

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 November 2005

TO: AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan in his hometown of Al-Hudaida.

2. The detainee said he wanted the opportunity to train in Afghanistan because it was his duty as a Muslim to be trained. He had no intentions of fighting in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee left for Pakistan at the end of July 2001. He traveled to Karachi and stayed at the Dubai hotel and the Madafat Riyad guesthouse. The detainee then traveled to Quetta where he stayed at the Daftar Al-Taliban guesthouse. From there he went to Kandahar and stayed at the Madafat Al-Nibras.

4. The detainee stayed at a school, where a senior al Qaida operative was working, in the vicinity of Barmal, Afghanistan when he was fleeing Afghanistan.

5. From Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee fled to Zurmat. He then crossed over the border and went to Lahore, Pakistan.

6. The detainee then left Lahore and went to Karachi, Pakistan, where he was hidden in several places. When things got dangerous in Karachi, he was told to go to Chabahar, Iran.

7. While detainee was attempting to travel to Yemen via Chabahar, Iran he and his travel companion were detained, questioned and released by Iranian police at a roadside checkpoint located on the main road to Chabahar from Zahedan, Iran.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1

Page 1 of 3

000694

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI**

8. While at the Iranian checkpoint, the detainee claims he was beaten and questioned. The Iranian police officers attempted to speak to detainee in several languages. The detainee claimed he did not speak throughout the encounter with the Iranian police because he had been given instructions at the start of his journey to not reveal that he was an Arab.

9. The detainee went back to Quetta, Pakistan with eight other Arabs and then went to Lahore. He stayed one month in Lahore, Pakistan.

10. The detainee stated he attended a religious speech to al Qaida operatives.

11. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida member.

### b. Training

1. The detainee then traveled to the Al-Farouq training camp. He stayed at a reception tent that was located about 50 meters from the actual camp for five days before starting training with his group. He received training on the Kalashnikov, pistol, Beka, RPG and the Magnoona. The detainee only trained for 25 days because the camp closed due to United States bombing.

2. All the trainees in the Al Farouq camp were told to go home because it was not safe there due to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. On approximately 13 September 2001, trainees were transported to the Al Nebras guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. An identified al Qaida member claimed the detainee took part in explosive training.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee said he saw Usama bin Laden at several lectures.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested at the apartments in Karachi's defense II commercial area where a two and one half hour long firefight between Arabs and Pakistani security forces ensued. Two handguns and three Russian style grenades were recovered from the scene. A Kalashnikov rifle and a submachine gun used by the Arabs were also seized by police officials.

2. The detainee stated the weapons were kept in a small suitcase in a common room. Also in the room were some computer equipment and other things kept behind a curtain.

3. A computer was recovered in the safe house where the detainee was arrested. The computer contained information on flight navigation maps and flight simulators.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI**

4. The computer recovered during the detainee's arrest contained a manual that discussed kidnapping, hijacking, smuggling various things into countries or states and al Qaida documents about artillery and different types of mortars.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. According to the detainee he never used the computer and did not know what was on it.
- b. The detainee stated he had no information regarding imminent terrorist attacks worldwide.
- c. The detainee emphatically denied he trained on explosives. He insisted that whoever claimed that he had explosives training is either lying or mistook his identity.
- d. The detainee expressed some anger about Sheiks who issue Fatwas, then recant. The detainee said that clerics make you believe you will burn in hell if you do not participate in Fatwas and jihad.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 November 2005

TO: AL MAYTHALI, HA IL AZIZ AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAYTHALI, HA IL AZIZ AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. After hearing about training camps in Afghanistan, the detainee traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
    2. The detainee said he used al Qaida routes and al Qaida methods to flee Afghanistan
    3. The detainee was arrested at a terrorist safe house where an al Qaida computer along with detailed al Qaida documents were found.
    4. The detainee stayed at two different guesthouses in Kabul, Afghanistan.
    5. One of the guesthouses the detainee stayed at in Kabul is a known al Qaida guesthouse.
  - b. Training
    1. The detainee attended basic training at the al Farouq camp in December of 2000. He was trained on the use of rocket-propelled grenade launchers, AK-47, PK machine gun and the Makarov Pistol.
    2. The detainee stated he was also trained in trench digging, disguise techniques, escape methods, evasion and map reading.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000697

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAYTHALI, HA IL AZIZ AHMED**

3. The detainee claimed he attended a personal security course to learn how to legally acquire passport documents in foreign countries.

