



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330613

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

13 June 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Said Salih Said
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Said Salih Said Nashir, Hani Saleh Rashid Abdullah, Abu al-Fedal
- Place of Birth: Habilain, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 29 September 1969
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000841DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 7 September 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an al-Qaida operative who planned to participate in terrorist operations targeting US forces in Karachi, Pakistan (PK), and possibly inside the United States. Detainee was captured in a Pakistani raid on an al-Qaida safe house in Karachi, during which senior al-Qaida operative Hamza al-Zubayr was killed. A laptop computer recovered from the safe house where detainee was captured contained data that could be used to target aircraft for hijacking operations. Also recovered was the will of another detainee in which he noted his intention to martyr himself, and

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330613

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330613

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

additional documents indicating an impending attack against hotels in Karachi. Detainee is assessed to have served in the 55th Arab Brigade under the leadership of al-Qaida commander Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi), US9IZ-010026DP (IZ-10026), and deployed with other al-Qaida personnel during hostilities with US and Coalition forces.¹ Detainee admitted training and residing at al-Qaida associated facilities. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Additional information on planned terrorist attacks against US forces in Karachi
- Additional information on radio-controlled detonation devices

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended the "26th of September School" in Aden, YM, where he completed the eighth grade. From 1987 through 2001, detainee worked as a construction laborer for various employers.²

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Al-Qaida facilitator Marwan Mughil recruited detainee to travel to Afghanistan (AF) for two months of training, after which detainee intended to return to Yemen. Detainee gave Mughil his passport, and sometime later Mughil sent detainee to Sanaa, YM to meet Mughil's associate, Abu Muad. Abu Muad returned detainee his passport, along with an airline ticket and \$200 US.³ In June 2001, detainee traveled to the al-Nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar, AF, via the United Arab Emirates (AE),

¹ Analyst Note: The 55th Arab Brigade was UBL's primary formation supporting Taliban military objectives. It was almost exclusively comprised of Arabs, many of whom had affiliations with other international terrorist groups. Al-Qaida leaders commanded the brigade, and UBL was thought to have participated closely in its command and control.

² 000841 KB 01-NOV-2002

³ IIR 6 034 0934 03, TD-314/49402-01, Entry III

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

and Karachi and Quetta, PK. Detainee traveled with three other people: two from Hadramaut, YM and one from al-Hudaydah, YM.⁴

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee received training at al-Faruq Training Camp from July until September 2001. Upon completion of training, detainee returned to the al-Nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar, where he remained until 11 September 2001. Al-Qaida leadership at al-Nibras then issued detainee an AK-47 assault rifle and deployed him to guard an airport located 30 minutes south of Kandahar, on the road to Spin Boldak, AF.⁵ Abu Hadeth al-Iraqi was in charge of all the guards at the airport. All the groups at the airport were equipped and directed by al-Qaida.⁶ On 3 December 2001, the Taliban ordered detainee and others to retreat. Detainee traveled to a valley located between Zormat and Khowst, AF where detainee hid in caves for approximately 10 days.⁷ Detainee next traveled with a group to a tribal area in Afghanistan and then to Wana and Lahore, PK, before arriving in Karachi. In Karachi, detainee received \$1,000 US from an al-Qaida member named Khallad and attempted to make his way back to Yemen via Iran.⁸ However, detainee returned to Karachi due to fear of being captured by the Iranian police.⁹

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) On 11 September 2002, Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) officers, rangers, and police conducted raids against three suspected al-Qaida residences in two separate sections of Karachi. Detainee, along with several other Arabs, who were in the apartment with him, resisted and fought a nearly three hour firefight with Pakistani security forces. The firefight left two of the Arabs dead and five captured, along with several of the Pakistani officials injured.¹⁰ The Arabs in the apartments were reportedly members of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi, including hotels frequented by

⁴ 000841 KB 01-NOV-2002, Analyst Note: Al-Qaida's al-Nibras Guesthouse was a waypoint and support center for Arabs transitioning to and from local training camps in the Kandahar area. Variants of Nibras include Nipras and Nebras.

