The detainee's name was listed on a document recovered from safe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida members in Karachi, Pakistan.
 - 8) The detainee was identified as a Usama Bin Laden security guard who was with Usama bin Laden between 11 September 2001 and 12 November 2001.
- c) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated he was aware of a future terrorist attack that involved the use of a lethal serum that causes death within six months. The detainee also stated that if he were free, no one would be able to stop him from doing what he wanted to do. The detainee stated that what he knows is so important and so dangerous, United States' intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation would never imagine it.
 - 2) The detainee stated his younger brother was killed in Afghanistan while fighting with the Taliban.
4. (U) The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he was not a part of any groups, governments or organizations, but that he was a holy warrior fighting under the banner of Allah.

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- b) The detainee denied ever meeting or even seeing Usama bin Laden and stated that he only knows of Usama bin Laden through the media.
 - c) The detainee stated he did not swear allegiance to anyone while in Afghanistan.
 - d) The detainee denied any involvement in the USS COLE attack.
 - e) The detainee stated he was arrested several times in Yemen because of the people with whom he associated. The detainee claimed he was innocent of any wrongdoing.
 - f) The detainee denied ever seeing or hearing Usama bin Laden.
 - g) The detainee stated, when asked about his previous statement that he was a member of al Wafa, that he only made that statement because he was being beaten.
 - h) The detainee stated he had never been to or heard of a training camp anywhere in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he received weapons training in Bosnia so he had no need to attend another in Afghanistan.
 - i) The detainee stated every time he speaks with a new group of investigators, it generates more confusion because some investigators misunderstand what he is trying to say. As an example, the detainee stated he never stated that al Qaida intended to inject a serum that would end someone's life after a few months, but rather he was talking about a United States capability. The detainee stated he would be willing to assist the United States Government find Usama bin Laden.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 January 2008

To: SHAHIN, MUHAMMAD IBN ARFHAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHAHIN, MUHAMMAD IBN ARFHAN

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3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he volunteered for three months in the war in Bosnia. The detainee worked at a hospital assisting the wounded and performing miscellaneous jobs.
 - 2) The detainee fought in Bosnia for eight months in a major operation.
 - 3) The detainee was named on a list associated with Mujahedin fighting in Bosnia.
 - 4) The detainee was a wanted fugitive for his involvement with a 1997 Bologna, Italy extremist cell that specialized in recruitment of individuals to form terrorist cells, logistical support to North African and European terrorist groups, harboring wanted criminals, document forgery, and counterfeit currency.
 - 5) The detainee admitted using counterfeit currency in Italy.
 - 6) The detainee was a wanted member of another known terrorist organization in Italy.
 - 7) The detainee stated that after reaching Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he decided to attend a known al Qaida training camp.

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- 8) The detainee was the deputy emir of the Tunisians at the al Qaida training camp.
 - 9) The detainee stated that while in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he lived in a guest house known to host Tunisians who wanted to receive training.
 - 10) The detainee stated he was in charge of day-to-day operations of the guest house. The Tunisian immigrants who lived at the house formed a network to train and fight against the Tunisian government.
 - 11) The detainee served as the point of contact between a senior al Qaida Lieutenant and the Tunisian group located in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 - 12) The detainee helped Afghani Mujahedin cross the border.
 - 13) The detainee was a founding member of a combatant group.
 - 14) The detainee's combatant group is designated a foreign terrorist organization and is associated with al Qaida and North African extremist groups.
 - 15) The detainee stated he considered himself to be the third or fourth person in the leadership hierarchy of the Tunisians in Afghanistan.
 - 16) The detainee stated he used his occupation as a taxi driver to obtain false travel documents for others.
 - 17) The detainee hosted three al Qaida personnel at his house while they made their way from Kabul, Afghanistan to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
 - 18) The detainee traveled to Tora Bora, Afghanistan to fight with al Qaida following the 11 September 2001 attacks.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee attended a known al Qaida training camp and received two months of military training that included the use of the Kalashnikov rifle and Makarov pistol.
 - 2) The detainee attended light weapons training at another known jihadist training camp.
 - 3) The detainee was identified as an assistant instructor for a tactics training course held for Arabs fighters. The course consisted of woodland and mountain tactics, small explosives, hand grenades and landmines, and first aid training.

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c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he ate and drank tea with a known al Qaida member on multiple occasions at a known al Qaida training camp.
- 2) The known al Qaida member was involved with the 11 September 2001 attacks.
- 3) The detainee stated he lived in his father-in-law's house along with several other Arabs. The group of Arabs included an Algerian that operated a terrorist group and had ties to al Qaida, the head director of a known jihadist training camp that concentrated on light arms and explosives training, and a man involved with the Taliban.
- 4) The detainee's father-in-law was sentenced to five years for recruiting Muslims for terrorist training in Afghanistan.
- 5) The detainee obtained false travel documents for a senior al Qaida lieutenant.

d) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee was arrested for having an illegal Afghan passport in his possession.
 - 2) The detainee stated he was a previously a violent person and once killed a man who owed him money. The detainee stated the man he killed was a tyrant, and that is what happens to tyrants. The detainee also stated tyrants are always toppled and that the United States would be no different.
 - 3) The detainee stated the detainees in Cuba will never forget the tyranny brought unto them by America. If they are released from Cuba, the detainees are going to get revenge for the time they spent there.
 - 4) The detainee stated he would kill President Bush if given the chance because President Bush is the cause of all problems for Muslims.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied that any of the men who lived with him at the Jalalabad, Afghanistan guest house worked at jihadist training camps or had any allegiance to Usama bin Laden or al Qaida.
 - b) The detainee stated the group he worked with in Jalalabad, Afghanistan did not have ties to al Qaida. The detainee denied pledging bayat to Usama bin Laden.

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- c) The detainee denied any role in document forgery or logistical support for any organization, either in Italy or in Pakistan. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of North Africans in Europe who are, or were, involved in logistical support for any terrorist organization.
 - d) The detainee was adamant about having nothing to do with al Qaida or the Taliban.
 - e) The detainee stated he had never been to training camps nor trained on weapons.
 - f) The detainee stated he did not have any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks, nor does he have knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or its interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 December 2007

To: AL-SABRI, MASHUR ABDULLAH MUQBIL AHMNAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SABRI, MASHUR ABDULLAH MUQBIL
AHMNAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated that in August 2000, an al Qaida/Taliban recruiter and travel facilitator, advised the detainee to travel to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
 - 2) The detainee stated he was influenced by a fatwa encouraging men to go to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. The detainee stated he was also told the Taliban would assist him in getting from Pakistan to Afghanistan because he was Arabic. The detainee stated that in the summer of 2000 he traveled to Afghanistan.
 - 3) The detainee stated a member of Jamat-al-Tabligh, helped the detainee get to Afghanistan by providing contacts, a plan and a route of travel.
 - 4) Preachers of Jamat-al-Tabligh support Islamic Terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
 - 5) The detainee stated he purchased a round-trip ticket on Tunisian Air and flew from Sanaa Yemen, through the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and arrived in Quetta, Pakistan. Once in Quetta, the detainee stated he took a taxi to the Taliban offices. The detainee

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stated he waited for two days in the Taliban offices before leaving to cross the border.