4. The detainee received additional light weapons training at the Malik Center outside of Kabul, Afghanistan.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee claimed seeing Usama Bin Laden while at al Farouq but later changed his story and said he never saw Usama Bin Laden at al Farouq.

2. The detainee was identified by a senior al Qaida operative as having worked as a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden.

3. The detainee stayed at an apartment in Karachi, Pakistan where he was visited by a senior al Qaida operative who asked the detainee to be patient and then the detainee would be able to return to his country when things settled down.

4. A known al Qaida facilitator assisted the detainee in fleeing Afghanistan to a safehouse in Karachi, Pakistan.

### d. Intent

The detainee's name was listed on a letter from a senior al Qaida operative to another al Qaida operative for a planned future terrorist attack against on multiple targets.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.

b. The detainee denies knowledge of the letter listing the detainee's name in a future attack against United States interests.

c. The detainee claims he is not a member of al Qaida.

d. The detainee claims feeling pressured by Pakistani interrogators to admit attending an al Qaida security course at the Kandahar Airport and now denies attending the course.

e. The detainee claims he operated in a support role and did not participate in direct combat against the Northern Alliance.

UNCLASSIFIED

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAYTHALL, HA IL AZIZ  
AHMED**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

23 November 2005

TO: NASHIR, SA ID SALIH SA ID

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASHIR, SA ID SALIH SA ID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was recruited to travel to Afghanistan after talking to his neighbor about the neighbor's travels to Yemen and Afghanistan. The neighbor told the detainee that he could go to Afghanistan for basic training. The neighbor gave the detainee \$100 U.S. dollars for a plane ticket and \$200 U.S. dollars spending money.

2. The detainee's neighbor was identified by a foreign government service as a Yemeni Jihadist.

3. The detainee was very inspired by Usama bin Laden's speech at al Farouq.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained at the al Farouq camp.

2. The detainee was trained to use the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades, land mines, Composition-3 (C-3) and Composition-4 (C-4) explosives.

3. The detainee was also trained to use a pistol and read maps.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed in a Taliban guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistan and the Nebras guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan on the way to the training camp.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000700

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASHIR, SA ID SALIH SA ID**

2. The detainee saw Usama bin Laden on 2 occasions at al Farouq. In August 2001, Bin Laden gave a speech and talked about Jihad, fighting America, possible attacks on America, the USS Cole and the embassies in Africa.

3. Upon completion of his training at the al Farouq camp, the detainee returned to the guesthouse in Kandahar for approximately one week.

4. After the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and told by al Qaida members to guard a Kandahar airport.

5. At the airport, the detainee guarded a large one-story building that belonged to Usama bin Laden.

6. The airport near Kandahar was not in use at the time the detainee guarded it. The purpose for guarding the airport was to prevent the United States from using it.

7. The detainee stayed at the airport until 3 December 2001 when the Taliban took over the guard positions.

8. The detainee worked as a guard at the Kandahar airport from 12 September 2001 until sometime in November 2001. The detainee identified a man who was a group leader of about 10 people at the airport area in Kandahar.

9. The airport group leader is an al Qaida leader, a veteran Afghan fighter and head of the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse named Khan Ghulam Bashah.

10. After withdrawing from the airport the detainee traveled to a valley between Zurmut and Khost, Afghanistan that contained many caves. The detainee stayed in the caves for a period of approximately ten days, during which time the Taliban provided food.

11. The detainee spent approximately nine weeks moving between Afghanistan and Pakistan staying at various houses, eventually settling in Karachi, Pakistan.

12. At some point, a senior al Qaida operational planner visited the apartment the detainee was living in at the time. After the planner's visit, the detainee was told it was time to go to Iran.

13. The detainee was taken to an al Qaida operative's house in Karachi, Pakistan, where he met a senior al Qaida operational planner. The detainee greeted the senior al Qaida operational planner and received \$1000 U.S. dollars for travel expenses to get back to Yemen.

