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folder continue from the  
previous folder.**

March 18

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WASHINGTON

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

March 18, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report...

"The negotiation has reached a critical stage with the strong possibility that the talks could fail in the next 48 hours. I met with President Sadat for about two hours this evening, and I outlined the position which the Israelis authorized me to convey to him in as positive light as possible. I stressed that Rabin wanted an agreement, but faced an extremely difficult domestic situation.

"I stressed also that if Rabin was to get a proposal calling for Israeli withdrawal out of the passes and oil fields through the Knesset, he had to get something substantial in return on the political side. I reported again Israeli insistence for a formulation which the Israelis had given me which reads as follows:

Quote: Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means.

They will refrain from permitting, encouraging, assisting, or participating in any military, paramilitary or hostile actions, from any warlike or hostile acts and any other form of warfare or hostile activity against the other party anywhere.  
Unquote.

"Sadat's reaction was very much as I expected. He was calm, sober, and determined. He felt the Israeli formulation was an insult in the context of a partial withdrawal, and expressed deep disappointment. Sadat said that the Israeli proposal went beyond nonbelligerency, forcing him to make peace while his territory was occupied. He said he agreed not to use force but if he went further he would be finished. After further discussion and a quiet hour with him alone, I was able to get him to agree to review his own position, and to provide me with something more to permit me to make a last ditch effort with Israel upon my

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 10/01/03~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

return tomorrow. He agreed to provide me with some additional proposals as a final Egyptian position. He said no matter what happens in the negotiation, it is not their intention to impair U.S.-Egyptian relations. I believe he means this, but I doubt that he will be able to sustain such a position over a period of time if our efforts fail. He will be violently attacked by the radical Arabs and the Soviet Union.

"About an hour after I completed my meeting with Sadat, I received an urgent call to meet with Fahmi and General Gamasy. Fahmi said President Sadat had reacted very badly to what I had brought back from Israel, that Israel was demanding more than Sadat could give. Fahmi expressed great concern that tomorrow after his meeting with me, Sadat would say something publicly which would take him on an irrevocable course. He urged me to talk to Sadat to discourage such a statement in order to allow time for one more effort with Israel. During the course of this meeting, Fahmi showed me some new Egyptian positions which he is going to recommend to President Sadat tomorrow -- all of which are helpful, and go further than any previous Arab position. They are prepared to declare:

- (A) That the agreement is a major step towards peace,
- (B) To renounce the use of force unconditionally,
- (C) To have the agreement last in effect indefinitely ("unless superseded by another agreement"),
- (D) To extend UNEF automatically every year.

In addition they are willing to lift the boycott selectively. But it is practically certain that Israel will refuse on the ground that it wants a legal statement of nonbelligerency and a formal permanent status of UNEF. This Sadat could not do if he wanted. It would mean that he would make peace while Israel is still 100 miles inside Egyptian territory; that he would publicly separate from joint Arab projects like the boycott. Sadat is conceding more than I ever thought possible, but if he goes beyond a certain point he will be destroyed. Sadat is operating within certain political limits.

"I intend to make one more all-out effort tomorrow night with the Israeli negotiating team but with little hope of success. In this connection, you should know since last July we have made it endlessly clear to Allon, Peres, and Rabin on more than a dozen occasions that a formal statement of nonbelligerency is politically impossible. The Israelis heard this during the Allon talks in Washington in July, December, and January; They were told this during the missions in October and November;




it was reiterated during the negotiations which I undertook a few weeks ago at their behest to help prepare the cabinet to move towards the necessary decisions. I regret to say that either by neglect or design the Israeli government strongly encouraged us to engage our full prestige in this exercise and led us to believe that a formula less than non-belligerency would be acceptable to Israel. It was on this assumption that my latest mission was undertaken. Yet I have discovered that Rabin, as well as Peres and Allon and the entire cabinet are strongly committed, for internal political reasons, to getting nonbelligerency from Egypt.

"The impact on our international situation could not be more serious. From the Shah to Western Europe, from the Soviet Union to Japan it will be hard to explain why the United States failed to move a country of less than three million totally dependent on it in the face of Egyptian proposals which will seem extremely generous to them. It will be considered a sign of U.S. decline and impotence compounding events in Cambodia, South Vietnam, Turkey, and Portugal. Sooner or later a multiplier effect will set in.

"My plan for Tuesday evening's meeting with the Israelis is to try once again to make clear to them the most serious consequences which would result from failure. I intend to make the following points, subject to your approval. Taking as strong a line as I believe will be necessary is likely to have domestic repercussions and I cannot proceed without your approval. But the repercussions of failing for our interests, as well as Israel's, are too great not to do so. The key points I propose to include are as follows:

"A. I have reported fully to President Ford on the details of our last meeting and the position taken by the Israeli government.