⁵ 000841 KB 01-NOV-2002

⁶ IIR 6 034 0373 03, Analyst Note: Abu Hadeth al-Iraqi is assessed to be Nashwan Abd al-Razzaq Abd al Baqi aka (Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi) ISN US9IZ-010026DP, (IZ 10026), an al-Qaida commander in charge of the 55th Arab Brigade, of which detainee is assessed to be a former member.

⁷ IIR 6 034 0373 03, IIR 6 034 0612 03

⁸ 000841 KB 01-NOV-2002, Analyst Note: Khalad Atash is assessed to be Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Khallad), aka (Silver), US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014), the mastermind of the USS COLE attack, who visited detainee's apartment in Karachi every two weeks.

⁹ 000841 KB 01-NOV-2002, IIR 6 034 0376 03

¹⁰ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/37833-02, Analyst Note: Ten individuals were detainee in the three raids. Detainee's group was dubbed the "Karachi 6" (see TD-314/36523-02 as well as the eight open source articles in JDIMS titled "Karachi 6 ...").

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

US soldiers.¹¹ Shortly after their arrest, detainee and his associates were turned over to US forces at the Karachi Airport and then transferred to Bagram, AF.¹² In all, Pakistani forces detained 10 individuals during three raids including Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, ISN US9YM-010013DP (YM-10013); and Hassan Muhammad Ali Bin Attash, ISN PK9SA-001456DP (SA-1456).¹³

b. (S) Property Held: None

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 28 October 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Al-Faruq Training Camp, where detainee attended several months of basic training
- Various safe houses in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran
- Al-Qaida recruiter and travel facilitator, Marwan Mughil

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Most of detainee's reporting is assessed to be credible. He admitted staying in al-Qaida guesthouses and safe houses, training at al-Faruq, and acting as a member of the guard force at the Kandahar airport. However, he has failed to provide details about the Karachi bombing plot.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is an assessed al-Qaida operative who planned to participate in terrorist operations against US forces in Karachi. A laptop hard drive recovered from the safe house where detainee was residing contained information that could have been used in targeting aircraft, to support hijacking and other terrorist operations. Detainee is assessed to be a member of the 55th Arab Brigade who fought in support of al-Qaida objectives. He is associated with key al-Qaida operatives. Detainee was recruited to travel to Afghanistan for militant training by an assessed al-Qaida recruiter. Detainee admitted training and residing at al-Qaida associated facilities.

¹¹ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/36523-02, TD-314/37823-02

¹² IIR 6 034 0370 03

¹³ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/37833-02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee is an assessed member of al-Qaida and was captured in a firefight with Pakistani security forces. He was identified as a Karachi al-Qaida cell member and a would-be participant in planned attacks against US forces.
 - (S//NF) Shawki Awad Balzuhair, ISN US9YM-000838DP (YM-838), stated that every one of the six individuals living in a Karachi safe house with Hamza al-Zubayr, including detainee, was an al-Qaida member. YM-838 said Hamza al-Zubair was the group's operational leader and was unconditionally accepted as the leader of the group given his stature in al-Qaida. YM-838 also said al-Zubayr formerly served as a senior military trainer at al-Faruq Camp. YM-838 stated that Anas al-Pakistani was the group's caretaker.¹⁴
 - (S//NF) Detainee listed his roommates at the time of the raid as Ayub Murshid Ali Salih, ISN US9YM-000836DP (YM-836); YM-838; Musab Omar Ali al-Mudwani, ISN US9YM-000839 (YM-839); Hail Aziz Ahmed al-Maythali, ISN US9YM-000840 (YM-840); and Amar, a reported UBL bodyguard who was killed during the firefight.¹⁵ (Analyst Note: Amar is likely a reference to Ammar Abdallah Ali al-Dhalai, variant (Abu Ammar al-Dale), a former UBL bodyguard.¹⁶)
 - ◆ (S//NF) According to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), aka (Mukhtar), (KU-10024), Hamza al-Zubayr had identified two Yemeni operatives, Ammar al-Dalih and Hassan aka (Mansur), who would serve as "martyrs" in the planned Karachi operation.¹⁷
 - (S//NF) YM-838 stated that Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Khallad), aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014), was the group's primary facilitator in Karachi. YM-10014 was their link to senior people in al-Qaida and would visit the apartment roughly every two weeks. YM-838 also said that senior al-Qaida operative Ammar al-Baluchi, ISN US9PK-010018DP (PK-10018), visited to bring money, clothing, and assistance. Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani, ISN US9PK-001461DP (PK-1461), who was well known to the group as a Karachi-based facilitator who transported many of them from other safe houses, also often visited.¹⁸
 - (S//NF) According to a Pakistani government service, individuals located in two of the Karachi residences raided on 11 September 2002 were suspected of being part of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi.¹⁹

