




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300723

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

02 Aug 2005


MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country with
Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000455DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: AliSheer Hammedulah
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Khamidullo Kudratillaevich Appakkhodzhaev, Khammidullaha Kudratillaevich Appakhodjaev.
- Place of Birth: Tashkent/Uzbekistan (UZ)
- Date of Birth: 19 November 1974
- Citizenship: Uzbekistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9UZ-000455DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health and has no known allergies.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement. NOTE: JTF-GTMO Recommends Transfer With Conditions to the Government of Uzbekistan pursuant to a diplomatic note passed to the American Embassy in Tashkent requesting detainee be returned to Uzbekistan for prosecution. (Tashkent 00888 300237Z MAR 05)

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300723

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300723

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000455DP (S)

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 04 June 2004.

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is part of the Al-Qaida Network. Detainee fought in Chechnya and in Afghanistan for the IMU. Detainee is possibly the IMU senior explosives instructor. He may have gained his knowledge directly from one of Al-Qaida's senior instructors. Several IMU operatives identified detainee as a guard for the IMU Intelligence bureau in Kabul. Detainee was indoctrinated into the extremist faction of Islam and will most likely continue terrorist activities if he is released. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee claimed to be an Uzbek national born in Tashkent. He completed tenth grade at the Manan Uighur School in Tashkent where he trained to be a pastry chef. Detainee continued his education by attending Tashkent's Commercial Technical School. Detainee claimed he earned a higher-level chef's degree.

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: After the Tashkent bombings in 1999, detainee left Tashkent for Astrakhan, Russia. Detainee discussed going to Afghanistan after he claimed he heard on the radio that Afghanistan was accepting Uzbeks. He claimed he heard of Uzbeks going to Afghanistan to flee religious oppression. At that time he joined in discussions about going to Afghanistan with an Azerbaijani (AZ) named Elchin. Elchin acquired a visa for detainee. Detainee claimed he traveled from Uzbekistan to the areas around Chechnya in order to find work. Detainee traveled from Russia to Baku, AZ where he stayed for one week. Detainee left Baku and traveled to Mashad, Iran (IR) via Tehran, IR. Detainee then went to the Afghan/Iran border; however, the Afghan border guards would not allow him to cross. Detainee told the guards that he could not go back to his homeland because he was an oppressed Muslim. Detainee received permission to enter AF after he bribed a Taliban official with \$300USD. (Analyst Note: during several interviews the price detainee paid the Taliban official ranges from \$30USD to \$300USD.)

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee claimed he was introduced to a Taliban official at the border who took him to Kandahar, AF via Herat, AF. According to detainee's account, the Taliban questioned him and decided he was not a threat. Detainee was offered a job as a guard at a Madrassa for children. Detainee received room and board for his services. Detainee claimed he did not carry a weapon or receive any military training.

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000455DP (S)

d. (S//NF) Capture Information: Detainee claimed he heard that the Taliban were fighting the Northern Alliance, but the Taliban never asked him to fight. Detainee got sick with a malarial type disease and spent a week in the hospital. In February 2001, the Taliban stopped paying detainee and he claimed he met some "Afghan Uzbeks" who told him about other "Afghan Uzbeks" in Mazar-e-Sharif (MES). In October 2001, detainee decided to travel to that area; however, there was still fighting in the vicinity of MES so detainee stayed in a small village near MES until 12 January 2002 when he finally headed towards MES. On his way to MES, the Northern Alliance forces captured him. The Northern Alliance held detainee for approximately 2 months and then turned him over to the American Forces for detention during the March-April timeframe of 2002.

e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 19 June 2002

f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- No Information noted on KB

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S//NF) Detainee is a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). He may be the senior explosives expert and trainer within the IMU. Detainee possibly had knowledge of or assisted with IMU's first simultaneous bombing in the 1999 Tashkent attacks. Detainee received terrorist training in Chechnya and Afghanistan from Al-Qaida sponsored camps and individuals.
 - (S//NF) The IMU is a Tier 1 target. Tier 1 targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.
 - (S//NF) Detainee probably received explosives training from Abu Khabab Al Masri. Masri conducted explosives and poison training at the Derunta training camp complex for Al-Qaida.