"B. The consequences of failure are so serious for both Israel and the U.S. that it is essential that Israel reconsider its position in light of the latest concrete ideas which Egypt has asked me to convey to you. Failure to achieve a second-stage Egyptian-Israeli agreement, four months of arduous preparatory discussions in which the U.S. has been so directly involved, affects the vital interests of the U.S. and of Israel. In the Middle East, there going to be a sharp swing away from the West and moderation, with radicalism and the USSR the only beneficiaries. The hopeful shift towards peace, even in Syria, will be lost. This will touch such countries as Saudi Arabia. Western Europe, to protect its position in the Arab world, will dissociate from us. Iran will accelerate its own cause. The Soviet Union will re-emerge in an increasingly strong position. There will be a



very great risk of a costly war of attrition between Israel and its Arab neighbors. I am convinced, after my talks in Syria, Egypt, and Jordan that this is the case.

"C. Failure of these negotiations will also have an adverse influence going well beyond the Middle East. The economic repercussions for the West could be disastrous, as well as the ensuing political shifts in Western Europe. We are being asked to (garbled) a stalemate threatening our interests in all parts of the world.


"D. All of this is the result because Israel either accidentally or deliberately misled the U.S. and even the moderate Arab states.

"D. Israel's inability to be more responsive to achieve a successful negotiation cannot but have far-reaching repercussions in the U.S. failure of these negotiations will require an overall reassessment of the policies of the U.S. that has brought us to this point.

"F. I have been asked to make these points with the full authority and approval of President Ford.

"I would appreciate your response by NLT 1100 March 18. If it could include a sentence or two of support that could be read to the cabinet, it would help."

Warm Regards.







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DEPARTMENT PASS MSCE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

E.O. 11652: NA  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: REMARKS TO PRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRES.  
SADAT FOLLOWING MARCH 18, 1975 MEETING AT ASWAN REST HOUSE

REF: STATE 24911

1. SUBJECT REMARKS FOLLOW: QUOTE

2. SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE PRESIDENT AND I REVIEWED IN THE  
USUAL FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE THE IDEAS WHICH I BROUGHT FROM ISRAEL.  
THE PRESIDENT HAS GIVEN ME SOME ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND  
IDEAS TO TAKE BACK TO ISRAEL. I AM RETURNING THERE THIS  
AFTERNOON AND I EXPECT TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS THERE.  
THIS IS ALL I HAVE TO SAY.

3. QUESTION: CAN YOU SEE A BREAKTHROUGH, DR. KISSINGER?

4. ANSWER: KISSINGER: ONE CAN'T, IN NEGOTIATIONS, SPEAK  
OF ANY PARTICULAR POINT AT WHICH THERE IS A BREAKTHROUGH.  
I AM TRYING TO NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES BY  
EXPLAINING THE IDEAS AS CAREFULLY AS I CAN.


5. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, HAVE YOU ALREADY NARROWED THE GAP  
BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES?

6. ANSWER: KISSINGER, AS I HAVE SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS,  
I'M

THE GAP HAS NARROWED BUT IT ALWAYS REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER  
IT CAN FINALLY BE CLOSED.

7. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE  
PROGRESS, IF ANY, IN THIS SPECIFIC SESSION?

8. ANSWER: SADAT: WELL, AS SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS STATED WE  
HAD A FRUITFUL TALK AND I HAVE GIVEN HIM SOME NEW CONSIDERATIONS



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AS AN ANSWER TO WHAT HE HAS BROUGHT HERE AND I THINK IT IS PREMATURE NOW TO SAY MORE.

9. QUESTION: DR. KISSINGER, ARE YOU DETERMINED TO STAY IN THE REGION?

10. ANSWER: KISSINGER: AS I HAVE SAID ON MANY OCCASIONS, I AM DETERMINED TO STAY UNTIL WE EITHER REACH AN AGREEMENT OR IT IS CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT REACH AN AGREEMENT. SO I AM DETERMINED TO STAY HERE.

11. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, IN VIEW OF THE VIEWS BROUGHT FROM ISRAEL BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD INVOLVE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND FROM THE OIL FIELDS WOULD BE WITHIN THE REALM OF POSSIBILITY?

12. ANSWER: SADAT: I CAN ANSWER YOUR QUESTION ON THURSDAY, LET US HOPE, WHEN DR. KISSINGER RETURNS.

13. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, ARE THERE SOME SUBSTANTIAL AREAS ON WHICH YOU AND THE ISRAELIS DO AGREE?

14. ANSWER: SADAT: WELL, I THINK YOU SHOULD ASK THE SECRETARY THIS QUESTION.

15. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY? (LAUGHTER)

16. ANSWER: KISSINGER: I THINK THERE ARE SOME AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND THERE ARE SEVERAL SUBSTANTIAL AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT.

17. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU GET THE FEELING THAT THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS IN THE LAST SESSION HERE, IN THE LAST ROUND OF EXCHANGE?

18. ANSWER: SADAT: I HAVE THE THE IMPRESSION THAT, AS I TOLD YOU AT THE BEGINNING, IT IS A VERY HARD, DIFFICULT AND COMPLICATED ROUND.