¹⁴ TD-314/37833-02, IIR 6 034 0361 03, Analyst Note: Anas is an alias used by Pakistani national and safe house keeper Saif ul Rahman, who was detained in the raid and retained in Pakistani custody (see TD-314/37098-02).

¹⁵ TD 314/37098-02, TD-314/37822-02, TD-314/37833-02, Analyst Note: Also among the individuals captured with detainee was Bashir Nasir Ali al-Marwalah, ISN US9YM-000837DP (YM-837).

¹⁶ 001453 SIR 22-NOV-2004

¹⁷ > TD-314/37098-02, TD-314-12088-03

¹⁸ TD-314/37822-02, TD-314/37833-02

¹⁹ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/36523-02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

- (S//NF) Among the papers found at the residence where detainee was captured, was an undated letter addressed to Hamza al-Zubayr from an individual named Mukh.²⁰ (Analyst Note: Mukh is a variant of an alias used by KU-10024.)
 - ◆ (S//NF) PK-1461, who is familiar with the coded terminology used by KU-10024, said the letter, addressed from KU-10024 to Hamza al-Zubayr, contained instructions for al-Zubayr to speed up the execution of a planned, coordinated terrorist attack on multiple targets, likely using poisons and remote detonators. PK-1461 added that the tone of the letter to al-Zubayr indicated that he was an operational leader in Karachi and was given responsibility of a big operational task.²¹
 - ◆ (S//NF) KU-10024 admitted being the author of the letter, dubbed the “Perfume Letter,” and stated the attack was to take place using military grade explosives against two hotels that housed US troops. KU-10024 commented the operation was postponed because it was compromised when the Pakistani ISID raided al-Qaida residences tied to al-Zubayr’s cell in September 2002 and arrested a number of cell members.²² (Analyst Note: It is assessed KU-10024 is referring to the raids which resulted in al-Zubayr’s death and the capture of detainee, the rest of the Karachi Six, YM-1456, PK-1461, and Abdul Rahim Gulam Rabbani, ISN US9PK-001460DP (PK-1460).)
 - (S//NF) Recovered from the safe house where detainee was captured was the will of YM-837, which he wrote in preparation for being a participant in a suicide operation.²³ (Analyst Note: The presence of the document indicates that YM-837, and perhaps the group as a whole, were in the final stages of planned suicide operations.)
 - (S//NF) KU-10024 stated that in March 2002 al-Zubayr discussed conducting a car bomb attack against the "Midway Hotel" and "Airport Hotel," located in the immediate vicinity of the old airport in Karachi. The hotels were chosen as targets because they regularly housed large numbers of US troops. KU-10024 approved of the idea and agreed to fund it with \$30,000 US to purchase the two cars needed for the operation.²⁴
 - (S//NF) Over 20 radio-type detonating devices were discovered in the Tariq Road safe house, which was one of the other residences raided at the same time as detainee’s apartment. The devices were built inside of black “Sega” videogame cartridges and were designed for remote activation through use of a cell phone.²⁵

