



SECRET//NOFORN//20301215

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

15 December 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9TS-000717DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdul Haddi Bin Hadiddi
- Aliases and Current/True Name: 'Abd Al Hadi Bin Hadhili Bin Muhammad Bin Ayad Al Hammami, Hedi Issam Ben H'Dhili Al Himami, Abdul Hadi Muhammad, Abdul Haddi Bin Al Tunisi, Abdul Haddi Hadili, Mamami, Abdoul Hedi, Muad, Abu Zur, Abu Ra'id¹
- Place of Birth: Biralash, Tunisia (TS)
- Date of Birth: 18 March 1969
- Citizenship: Tunisia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9TS-000717DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He has no allergies and no travel restrictions.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD Control (DoD) 1 October 2004.

¹ Names include variant spellings and combinations of: Hadi (Hedi, Abdul Haddi), Hadili (Hadiddi, Bin H'Dhili), Asem (Issam, Assem), Muhammad, Hamami (Himami, Mamami), Zur (Dhar, Dar, Thur), Muad (Mu'az, Muath), and Ra'id

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b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed as affiliated with the Al-Qaida global terrorism network. Detainee was active in the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN)² with specific reported membership in the Algerian Islamic Armed Group (GIA).³ Detainee reportedly trained at Al-Qaida's camps in Afghanistan and is linked to international terrorists. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies. JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value. [THERE IS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IN A SCI SUPPLEMENT]

4. (S//NF) Detainees Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Although of Libyan origin, detainee was born in Tunisia and claims Tunisian citizenship.⁴ Detainee has eight years of formal education. He quit school at age 16 to work on his father's farm. The Tunisian government harassed detainee's family because his oldest brother, Al Arusi,⁵ was allegedly involved with the Al Nahda Islamic Movement. As a result, detainee left Tunisia in 1999 for Morocco.⁶ (Analyst Note: Detainee has admitted to living in Italy, but has not provided a full account of his time there.)⁷

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Between 1999 and 2000, detainee moved between Morocco and Mauritania (MR). Detainee met a group from the Jama'at Al-Tablighi (JT)⁸. They recommended he travel to Pakistan, where they said he would be safe from the Tunisian authorities. Since the Tablighi group offered to pay for the airfare and visa, detainee accepted their offer and traveled to Pakistan (PK) in January 2000. In June 2000, detainee met Ibrahim Muhammed Ibrhim Al Nasir, US9TS-000721DP (TS-721), in Karachi

² (Analyst Note: The GJSN is a Tier 0 counterterrorism target. Tier 0 targets are defined as terrorist groups that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests.)

³ (Analyst Note: GIA is an organization under the GJSN umbrella and is classified as a Tier 0 counterterrorism target.)

⁴ TD-314/36995-02

⁵ (Analyst Note: No further information is available on Al Arusi.)

⁶ TD-314/36995-02

⁷ 000717 SIR 12 Mar 2004

⁸ (Analyst Note: The JT is a Tier 2 Counterterrorism NGO Target. Tier 2 NGOs are defined as having demonstrated the intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.)

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and married his daughter one year later. In August 2001, he moved from Peshawar, PK to Jalalabad, Afghanistan (AF), because the Pakistani police started arresting Arabs.⁹

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: According to the Tunisian government, detainee trained in small arms at an Al-Qaida training camp in Afghanistan (discussed below).¹⁰ Detainee claims that he studied religion but never attended any military training.¹¹

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Detainee claimed he fled the bombing in Afghanistan in November 2001 and returned with his family to Pakistan. In mid-February 2002, detainee and his family moved into TS-721's residence in Lahore, PK. In April 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested detainee. After leading authorities to his residence, authorities also arrested Jihad Deyab, US9LE-000722DP (LE-722). Pakistani authorities transferred detainee to US forces custody on or about 7 June 2002.¹² (Analyst Note: Other reporting does not support detainee's account of his arrest. CJTF76 database information on detainee does not include information on the location or date of his arrest, but does note that he was processed at Bagram on 7 June 2002 and information obtained during Tunisian debriefing of detainee listed his arrest as 1 April 2002.)¹³

b. (S) Property Held:

- Detainee has no documented pocket litter.

c. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 5 August 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Limited information on Al Nahda Group in Tunisia
- General information on the Jamaat Al-Tablighi Islamic Organization

⁹ TD-314/36995-02, KB 13-Aug-2002, IIR 6 034 0147 05, IIR 6 034 0623 03, IIR 2 340 6990 02

¹⁰ TD-314/05602-03

¹¹ TD-314/36995-02 The debriefer noted that detainee had apparent inconsistencies in his story and was clearly concealing information throughout the meeting.

¹² IIR 6 034 0623 03 (Analyst Note: Information found in supplement to this assessment casts some doubt on detainee's capture story and should be read in addition to TD-314/53520-05.)

¹³ TD-314/36995-02

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6. (S//NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account: Despite detainee's claim that he left Tunisia because of his brother's alleged activities, it is more likely that he (detainee) was involved in nefarious activity, and needed to leave Tunisia to avoid imprisonment. His timeline is disjointed and large portions are fabricated. Detainee attempts to limit his travels to North African countries, but other reporting places him in Europe with ties to known terrorists and criminal activity, possibly linked to the funding of extremist organizations. It wasn't until 2004 that detainee admitted to living in Italy, but continued to withhold information.¹⁴ Detainee has not been forthcoming with information regarding his timeline, activities, locations, travels, and associations.

7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is affiliated with Al-Qaida, and has links to known terrorists and the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN) in Europe and North Africa. Detainee was specifically reported to be a member of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). He is assessed to have received training in an Al-Qaida training camp and may have facilitated extremist travels.

- (S//NF) Detainee is affiliated with Al-Qaida and its global terrorist network.
 - (S//NF) Detainee is assessed to have received training at either the Khalden training camp or the Derunta training camp. Reporting from the Tunisian government regarding the training by detainee and other detainees includes detainee obliquely when it stated that they received small arms training at Khalden and Derunta.¹⁵ Other Tunisian reporting states detainee received training in Bosnia, which detainee denied.¹⁶ (Analyst Note: The reporting is not clear in its designation of training for individuals at specific camps and detainee's presence at a specific Al-Qaida camp in Afghanistan cannot be determined. Khalden is known for various types of instruction, including training Al-Qaida suicide bombers.¹⁷ The Derunta camp specialized in explosives training.¹⁸ The Tunisian government reporting listed detainee as "among the most dangerous operatives."¹⁹

¹⁴ 000717 SIR 12 Mar 2004

¹⁵ TD-314/05602-03

¹⁶ TD-314/35901-03

¹⁷ IIR 2 340 6278 02

¹⁸ TD-314/24595-02

¹⁹ TD-314/05602-03

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- (S//NF) Detainee's identification papers were reportedly found in a cave in Tora Bora in mid-December 2001.²⁰ (Analyst Note: The presence of the papers in Tora Bora indicates the detainee was likely present during hostilities in the region. Italian law enforcement intercepted the communications between a member of the Islamic extremist Al Tahqiq Organization aka Takfir Wa Hijra in Italy and detainee in 2002. The intercepts include the sounds of explosions in the background, which indicated that the detainee and his group were attempting to escape air raids. While the timing of the intercepts and recovery of detainee's documents do not coincide, they may support the assessment that he affiliated with forces opposing the US-led coalition. However, the date of the intercepted phone calls listed in the reports places them after detainee was arrested.)²¹
- (S//NF) Detainee is a probable document forger. Abu Zubaydah, a senior Usama Bin Laden operative, identified an individual by the alias Abu Zur Al Tunisi as a good document forger. Abu Zubaydah noted that Abu Zur was based in Lahore, Pakistan, was a good friend of Abu Wa'il Al Suri, and was familiar with the Tunisians in Italy.²² (Analyst Note: Detainee shares the alias Abu Zur. As noted above, detainee was captured with LE-722. LE-722's alias is Abu Wa'il Al Suri. Also, detainee resided with this family in Lahore, PK as of mid-February 2002. While probable, it is unknown if detainee is the document forger in question. Abu Zubaydah did not recognize detainee's name and photograph.²³ If detainee is the noted Abu Zur, it may indicate Abu Zubaydah was aware of detainee's alias and activities, but never met him. Detainee's background (below) supports direct links to the Abu Zubaydah associated North African Extremist Network and probable associations with Abu Zubaydah and his facilitators in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Italy. Detainee's links to Abu Zubaydah require further investigation.)
- (S//NF) Detainee was a member of the GJSN in Italy and Afghanistan, with specific ties to the GIA and GSPC. Detainee had associations with known terrorists and belonged to a GIA cell that may have provided support to them.
 - (C//NF) Detainee was arrested in Bologna, Italy (IT), in April 1996, for passing counterfeit 100,000 Lire notes. Upon searching his apartment, the Italian Carabinieri found handguns, ammunition, and two altered French passports. The passports had pictures of extremists Moloud Bouguelane and Lionel Dumont.²⁴ (Analyst Note:

