



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360**

JTF GTMO-CG

3 September 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000572DP (S)

**1. (FOUO) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Salah Mohammed Dhab
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Abu Abdal Rahman, Salah Muhammad Salih Al Dhab
- Place of Birth: Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 1972
- Citizenship: Yemen (YM)

**2. (FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in good health. He has no significant medical history, but upon in-processing, he was noted to be G6PD-deficient. He has no known drug allergies.

**3. (S) Detainee Summary:**

a. (S) Background and Capture Data. Unless otherwise noted, the following background notes are based solely on the detainee's statements:

- **Prior History:** The detainee was born in Saudi Arabia, but he claims Yemeni citizenship. The detainee left Saudi Arabia for Yemen in 1990. *Analyst Note: Detainee was not afforded Saudi Arabian citizenship because his family was of Yemeni decent.*
- **Recruitment and Travel:** The detainee lived in Hudaydah, YM. Detainee's friend, Gelan Uthman, was a former mujahid and fought in the 1980s against the Russians. Uthman introduced the detainee to Abd Al-Razzaq in Sana'a, YM. Razzaq explained to the detainee how to get to Afghanistan (AF). Approximately 1998, the detainee traveled from Sana'a, YM, through Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan (PK), where he stayed in a guesthouse. He then went on to Kandahar, AF, staying there two days, and then traveled to Kabul, AF, where he stayed at Abu Khalid's guesthouse for one week.

**CLASSIFIED BY:** Multiple Sources  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958 Section 1.5(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20290903

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: (S) Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000572DP

- Training and Activities: The detainee was trained to use the RPG and small arms at the Sadeeq terrorist camp located outside of Khowst, AF. Detainee returned to Hedaydah, YM, in approximately 1998 and spent 12 to 15 months making arrangements for another trip back to Afghanistan with his family. Detainee and his family traveled in approximately 1999 to Kandahar, AF via Karachi, PK. In Kandahar, the detainee and his family stayed in an apartment provided by the Taliban. The following week, they continued to Kabul, AF, where they stayed for about 2 ½ years. In Kabul, AF, they stayed with Abu Zubayr, collecting charitable donations and selling honey to support the household. After one year, in approximately 2000, detainee and his family moved into their own house.

- Capture Information: When Kabul fell, in November 2001, Zubayr took the detainee's family to Kandahar and the detainee went by himself to Logar. The detainee bought a Kalashnikov rifle and traveled with five unidentified Arabs to Gardez, AF, continuing into the mountains by foot. He later met a Pakistani man named Muhammed Masoud and traveled with him to Karachi, PK, where he rented an apartment. Two days later on 7 February 2002, the Pakistani police knocked on his door and arrested him, along with "Riyadh the Facilitator," who is discussed in detail below. They were both transferred to the American prison in Kandahar, AF.

b. (S) Transfer to JTF GTMO: Detainee was subsequently transported to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, on 8 June 2002.

c. (S) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on madafas (guesthouses).

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S//NF) Detainee has admitted that he received training on light weapons and the RPG at Camp Sadeeq. He was instructed by camp leader Abu Atta, confirming his enemy combatant status. Abu Khalid, whom the detainee met at a guesthouse in Kabul, AF, arranged for the detainee to attend Camp Sadeeq. *(Analyst Notes: The detainee probably received basic training elsewhere and advanced Al-Qaida sponsored training at Camp Sadeeq, because Camp Sadeeq was used for advanced training by Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida selected its most promising students for more specialized or advanced training. Camp Sadeeq also contained laboratories. Some of the laboratories are reported to have been used for explosives, poisons, and gasses. Chemical tests were performed on live rabbits at one lab. The rabbits died during testing. While the detainee claimed Abu Khalid arranged for his training, further reporting states that, normally, advanced training at Camp Sadeeq was given on the recommendation of the trainers, indicating that Abu Khalid may have been a basic skills trainer for the detainee or a high-level Al-Qaida member.)*

- (S//NF) Detainee was captured at an Al-Qaida safe house in Karachi, PK, with known Al-Qaida facilitator Sharkaoury Abdo Ali Al-Hajj, aka Riyadh the Facilitator. *(Analyst Note: Sharkaoury, variant Charkawi, is a well-known Al-Qaida facilitator who traveled to Bosnia in*

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: (S) Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000572DP