²⁰ TD-314/37823-02

²¹ TD-314/41583-02, TD-314/39649-02

²² TD-314/17985-03

²³ >000837 AFGP-2002-906445 02-DEC-2002

²⁴ > TD-314/37098-02, TD-314-12088-03

²⁵ TD-314/37098-02, TD-314/40307-02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

- (S//NF) Coalition forces seized two of the same type of radio-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) components in Khowst, AF on 27 July 2002.²⁶
- (S//NF) Detained al-Qaida bomb maker Ahmad Hakim Fawzan al-Qasim, aka (Abu al-Bari al-Filistini), discussed the production of remote control firing devices (RCFDS) and timers for use in improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Al-Qasim estimates the two workshops in Karachi produced between 400 to 500 RCFDS, 600 to 700 Casio timers, and 600 to 700 integrated circuit (IC) timers. Other al-Qaida members involved in the workshop include PK-10024, YM-10014, SA-1456, PK-1460, PK-1461, Abu Hamza al-Zubayr, and PK-10018.²⁷
- (S//NF) Two laptop hard drives were recovered during the raids in which detainee was captured.²⁸
 - (S//NF) The hard drives contained images of instrument approach charts for major US and European airfields, along with flight simulator software. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) analysts assessed that a hijacker could use the data on the hard drives to study the proper approach to a commercial airfield, helping disguise his intent to crash an aircraft into a building or facility at or near the airport. In addition, terrorists could use the charts and software on the hard drive to study incoming aircraft patterns, assisting in targeting with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).²⁹
 - ◆ (S//NF) While staying at the safe house in Karachi, YM-10014 told detainee that there would be another attack in the US bigger than the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York.³⁰ (Analyst Note: Although no such attack materialized, the data on the laptop may have been part of the planning for such an operation.)
 - (S//NF) In addition to the aviation chart data mentioned above, the hard drive contained procedures for kidnapping, smuggling money, weapons, ammunition, personnel, lectures and essays on terrorist training, executions, assassinations, and guerrilla warfare; remote control and electronics training programs; Stinger anti-aircraft missile assembly instructions; and other al-Qaida affiliated documents and videos.³¹
- (S//NF) Passports belonging to UBL's family were also recovered in the raid of detainee's Karachi safe house.³²

²⁶ >IIR 6 044 7041 02

²⁷ >TD-314/67976-04

²⁸ TD-314/37121-02, Analyst Note: Ayub Murshid Ali Salih, aka (Akramah), aka (Safar), refers to detainee.

²⁹ Al-Qaidas possible study of aircraft approach charts - 26-SEP-2003

³⁰ 000841 SIR 22-NOV-2002

³¹ TD-314/37121-02, TD-314/37833-02

³² TD-314/37103-02, TD-314/40307-02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

- (S//NF) In Afghanistan, detainee fought in support of al-Qaida objectives and is assessed to have been a member of UBL's 55th Arab Brigade.
 - (S//NF) Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj, aka (Riyadh the Facilitator), ISN PK9YM-001457DP (YM-1457), photo-identified detainee and remarked that he had fought north of Kabul under the leadership of IZ-10026.³³ IZ-10026 was one of UBL's closest commanders, and was in charge of al-Qaida's 55th Arab Brigade on the northern front in Afghanistan.³⁴
 - (S//NF) Detainee remarked that after the 11 September 2001 attacks, al-Qaida assigned him to guard the Kandahar Airport and he added that an individual named Abu Hadeth al-Iraqi was in charge of the guards.³⁵ Detainee said that each person had an AK-47 and that each group at the airport had an anti-aircraft gun, an SA-7, and a rocket propelled grenade (RPG).³⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee had additional associations with high-level al-Qaida operatives.
 - (S//NF) Detainee claimed he met KU-10024 twice while in Karachi. On one occasion, detainee traveled to YM-10014's house in Karachi where KU-10024 personally provided him with \$1,000 US for travel expenses to get back to Yemen.³⁷
 - (S//NF) Detainee said he met senior al-Qaida members Muhammad Ibrahim Makkawi, aka (Sayf al-Adel), and Sulaiman Abu Ghaith at the Kandahar Airport and al-Faruq Training Camp respectively.³⁸ (Analyst Note: Sayf al-Adl was head of security for UBL, a trainer at al-Faruq, the senior intelligence advisor in Kandahar and the overall leader at Kandahar Airport when detainee was there. Sulaiman Abu Ghaith is an al-Qaida spokesman, planner, and coordinator.)
- (S//NF) Al-Qaida recruiters Abu Muad and Marwan Muqbil, aka (Marwan Ahmad Muqbil Salih), aka (Marwan Qassim Jawan), aka (Abu Ali al-Yafii),³⁹ recruited detainee and facilitated detainee's travel to Afghanistan.⁴⁰
 - (S//NF) Abu Muad is likely Ahmad Ibrahim Abu Hasana, aka (Abu Muaz al-Jiddawi), variant (Anu Maath), a known al-Qaida facilitator who operated in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. According to Haji Hajjaj Awwad al-Hajjaji al-Silmi, ISN US9SA-00245DP (SA-245, transferred), Abu Muaz al-Jiddawi was well known to be the primary person to be contacted if a person wanted to get to Afghanistan.⁴¹