19. QUESTION: MRS. PRESIDENT, THE ISRAELIS APPEAR TO BE TALKING ABOUT A DEMAND FOR THE ELEMENTS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NON-BELLIGERENCY FROM EGYPT. IS THIS ANY MORE ACCEPTABLE TO YOU THAN THE PER SE DEMAND FOR NON-BELLIGERENCY?

20. ANSWER: SADAT: I HAVE STATED OUR POSITION AND IT IS QUITE CLEAR. WE SHALL NOT AGREE TO NON-BELLIGERENCY AS LONG AS THERE IS ANY FOREIGN SOLDIER ON OUR LAND, AND I SAID THAT DOING SO MEANS THAT I AM INVITING THEM TO STAY, SO I THINK THAT THIS IS QUITE CLEAR.

21. QUESTION: THE IDEA OF JOINT PATROLS WITH ISRAEL, DR. KISSINGER, HAS BEEN DROPPED COMPLETELY?




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22. ANSWER: DR. KISSINGER: I THINK THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS PUT OUT A STATEMENT ON THE EGYPTIAN POSITION, WHICH IS CLEAR AND FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND HAS BEEN FULLY COMMUNICATED.
23. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A BUFFER ZONE IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE A STRENGTHENED UNITED NATIONS FORCE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND THE EGYPTIAN FORCES IF AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED?
24. ANSWER: SADAT: I THINK THIS IS QUITE NATURAL BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY THERE. THERE IS A BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN US IN WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATES, IT IS ALREADY THERE.
25. QUESTION: SO THAT ANY AREA THAT WILL BE EVACUATED BY THE ISRAELIS AS A PART OF A NEW AGREEMENT, COULD BE REPLACED OR COULD BE SOLDIERED BY UNITED NATIONS TROOPS? IS THAT CORRECT?
26. ANSWER: SADAT: WELL, YOU ARE DRIVING AGAIN TO TRY TO FIND SOME OF THE DETAILS OF WHAT WE ARE DISCUSSING.
27. QUESTION: THAT'S TRUE, SIR. (LAUGHTER)
28. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY: THE IDEAS YOU'LL BE CARRYING BACK TO ISRAEL NOW, ARE THEY A REFINEMENT OR ARE THEY SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE IDEAS YOU CARRIED BACK LAST FRIDAY?
29. ANSWER: KISSINGER: IN EACH ROUND THE IDEAS, OF COURSE, ADVANCE AND SOMETIMES COVER COLLATERAL AREAS. BUT I DON'T WANT TO GET DRAWN INTO A DISCUSSION OF WHETHER THEY ARE ENTIRELY NEW OR A REFINEMENT, BUT I THINK THEY REPRESENT, AS I HAVE SAID, ADDITIONAL INPUT FOR THE ISRAELI SIDE.
30. QUESTION: DO YOU THINK, DR. KISSINGER, THAT YOU CAN REACH AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE TIME OF THE RENEWAL OF THE UN FORCES?
31. ANSWER: KISSINGER: CERTAINLY, YES.
32. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU HAVE ANY TIME IDEA HOW LONG AN AGREEMENT MIGHT TAKE TO IMPLEMENT?
33. ANSWER: SADAT: WE HAVE NOT YER REACHED THIS POINT.
34. QUESTION: BUT WOULDN'T TIME BE A CRUCIAL ELEMENT, SOME IDEA OF HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE, WOULD THAT NOT BE A CRUCIAL ELEMENT?
35. ANSWER: SADAT: YOU WERE SPEAKING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND YOU ARE ASKING NOW ABOUT REACHING AN AGREEMENT.
36. QUESTION: MY POINT, MR. PRESIDENT, IS THERE HAS TO BE SOME UNDERSTANDING OF HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT BEFORE AN AGREEMENT COULD BE SIGNED.
37. ANSWER: SADAT: WHEN WE AGREE FIRST ON THE PRINCIPLES, I THINK THE PERIOD OF IMPLEMENTATION CAN BE



DISCUSSED AFTER THAT, BUT WE HAVE NOT YET AGREED UPON THE PRINCIPLES.

38. QUESTION: DO YOU THINK, DR. KISSINGER, YOU CAN EACH THE SAME KIND OF AGREEMENT?

39. ANSWER: SADAT: WE HAVE NOT YET AGREED UPON THE PRINCIPLES.

40. QUESTION: DO YOU THINK THERE CAN BE AT THE SAME TIME AN AGREEMENT ON THE SYRIAN FRONT?

41. ANSWER: KISSINGER: THE CONDITIONS IN THE DIFFERENT AREAS VARY, SO I DO NOT WANT TO SAY THAT PRINCIPLES CAN NECESSARILY BE AUTOMATICALLY APPLIED. BUT I HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY AND PUBLICLY THAT THE PROCESS OF PEACE APPLIES TO THE WHOLE AREA, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DO ITS UTMOST TO PROMOTE PEACE IN THE ENTIRE AREA.

42. QUESTION: HAVE YOU DISCUSSED BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND THE USA?

43. ANSWER: KISSINGER: WE ALWAYS DISCUSS OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, WHICH WE THINK ARE EXCELLENT. (THE PRESIDENT NODDED.)