14. The homeowner was a prominent member of al Qaida who was subordinate to the senior al Qaida operational planner.

UNCLASSIFIED



## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASHIR, SA ID SALIH SA ID**

15. The homeowner was responsible for detainee and the others in the apartment before they were arrested. The homeowner brought money for them, provided some of them with passports and facilitated their travel out of Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

The Pakistani police arrested the detainee in Karachi on 11 September 2002. There were two or three grenades, one Kalashnikov and two pistols in the apartment he was living in when he was arrested.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee went to Afghanistan to prepare to fight the Jews, not the Christians.
- b. The detainee stated he would not harm an American if he happened to see one in Yemen.
- c. The detainee stated he would never kill innocent women and children in the United States because it is against his religion.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

18 July 2005

TO: MOHAMMED, AKHTAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, AKHTAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee worked for Nasim, the leader of the Behsood Security post, and Gul Karim, the head of the security forces in Jalalabad.

2. The detainee identified an Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) compound.

3. The HIG is a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party and was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, the HIG ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. The HIG offered to shelter Bin Ladin after he fled Sudan in 1996.

b. Intent

1. Akta Mohammad, of Marah Warah, was the operations subcommander for the 21 September 2002 rocket attack on United States forces in Asasabad.

2. The detainee was identified as a heavy machine gun operator for the Taliban and from the Konar Province.

3. The detainee worked near Jalalabad at the Behsood Bridge security post. His job was to protect the bridge and be visible to protect the roads.

c. Other Relevant Data

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000703

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, AKHTAR**

The detainee stated that it was probably his tribal enemies who gave false information to the Americans accusing him of being a Taliban commander.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee stated he did not support or work for the Taliban.
  - b. The detainee said he did not want the United States to leave Afghanistan.
  - c. The detainee stated ordinary people are happy with the Americans and are not happy with the warlords.
  
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

5 August 2005

**TO: NASIM, MOHAMMED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASIM, MOHAMMED**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

**a. Commitment**

1. Detainee admitted to being responsible for the 28 Aug 2002 rocket attack at Jalalabad Airport, which struck close to a team of U.S. Army soldiers.

2. Detainee was captured with a Russian artillery officer's compass, a blasting circuit tester and three rocket motors.

3. Source reporting states the detainee was pro-Taliban and was the former governor of the Zabul province, during the time the Taliban was in power.

**b. Training**

1. Detainee stated he was trained by Shir Jan to fire rockets.

2. Detainee was witnessed at a training camp south of Kandahar near the Shorandam mountain. According to the individual who witnessed the detainee at the camp, the detainee was supposed to attend missile training at an Arab training camp.

**c. Connections/Associations**

1. Reporting states the detainee was a former Hezb-E Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG) commander.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000705

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASIM, MOHAMMED**

2. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has long established ties with Usama Bin Ladin. HIG was known to have several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was the pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. The founder of HIG was known to have sheltered Usama Bin Ladin after he fled the Sudan. HIG was staged small attacks in its attempt to force US troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.

3. Detainee has been connected to Shir Jan.

4. Shir Jan is a known anti-American and is responsible for recruitment of operatives in actions against U.S. and coalition forces. Shir Jan was directly involved in the 28 August 2002 rocket attack on Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

### **d. Intent**

1. Afghan officials decided to arrest the detainee when they discovered that he was on the verge of launching another attack.

2. Reporting states the detainee fought directly against U.S. forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and has been with the Taliban for 5-6 years.

### **e. Other Relevant Data**

1. While at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, Cuba, the detainee has been witnessed by MP's acting as a lookout.