³³ TD-314/38078-02 Paragraph F

³⁴ IIR 2 340 6093 02, IIR 2 340 7121 02

³⁵ IIR 6 034 0373 03

³⁶ IIR 6 034 0373 03, 000841 SIR 28-OCT-2002, Analyst Note: The SA-7 is a Russian-designed, man-portable, shoulder-fired, surface-to-air missile system.

³⁷ 000841 KB 01-NOV-2002, IIR 6 034 0509 03

³⁸ TD-314/39080-02

³⁹ 000841 KB 1-NOV-2002, 000728 SIR 10-JUN-2005

⁴⁰ IIR 6 034 0934 03, TD-314/39080-02

⁴¹ IIR 6 034 0154 02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

- (S//NF) Marwan Muqbil is likely identical to Marwan Ahmad Muqbil Salih, whom the Yemen Political Security Organization (PSO) identified as a Yemeni al-Qaida member believed to be in Afghanistan as of 15 December 2001.⁴²
 - (S//NF) According to YM-10014, Marwan Muqbil was probably identifiable with Abu Ali al-Yafii, aka (Marwan Qassim Jawan).⁴³
 - (S//NF) Marwan Jawan was an active al-Qaida recruiter in Yemen.⁴⁴ He was an extremist who had fought in Chechnya and Afghanistan.⁴⁵ He was also reportedly a UBL bodyguard.⁴⁶ Jawan met potential recruits at mosques and collected money from Taiz, YM merchants to pay for airline tickets for the recruits' travel to Pakistan. The merchants knew Jawan used their donations for this purpose.⁴⁷ Jawan also illegally procured and sold visas to individuals who could not obtain them on their own.⁴⁸ Jawan was reportedly killed in Kandahar during the Coalition bombing campaign.⁴⁹
 - (S//NF) At least eight other JTF-GTMO detainees assessed to be affiliated with al-Qaida were recruited or facilitated by Jawan.
 - ◆ (S//NF) Samir Naji al-Hasan Muqbil, ISN US9YM-000043DP (YM-043)⁵⁰
 - ◆ (S//NF) Adil Said al-Haj Ubayd al-Busayss, ISN US9YM-00165DP (YM-165)⁵¹
 - ◆ (S//NF) Muhssin Muhammed Mugible al-Askarry, ISN US9YM-000193DP (YM-193, transferred)⁵²
 - ◆ (S//NF) Abdallah Yahya Yusif al-Shibli, ISN US9YM-000240DP (YM-240)⁵³
 - ◆ (S//NF) Khaled Qasim, ISN US9YM-000242DP (YM-242)⁵⁴
 - ◆ (S//NF) Riyadh Atiq Abdu al-Haj al-Radai, ISN US9YM-000256DP (YM-256)⁵⁵
 - ◆ (S//NF) Khaled Muhammad Salih al-Dhuby, ISN US9YM-000506DP (YM-506)⁵⁶