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000455DP (S)

- (S//NF) Al Masri had his own mobile chemical weapons laboratory used to train students and was paid by the IMU to provide training to its operatives.
- (S//NF) Detainee is possibly the IMU's senior explosives expert and trainer. Reporting states that an individual sharing detainee's name (Khamidullo) was considered the senior Uzbek instructor.
- (S//NF) Two IMU operatives positively identified detainee as member of the IMU who received terrorist training in Chechnya and Afghanistan.
- (S//NF) He was also identified as previously working as a security guard for the IMU's intelligence wing in Kabul.
- (S//NF) An IMU operative positively identified detainee from a photograph as a member of the IMU who was either killed or captured with Oibek Jamaludinovich Jabarov, US9UZ-000452DP, (ISN 452), who he also positively identified as an IMU operative. Both were identified as fighting in the Shimon area of AF (NFI). The operative correctly identified detainee's alias as Alisher.
 - (S//NF) This same source identified detainee as having been a security guard at an IMU prison prior to his death or capture.
 - (S) Analyst Note: The prison probably refers to IMU Intelligence wing in Kabul. Most intelligence headquarters had holding cells in order to interrogate prisoners.
- (S//NF) One of the IMU's first terrorist attacks was simultaneous bombings in Tashkent in 1999.
 - (S//NF) Detainee admitted to leaving Tashkent following these bombings.
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted providing U.S. military debriefers with a fake name and withholding his true last name, which is Appakhojiev (var: Appakhozhev). Detainee's full name is Khamidullo Kudrotillaevich Appakhojiev.
- (S//NF) An IMU Fighter Hiknatullah Gulomkhonovich Kudratov, who was captured by Uzbek authorities, identified detainee as having fought in Chechnya. Detainee's location at the time Kudratov reported seeing him coincides with detainee's own reports.
- (S//NF) The IMU had two camps outside Mazar-e-Sharif, AF and a headquarters building in Kabul. They had supporting headquarters in Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, Kandahar and Herat. Detainee traveled to each of these places possibly for training and duty as a guard.
- (S//NF) A foreign security service officer identified photo of detainee and provided his full name and place of birth.
- (C) A diplomatic note passed to the American Embassy in Tashkent requested that detainee be returned to Uzbekistan for prosecution.
- (S//NF) Detainee claimed that a man named Elchin who he met in a bazaar helped him procure a passport, money and bus ticket to travel to Afghanistan. Elchin also

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000455DP (S)

acquired lodging for the week for detainee while he waited in Baku, Azerbaijan (AZ) for a ticket to Afghanistan. (Analyst Note: Elchin is possibly Elchin Mamedov, a leader and facilitator for the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). This group is not unlike the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as they are both dedicated to create a world Islamic state through violence.)

- (C) Elchin Mamedov and five others were sentenced to three to eight years in prison for attempting to form an Islamic state in Azerbaijan.

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a LOW threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile.

6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.

- (S//NF) Detainee has not been completely forthcoming during interviews. It is assessed detainee is an Islamic extremist and member of the IMU since at least 1999. This is when he left Tashkent, UZ after the city was bombed. Detainee may have knowledge of these bombings. Detainee's length of service in the IMU indicates a high level of knowledge concerning the IMU tactics, members, training camps, support camps, financial backers. Due to his experience in Chechnya and Afghanistan, it is assessed that detainee is an experienced fighter; therefore, his knowledge of IMU explosives training program is believed to be extensive

b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:


- Uzbekistan Islamic movements and personnel
 - Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IMU
 - Oibek Jamaludinovich Jabarov (ISN 452)
 - Hizb-e-Tahrir (Islamic Revival Party)
 - Elchin
- Training camps in Afghanistan
 - Al Farouq
 - Derunta
 - Al-Qaida explosives expert and trainer Abu Khabab Al Masri
 - Uzbek training facility Kabul
 - Uzbek training facility Mazar-e-Sharif.
 - Uzbek support facilities
 - Konduz

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation for Transfer to the Control of Another Country with Conditions (TWC), Subject to the Conclusion of an Acceptable Transfer Agreement for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9UZ-000455DP (S)

- Kandahar
- Herat
- Links between IMU to Al-Qaida
- Financial backing for the IMU
- Knowledge of Tashkent bombings that occurred in 1999

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 04 April 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


JAY W. HOOD
Major General, USA
Commanding