2. Detainee has assaulted Guantanamo Bay MP's.

3. Detainee has participated in riots in the camp at Guantanamo Bay.

4. Detainee has been witnessed by Guantanamo Bay MP's practicing his martial arts.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

Detainee claims their rockets were not powerful enough to kill a chicken, because they were so weak.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 August 2005

TO: NASIR, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASIR, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was identified as a student at jihad madrassas preparing for the front lines.
2. The detainee reportedly disclosed that he had been involved in a grenade attack against a U.S. military truck in Kabul City, Afghanistan, and then fled to a mosque.

b. Training

The detainee was reportedly seen in a military training camp in the Peshwar province of Pakistan before he was captured. The detainee was training in the use of rockets, heavy machine guns, AK-47's, and hand grenades.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that while attending the Taleemolquran Madrassa, Qari Anhamullah asked him numerous times to join the Taliban.
2. The detainee stated Qari Inamullah was a good character, but he knew he was involved in the Taliban.
3. Detainee stated Qari Inamullah claimed to be a driver for a high level Taliban official. Inamullah told the detainee he often traveled to Afghanistan to meet with this official. Inamullah also claimed to be on Taliban business when going to Lahore, Pakistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000707

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASIR, ABDUL**

4. Qari Anhamullah invited the detainee to another madrassa located in Wana, Pakistan.
5. Qari Anhamullah paid for all of the detainee's expenses during the six weeks he stayed in Wana, Pakistan.
6. Wana, Pakistan is an area known as an ingress and egress route for al Qaida and the Taliban to flee into Pakistan.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. While at Wana, Pakistan, the detainee and 30 individuals attacked an American base.
  2. Upon arriving at the location Qari Anhamullah handed the detainee an AK-47, which the detainee accepted. The detainee witnessed Qari Anhamullah firing an RPG at the American base. The detainee stated Anhamullah was the leader of the attack.
  3. The detainee stated the attack only lasted a moment before they fled. The detainee stated he could not remember the direction he was supposed to go to regroup. He was then met by American and Afghan soldiers. He surrendered and was detained.
  4. The detainee was captured with seven hand grenades and a magazine for the AK-47.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated Inamullah admitted to tricking him into going along with the attack on the American base.
  - b. The detainee stated he never fired his weapon in the attack on the American base.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO: NASRULLAH, FNU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASRULLAH, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee is identified as having been a member of the Taliban four years before the United States attacked Afghanistan.
    2. The detainee was conscripted into the Taliban around 1997 or 1998 where he worked for approximately 60 days as a clerk and a guard.
    3. In 1997, the detainee served 12 days as a secretary to a senior Taliban Official because the detainee could read and write. As a secretary, the detainee wrote money orders for other commanders and wrote receipts.
    4. The detainee states he was a soldier and did not know the political or military issues.
    5. The detainee is identified as joining a 40-man group after the end of the Taliban regime.
    6. The detainee told another individual that he lied to his interviewers and actually did fight for the Taliban against United States forces while at Mazar-e-Sharif.
    7. The detainee told another individual he was part of the uprising at the compound that was surrounded by United States and Northern Alliance forces and later used as a prison.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000709



## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASRULLAH, FNU**

8. The detainee told another individual he retreated with Taliban forces to the compound and he was able to escape with approximately 80 others after the uprising.

9. The detainee was captured delivering a letter to a former Taliban Brigade Commander. The letter was from a high-ranking Taliban Commander who requested the Brigade Commander to report to Quetta, Pakistan to fight and avoid capture by the Americans.

#### b. Training

The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and a pistol while he was at Mazar-e-Sharif.

#### c. Intent

The detainee told another individual that when he got back to Afghanistan he would get even with the interviewers.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan to receive medical treatment. That was the only time the detainee had been outside Afghanistan.

#### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied knowledge of a 40-man unit, that weapons were found at his home, or that he had any further association with the Taliban other than the two months he was a conscript.

b. The detainee denied being involved with any extremist groups.

c. The detainee states he does not hate Americans, but if Americans know in their hearts that he is innocent and keep him in jail on purpose, then they are not humane.

d. The detainee did not have a satellite telephone.

e. The detainee's future plans are to provide for his family.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 October 2005

TO: ISMAT ULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAT ULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee admitted that he was a Taliban soldier and that he freely went to serve with the Taliban because he had to.

2. The detainee has been a member of the Taliban since approximately 1997.

3. The detainee stated that during his approximate one-year term with the Taliban he served as a guard for a checkpoint in Dara Sufe.

4. The detainee was a sub-Commander of some members of a 40-man unit. This unit fought at Tora Bora and escaped to Peshawar, Pakistan.