²⁰ TD-314/27300-02²¹ TD-314/27300-02 (Analyst Note: If this was the detainee (mentioned by name in the reports), the dates of the intercepted phone calls are incorrect and occurred more likely between December 2001 and April 2002. If this is not the detainee, it may indicate detainee's claimed name is not his.)²² TD-314/25161-02²³ TD-314/53520-05²⁴ IIR 2 199 0017 02, TD-314/36805-02

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Bouguelane was affiliated with the "Roubaix Gang," which Dumont co-founded. The Roubaix Gang was a radical Islamic militant group in northern France (FR) that set off a car bomb in front of the police station in Lille, France just two days before the G-7 Summit in March 1996. (Analyst Note: The timing of detainee's possession of the passports (April 1996) and the bombing (March 1996) indicate detainee likely associated with Dumont following the attack and may have knowledge of the event). Dumont was sentenced to 20 years for killing a police officer in February 1997 in Bosnia, but escaped in 1999.²⁵ At the time of their 1997 arrest, Dumont and Bouguelane both possessed false Italian documents. In December 2003, Dumont was recaptured in Munich by German authorities.²⁶

- (S//NF) Detainee has a reported association with Abdelkader Lakhoul who was charged in Italy with procurement of false documents, falsification of public seals, and in connection with 21 Million Lire (approximately \$10,000 USD) in counterfeit bills.²⁷
- (S//NF) Detainee also has reported association with Abu Nasim Al Tunisi aka Fezzani Moez Ben Abdelkader. Al Tunisi is identified as a known Al-Qaida facilitator with links to the Milan Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI). Both detainee and Al Tunisi were sought by the Italian government for legal proceedings linked to a 1998 investigation into the GIA.²⁸ (Analyst Note: Due to detainee's links to extremism in Italy, Al Tunisi and the investigation of both of their connections to Islamic extremism in Italy, detainee has possible associations to the ICI. The ICI was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais Network, identified as the core for the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) in Italy²⁹ and linked to other cells in the North African Extremist Network.³⁰
- Reporting also identified detainee as one of the founders of the Piccola Societa Cooperativa Eurocoop A.R.L. The Eurocoop Company provided foreign workers with false documents allowing them to obtain residence permits in Italy.³¹ (Analyst Note: Cells of several North African Extremist groups in Italy are believed to have set up consumer cooperatives used as a cover for terrorist activities.)
- (S//NF) In June 2002, a list of GIA members in Italy included detainee's name. The list noted detainee was still at large and included detainee's brother (who had

²⁵ TD-314/06830-04²⁶ TD-314/06830-04, IIR 2 199 0017 02²⁷ TD-314/17389-02²⁸ TD-314/36805-02²⁹ IIR 6 034 1397 04³⁰ TD-314/30103-02³¹ IIR 2 199 0017 02, TD-314/36805-02

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been arrested and is listed on the Department of the Treasury Specially Designated National List), Adel Ben Hamed Hkimi (ISN US9TS-000168DP), and Lionel Dumont.³²