- 6) The detainee stated he paid for a taxi to drive him to the border at Boldak, Pakistan, then took a motorcycle across the border where he re-met the taxi. The detainee stated from the village of Boldak, another driver took the detainee to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to an Arab guest house called Habi Habbash House where he stayed for two weeks. While at the guest house, the detainee stated he made daily visits to an Islamic institute which was located across the street from the guest house.
- 7) The detainee stated he went to Jalalabad, Afghanistan via Kabul, Afghanistan. Once in Kabul, the detainee stayed in Kabul for two days in an Arab house. The house was a white two story home surrounded by a wall, run by a Saudi national.
- 8) The detainee stated that while in Kabul, Afghanistan, he stayed in an al Qaida safe house. The detainee stayed at the safe house on two occasions; the first time for two days and the second time for a week.
- 9) The detainee stated once he left Kabul, Afghanistan, he traveled to Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 10) The detainee stated he stayed in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, for one year. The detainee stated he lived with an associate of the detainee's Jamat-al-Tabiligh contact.
- 11) The detainee stated while living in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee was introduced to a small arms weapons dealer. After five months, the detainee stated he bought a pistol from the dealer.
- 12) In May 2001, the detainee was identified as working at the al Nebras and Hajji Habbash guest houses. The detainee was identified as helping new arrivals (fighters) travel from the Hajji Habbash guest house to the airport and/or to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee was identified as facilitating local travel for the fighters by helping them locate cabs. The detainee also assisted by making reservations for auto or air transportation and identified weapons and weapons dealers for those interested in purchasing them.
- 13) The al Nibras guest house was for new people who were being sent to training camps. The al Nibras guest house was kept in tight control. The Hajji Habbish house was for everyone, new or old, coming to or leaving Afghanistan. Most Arabs who stayed in the Hajji Habbish house were Yemeni.
- 14) The detainee was identified at the al Nebras guest house, carrying messages and moving people around town. The detainee was said to be a permanent resident of the al Nibras

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guest house with his own room. The detainee was identified as being able to travel anywhere without papers.

- 15) The detainee stated he went to the second line of defense near Bagram, Afghanistan in May 2001. He stated he went there to support the Taliban, who were positioned to fight Northern Alliance Troops.
- 16) The detainee was identified as working for Usama bin Laden. The detainee was identified as performing administrative and organizational duties, signing in new recruits and facilitating their moves to the front lines. The detainee was identified wearing a traditional Afghan uniform and appeared to be one of the bosses.
- 17) The detainee was identified as someone who swore Bayat to Usama bin Laden because he and the people around him knew Usama bin Laden's travel dates and routes.
- 18) The detainee was identified as living at the Usama bin Laden compound and staying in the al Qaida guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 19) The detainee was seen in Afghanistan in mid and late 2000, and early 2001 at the airport village and the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 20) A source indicated that it was well known that individuals associated with the Kandahar Airport were automatically associated with being a member of Usama bin Laden's group. A source indicated that it was certain that those who spoke about going to the Kandahar Airport were linked to al Qaida.
- 21) The detainee was identified as someone who was a member of al Qaida because he followed Usama bin Laden's orders to keep the guest house up and running. The detainee was identified as facilitating the transfer of weapons and other supplies to the frontlines. He was also identified as someone who transferred approximately 20,000 United States Dollars to the airport around September 2001.
- 22) In September 2001, the detainee was identified as arriving in Tora Bora, Afghanistan with another GTMO detainee. Further, the detainee was identified as wearing a commonly issued military vest and carrying a Kalashnikov rifle in his hands while at Tora Bora. The detainee was identified as someone who accompanied Usama bin Laden because when Usama bin Laden returned to Tora Bora the detainee would return at the same time.

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- 23) The detainee was identified as returning to the Hajji Habbash guest house from Tora Bora, Afghanistan, accompanied by Usama bin Laden.
 - 24) The detainee stated that in late 2001, he traveled to Bagram, Afghanistan to assist Taliban fighters in their efforts against the Northern Alliance fighters. The detainee stated he lived in Kabul, Afghanistan, at the guest house of a Taliban fighter who had been in charge of a defensive fighting line outside of Bagram. The detainee stated he spent a week in the fighting line. The detainee stated he returned to Kabul and stayed at the Taliban fighter's guest house.
 - 25) The detainee was a Yemeni jihadist with a Yemeni Passport and was in Afghanistan in late December 2001.
 - 26) The detainee was in Afghanistan as of 15 December 2001.
 - 27) Once the United States military action began in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee stated he was driven to the Pakistan border. The detainee remained in a border town for a month.
 - 28) The detainee stated he left Jalalabad, Afghanistan, after the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan and headed for Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee stated his Afghan guide told him the detainee would be arrested at the border and suggested the detainee turn himself in rather than be arrested. The detainee turned himself in at the border.
 - 29) The detainee was identified as someone involved in the transport of large sums of money around Afghanistan. The detainee was identified as going to give money to Usama Bin Laden in Afghanistan but was not able to complete the mission because the war had started.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated that during the summer of 1998, he went to Taiz, Yemen, and stayed with his maternal uncle for approximately five months. The detainee stated that during this time, his paternal uncle taught the detainee about weaponry. The detainee was taught to fire the Kalashnikov rifle and a pistol.
 - 2) The detainee stated he had no prior military service.
 - 3) The detainee was identified as completing the anti-aircraft missiles training program in July 2001.

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c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated that in the winter of 1998, Saudi authorities came to the detainee's residence and arrested an individual who was staying with the detainee. The detainee stated he was also arrested for harboring a fugitive. The detainee was deported to Sanaa, Yemen.
- 2) The detainee stated that in the spring of 1999, he rented a one story house in the Sina District of Taiz, Yemen. The detainee stated he paid rent using 7,000 Saudi Riyals. The detainee stated he obtained the money using his savings and money wired to him by his family.
- 3) After moving to Taiz, Yemen, the detainee stated he started a business trading honey. The detainee stated a Saudi man he met at a local mosque gave him the idea to sell honey. The detainee stated he, along with nine other men, rented rooms in a five-bedroom house. The detainee stated one of the men was Hassan al-Khamari.
- 4) The detainee stated an acquaintance from the mosque, who had fought with the Taliban for two years, recommended the detainee go to Afghanistan.
- 5) The detainee stated that the same acquaintance had traveled to Afghanistan for military training and fought for the Taliban. The detainee stated he became interested in this discussion and inquired about receiving military training.
- 6) The detainee stated that when he returned to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, via Kabul, Afghanistan, he was informed his friend, Hassan al Khamri, had been killed while bombing the USS Cole.
- 7) The detainee was identified as a member of a group involved in the USS Cole bombing. The group conducted surveillance and prepared the explosives for the USS Cole bombing.
- 8) The detainee stated that he left Taiz, Yemen, and went to Sanaa, Yemen. The detainee stated his father told the detainee to stay with a family friend. While the detainee stayed in the Gat al Yahoud District of Sanaa with this family friend, two individuals came to visit. The detainee stated that four days after the two individuals came to visit, Sanaa police raided the house arrested the detainee and the residents.