5. This 40-man Taliban team was under the control of Commander Akhund Zada. The team was part of the front line against the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

1. The detainee said that his team carried AK-47's and the Taliban taught them how to use the weapons in Dara Sufe.

2. The detainee is a good driver and knows how to use rockets and heavy machine guns.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000711

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAT ULLAH

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's direct Taliban Commander was Akhund Zada.
2. The detainee is also associated with another Taliban Commander. The detainee admitted delivering a letter for this Taliban Commander to a person in the Oruzgan Province of Afghanistan. The detainee later found out the person in Oruzgan Province was a top Taliban leader.
3. The detainee was tasked to deliver four letters to a known Taliban leader from high-level Taliban leaders in hiding.
4. The detainee is associated with another detainee who admitted fighting against United States troops in Kandahar.
5. The detainee is affiliated with an Egyptian terrorist and individuals who were backed by al Qaida and fought against United States troops.
6. The detainee was part of Usama Bin Laden's main security escort detail assisting Usama Bin Laden out of Afghanistan.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. Oruzgan authorities captured the detainee just outside of Chenartoo, Afghanistan. The Governor of Oruzgan and his men arrested the detainee.
2. The detainee had an AK-47 in the vehicle he was driving when Afghani soldiers captured him.
3. The detainee is a Taliban Commander and the Taliban issued him a station wagon.
4. The detainee joined the Taliban because he wanted the same rights as the others who lived in the Oruzgan area.
5. Another man and the detainee had planned to kidnap the Oruzgan Province Governor's son in exchange for releasing prisoners in Kandahar. The detainee also talked about killing the Governor by bombing his office.
6. The detainee primarily operated against United States personnel in the Oruzgan Province, Lashkar Gah and Helmand. The detainee's intent was to bomb or strike soft targets primarily using AK-47's.
7. The detainee had a satellite telephone to stay in contact with other unit commanders.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ISMAT ULLAH**

8. The detainee lived in a house in a neighborhood owned by the Taliban.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee stated that he did not voluntarily work for the Taliban Military but was forced to work for them if he wanted to stay in his house in Kandahar.
  - b. The detainee stated that he is not against the Americans and is not aware of any planned attacks against the Americans.
  - c. The detainee denied knowing anything about Usama Bin Laden or being part of a team that escorted Usama Bin Laden out of Afghanistan.
  - d. The detainee denied ever having a satellite phone or driving a Taliban vehicle because only commanders had vehicles.
  - e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 November 2005

To: **SANGARYAR, RAHMATULLAH**

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SANGARYAR, RAHMATULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

When the detainee was very young he joined the Mujahadeen to fight the Soviet Union.

b. Training

The detainee is trained in the use of hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, the AK-47 and the Sakil machine gun.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee met with Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Supreme Leader of the Taliban, on only one occasion in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee was listed as a member of the Senior Staff of Taliban Defense Ministry Personnel.

d. Intent

1. The detainee was identified as being assigned to a 40-man team of fighters.

2. The 40-man team was funded primarily by Pakistani and Syrian Non-Government Organizations with some ties to al Qaida.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000714

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SANGARYAR, RAHMATULLAH**

3. The detainee was reported as being named the new Director of Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin cell operations in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee commanded over 500 Taliban soldiers in Kabul.

2. The detainee fought the Northern Alliance and the Taliban as the Supreme Commander in Kabul.

f. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee survived approximately 18 bullet wounds that apparently occurred during the Russian Jihad and during his time as a Taliban Commander.

2. The detainee was told he would be turned over to the United States to provide information about enemies of the Afghanistan Government.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has a strong desire to return home to family and find work as a laborer.

b. The detainee believes he is being treated fairly and holds no grudge against any Americans.

c. The detainee believes he was handed over to the United States Government to provide intelligence information and not for suspicion of being a terrorist.

d. The detainee claimed he is not against United States Forces and he supports the new Afghanistan Government.

e. The detainee reported a Taliban recruitment request to the legitimate regional governor as he was instructed.

f. The detainee claimed to have fought the Taliban when the Taliban threatened Kabul's interests.