⁴² TD-314/01498-02, Number 35; TD-314/49402-01, III

⁴³ TD-314/22080-04

⁴⁴ IIR 6 034 0109 02

⁴⁵ IIR 2 340 6386 02, IIR 6 034 0110 05

⁴⁶ IIR 6 034 0211 06

⁴⁷ IIR 2 340 6355 02

⁴⁸ 000728 SIR 21-JUN-2005

⁴⁹ IIR 6 034 0110 05

⁵⁰ IIR 6 034 0870 04, IIR 6 034 0034 05

⁵¹ IIR 6 034 0109 02, IIR 6 034 0086 03, IIR 6 034 0605 02

⁵² IIR 6 034 0010 05, IIR 2 340 6690 02, IIR 6 034 0791 02,

⁵³ IIR 6 034 0744 02

⁵⁴ IIR 6 034 0722 02, IIR 6 034 0723 02

⁵⁵ 000256 KB 17-JUN-2002, IIR 6 034 1550 03, IIR 6 034 1539 03, IIR 6 034 1541 03, IIR 2 340 6355 02

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

- ◆ (S//NF) Abdul Muhammad Ahmad Nassir al-Muhajari, ISN US9YM-000728DP (YM-728)⁵⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted training and residing at al-Qaida associated facilities.
 - (S//NF) Detainee attended the al-Faruq Training Camp, located near Kandahar, where he received small arms training and instruction on map reading. In August 2001, while detainee was at al-Faruq, UBL visited the camp and gave a talk about the conflict between Israel and Palestine.⁵⁸
 - (S//NF) Detainee stayed at the al-Nibras Guesthouse prior to attending al-Faruq. After completing training at al-Faruq, detainee stayed at the Haji Habash Guesthouse and was there when the September 11th terrorist attacks occurred.⁵⁹

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been sporadically compliant and hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 47 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 11 May 2008, when he was found in possession of contraband. He has three Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 2 August 2007, when he kicked a guard. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, damage to government property and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 11 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and four so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 27 February 2007.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee's selection and preparation for a special mission in a planned attack against US forces in Pakistan provided him information on key al-Qaida operatives, personnel, facilitators, methods, and techniques. Detainee's tenure in an al-Qaida affiliated safe house, where a computer containing information which could be used to target US and European airfields was seized, reflects probable knowledge of terrorist targets based on data stored within retrieved computer hard drives. Detainee's assessed membership in the 55th Arab Brigade provided detainee with information on al-Qaida military commanders, tactics, as well as routes of ingress/egress from Afghanistan.

⁵⁶ TD-314/46244-02, Analyst Note: Al-Jafi is a variant of al-Yafii (see IIR 6 034 0686 03).

⁵⁷ 000728 SIR 10-JUN-2005

⁵⁸ IIR 6 034 0934 03

⁵⁹ IIR 6 034 0934 03

JTF-GTMO-CDR

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000841DP (S)

Detainee's recruitment by an assessed al-Qaida recruiter reflects knowledge of al-Qaida facilitators and recruiting methods.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is an assessed al-Qaida member with considerable knowledge of a planned terrorist plot to attack US military forces in Pakistan and possibly in the US, including information on other participants and their roles. Detainee has considerable information on key al-Qaida operatives and facilitators, including other detainees, as well as terrorist suspects still at large. Detainee has information on the 55th Arab Brigade and its leadership, as well as tactics. Detainee has information on al-Qaida recruiters and recruitment methods.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Planned terrorist attacks in Pakistan and the US
- Al-Qaida training at al-Faruq
- Senior al-Qaida leaders, including KU-10024, YM-10014, and Sayf al-Adel
- Detainee's intentions after release from US custody
- Terrorist travel facilitations and operations in the CENTCOM AOR
- Terrorists, extremists, and associated organizations means of communications in Afghanistan and Pakistan

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 8 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.