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- 9) The detainee and the other occupants of the house were identified as members of al Qaida.
 - 10) The detainee stated the individuals who were visiting the house, were involved in a car theft ring. The detainee stated this is what led to the raid and the detainee's subsequent arrest. After being held for nine months, the detainee stated he was released from jail and returned to his paternal uncle's residence, in Taiz, Yemen. The detainee stated he remained at his uncle's house for one week before returning to Sanaa, Yemen.
 - 11) The detainee stated the car theft ring involved stealing and selling vehicles in Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated the proceeds were then used to purchase weapons. The detainee stated the goal was to free an incarcerated individual who was being held by Yemeni officials for killing four German tourists. The detainee stated the original plan was to kidnap the German tourists to use them as leverage in order to free an imprisoned Sheikh.
 - 12) The detainee stated that while in Quetta, Pakistan, he stayed at the Daftar al Taliban.
 - 13) Daftar Taliban is a Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan, helping Arabs cross the border into Afghanistan by coordinating travel and lodging for a fee. Taliban office advises Arabs to stay at houses in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan, during travel.
 - 14) The detainee was identified as working at the Haji Habish guest house.
 - 15) The detainee was identified as staying at the al Ansar guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan in early 2001. This guest house was close to the Haji Habash Mosque, near an old Afghani Army base. The detainee was identified as being at the al Ansar guest house for a few days.
 - 16) The al Ansar Mudafa, or guest house, in Kandahar, Afghanistan was a waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning to and from local training camps in the Kandahar area.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated that in January 2000, while attending court appearances for a friend, the detainee convinced a security officer to allow his friend to use the detainee's cell phone to make phone calls from prison. The detainee stated he was arrested for suspicion of providing the cell phone to further terrorist operations. The detainee stated he denied the allegation and was imprisoned for three days prior to being released. The detainee stated he returned to Taiz, Yemen, and stayed with his uncle.

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- 2) The detainee stated that while he was in Afghanistan, he was always armed. The detainee stated he purchased a Russian Makrof sawed off pistol while in Jalalabad, Afghanistan two to three months prior to the 11 September 2001, attacks against the United States.
 - 3) The detainee was transferred to United States Forces control on 5 January 2002.
 - 4) The detainee was identified as being called Mashoor, meaning famous, because he was in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for a long time and was well known and respected.
 - 5) The detainee was identified on a list of 324 Arabic names, aliases, and nationalities recovered during a raid from an al Qaida safe house located in Karachi, Pakistan.
 - 6) The detainee stated he did not know anybody involved in terrorist activities against the United States. When asked about the USS Cole, the detainee initially made a statement to the effect of, what about it and attempted to rationalize that the individuals involved did nothing wrong.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he did not receive terrorist training and did not attend a terrorist training camp.
 - b) The detainee stated he was approached about joining al Qaida, but refused the offer because he does not believe in jihad.
 - c) The detainee stated he was not involved or connected to al Qaida and terrorist activities.
 - d) The detainee stated he was not aware that the car theft ring in Saudi Arabia was for the purpose of orchestrating a terrorist operation to facilitate the release of a person who had been sentenced to death for the murder of four tourists. The detainee stated he knew nothing about that.
 - e) The detainee stated he was shocked when he heard the news regarding Hassan al Khamiri's involvement in the USS Cole bombing. The detainee stated he thought it was wrong for al Khamiri to bomb the USS Cole.
 - f) With regard to the USS Cole, the detainee stated he was not involved in that attack or any other terrorist attack.

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- g) The detainee stated he would like to get married when he leaves Guantanamo Bay. The detainee stated he is willing to go back to Yemen or any other country upon release.
 - h) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to find a wife and denied going to escape any involvement with the planning of the attack on the USS Cole.
 - i) The detainee stated he did not know who the Northern Alliance was, and did not care to know. The detainee swore that he did not know them and has heard of them since he has been in prison.
 - j) When asked why he went to fight in Afghanistan, the detainee stated he did not fight anyone in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to see what it was all about. The detainee stated he heard a lot about the pure Islamic government there and the safety of Afghanistan.
 - k) The detainee stated when he turned himself in at the border he had hoped he would have been allowed to return to Yemen.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 December 2007

To: AL MARI, JARALAH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARI, JARALAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) In July 1993, the detainee stated his father suggested he consider learning English in the United States or England. Two of the detainee's brothers studied in the United States.
 - 2) The detainee stated his brother attended college in the United States for four to five years although he claimed not to remember the location or name of the college. The detainee stated he asked his brother many questions about going to the United States, and that his brother encouraged him to go to the United States.
 - 3) The detainee stated he had difficulty with the language program, so he left the United States for good on 11 November 1994.
 - 4) The detainee stated that shortly after his family sold the family business, his wife left him for two weeks due to his excessive alcohol consumption. Ashamed, the detainee decided to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia to become a better Muslim.
 - 5) The detainee traveled alone to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in late July or early August of 2001. The detainee attended a mosque in Mecca and attended a several day course on Islam. At the mosque the detainee met an individual with whom he spent several hours a day together over a period of a week discussing Islam and the jihad in Afghanistan. The

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individual described the jihad to the detainee as non-Muslims killing Muslims. This individual introduced the detainee to another individual who would be the detainee's point of contact to make the jihad to Afghanistan.

- 6) The detainee was instructed to say he was associated with Jamat-al-Tabligh, throughout his travels. The detainee stated, by doing so, his travel across borders would not be questioned.
- 7) Jamat-al-Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
- 8) In September 2001, the detainee flew from Doha, Qatar, to Karachi, Pakistan, on Qatar Airlines and stayed at a hotel.
- 9) From Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee flew to Quetta, Pakistan with three or four other Arab males on the plane but was told not to acknowledge them or act like he knew them.
- 10) Upon arrival in Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee was directed toward two vehicles. The detainee was transported with five other individuals in a pickup truck with a cover over the bed to a mudaffa.
- 11) The detainee stayed in a small building on the grounds of a mudaffa in Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee was told there were other individuals staying in a larger house on the grounds of the mudaffa, and that these individuals were Taliban.
- 12) While at the mudaffa, the detainee stated he walked into a room with a television set and VCR and saw a videotape of very poor quality playing. The detainee was told the tape was about the USS Cole. The detainee watched about five minutes of the tape, and stated he saw footage of men chanting about Palestine and children throwing rocks.
- 13) The detainee stated the group he was traveling with was told to leave their money and passports before departing from the mudaffa. The detainee stated that four cars transported the group three to four hours to the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. At the border, the detainee exited the car to travel on motorcycle around the border checkpoint. On the other side of the border, the detainee met the car and driver in Buldak, Afghanistan, and received back their passports and money.
- 14) In Buldak, Afghanistan, an Afghani taxi driver then drove the detainee four or five hours to a mudaffa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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- 15) The detainee stated he stayed with three other individuals at a mudaffa in Kabul, Afghanistan, called Azam.
 - 16) This mudaffa was a transition point for Arabs going to or from the frontlines or training camps and received funding from both al Qaida and Taliban sources.
- b) Training
- 1) In September 2001, two buses picked up the detainee and approximately 35 people from the mudaffa in Kandahar, Afghanistan, to travel to the al Farouq Camp. The buses dropped the group off in the afternoon and they began to walk towards the al Farouq Camp. The group stopped and stayed in the area of al Farouq Camp set aside for new arrivals.
 - 2) The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.
 - 3) In September 2001, while the detainee was at al Farouq, Usama bin Laden visited the camp to deliver a speech. Usama bin Laden celebrated the attacks on the United States and encouraged trainees to continue on with the jihad.
 - 4) The detainee stated he saw a couple of people who walked confidently through the camp and believes those individuals may have been members of al Qaida. The detainee knows of no one else who either was or may have been members of al Qaida. The detainee stated he did not hear of a group by the name al Qaida until after his capture. Al Qaida, along with all of the fighters and trainees, were called Mujahedin. The detainee did not see or hear of anyone being recruited or selected for the group now known to him as al Qaida.
 - 5) The detainee was identified by photograph as having attended the al Farouq training camp in April, 2001. The detainee had left for the Murad Beg training camp in March, 2001.
 - 6) The Murad Beg training camp was between Kabul and near the Bagram airport in Afghanistan. Arab Mujahedin took over the village of Murad Beg and used it for training in urban warfare and advanced tactics. It was also used to provide Mujahedin presence near the Bagram lines in Afghanistan.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated his recruiters for jihad in Afghanistan may be members of al Qaida.