44. QUESTION: DO YOU THINK THE IDEA OF A SINGLE ARAB DELEGATION MIGHT BE A WAY AROUND THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAELI OBJECTIONS TO DEALING WITH THE PLO IN GENEVA?

45. ANSWER: KISSINGER: WE HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS SORT OF IDEA, AND WHEN IT COMES TIME TO ORGANIZE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, WE CAN ADDRESS SPECIFIC ISSUES OF THIS NATURE.


46. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, DO YOU SEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF OPENING INDIRECT TRADE TO ISRAEL, OR INDIRECT TOURISM, FOLLOWING A WITHDRAWAL FROM PART OF THE SINAI?

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47. ANSWER SADAT: I'LL TELL YOU, UP TO THIS MOMENT WE DIDN'T AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THIS VERY LIMITED WITHDRAWAL, AND YOU ARE RAISING ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED THERE IN GENEVA AFTER THE FINAL SOLUTION. YOU CAN'T RAISE ISSUES LIKE THIS NOW.

48. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, YOU MUST HAVE AN IDEA THOUGH WHAT THE FINAL SOLUTION WOULD LOOK LIKE. CAN YOU GIVE US IN GENERAL TERMS WHAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE SO FAR AS A FINAL SOLUTION? WHERE WOULD ISRAEL EXIST? WHERE WOULD ITS BOUNDARIES IN GENERAL LAY?

49. ANSWER: SADAT: I HAVE ALREADY STATED THIS BEFORE--THE BORDERS OF '67. AND IF WE CAN SUCCEED IN GENEVA TO END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY I THINK WE WOULD MAKE A VERY BIG ACHIEVEMENT



FOR THIS GENERATION. SURE, AS I TOLD YOU BEFORE AND SO I HAVE STATED BEFORE ALSO, THE CORE OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM IS THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. SO IF WE CAN ACHIEVE IN OUR GENERATION THE END OF THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL AND SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION, IT WILL BE A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT.

50. QUESTION: WITH YOUR FORESIGHT, SIR, YOU ALWAYS SAY THIS GENERATION, CAN YOU LOOK TO THE NEXT GENERATION PERHAPS WITH YOUR FORESIGHT AND TELL US WHAT SITUATION YOU ENVISION BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS IN THE NEXT GENERATION?

51. ANSWER: SADAT: I HAVE SAID BEFORE IT DEPENDS UPON THEIR CONDUCT AND I CAN'T SPEAK FOR THE NEXT GENERATION.

52. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT; CLARIFICATION: DO YOU MEAN TO LEAVE THE IMPRESSION IN THIS CURRENT DISENGAGEMENT THAT YOU DON'T THINK IT SHOULD INCLUDE SUCH THINGS AS IMPROVED COMMERCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IMPROVED TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME PROPOSALS MADE IN ISRAEL THAT PART OF THE AGREEMENT CAN BE STEPS SUCH AS IMPROVING TRANSPORTATION FROM CAIRO TO TEL AVIV OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT.

53. ANSWER: SADAT: ARE YOU ASKING ME?

54. QUESTION: IN ANSWER TO A PREVIOUS QUESTION YOU SAID YOU THOUGHT THAT SUCH MATTERS SHOULD BE TAKEN UP ON GENEVA AND NOT WITHIN THIS DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.

55. ANSWER: SADAT: IT IS STILL PREMATURE AND IT IS REALLY ABSURD TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS AS THIS. AS I SAID, IF WE HAD REACHED A STATE OF ENDING THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL, THIS WOULD BE A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT FOR OUR GENERATION. THERE IS NO POINT AT ALL IN DISCUSSING THESE RELATIONS WHEN WE CAN'T AGREE UPON ENDING THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY.

56. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, JUST HOW SERIOUS WILL IT BE IF THESE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL?

57. ANSWER: SADAT: WELL, I HAVE TOLD MY PRESS THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT WE MAY NOT REACH ANY AGREEMENT AND WE ARE READY TO FACE WHATEVER COMES.

58. QUESTION: WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCES, SIR?

59. ANSWER: SADAT: WELL, AS THE BRITISH SAY, WE CAN'T CROSS THAT BRIDGE UNTIL WE REACH IT.

60. QUESTION: AND IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED, IS IT A BIG PUSH FOR PEACE?

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61. ANSWER: SADAT: SURE, IT WILL BE A TURNING POINT.

62. QUESTION: DR. KISSINGER, DO YOU BELIEVE IT IS AT THIS STAGE THE PALESTINIANS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THESE TALKS CONCERNING THEIR FUTURE?

63. ANSWER: KISSINGER: I THINK THE TWO PRESS CORPS ARE COMPETING IN ASKING PROVOCATIVE QUESTIONS.

64. QUESTION: MR. PRESIDENT, WHY DO YOU THINK IT WOULD BE A TURNING POINT? YOU SAID IT WOULD BE A TURNING POINT IF IT SUCCEEDS, COULD YOU ELABORATE?