g. The detainee collected weapons from his tribesmen and turned over six small cars, one truck, two mounted anti-aircraft weapons, 39 Kalashnikovs, two RPG-7's, four PK's, two 82 series machine guns and six handheld radios to the regional Governor.

h. When the United States captured Kabul, the detainee dissolved his forces and turned over his weapons and communications equipment to the new Afghanistan Government.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SANGARYAR, RAHMATULLAH**

- i. The detainee refused a Taliban request and dissolved his forces.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 3 of 3

000716

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

10 November 2005

To: AL BIHANI, TALFIQ NASSAR AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TALFIQ NASSAR AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee has been identified as an al Qaida operative who was released from Iran.
2. The detainee admitted to being a member of Jamaat al Tablighi.
3. The detainee traveled to the Raywand Mosque in Lahore, Pakistan where he stayed at the center for approximately six months.
4. The detainee used his own money to purchase his ticket and traveled to Karachi, Pakistan in May 2001.
5. The detainee stayed at a guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan that was associated with Yemeni jihadists with extremist connections.

b. Connections/Associations

The detainee is acquainted with an al Qaida operative who fled to Iran when the Taliban regime fell.

c. Other Relevant Data

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000717



## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TALFIQ NASSAR AHMED**

1. The detainee learned to use the Kalashnikov in Yemen in 1999.
2. A report indicated that a foreign government was going to turn over some al Qaida operatives, including the detainee to the Afghanistan government.
3. The detainee stated he traveled to Quetta, Pakistan then to Baluchistan Pakistan where he was smuggled into Iran and later arrested for not having an Iranian visa.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - b. The detainee reported he has never been to Hajj and does not enjoy the company of religious people.
  - c. The detainee denied any affiliation with al Qaida or any other extremist groups.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 of 2

000718

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 August 2005

TO: KHAN, SHAWALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SHAWALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed the Taliban conscripted him in approximately 1998, took him from his land and forced him to perform duties as a guard and general laborer for approximately two months. The detainee claimed he was involved in one battle against the Northern Alliance, but stated his entire group (approximately 70 individuals) retreated and ran back to the Taliban facilities when the fighting started.

2. The detainee worked for the Hezb Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) during the Mujahedin as an operator of the "I COMM" system, or communications system.

3. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama Bin Ladin. HIG founder Gulbuddin Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), and establish a fundamentalist state.

4. The detainee was identified as a go-between and facilitator within a HIG operations cell in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He owned a small oil shop in Kandahar and used the shop to conduct meetings and as a contact point with other members within the cell.

5. In early September 2002, HIG commander Zabit Jalil directed the detainee to carry out a terrorist operation targeted at U.S. military personnel located at Gecko base, Qandahar,

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 4  
Page 1 of 3

000719

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SHAWALI

Afghanistan. Jalil sent a second unidentified individual who was allegedly an explosives expert from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to assist the detainee in the attacks.

6. On 9 November 2002, the detainee delivered a radio-controlled binary detonation device and two blasting caps to an operative working within his organization. The device was to be used in conjunction with two mines. The intended use for these items was to target American civilians or U.S.-led coalition military patrols.

7. As of early September 2002, the detainee was trying to purchase two rockets through an intermediary.

#### b. Training

The detainee stated he was taken to a HIG training camp in Pakistan. They were trained on the use of cannons, radios, rockets, mortars and RPGs.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee contacted other cell members solely through radio communication and acted as a messenger between cell operatives and Noor Agha. Materials and direction for operations were controlled by Noor Agha with the cells kept separate from each other through communications passed by the detainee.

2. Noor Agha was the facilitator and command element of the cell. He brought supplies and explosives from Pakistan through border crossing points in the Spin Buldak district. Agha received his orders and operational supplies from Zabit Jalil in Quetta, Pakistan.