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- 2) The detainee stated that while at a mudaffa he heard about Usama bin Laden and al Qaida, which was described as a group of people who made it possible for others to go on jihad.
- 3) The detainee stated he did not learn that al Farouq was a training camp owned by Usama bin Laden until he arrived at the camp.
- 4) The detainee later stated, he first learned that al Farouq was owned by Usama bin Laden while staying at the guest house. This was prior to arriving at al Farouq.
- 5) The detainee stated he lived with his brother in their father's house with their respective families after November 1994.
- 6) The detainee's brother was identified as returning from fifteen to nineteen months of training as a fighter in Usama bin Laden's camps in Afghanistan in February 1996. His brother was described as being dressed in a long, white caftan, and had a long full beard.
- 7) The detainee stated in 1995, he sent money to his brother in Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated he deposited approximately 3,000 United States Dollars into his brother's account. The detainee stated he had done this on at least three or more occasions.
- 8) An al-Qaida operative was sent to the United States as a sleeper shortly before the 11 September 2001 attacks, who is the detainee's brother.
- 9) The detainee's brother was to serve as al Qaida's point of contact in settling other operatives in the United States in preparation for follow-on operations to the 11 September 2001 attacks.
- 10) There was no further contact with the detainee's brother after 11 September, and the detainee went to Kandahar, Afghanistan just before the city fell. At this time, the detainee was given a letter to present to a senior al Qaida Facilitator that requested 10,000 United States Dollars be sent to the detainee's brother in the United States.
- 11) The senior al Qaida Facilitator worked with senior al Qaida leaders to bribe officials, forge documents, and provide visas, money, and airline tickets for people traveling to Afghanistan.
- 12) Contact was lost with the detainee's brother after his arrival in the United States and an al-Qaida operative had hoped to reestablish contact with the detainee's brother through the detainee.

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- 13) The detainee had come to Afghanistan to fight against the United States alongside the rest of the Mujahedin.
 - 14) The detainee was to try and contact his brother in the United States.
 - 15) The detainee was to be a future conduit to the detainee's brother in the United States.
 - 16) The detainee was detained at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border sometime in October or November 2001 as he was attempting to leave Afghanistan.
 - 17) The detainee's brother re-entered the United States on 10 September 2001 in order to enroll in a graduate program at Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft confirmed that the detainee's brother was an operative sent by al Qaida to facilitate another wave of terrorist attacks on Americans.
 - 18) On 22 May 2003, the detainee's brother was charged by a federal grand jury in Peoria, Illinois, with making false statements to FBI agents during the investigation of 11 September 2001. The indictment alleges that the detainee's brother lied to agents about calling Mustafa Ahmed al Hawasawi, a named un-indicted co-conspirator in the indictment charging Zacharias Moussaoui with crimes relating to the 11th September 2001 attacks.
- d) Intent
- 1) Through discussions with his recruiters the detainee stated he understood that his activities in Afghanistan would include attending training camp, fighting and killing the people who were killing Muslims.
- e) Other Relevant Data
- 1) While fleeing Afghanistan, the detainee's bus was stopped at a checkpoint on a mountain between Chamin and Quetta, Pakistan. A guard boarded the bus and saw the detainee, who did not answer when the guard asked if he was Arabian. The guard escorted the detainee off the bus to a camp for soldiers. The detainee's passport and tickets were taken from him at the camp.
 - 2) The detainee was taken to the jail in Chamin, Pakistan, with four other Arab males.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARI, JARALAH

- a) The detainee stated he had no knowledge of his brother being involved with any members of al Qaida or the Taliban. The detainee also denied knowledge of his brother being involved with anyone who had assisted in the 11 September 2001, attacks on the United States.
 - b) The detainee denied ever sending money to his brother or anyone in the United States.
 - c) The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan to perform jihad, but claims he was misled. The detainee learned after his arrival in Afghanistan that the Taliban were not as good as he was told.
 - d) The detainee stated he had second thoughts and wanted to return to Qatar after learning al Farouq was owned by Usama bin Laden.
 - e) While at al Farouq, the detainee became sick and wanted to leave the camp and return home. The detainee stated he wanted to leave before the bombing began. The detainee stated he missed his wife and children.
 - f) The detainee stated he knows of no one who was or may have been members of al Qaida, and did not hear of a group by the name of al Qaida until after his capture.
 - h) The detainee was not an al Qaida member nor was he aware of his brother's activities in the United States.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 December 2007

To: AL AZANI, SAAD MASIR MUKBL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AZANI, SAAD MASIR MUKBL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee traveled to Pakistan as a way of getting to Afghanistan for jihad. Later in the same interview the detainee stated his reason for going to Afghanistan was to recruit people to Islam through the Jamat-al-Tabligh.
 - 2) The Jamat-al-Tabligh organization has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
 - 3) The detainee admitted to being a member of the Jamat-al-Tabligh.
 - 4) The detainee was identified as being selected to carry out certain operations or perform certain business matters for the Jamat-al-Tabligh.
 - 5) The detainee lived and studied for two years at a college in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee studied science and advanced education and his tuition was paid by some teachers of the college.
 - 6) The detainee studied at the Institute of Islamic Studies

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL AZANI, SAAD MASIR MUKBL

- 7) The Islamic Institute was financed by Usama bin Laden. The detainee was identified as having forwarded money to the Islamic Institute.
 - 8) The detainee attended a gathering where Usama bin Laden gave a speech at an institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- b) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee received assistance obtaining a temporary lodging in Karachi, Pakistan, a passport and visa to Yemen.
 - 2) The detainee and others fled the Institute of Islamic Studies in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The group traveled by car to Khowst, Afghanistan where they slept in a tent in the valley for approximately 15 days.
 - 3) One of the detainee's aliases and passport information was found on a document listing names, aliases, and nationalities recovered from a suspected al Qaida safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
- c) Other Relevant Data
- 1) Pakistani police raided a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan on 7 February 2002 and captured the detainee and other individuals.
 - 2) A search of the safe house in Karachi, Pakistan uncovered two aircraft passenger personal flotation devices complete with carbon dioxide inflation cartridges.
 - 3) An initial analysis of the two life vests and backpack tested positive for Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate. Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate is one of the most powerful explosives used in blasting caps and core explosive materials.
 - 4) The detainee stated that he is a Tabliri, a Yemeni sect of Islam, and as such, must spend four months of his lifetime devoted to the Tabliri.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee claims he has no military service or experience.
 - b) The detainee is not aware of any individuals who have received training to conduct terrorist operations and who may have been dispatched to carry out unspecified attacks.