65. ANSWER: SADAT: THE NEXT TIME, THE NEXT VISIT OF DR. KISSINGER, THEN I CAN ELABORATE.

66. ANSWER: THANK YOU.

67. FOR JERUSALEM: AMBASSADOR ANDERSON ASKS THAT YOU REPRODUCE THESE REMARKS AND HAVE MULTIPLE COPIES ON HAND FOR SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL. EILT

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

GCE SIDE:

PRESIDENT SADAT  
FOREIGN MINISTER FAIMY  
GENERAL GAMASY

US SIDE:

SECRETARY KISSINGER  
UNDER SECRETARY SISCO  
AMBASSADOR EILTS

PLACE:

ASWAN, EGYPT

DATE:

MARCH 18, 1975

Secretary Kissinger said that he had talked with the President and with Gamasy the previous evening. He could add very little to the meeting of the previous day. The Egyptian reaction was totally expected. He could not refuse to present the Israeli paper lest he be accused of transgressing his role and compromising his impartiality. If there is a break-up of negotiations, there will be a complicated battle at home. If President Sadat is prepared to give us a final Egyptian position, we will make a massive effort with the Israelis. Should this fail, we should consult on a common strategy on how to handle the situation with particular regard to two aspects:

- a) the problem of Egyptian-Israeli relations, and
- b) the problem of US-Egyptian relations.

The Secretary continued that we believe the strategy the President began earlier, as expressed in the October War, is correct. It must, if we stick by it, produce the desired results. The US will not tolerate being treated this way (if negotiations abort). Unless the President makes some radical move, we will continue on the same strategy.


The Israeli advance can be either through incompetence or ill-will. The Secretary opined it is the former. The

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rationality for those who believe it is ill-will is threefold:

- a) A US Presidential election is due next year and the Israelis may have decided to take their chances;
- b) the Israelis hope that the Congress will override the Administration, and
- c) the Israelis desire to get rid of the Secretary on the theory that only he is able to move them back.

In the Secretary's judgment, however, propositions b and c will not turn out to be true. We can discuss the matter further on Thursday, following the Secretary's return from Israel. There is still an opportunity to come to a conclusion.

President Sadat said that after the previous evening's talk, he was about to react that there was nothing new to warrant carrying on. The President felt, however, that such a position would be letting the Secretary down. He could appreciate the Israeli political judgment in opposing any step toward peace -- either it was a conceptual unwillingness or ill-will. If this is the Israeli attitude now, what will it be for every 50 kilometers? What will it be later? Nevertheless, in order not to let the Secretary down, the President had put down his last word.

The President then gave the Secretary the statement drafted by Fahmy. He noted it contained everything, including his statement in Paris. Although Fahmy had opposed this, he had no objection to stating it again, but it could not be in a substantive article.

After reading the Egyptian paper, the Secretary asked about para 3, i.e. to refrain from the use of force. If that article could stop after the phrase, "duration of this agreement," or some shorter version, this would be helpful.

The Secretary continued that if we were to put forward an American plan, it would be close to the President's proposals except for para 3. The Secretary acknowledged that the Egyptian paper represented a massive Egyptian effort for which he expressed appreciation.





The President recalled that when they had first talked, he had told the Secretary about the German problem: "Give them a finger and they will take the whole hand." The President expressed the fear that because of the incompetence of the Israeli leaders, we may involve ourselves in a very complicated negotiation. If he had given the Secretary the paper earlier, they would have raised trouble on the military side. The Secretary said that everything Egypt is doing must be done in the context of a satisfactory military solution. The US will not participate in anything that would provide ammunition for the President's opponents. If the President would allow the Secretary to put forward the Egyptian ideas, the Secretary would say he would bring it to the President if the "conditionality" (duration of the agreement) is removed.

Fahmy intervened to say that the Egyptian proposals must be presented as an American proposal. The Secretary agreed. On para 4, the Secretary noted his understanding that this would be done in a letter from the United States to the Egyptians. Nevertheless the President should know that this might be leaked. The President said he was prepared for this.

On para 2, the Secretary said that if a war of attrition breaks out on the Syrian front, the Israelis will clearly retaliate. While the US can prevent a preemptive war, it cannot do so if Asad begins a war of attrition. The President thought the Syrians will not start a war of attrition. The Secretary indicated that, in his view, Israel will not do so either. However, they must have the right to retaliate. Fahmy intervened to say this was very normal. He thought if the US could promise these two points, this would be agreeable.

On Article 6, regarding Syria, the Secretary said he would like to phrase this to be consistent with his talks with Asad. The Secretary recalled he had told Asad that disengagement is not a viable solution for the Golan, but that there might be an interim agreement. Moreover, it will be difficult to do anything by the middle of 1975. Something along the lines that a maximum effort will be made to move along as rapidly as possible might be used, and for this the Secretary could get President Ford's approval.