3. The detainee's uncle is Zabit Jalil, a commander in HIG.

4. Zabit Jalil has a direct association with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and attends meetings with him. In addition to Hekmatyar, Jalil maintains contacts with extremist Arabs and Kashmiris in Pakistan as well as specialists that manufacture the radio-controlled detonation devices.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

Upon capture, numerous weapons were found in the detainee's family orchard to include 2 tanks, rockets, Kalashnikovs and other guns. The detainee was also found with a 50-meter spool of detonation cord.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was asked whether he was told by his uncle to place explosives. He answered decisively no.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SHAWALI**

b. The detainee claimed ignorance of his uncle's activities. The detainee stressed that while his uncle was in Afghanistan the uncle worked for the Karzai government, therefore detainee also worked for the Karzai government.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

7 November 2005

TO: JAWAD, MOHAMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAWAD, MOHAMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee met an individual at the detainee's shop in the Khowst Province around October 2002. This individual initially approached the detainee with an opportunity to make extra money. The job would involve killing Americans.

2. The detainee attended Qurey Mosque in Miran Shah, Pakistan in early December 2002 where he met four people. The detainee was asked if he would be interested in helping them clear mines. The detainee would be paid at least 12,000 Pakistan Rupees for his labor.

b. Training

1. The detainee trained for approximately one and a half days in the Khowst Province of Afghanistan. Upon arrival, the detainee was given one or two injections in his right leg that caused confusion and incoherence. Additionally, on the day of the mission, the detainee was given two oral pills that caused the same effects.

2. The detainee was trained to use AK-47's, rocket launchers, machine guns and hand grenades.

3. The detainee was identified as being at a Jihadi Madrassa before the Americans came to Afghanistan. The detainee was attending training on how to throw grenades. The detainee was seen with a fake plastic grenade in his hand.

4. The detainee trained with the Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 7  
Page 1 of 2

000722

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAWAD, MOHAMED**

### c. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. On 17 December 2002, two people ordered the detainee and a second individual to position themselves near the mosque and to wait for an American target to pass. As an American vehicle passed, the second individual ordered the detainee to throw a grenade into the vehicle.

2. The detainee stated, originally he was not the person who was supposed to throw the grenade but that the grenades were passed to him at the last minute. He and others were waiting in the market for United States' vehicles to pass. The other individuals told the detainee to throw the grenade, so he did.

3. As the detainee threw the grenade, the second individual fled the scene and the detainee was caught by a local police officer at the site of the explosion.

4. The detainee made a written confession to this attack, signed it and marked it with his fingerprint.

5. The detainee told a senior Afghani police officer that he was proud of what he did and if he were let go, he would do it again.

### d. Other Relevant Data

A senior Afghani official stated he heard the detainee admit to throwing the grenade at the two United States soldiers.

#### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee maintains his innocence stating someone else threw the grenade. He stated he was at the scene when this individual threw the grenade, however he wasn't involved.

b. The detainee said he has not served in any military army and never received any military training or terrorist training.

c. The detainee said he had no knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States prior to the event nor does he have any knowledge of future attacks against United States citizens.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

3 August 2005

TO: MOHAMMED, TAJ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, TAJ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was captured on 9 December 2002 under suspicion of firing Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) at the American firebase in Asadabad, Afghanistan, on 2 December 2002.

2. The detainee admitted firing three RPGs at the firebase. He didn't know the date but it is believed that this was an attack that occurred in September 2002.

3. The detainee said he was offered money by Mullah Sher to fire the RPGs at the American base. After he had completed the attack, Mullah Sher took the RPG launcher back from him and instead of the promised payment, bought him a pair of tennis shoes. The detainee stated that Mullah Sher has others working for him to conduct attacks against Americans.

4. Maulawi Sher Wali is a former Taliban Border Brigade Commander for Kunar Province. In early April 2005, he was reported to have worked to smuggle explosives from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

5. After the rocket attack, the detainee went with Rohullah to the village of Patak, Pakistan, and met with Kazi Hajji. Once there, Kazi Hajji gave a letter to the detainee who took it to the Mullah at the mosque in Asadabad. This Mullah has incited people while speaking in the mosque against the central government and the United States. The letter instructed the Mullah to pay the detainee, who received 1,400 Rupees.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 4

000724

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, TAJ

6. Ruhullah is a known al Qaida cell leader who operated out of Kunar Province, Afghanistan, and the Pakistan border regions.

7. Before Ramadan, the detainee went to Bajoor, Pakistan, and met with Kazi Hajji and was paid 20,000 Rupees. After firing the rockets, he was paid 3,500 Rupees by Jan Shah. Jan Shah then drove the detainee to Kas Kunar where the detainee crossed the river near the Spin Jumat (Spin Mosque). The detainee was then seen near a stream in a taxi talking on a radio. This was .5 km south of the firebase around the time of the rocket attack.