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- c) The detainee does not have knowledge of any potential operatives who may be involved in terrorist activities against the United States or Western interests.
- d) The detainee does not like Usama bin Laden or terrorism. The detainee has never been approached by anyone seeking assistance or money for terrorist related activities. The detainee has not observed anyone preparing to conduct terrorist acts.
- e) The detainee denied ever seeing Usama bin Laden at the Institute of Islamic Studies.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 January 2008

To: MUHAMMED, ZAMIR

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ZAMIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he left Khartoum, Sudan, in 1994 via Kenyan Airlines and flew to New Delhi, India, with a transit stop in Kenya. The detainee then traveled by train to Lahore, Pakistan. From Lahore, the detainee traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, and then on to Afghanistan.
 - 2) The detainee stated he served as a weapons trainer at Camp Khalden in Afghanistan for approximately six to seven months in 1997. The detainee trained approximately 50 to 70 people on the following weapons: PKs, Kalashnikov rifles, RPGs, RPKs, mortars and artillery. Instruction from the detainee included assembly and disassembly of weapons, operations of the weapons and controlling fields of fire.
 - 3) The detainee was a weapons instructor at Khalden Training Camp.
 - 4) Khalden Camp included instruction on the Kalashnikov rifle, the American M16; German G13; and, the Israeli light and heavy Uzi. The trainees at Khalden Camp also took special courses: explosives; topography; tactical; and, first aid.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ZAMIR

- 5) The detainee was an al-Qaida operative who provided terrorist training in Afghanistan.
 - 6) The detainee worked for an al Qaida operative at Khalden Camp from 1993 until the camp closed. The detainee was a camp instructor, but because the detainee was good with people, the detainee was frequently left in charge of Khalden Camp because the detainee could handle all aspects of the camp, including managing money, people, course scheduling, and instruction.
 - 7) The same al Qaida operative trained numerous al Qaida personnel at Khalden Camp who in turn were either involved in or may become involved in al Qaida terrorist attacks.
 - 8) The detainee arrived in Afghanistan in late 1998/early 1999 and was assigned to participate in al Qaida-planned attacks against unnamed United States military bases in Khobar and/or Dhahran.
 - 9) The detainee ran Khalden Training Camp in the absence of the senior al Qaida operative.
 - 10) The detainee was one of three veteran trainers at Khalden Camp in Afghanistan in 1998 who received a two-month training course on electronic firing devices. The training included: electrical theory and basic electronic circuitry; simple remote control firing devices; timers; and, photocell firing devices. The detainee was expected to train other Mujahedin on electronics after the course.
 - 11) The detainee was an instructor and the head of Khalden Training Camp.
 - 12) The detainee stated he was the 70th Taliban commander.
 - 13) The detainee was a trainer at Khalden Training Camp.
 - 14) The detainee stated he was captured in a safe house operated by an al Qaida facilitator.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he arrived at Khalden Camp in 1994. The detainee received instruction on: the Kalashnikov rifle; PK machine gun; 75 and 82 mm heavy artillery; SPG-9 anti-tank weapon; 82 mm mortar; Zukair anti-aircraft weapon; RPG launcher; and, mountain warfare. The detainee stated he trained hundreds of recruits on the use of small arms and artillery from 1994 until 1999.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ZAMIR

- 2) The detainee trained on SAM-7s as well as having trained at al Farouq Camp, which included instruction on weapons, handguns, artillery and explosives.
 - 3) The training in the al Farouq camp took 45 days, and was a basic training course. The training involved a preparation course that covered all types of topics, such as weapons, topography, field guns, first aid and explosives.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he attended a meeting with several individuals, where he learned the Taliban government would formally deactivate Camp Khalden in July 2000.
 - 2) The detainee stated he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, after the Khalden Camp closed in 1999. During his stay there, the detainee met Ayman al Zawahiri and another senior al Qaida facilitator. The detainee stated he met al Zawahiri once, but had frequent contact with the al Qaida facilitator.
 - 3) A senior, trusted associate of Usama bin Laden stated Ayman al Zawahiri is one of bin Laden's closest al Qaida associates. The trusted associate also stated Zawahiri is the Emir of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and a constant companion to Usama bin Laden.
 - 4) The detainee stayed in a senior al Qaida leader's guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2000. The detainee and the senior al Qaida leader became close associates.
 - 5) The detainee stated he met Usama bin Laden and Abu Atta while at the Jihad Wali Camp.
 - 6) Abu Hafs al Masri is a high-ranking individual in Usama bin Laden's organization.
 - 7) The detainee stated that he was at Zubayda's house when he was captured on 24 March 2002.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee's skill in electronics was average and the detainee had difficulty making a circuit when given a schematic, but could probably make a device given enough time. The detainee was not able to train others in electronics.
 - 2) The detainee was a Sudanese who used to work among Usama bin Laden's guards and was important within al Qaida.
 - 3) The detainee had no connection with previous operations and his relationship with al-Qaida was limited. When Khalden Training Camp closed, the detainee became sad and

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUHAMMED, ZAMIR

angry with al-Qaida.

- 4) The detainee stated the purpose of Camp Khalden was not to train al Qaida, but to train the normal Muslim for future jihad. The detainee also stated it is every Muslim's duty to train for future jihad and that there is no jihad happening today.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he felt as if he was being accused of al Qaida and he is not a member of al Qaida and has no knowledge of al Qaida's operations.
 - b) The detainee stated he never swore allegiance to al Qaida, the Taliban, Usama bin Laden, or any other individuals or groups.
 - c) The detainee stated he is not a fighter and does not believe in fighting. The detainee also stated he does not agree with the fatwa issued by Usama bin Laden calling for violence against America.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 December 2007

To: MADNI, HAFES QARI MOHAMMED SAAD IQBAL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MADNI, HAFES QARI MOHAMMED SAAD IQBAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he traveled to Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Afghanistan and many times to Pakistan.
 - 2) The detainee stated he was the General Secretary of the Sipah-e-Islam Pakistan (SIP). The SIP was set up in 1994 by Sunni university students, as a mirror of the group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The detainee explained the SSP was an anti-Shia group which had been established to counter the Iranian revolution. The SIP was supported by the SSP and members of the SSP had dual membership in the SIP. The detainee claimed the SSP assassinated the Iranian Ambassador to Pakistan in the early 1990s.
 - 3) The Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian group that follows the Deobandi School. Violently anti-Shi'a, the SSP emerged in central Punjab in the mid-1980s as a response to the Iranian Revolution. The group's activities range from organizing political rallies calling for Shi'as to be declared non-Muslims to assassinating prominent Shi'a leaders
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MADNI, HAFES QARI MOHAMMED SAAD IQBAL

- a) The detainee stated that he did not want to return to Pakistan because he would be labeled a terrorist.
 - b) The detainee stated that with regard to his relationship to a known jihadist, he made a mistake when he got involved with bad people at a young age.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

07 December 2007

To: SA'ID, SA'ID SALIH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SA'ID, SA'ID SALIH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he was recruited by his neighbor to travel to Afghanistan for basic training and that his neighbor paid for the detainee's travel to Afghanistan.
 - 2) The recruiter is a Yemeni jihadist believed to have been in Afghanistan.
 - 3) The detainee stated he traveled from Yemen, to United Arab Emirates, to Pakistan and onto Afghanistan in June 2001. The detainee stayed at the Nebras guest while in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 4) The detainee fought north of Kabul, Afghanistan under the leadership of a senior al Qaida operative.
 - b) Training
 - 1) The detainee stated he was at the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan from July 2001 until September 2001 and was trained in the use of the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades, land mines, composition-3, and composition-4 explosives.