President Sadat asked about the UNDOF mandate. The Secretary said his impression is if we can get something started by May, Asad will go along with it. If he, the Secretary, returned to Damascus one more time and goes back in late April or early May, he thought Asad would accept. This was also the impression that Deputy Primin Haydar had conveyed. The President said he had already suggested earlier that the Secretary go to Syria in late April or early May.



Apart from the above, the Secretary said he had no further points on the Egyptian paper. Fahmy said the items mentioned in para 12 would be the subject of a letter from the US. The Secretary agreed, but said the letter would contain the language of the Vladivostok statement with the USSR.

The Secretary added that paras 4, 6, 12 and 13 will not be presented to the Israelis at this time. Fahmy agreed, noting that these points dealt with the US. The Secretary opined that these should take place only after the general signature of an agreement.

President Sadat acknowledged that, despite what had earlier been discussed, he was deeply disappointed. The President said he would almost prefer if the Israeli reaction were ill-will, which would mean that Egypt has an opponent whose purpose is unquestionable. The Secretary reiterated, however, that both Rabin and Allon are acting from incompetence. If we remain on our present course, he thought the present Israeli group wants peace.

They want non-belligerency for two reasons:

- a) domestic and b) moving towards a genuine peace.

The Secretary recalled that he understood and predicted the Egyptian reaction. He indicated his deep disappointment with the Israeli reaction. However, he believed it might be in connection with a crisis situation. In this kind of a situation, there is a point after which things move. He thought this might be the situation in Israel.

The Secretary then outlined his plan as follows:

He would present the Egyptian ideas orally rather than as a paper. This, in his judgment, is wiser, since it will reduce possibilities of a leak. He would state it is his impression that is President Sadat's final position. Second, he would add an extremely strong American statement to the presentation. He had first considered sending a letter from President Ford, but decided this would be wrong. The Israelis would think he wrote it and view it as a sign of weakness on the part of the Secretary. Instead, therefore, he had sent word to President Ford asking his approval about what he might say.

His remarks will be very strong. Regardless of the results of the dispute, he would not be here if he did not believe there was a chance of succeeding. We would not have proposed the two-stage approach if he had not thought it could succeed. We had been led to believe (by the Israelis) that the negotiations might be difficult, but satisfactory in the end.

The Secretary again noted that should the negotiations abort, we have to think about Egyptian-Israeli relations and Egyptian-US relations. For us it is a problem of the position of the US in general. At the same time, the Secretary believed that US-Arab relations should not atrophy. Therefore, it is important these be given another chance.

The President agreed. He indicated he would answer in detail, but would not let the Secretary down. The Secretary said it is a question of evolution of the area and why.

The President noted that this begins with his personal relations with the Secretary. Thereafter, it is a matter of the impact on peace and the future of the area. The Secretary agreed. He recalled he had always visualized that sooner or later more forces would be mobilized against him. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that this is the case. Unfortunately, we were faced with the resignations of a President and a Vice President in 1974. Nevertheless, we will see later that evening (in Israel) what the Israelis would do. If they reject the ideas, the Secretary proposed that we then discuss a common strategy which we will implement. The Secretary's idea is to come on Thursday. He did not know what kind of Israeli reaction there would be after he takes them the President's strong views. If the negotiations remain in progress, he would go back Thursday night (now Friday). Otherwise, he would go back late that night or early on Friday. There are no Israeli papers on Saturday to carry the news. He could get back to the US before Israelis started their public news media going. If the Secretary agreed, the President would not announce the abortion of the negotiations for a few hours. The Secretary said he would agree. We should come out as we began the exercise.

The Secretary thought there was a 60-40 chance that the Israelis will reconsider. The President opined this is overly optimistic.



The Secretary suggested the President consider carefully concretely what can be done between the US and Egypt in the event of an abortion. It might be very important to have a meeting with President Ford. It might not be elaborate (as official) a meeting, but a business meeting. Perhaps, as an alternate possibility, such a meeting could take place in Europe. The President said this will have to be considered.

The President indicated there should not be a concrete announcement until there have been further discussions on how talks go in Israel. We would not have to decide until Thursday.

Thereafter, the President and the Secretary met privately for another half-hour prior to a lunch at the Presidency for the participants in the talks.

AMB:HFrElts:ajc - 3/20/75





MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 18, 1975

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass the following message to you:

"I completed a two-hour meeting this morning with President Sadat at which he presented me with further Egyptian modifications of their position in order to make a final try with the Israelis. I will now meet with the Israelis this evening underscoring that Sadat, in my judgment, has carried the political concessions, in return for withdrawal, as far as he is able.

"He has committed himself to refrain from the use of force which every man in the street will interpret more or less synonymously as no different than a non-belligerency pledge. He has agreed to renew the UN force mandate annually and has given us a formula which, for all practical purposes, amounts to an indefinite commitment. He has linked the agreement to no other agreement, and therefore, meets the point made by the Israelis that the agreement must stand on its own feet. And finally, by agreeing that the agreement will remain in effect until it is superseded by another agreement, it meets the key Israeli point that it is open-ended.