*1995 to participate in jihad and attempted to participate in jihad in Somalia. He was later implicated in the planned attack on the US Embassy in Sana'a, YM. He facilitated the travel of many mujahideen into Afghanistan, and also out of Pakistan, following the US led attacks against the Taliban and Al-Qaida associated forces in Afghanistan.)*

- (S/NF) Detainee and his family lived with an Abu Zubayr. Reporting indicates that an Al-Qaida senior lieutenant was in charge of a guesthouse where the detainee lived. *(Analyst note: This senior lieutenant is most likely Zubayr, who has been identified as managing several guesthouses in Afghanistan. It is believed that this Zubayr is also the Abu Zubayr who was involved in attempts to destroy US and British ships in the Straits of Gibraltar and is now incarcerated in Morocco.)*

- (S) Detainee identified Yemeni Abu Al-Maqdad as one of the camp trainers. (S) Detainee claims to have stayed at an unidentified hotel in the Sadar Bazaar area of Karachi, PK. *(Analyst note: The Sadar (Saddar) Bazaar is an area known for Al-Qaida transient berthing. Several hotels, including the Dubai Hotel and the Mustafa Hotel, were used by numerous detainees during their ingress to Afghanistan. One hotel was also used by at least one of the hijackers approximately four months before the 11 September 2001 attacks.)*

- (S) A Taliban guesthouse financed all of the detainee's travel expenses, to include room and board, during his return to Yemen following his first trip to Afghanistan. *(Analyst note: This is unusual in that, while room and board were often provided, the guesthouses were not known to provide additional funding to the recruits. Travel expenses were normally provided by their recruiter or paid by the individual recruit. If the Taliban financed his travels back to Yemen, it could indicate that the detainee is a significant member of the Al-Qaida/Taliban forces.)*

- (S) Detainee was afraid when the Taliban fell (probably a reference to the fall of Kabul, AF); so he traveled two to three hours to Logar, AF. Detainee claims he went to a large unidentified school, where many Arabs were staying, and remained there for less than a week.

- *Analyst note: In November 2001, the Al Wafa NGO transferred its operations from Kabul to Logar, commandeering a vacant school. Detainees US9KU-000568DP and US9KU-000571DP, both associated with Al Wafa, were captured during the same raid on Riyadh the Facilitator's house during which the detainee was captured. It is likely that the school referenced by the detainee is the school occupied by Al Wafa. Al Wafa is classified as a Tier 2 NGO (non-governmental organization). Tier 2 NGOs are defined as those that have demonstrated the intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.*

e. (S) Intelligence Focus: JTF GTMO has determined that this detainee is of medium intelligence value due to his association with and knowledge of:

- Key Facilitators and trainers:
  - Sharkaoury Abdo 'Ali Al-Hajj, AKA Riyadh the Facilitator
  - Abu Khalid, Al-Qaida facilitator

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: (S) Recommendation to Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000572DP

- Abu Zubayr, senior Al-Qaida operative
- Trainers and Curriculum at Camp Sadeeq
- Function and uses of the Camp Sadeeq laboratory
  - Al-Qaida CBRNE program
- Taliban support to international travels
- Al Wafa NGO operations in Logar, AF


**4. (S) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee's only disciplinary incidents are non-aggressive, such as leading prayer, having a physical training session, or engaging in unauthorized communications. This detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and completely non-aggressive.

**5. (S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 24 February 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

**6. (S) JTF GTMO Assessment:**

a. (S) Summary: It is assessed that this detainee is a member of Al-Qaida and/or its global terrorist network. Detainee has demonstrated a commitment to jihad, has links to key facilitators in Al-Qaida's international terrorist network, has participated in terrorist training, likely participated in direct hostilities against the US and coalition forces, and maintains the capability to continue to do so if released. Detainee's probability of receiving advanced terrorist training, knowledge of key Al-Qaida facilitators, trainers, and safehouses makes it imperative detainee be retained in the custody of the US Government or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Government. His continued detention will allow for further exploitation of his past affiliation with various terrorist groups and prevent him from engaging in further terrorist activity. It has been determined that the detainee poses a medium to high risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be transferred for continued detention to his country of origin (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) if a satisfactory agreement can be reached that allows access to detainee and/or access to exploited intelligence. If a satisfactory agreement cannot be reached for his continued detention in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, he should be retained under DoD control

  
JAY W. HOOD  
Brigadier General, US Army  
Commanding

CF: CITF-GTMO