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UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SA'ID, SA'ID SALIH

- 2) The detainee stated he received weapons training, including the Kalashnikov, pistol and grenades. The detainee was shown dynamite but was not trained in the use of any explosives. The detainee also received training in reading maps.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated that while he was at the al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan, Usama bin Laden appeared at the camp on two separate occasions.
 - 2) The detainee stated after the 9/11 attacks on America, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and was told by some al Qaida members to guard the Kandahar airport.
 - 3) The detainee stated he guarded a big, one-story building next to the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan which belonged to Usama bin Laden.
 - 4) The detainee stated he knew the group leader for about ten people at the airport area in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the detainee was a guard from September 2001 until November 2001.
 - 5) The individual who the detainee knew as the group leader at the airport was a veteran Afghan fighter who was the head of a Kabul, Afghanistan guest house called Khan Ghulam Bashah.
 - 6) The detainee stated he was at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport until mid-November 2001. The detainee then returned to Karachi, Pakistan and stayed at three different houses for approximately one month, and then moved in with a member of al Qaida.
 - 7) The detainee stated a senior al Qaida operative gave him 1,000 United States Dollars for travel expenses to get back to Yemen.
 - 8) The detainee was one of six individuals living in a Karachi safe house with a senior al Qaida operative.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated Usama bin Laden gave a speech in August 2001 at the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan and talked about the jihad, fighting America, possible attacks on America, the USS COLE, and the embassies in Africa.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SA'ID, SA'ID SALIH

- 2) The detainee stated he was assigned to guard an airport located thirty minutes south of Kandahar on the road to Spin Buldak, Afghanistan.
 - 3) The detainee stated after withdrawing from the airport south of Kandahar, Afghanistan because of the United States bombing, he traveled to a valley between Zurmut and Khowst, Afghanistan. He stayed in the caves for a period of approximately ten days, during which time food was provided by the Taliban.
 - 4) Pakistani Police raided three suspected al Qaida residences in Karachi, Pakistan in September 2002. The detainee and several other Arabs resisted and fought a two and a half hour firefight. The detainee was one of the individuals captured.
 - 5) On the September 2002 raid on al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan, an undated letter from a senior al Qaida operative to another senior al Qaida operative was found.
 - 6) On the September 2002 raid on al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan, passports belonging to Usama bin Laden's family were found.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001, attacks on America.
 - b) The detainee stated he would never kill innocent women and children in the United States because it is against his religion. The detainee stated those who kill innocents should be killed. The detainee stated he would not harm an American if he happened to see one in Yemen.
 - c) The detainee stated he was never in a firefight.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 December 2007

To: PARACHA, SAIFULLAH A

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PARACHA, SAIFULLAH A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated a senior al Qaida operative was present when he received the \$500,000 United States dollars. The detainee stated he used the \$500,000 United States dollars to restore his credit rating. The detainee stated the al Qaida operative contacted him approximately six months later and requested the money back.
 - 2) The detainee stated he made a third visit to Afghanistan in the Fall of 2000. The detainee stated he met Usama bin Laden for the second time in the area of Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 3) The detainee's video broadcasting facility was used by a senior al Qaida operative in early 2002 to make a film of an individual discussing his experience at Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The video was passed to al Jazeera, the news channel.
 - 4) The detainee discussed a plan with al Qaida operatives for al Qaida to use the detainee's textile business to smuggle explosives into the United States. The plan involved shipping explosives in containers the detainee used to ship clothes he sold in the United States. The detainee agreed to this plan.
 - 5) The plan was to use the detainee's textile business as a cover to ship explosives, specifically C-4, to the United States. The explosives would have been concealed in

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PARACHA, SAIFULLAH A

standard 20 or 40 foot shipping containers.

- 6) The detainee was involved in a plan to open an import/export business in the United States and use it as a front to ship explosives. The plan involved an import/export business in Karachi, Pakistan and another one located in the United States, with an al Qaida operative managing the store. The detainee would assist setting up the store. The plan included shipping explosives from the company in Karachi, Pakistan to the United States location. The plan was to blow up several gas stations simultaneously.
 - 7) The detainee believed he could obtain chemicals from the Chinese. The chemicals were believed to be chemical or biological agents that could be used by the Mujahedin as a weapon.
 - 8) The detainee had an idea for al Qaida to attack a nuclear power plant. The detainee believed a nuclear explosion would result from such an attack.
 - 9) The detainee was involved in discussions regarding the feasibility of establishing a nuclear weapons program for al Qaida.
 - 10) The detainee assisted a senior al Qaida operative in selecting houses in Karachi to be used as al Qaida safe houses.
 - 11) The detainee set up a committee of ten well known individuals to raise funds for the construction of the Dawah Academy. The fund raiser was a success and they raised enough money to construct the academy.
 - 12) The detainee stated nuclear reactors in the United States would be excellent targets for attack.
 - 13) The detainee was an al Qaida facilitator.
 - 14) The detainee's production studio produced al Qaida videos with the goal of spreading Islam. The detainee obtained contact information during his 2000 visit with Usama bin Laden. The detainee had a large network of contacts from which he could find couriers to Usama bin Laden, and the detainee's Karachi, Pakistan office was well known to al Qaida.
- b) Connections/Associations
- 1) A Casio digital diary was found in detainee's possession when the United States detained him. The diary contained 1,265 telephone entries of vital intelligence value. The digital diary contained names, telephone numbers, email addresses and websites. The diary

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF PARACHA, SAIFULLAH A

contained contact information for Najmut Tariq.

- 2) Najmut Tariq is believed to be connected to al Qaida's anthrax program. Information was found in a document that linked Najmut Tariq's name with the anthrax vaccine and biological weapons.
- c) Intent
 - 1) The detainee expressed strong anti-United States sentiment. The detainee stated that nuclear weapons should be used against United States troops, as thousands of the troops would be killed at once. The detainee stated further that countries that were not close to the United States, such as China, could possibly be approached to obtain such weaponry.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detainee stated he only wanted to use Usama bin Laden as a voice for his company. The detainee stated he just wanted to help the Christians and Muslims understand each other. The detainee stated he had no intention of letting Usama bin Laden use his media company as a voice for terrorism.
 - b) The primary reason for the detainee's trip to Afghanistan was to contribute the establishment of a school for girls.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 October 2007

To: YAKUBI, MOHAMMED MUSSA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF YAKUBI, MOHAMMED MUSSA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Numerous sources have reported plans to destroy the bridge north of Fire Base Gardez. The individual mentioned by several different sources is the detainee, a police officer. The detainee was buying high explosive material from Bow Audin. The detainee has also been identified as the one responsible for the 04 June 2003 Improvised Explosive Device attacks. Apparently his intent was to blow up the bridge as forces were driving across it.
2. According to reporting, the detainee was directly responsible for an improvised explosive device attack on 4 June 2003.
3. On 4 June 2003 a United States Special Forces convoy was the target of an improvised explosive device attack. The improvised explosive device detonated near a Coalition Forces convoy traveling southeast along the Gardez-Khowst highway in Afghanistan.

b. Training

The detainee stated he was shown how to fire the AK-47 and Rocket Propelled Grenades at the police check post where he worked.