- (S//NF) In an October 2001 report, the Tunisian Government listed detainee as a member of a GIA support cell in Bologna, IT. The report clarified that detainee was at large in Afghanistan. It noted that the Italian government had dismantled a clandestine support network for the GIA, which included several Tunisians belonging to the Al-Nadha movement.³³ (Analyst Note: The Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) evolved from Al-Nadha's first military wing, the Tunisian Islamic Front (FIT). In 2002, TCG was assessed as the military wing of Al-Nadha and represented the radicalization of the organization.³⁴)
 - (S) While in Afghanistan, detainee was possibly involved in the facilitation of recruits from Europe. At least one recruit was to contact a Tunisian in Jalalabad named Abu Muad. (Analyst Note: Abu Muad is a variant for detainee's alias.)³⁵
- (S//NF) An Italian law enforcement official identified detainee's name as a known member of the Salafist Group for the Call and Combat cell in Bologna, whose leader was Mohamed Ben Brahim Saidani.³⁶
- (S//NF) Detainee was associated with the JT in Morocco in 1998. The JT gave detainee airfare and travel expenses to Pakistan.³⁷

c. (FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from a detention perspective. The detainee's overall behavior has been aggressive and non-compliant with the guard force and staff. The detainee currently has 23 Reports of Disciplinary Infractions with the last occurring on 11 December 2005 when he threw coffee on a guard. Other incidents for which the detainee has been disciplined include assault (major and minor), failure to comply, damage to US property, and inciting a disturbance. Although he has never been disciplined for cross block talking, TS-717 has done so on multiple occasions in spite of guard orders to stop. TS-717 has also threatened guards several times and has been noted using a racist slur towards guards. In 2005 the detainee has on record 11 Disciplinary Infractions. 17 of the 23 total disciplinary infractions committed by TS-717 have been for assaults. In addition to the assault on 11 December 2005, other

³² TD-314/30103-02, listed as number 46. Further research into detainee's association with all named individuals in the report is necessary.

³³ TD-314/38907-01

³⁴ TD-314/03827-02, (Analyst Note: The TCG is a Tier 0 Counterterrorism Target linked to the Global Jihad Support Network)

³⁵ IIR 2 340 6990 02

³⁶ IIR 5 398 5006 04

³⁷ TD-314/36995-02

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recent assaults include spitting and throwing urine on 28 November 2005, and throwing feces on guards twice in September. He also had an incident in September in which he defecated for no apparent reason onto his cell floor. In August of 2005, the detainee participated in a voluntary total fast by refusing 53 consecutive meals.


8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

- a. **(S) Assessment:** JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligence value.
- b. **(S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee reportedly forged documents for extremist support networks in Italy during the mid to late 1990s, and possibly in Afghanistan and Pakistan as late as 2002. Detainee was a member of the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN) in Italy with links to the GIA, JT, TCG, GSPC and Al-Qaida. Detainee has been linked to individuals responsible for a 1996 terrorist act in Europe. He possibly had access to Al-Qaida's financial and logistical networks. Detainee reportedly attended Al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan.
- c. **(S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** The scope and depth of detainee's relationship with extremist and terrorist elements in Europe and North Africa requires additional investigation. He should have specific information regarding terrorist support activities, including forgery, counterfeiting and facilitation. Although reporting indicates detainee was affiliated with Al-Qaida elements, his access to and knowledge of Al-Qaida leadership, facilitators and operations has not been determined. Detainee probably can provide insight into the interaction and cooperation of elements of the GJSN.
- d. **(S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**
 - Terrorist operations in Europe, to include attacks, personnel, funding and facilitation
 - Al-Qaida leadership and senior operatives, including Abu Zubaydah and Italy based cells
 - Al-Qaida training camps, curriculum, and trainers
 - Information on elements of the GJSN, particularly GIA and TCG associated groups Mujahid elements in Bosnia

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9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 11 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jay W. Hood". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the end of the last name.

JAY W. HOOD
Major General, USA
Commanding