"The meeting was somber. Sadat said all of this more in sorrow than in anger, repeating often that he was very disappointed in the Israeli reaction, and underscoring that he has lost faith that Israel can be worked with as a peace partner in the future. Time and again, however, as I previously reported to you, he stressed that he would not permit failure of this agreement to affect our relations adversely. I believe this to be his intention, but henceforth events will dictate positions. And on a whole series of issues he will have to side with the radical Arabs. He had a number of laudatory things to say about you which I will wish to report to you personally upon my return.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED


E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/89, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

HR, 10/01/03



"I deeply appreciate your prompt response to my message and the go ahead which you have given me in presenting our case strongly and firmly to the Israelis tonight."







CHECK LIST  
TALKING POINTS FOR JERUSALEM

MARCH 18, 1975

1. Tonight I want to do three things:

-- I want to begin by recalling what it is we have been talking about since we began discussing this agreement last summer. We have to have some perspective on what it is we have been trying to achieve.

-- Second, I want to review what we have achieved so far in this negotiation and to give you a report on my talks with Sadat.

-- Third, I want to look at the two courses ahead -- if we succeed and if we fail..

2. First, what have we been trying to do? Last summer there were two elements in our strategy:

-- You told us you needed time to consolidate your position and we succeeded in putting negotiations off for nine months until now. The cost was very high: Israel lost a chance to negotiate with the Arab leader (Hussein) who had in effect already conceded de facto non-belligerency and could have preempted the PLO on the West Bank. Sadat's position at home and in the Arab world was weakened because his policy produced no visible results. But we went along with the strategy and, to be fair, we had our own domestic problems.

-- In the negotiations, our hope was to achieve another move that would maintain a momentum in the peace process, maintain our control over the process, strengthen the more reasonable Arab Governments without forcing Israel to confront all at once the issues of a final settlement as starkly posed by President Asad in his Newsweek interview.

-- In the talks that we have had on this subject, there can be no misunderstanding about the kind of agree

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY Hrc DATE 10/01/03



ment we were talking about. During Allon's three visits (July, December, January), Prime Minister Rabin's visit in September, and in my three trips (October, November, February), we repeated again and again that the Egyptians could not give non-belligerency and/or a permanent renunciation of the military option for a withdrawal that left Israel in control of most of the Sinai, but that we should aim for an agreement that would include some useful concrete elements of non-belligerency. I thought this was understood. This was the assumption on which I based my present trip.

- Since I arrived on this trip, I have found the Israeli Cabinet and negotiating team continuing to operate on the premise that non-belligerency -- however it is formulated -- is a realistic objective now in exchange for a withdrawal which would leave Israel in control of most of the Sinai. The formulation that I took to Aswan was full non-belligerency without the name, the wording as well as the elements. Sadat could not accept either formulation. Sadat saw it as in effect humiliating in the eyes of his own people and the Arab world. He has, however, offered ideas of his own.

3. So much for the history. Where are we now? What have we achieved in these negotiations? Although the Israeli characterization is that Sadat has given "nothing," Sadat has in fact made significant concessions on the issues which Israel has identified as most important, and I think we are now dealing with the maximum he can do.

a. On the elements of non-belligerency and the non-use of force, the Egyptians are now prepared to accept the following:

- This is not a final agreement but a significant step towards peace. Egypt declares that peace is its objective.
- Non-resort to force without a time limit. "Considering that the Middle East crisis will not ultimately be solved by military force but rather by peaceful means.... Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement."



- Settlement of disputes by peaceful means without a time limit.
- No formal linkage of this agreement to another agreement.


b. On the question of concrete steps toward peace, we did not during this visit to Aswan go further into the concrete points Israel has raised but I believe some further movement may well be possible on a number of them. There is no need to detail these now because it will sidetrack us from the key issues. (FYI: They are:

- Adequate policing of the buffer zone.
- Movement of Arabs in the Sinai and the Gaza to and from Egyptian-held territory.
- We might get some refinement on the question of cruise ships and charter flights going to both Egypt and Israel.
- On propaganda, we would get some reduction, perhaps in specific categories.
- On economic warfare, we can make pragmatic gains on the boycott.
- Cessation of diplomatic pressures is difficult for him, but we might be able to get him to be passive.
- Freedom of navigation is fully covered.
- Canal passage of cargoes is fully covered.
- Joint Committee is accepted in principle, at least in relation to UNEF, and its functions might be expanded.)

c. On the duration of the agreement, Egypt has accepted:

- This agreement will be in effect until it is superseded by another agreement.

d. On the duration of the UN force, Egypt has agreed to the following formulation: "The UNEF will continue its function and its mandate will be extended annually




e. On military lines and deployment, Egypt seems prepared to drop its demand for occupation of the passes, but this depends on substantially meeting Gamasy's last proposal (Egypt in the west end of the passes). Although we have not pressed this, we think it would be possible to discuss force balances.