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c. Connections/Associations

1. A local Afghan source stated an individual is a major financial backer and supporter of Anti Coalition Forces. The individual's close associate works for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The associate receives money from the individual and passes it to the detainee. The source stated the detainee was the commander behind the attacks that killed two United States soldiers.
 2. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is a Terrorist Organization founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, as a faction of the Hezb-e-Islami party in 1977. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after he fled Sudan in 1996. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.
 3. The detainee advised that his boss was the commander of all police forces in Gardez, Afghanistan.
 4. Reporting indicated that former Gardeyz, Afghanistan police chief held a party at his compound in Gardeyz, Afghanistan during which a private meeting was held to establish an agreement to assist al Qaida operatives in Shahi Khowst, Afghanistan and the surrounding area.
 5. The detainee's brother, also a detainee, was apprehended at the detainee's home for suspected involvement in a mortar attack on United States forces. The detainee's brother had an identification card from Hezb-e-Islami and a satellite telephone number associated with the detainee's name. A mortar and rifles were found in the detainee's compound.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that the first time he heard about al Qaida was after being taken into custody. The detainee stated members of al Qaida are bad people and blames them for ruining the detainee's country.
 - b. The detainee stated that if released, he would like to return to his family in Gardez, Afghanistan.

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- c. The detainee stated he is glad the Americans entered Afghanistan. The detainee stated the American presence has been extremely beneficial to the detainee's country.
- d. The detainee denied possessing prior knowledge of the Improvised Explosive Device attack near the bridge in Khowst, Afghanistan.
- e. The detainee denied any intention of selling or providing either the Rocket Propelled Grenades rounds, or miscellaneous ammunition, to Anti Coalition Forces.
- f. The detainee's former employer stated that the detainee has never worked for either al Qaida or the Taliban and that if he had known that detainee was working for either one of these groups, he would not have hired him.
- g. The detainee stated he only fired Rocket Propelled grenades once during his training.
- h. The detainee stated he received no training to be a police officer, nor was he taught how to fire any weapons.
- i. The detainee stated that his brother was a carpenter and did some agricultural work. The detainee stated his brother had worked for a Non-Governmental Organization, NGO, for less than a year, but he did not know the name of the NGO.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 January 2008

To: BELKACEM, BENSAYAH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BELKACEM, BENSAYAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee visited a senior al Qaida lieutenant's guest house in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1994 en route to Bosnia to fight in the jihad.
 - 2) The detainee had ties to the Chechen movement in 1999 and had a connection to one of Usama bin Laden's lieutenants.
 - 3) The detainee planned to travel and join the jihadist elements in Afghanistan in late September 2001, in anticipation of the United States coalition invasion and encouraged his friends to do the same.
 - 4) The detainee applied for an Iranian visa in Bosnia for travel to Afghanistan on 1 October 2001.
 - 5) The detainee, without any viable means of financial support, was able to support himself and several other former Bosnian Mujahedin families in Bosnia. Some of the financial support was provided by the Director of the Saudi High Commission for Relief.
 - 6) The detainee was identified as the primary al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia in September 2001.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BELKACEM, BENSAYAH

- 7) The detainee was used as a contact to procure passports from 1997 to 2000.
- 8) The detainee the person who planned and assisted the arrival of an undisclosed number of unidentified travelers from Afghanistan.
- 9) The detainee an al Qaida member who had a group of former Bosnia Mujahedin of Algerian descent living and working under him in Bosnia.
- 10) The detainee was identified as an associate of a group of Algerians, with possible association to a terrorist organization, connected with a suspected plot against the United States embassy.
- 11) The detainee an Algerian national who fought in Bosnia in the mid to late 1990's.

b) Training

- 1) The detainee stated he served in the Algerian military from 1982 to 1984.

c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The Armed Islamic Group/GIA is described as an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group has frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. Since 1993, the Armed Islamic Group has killed more than 100 men and women in the country.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee denied any involvement with one of Usama bin Laden's lieutenants, Bosnian Mujahedin members and other Algerian-Bosnians suspected of involvement with planning an attack against the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia.
- b) The detainee stated he knew about al Qaida and that Usama bin Laden was the leader, but he only knew this from media reports. The detainee stated he never heard of al Qaida operating in Bosnia.
- c) The detainee stated he never associated with any terrorists or anyone who wanted to hurt the United States. The detainee stated he never worked with al Haraman although he has heard of them.

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- d) The detainee denied having much knowledge of the al Haramayn Organization and stated he had never heard of the organization being extremist.
 - e) The detainee stated he never had a bank account in Sarajevo or elsewhere in Bosnia.
 - f) The detainee stated he did not have any involvement in a plot to blow up the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia.
 - g) The detainee stated the Bosnian Government stated there was no case against him and he would be sent back to Algeria.
 - h) The detainee stated he had nothing to do with al Qaida and he has been truthful throughout his interrogations.
 - i) The detainee denied being involved in the facilitating of fraudulent passports for others. The only involvement the detainee had with fraudulent passports was that concerning his own fraudulent Yemeni passport.
 - j) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 January 2008

To: AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he took correspondence courses and a local community course in Macintosh computers during 1990 and 1991. The detainee stated he thought he had a job at a newspaper in Croatia in 1992, but then found out that the job was at the Islamic World Relief Organization, a well known Saudi-based nongovernmental organization. The detainee stated he was provided a letter from the Islamic World Relief Organization that indicated he was invited to come to Croatia for specific work.
 - 2) The International Islamic Relief Organization is a foundation under analysis for involvement in the financing of terrorism.
 - 3) The detainee stated he traveled by plane on Air Italia Airlines from Algiers, Algeria to Rome, Italy in May 1993. The detainee then purchased a train ticket and traveled from Rome to Zagreb, Croatia.
 - 4) The detainee stated he arrived in Split, Croatia in May 1993 and was directed to report to an apartment where he stayed with an unknown number of roommates. The detainee stated he first met an individual when he arrived in Split, Croatia in May 1993 to work for the International Islamic Relief Organization, (IGASA). The detainee stated he saw the individual socially approximately two times each month from 1995 through the fall of 2001.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

