

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, March 30, 1976  
9:40 - 10:20 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

Kissinger: One word about Sonnenfeldt. I told the conservatives their biggest problem is they attack the people who support them. What Hal tried to say in his convoluted way was that the Soviet relation to Eastern Europe was unnatural and it should be more historic.

President: What we have to do is get this statement out into the hands of these ethnic groups.

How about Hussein?

Kissinger: If I could just review Lebanon. There are two radical groups: the Jumblatt group and the PLO. There are two moderates: the Christians and moderate Arabs.

Syria has historically wanted to dominate Lebanon. Israel thinks that in the long term Syria in Lebanon would turn to the radicals and support the PLO. Syria feels that if they don't go in, the PLO will take over the country. I think Syria is right in the short run and Israel is right in the long run.

I think the best course of action is to support Syria politically and try to keep them out militarily. Under these circumstances, I think we need a senior guy in Lebanon. It could be Dean Brown or Bill Porter. Brown is associated with the Jordanian action of 1970 when Hussein smashed the PLO. That may be a problem. I would discuss Brown with the King.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/12/04  
BY llh, MAMA, DATE 6/12/04

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY BRENT SCOWCROFT  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

I think the King is more worried than Rifai. Rifai is practically a Syrian agent. I wouldn't be surprised if he didn't think the King would be knocked off and he would be President.

President: How about the West Bank troubles?

Kissinger: We have been lucky so far but it is in the interest of all the Arabs to stir things up there.

We won't get much more than Lebanon today. Everything you say will get back to Asad. Say we think highly of Asad. We agree with Asad's analysis. We would like his political solution without military intervention, because we see no way that can be done without arousing an Israeli reaction.

We will help by sending a senior representative. If we can get a ceasefire, then Syria could send in some more surreptitiously.

Israel has told us virtually nothing, while we have shared with them everything we had. But they have said they are in touch with the Christians.

What we need is an assessment as to the staying power of the Christians. If they can hold out and if Asad can split the PLO and Jumblatt, we can do it politically. If, though, the Christians can't make it, we maybe have to acquiesce.

President: How would you start it?

Kissinger: I would thank him for his constructive role. Then ask for his assessment and the outcome. Then say you agree with his solution, but you have the gravest doubts about the method. If we could get a ceasefire, then we could implement the Syrian political situation and Asad could sneak in some more forces. I think the Israelis would accept it under these circumstances.

Asad wants to become the spokesman of the Arab world, so he will work to get the PLO under his control. Of course, Sadat does not want this to happen and is therefore supporting the PLO. So we are better off not letting Syrian troops in unless the Christians are in danger of being wiped out.

You could tell Hussein that the results of intervention would be incalculable and it is not in his interest to have the PLO and Lebanese under Syria and perhaps have an Israeli intervention.

If we finish Lebanon, you know where we are on the negotiations. The non-belligerence approach is better than the Geneva approach, because it is a one-stage process rather than two.

President: What do you think about having another Rambouillet Conference?

Kissinger: I think it is basically a good idea. We could have it maybe in June. It would be good to have George Shultz organize it again, but I don't know if he can, in light of this suit.

President: How did you make out with Ansary and the oil deal?


Kissinger: [Describes]

President: I think we should ask the Iranians to hold the line on prices this summer. That would mean much more to us than a discount on 200,000 barrels a day.

Kissinger: I think we can get them to do that.

President: I have heard maybe Nixon is going to Iran. He cannot do that.

Kissinger: Let me talk to the Iranians. I think that is the best way to turn it off.



✓ P/K 30 Mar 76

Just 9:40 -  
10:20

K ~~I~~ One word about Genshaft. I told a  
conservative their biggest prob is they attack a  
people who support them. What Hal told to say  
in his convoluted way was that SU relation to  
EE was unnatural and it should be more honest.

\* P What we have to do is get this statement out  
into a hands of these ethnic groups.  
Honor about Hussein.

K If I could just review Lebanon.  
There are 2 radical groups: - Gemblatt + PhO.  
There are 2 moderates: Christians + moderate  
Arabs.

Syria has historically wanted to dominate Lebanon.  
I think in long term Syria in Lebanon would  
turn to a radicals & support PhO. Syria in  
fact if he doesn't go in a PhO will go take  
over a country.

I think Syria is right in short run & I in long  
run.

I think a best course of action is to support  
Syria politically & try to help them out militarily.  
Under these circumstances, I think we need a  
senior guy in Lebanon.

(Discusses Brown & Postar)

I would discuss Brown w/c King

I think a King is more worried than Rifai. Rifai  
is practically a Syrian agent. I wouldn't be surprised  
if he didn't think a King would be knocked off  
& he would be Pres.

P How about the A. Bank troubles?

K We have been lucky so far but it in a  
interest of all a Arabs to stop this up there

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 3/12/04

BY           , NARA, DATE 6/16/04

R Use must get much more than Lebanon truly.  
Everything will get back to Assad. Say we think  
length of Assad. We agree w/ <sup>Assad</sup> his analysis. We  
would like his political solution w/o mil. inter-  
vention, unless we see no way that can be done  
w/o ~~causing~~ causing I mention.

We will help by standing a series up. If  
we can get a CF, then Syria could send in some  
more surreptitiously.


I has told me virtually everything which we have  
shared everything. But they have said they in  
touch w/ Christians. >

What we need is an assessment of the staying  
power of Christians. If they can hold out + if Assad  
can split PLO & Jumblett, we can do it politically.  
If, tho, Christians cannot make it, we might  
have to reconsider.

P How would you start it?

K I would thank him for his constructive role. Then  
ask for his assessment & countermeasures. Then  
say you agree w/ his ~~conclusions~~ <sup>solution</sup> but have  
a great doubt about a method. If we could  
get a CF, then we could implement a Syrian  
pol. set. + Assad could break in some more  
force. I think a CF would accept it under those  
circumstances.

Assad wants to become a spokesman for Arab  
world, so he will work to get a PLO under his  
control. Of course, Sadat doesn't want this to happen  
& is  $\therefore$  supporting a PLO. So we are better off not  
letting Syrian traps in unless Christians are  
in danger of being wiped out.



\* oil storage will

You could tell Hussein results of intervention would be irreparable + it not in his interest to have PhD + Lebanon on the Syria + perhaps I intervention.

If we finish Lebanon, you know where we are on subject. The non-looky approach is better than a Sanad approach, because it is a one-stage process rather than two.

P What do you think about having another Ramakulit ~~of~~ Corp?

K ~~at all~~ I get I think it is basically a good idea. We could have it maybe in June. It would be good to have George Shultz engage it again, but I don't know if he can, in light of this suit.

P How did you work out w/ Ansary + a oil deal?

K (Disinterested)

P I think we should ask the Quennies to work a line on prices this summer. That would mean much more to us than a discount on 200,000 bbl/day.

K I think we can get them to do that.

P I have heard maybe Nixon is going to Iran. He cannot do that.

K Let me talk to the Quennies. I think that is a best way to turn it off.