4. As I said, I think we are now dealing with the maximum Sadat can do, and I believe it is considerable given his political realities. I think it is the best agreement Israel can get, and far better than no agreement. It does not mean there are no more difficult decisions ahead, but it would mean Israel would face them in a stronger position internationally, with a more manageable political situation in the area, and above all with United States influence over events enhanced rather than weakened. If, however, Israeli realities make an agreement on this basis impossible, I think it is time to assess the consequences of not going on to build an agreement around this position. I would like to make these points:

a. I have reported fully to President Ford on the details of our last meeting and the position taken by the Israeli Government.

b. The consequences of failure are so serious for both Israel and the U.S. that it is essential that Israel reconsider its fundamental position in light of the latest concrete ideas which Egypt has asked me to convey to you. Failure to achieve a second-stage Egyptian-Israeli agreement, after months of arduous preparatory discussions in which the U.S. has been so directly involved, affects the vital interests of the U.S. and of Israel. In the Middle East, there is going to be a sharp swing away from the West and moderation, with radicalism and the USSR the only beneficiaries. The hopeful shift towards peace, even in Syria, will be lost. This will touch such countries as Saudi Arabia and Western Europe to protect its position in the Arab world, will dissociate from us. Iran, which has been betting on us, will accelerate its own cause. The Soviet Union will remerge in an increasingly strong position. There will be a very great risk of a costly war of attrition between Israel and its Arab neighbors. I am convinced, after my talks in Syria, Egypt and Jordan that this is the case.



c. Failure of these negotiations will also have an adverse influence going well beyond the Middle East. The economic repercussions for the West could be disastrous, as well as the ensuing political shifts in Western Europe. We are being asked to finance a stalemate threatening our interests in all parts of the world.

d. All of this is the result because Israel either accidentally or deliberately misled the U.S. and even the moderate Arab states.

e. Israel's inability to be responsive enough to achieve a successful negotiation cannot but have far-reaching repercussions in the U.S. Failure of these negotiations will require an overall reassessment of the policies of the U.S. that has brought us to this point.

f. I have been asked to make these points with the full authority and approval of President Ford.

g. If, on the other hand, we can achieve an agreement, we can avert the worst of these consequences and maintain the present trend toward moderation and peace in the Middle East.

5. In summary, I believe that we now have two choices:

-- We can try to build an agreement around something very close to this position. If that is to be possible, I must go back to Aswan with a line that meets Sadat's most basic concerns. If Israel cannot accept this position as an Egyptian one but could accept it as a U.S. proposal, I am prepared to put it forth as such.

-- If we cannot develop an agreement, I will report to Sadat and come back briefly to Israel to announce that I am returning to the United States to assess the situation with the President and the Congress.

6. I will go to Saudi Arabia tomorrow and will return to Jerusalem tomorrow evening.


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Attached are:

TAB A - The new Egyptian paper.

TAB B - The Israeli formulations you took to Aswan.

TAB C - The basic Israeli paper.



Considering that the Middle East crisis will not ultimately be solved by military force but rather by peaceful means;

Desirous to reach ultimately the final and just peaceful settlement prescribed by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end, Egypt and Israel agree to conclude the following disengagement agreement:

1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from the oilfields including the town of El Tor.

2- The new lines will be drawn on the following basis:

a) the Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to a new line east of the passes;

b) the Egyptian forces will move up to the western entrance of the passes;

c) the area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed;

d) the area between the new Israeli line and a line ten kilometers to the east of it will be limited



in armament and forces;

3) the area between the new Egyptian line and a line ten kilometers to the west of it will be limited in armament and forces.

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

4- Nothing in this agreement would prevent Egypt from exercising its right to self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

5- The United Nations Emergency Force will continue in its function and its mandate will be extended annually.

6- A committee under the auspices of the United Nations or the chairmanship of the UN Chief of Staff will be established in order that military representatives of the parties discuss, in the zone of disengagement, problems arising from the implementation of this agreement.




7- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories.

8- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed timetable indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within three months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing of the present agreement.

9- Nothing in this agreement precludes the reconvening of the Geneva Conference which is to take place at the earliest possible date with the participation of all the parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

10- This disengagement agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement.


11- This disengagement agreement remains valid until superseded by a new agreement.





New article 3

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement.



3.

NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves, not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. They will refrain from all military or paramilitary actions, from any warlike and hostile acts and any other forms of warfare.

NOTE : This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).



March 17, 1975

NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means.

They will refrain from permitting, encouraging, assisting, or participating in any military, paramilitary or hostile actions, from any warlike or hostile acts and any other form of warfare or hostile activity against the other Party anywhere.

Note: This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975

Y. A.



ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

- (1) This agreement will remain in force until superseded by a peace agreement.
- (2) Undertakings regarding the duration of the agreement.
- (3) The parties recognize that the conflict between them cannot be solved by force.

Other Formulations to be included :

- (a) This is not a peace agreement it is a significant step towards just and lasting peace between them (in accordance ...etc.)
- (b) References in the agreement to some of the practical steps agreed.

March 17, 1975



PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

- (1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :



- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.

(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.



- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva

The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.



(7) Lines

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently , after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

11.3.75







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