- 5) Igasa is a humanitarian organization that is a cover-up for potential terrorist organizations. The Igasa organization mainly dealt with logistics, weapons, and ammunition for Islamic terrorists in the field. The Igasa branch in Zagreb, Croatia was headed by the individual in the previous statement. The individual in the previous statement was arrested as a member of the religious-terrorist organization Islamic Liberation Front. The individual went to Kosovo as one of the instructors in a Mujahedin unit.
 - 6) The detainee stated he flew to Sarajevo, Bosnia in February 1995 to apply for Bosnian citizenship. The detainee stated he went to Bosnia and was hired by the Qatar Charitable Society as a secretary to the Director in August 1995. The detainee stated the agency initially supported orphans, but then began to provide support to refugees.
 - 7) The Qatar Charity Foundation is a foundation under analysis for involvement in the financing of terrorism.
 - 8) The detainee stated that in 1995 he transferred within the Qatar Charity to Tuzla, Bosnia where he worked under the second in charge of the organization.
 - 9) The detainee stated he repaired computers for the Tayyiba Relief Agency in Sarajevo, Bosnia from 1997 to 2002.
 - 10) Taibah International has been identified as helping terrorists and extremists enter Europe. Terrorists from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, and other countries first go to Bosnia where they are given Bosnian passports. From there, the terrorists go to Milan, Italy, then to Frankfurt or Hamburg, Germany, and then anywhere else in Europe.
 - 11) The detainee was arrested in mid-October 2001 as a suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group.
 - 12) The Department of Homeland Security describes the Armed Islamic Group as an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group is known for frequent attacks against civilians and government workers, using assassinations and bombings, including car bombs.
 - 13) The detainee was identified as a suspect connected to threats against the American Embassy in Sarajevo.
- b) Connections/Associations
- 1) Bensayah Belkacem, Saber Lahmar, Muhammad Nechle, the detainee, Boumedienne Lakhdar, and Boudela Hadz were arrested for planning an attack on the American and

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British Embassies in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The arrests were based on information that Bensayah Belkacem was in contact with a senior al Qaida operative.

- 2) One of the individuals in the previous statement was identified as an al Qaida member who directed a group of Bosnian Mujahedin of Algerian decent. The individual planned to travel to join the jihadist elements in Afghanistan in late September 2001 in anticipation of the United States invasion, and encouraged his Algerian friends to do the same. The other individuals in the previous statement and the detainee all planned to travel to Afghanistan once receiving arrangements were made.
- 3) The detainee made threats against Stabilization Force personnel in Bosnia in 1999. The detainee said Stabilization Force troops were infidels occupying Muslim land and should be expelled. The detainee exhorted Bosnian Mujahedin to kidnap and "finish off" Stabilization Force soldiers and western civilians when given the opportunity.
- 4) The detainee expressed his intention to attack Stabilization Force troops with "white weapons", weapons that do not involve gun powder.

c) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee stated he was held with other Algerians in the Bosnian jail in Sarajevo, Bosnia for three months.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought the decision to discontinue detainment of the detainee and the other individuals with whom he was arrested after no evidence was presented against them to legal agencies.
- b) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
- c) The detainee stated that he was not involved or associated with any extremist groups in Algeria, nor did he know anyone who was.
- d) The detainee stated he did not engage in any of the fighting in Bosnia or Croatia at any time. He stated that he left Algeria for Croatia/Bosnia to work in a legitimate job, not to fight in the war.
- e) The detainee denied ever encouraging anyone to use weapons of any kind in any situation. He also denied ever participating in any jihad or that he had participated in any

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AIT IDR, MUSTAFA

training in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he never planned to travel to Afghanistan to take part in the jihad. The detainee denied that extremist activities took place at Tayyibah and that he never participated in extremist activities.

f) The detainee was asked if he had any associations with people who conducted terrorist activities or were in any way involved with terrorism. The detainee stated no, and that if he was associated with such people, he deserved to be in jail. The detainee was then asked if any of his friends had ever conducted or planned to conduct any terrorist acts. He said he did not care if his friends did such things, and that he could not be judged by their actions.

g) The detainee stated he is not a fundamentalist and that he has had nothing to do with terrorism, Usama bin Laden, or killing Americans. The detainee stated he has no involvement or interest in jihad or fighting. The detainee stated the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States were contrary to the teaching of the Islamic faith and against his personal beliefs. He stated the perpetrators of the attacks were not human. The detainee further stated any Islamic group who kills people has no right calling themselves Islamic.

h) The detainee stated that at no time did he train the Bosnian Mujahedin in self-defense tactics and techniques.

i) The detainee stated that he was not in Bosnia when the fighting was going on and there was no way he could have been a trainer for the Mujahedin Brigade. He stated he was in Croatia and he had certificates that can prove his whereabouts.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

08 January 2008

To: AL HAJ, BOUDELLAA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, BOUDELLAA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee was one of the Mujahedin commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992.
 - 2) The detainee was an Algerian combat instructor in 1992.
 - 3) The detainee admitted he fought with the Taliban.
 - 4) The detainee stated he was told to stay at the Taliban center in Quetta, Pakistan before proceeding to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - b) Training
 - 1) The detainee served in the Algerian military from 1987 to 1989 as an administrative specialist and in the Bosnian Army from 1992 to 1995 as a cook.
 - 2) The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and grenades.
 - c) Connections/Associations
 - 1) The detainee worked for the Islamic Charitable Committee in Peshawar, Pakistan taking care of orphans.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, BOUDELLAA

- 2) The detainee worked for the Islamic World Committee in 1996.
 - 3) The detainee worked for the Human Appeal International in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina supervising orphans throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.
 - 4) Human Appeal International is also known as the Benevolence International Foundation.
 - 5) Benevolence International Foundation is suspected of cooperating with the terrorist group al-Qaida. The former head of the foundation is suspected of having close ties with Usama bin Laden.
 - 6) The detainee was a suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group and was arrested on 21 October 2001.
 - 7) The Armed Islamic Group is an Islamic extremist group. The group has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages.
 - 8) The detainee is suspected of having links to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist organization.
 - 9) The detainee came in contact with various al Qaida leaders in December 2001.
 - 10) The detainee was a close associate of a primary al Qaida facilitator in Bosnia.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee claimed he left Algeria to travel to Saudi Arabia in 1989 to participate in a religious pilgrimage called Haj.
 - 2) The detainee stated that around the beginning or middle of 1994, the job ended, the office closed and the Islamic Charitable Committee stopped all activities and funding ceased. The detainee found a job teaching the Koran and Islamic teachings to soldiers in the Bosnian Army.
 - 3) The detainee stated that he used his certificate with the Bosnian Army from 1992 to 1995 as a means to marry a Bosnian citizen woman in order to receive his Bosnian citizenship.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAJ, BOUDELLAA

- a) The detainee stated he has never been to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was accused of being at Tora Bora, Afghanistan but that was impossible because he was in jail in Bosnia at the time.
 - b) The detainee stated the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States were not in line with true Islam.
 - c) The detainee stated he had never told a lie in his life, not even as a child.
 - d) The detainee stated he has never thought of committing crimes or hurting Americans. The detainee stated he would not talk to someone who believes in terrorism.
 - e) The detainee denied supporting terrorism. The detainee stated he was merely an employee of a benevolent organization and knew nothing of support for terrorism.
 - f) The detainee denied knowledge of any Islamic training camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
 - g) The detainee denied having any contact with members of Active Islamic Youth, Muslim Youth, or any other Muslim organizations other than non-governmental organizations.
 - h) The Active Islamic Youth is associated with Islamic extremist activity in Bosnia and the Bosnian Wahabi and former Mujahedin communities.
 - i) The detainee claimed no affiliation with al Qaida or any terrorist organization. The detainee further denied ever being trained as a soldier for Bosnia-Herzegovina or Algeria. The detainee stated that cooks and administrative personnel do not receive weapons training.
 - j) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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