8. Mullah Sher and Rohullah gave explosives to the detainee who then delivered them to Malawi Aslam. It is believed Malawi Aslam was responsible for the IED attack south of the firebase in September 2002. The detainee was paid by Alef Khan to pass the explosives over to Aslam.

9. Alef Khan has been identified as an armed insurgent operating out of Qalae Siahi District in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.

#### b. Connections/Associations

1. Prior to firing the rockets at the firebase, the detainee was with Sher and Rohullah on the east side of the Kunar River. Then the detainee was in a car with Sultan Sayed near Jan Dad's house.

2. Sultan Sayed is one of four appointed HIG sub-commanders in Kunar Province, to include the region around Asadabad.

3. The detainee said that while he was at Friday prayer at the mosque in the town of Shiekh Yousef, Pakistan, a Lashker Tauba commander gave the prayer and began to speak about the jihad in Kashmir. After the speech he asked for volunteers and financial aid to fight in Kashmir. The detainee went to him and offered to round up some people from his home province to fight in the jihad.

4. The Secretary of State has designated the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad (MOI), a Sunni anti-United States missionary organization formed in 1989. The LT is led by Abdul Wahid Kashmiri and is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India. The LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir since 1993.

5. United States Forces obtained information stating that the detainee had been working in Pakistan and had been known to be associated with the families of Saber Lal and Hajji Rohullah.

6. Saber Lal and Hajji Rohullah are Taliban commanders.

UNCLASSIFIED



## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, TAJ

7. The detainee was once a soldier for Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander Sher Wali.

8. The Secretary of State has identified the HIG as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded HIG as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama Bin Ladin. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan government, and establish a fundamentalist state.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. Prior to his detention, the detainee had never heard of Usama Bin Laden or al Qaida.
- b. The detainee stated he never worked for the Taliban.
- c. A known Taliban member who received terrorist training in Afghanistan stated the detainee was not al Qaida or Taliban and that he was only an animal caretaker and nomad from the Konnar Province.
- d. The detainee claims no knowledge or involvement with Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (Hezbi-E-Islami Gulbiddin) (HIG).
- e. The detainee stated he does not know a Rohullah, Alef Kahn, Saber Lal, or Malawi Aslam. The detainee stated that he knew a Mullah Sher when the detainee helped him build a mosque in approximately 2001.
- f. The detainee denies any type of weapons training.
- g. The detainee denies any involvement with any attacks against Americans.
- h. The detainee had never heard of the September 11 attacks until he was detained.
- i. The detainee stated he likes the United States' presence in Afghanistan because it brings peace and stability to the country.
- j. The detainee believes jihad against the United States is wrong, and he does not intend to support it in the future.
- k. The detainee believes his cousin had two men provide misinformation to the Americans about the detainee's alleged involvement with the attack in order to retaliate for the detainee's physical attack on him.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMED, TAJ**

1. The detainee claims two interpreters, Waheed and Hajji, who were with the Americans at the time of his capture told him to confess to firing the rockets, promising that he would then be released.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4 of 4

000727

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 August 2005

TO: ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. In 1990 the detainee worked at an Islamic Relief Organization (IRO) called Haiat Ali Ghatha Al Islami Al Alamia. He lived for free at a guesthouse owned by the charity in the Hayat Abad district of Peshawar. Fighters from Afghanistan stayed at the guesthouse.
    2. The International Islamic Relief Organization/Hay-at al-Igathat al-Islamiyya al-Alamiyah of Saudi Arabia is designated a Tier 1 Non-Governmental Organization having demonstrated sustained and active support for terrorist organizations willing to attack U.S. persons or interests.
    3. The detainee left Afghanistan in 1993 because of internal fighting. He took a convoluted route of travel through India, Nepal, India and the Maldives over several months. He ultimately entered the United Kingdom using a false passport to claim asylum. The detainee traveled with Abu Qatada.
    4. After his release from prison for credit card fraud the detainee became involved in the creation of a charity called the Human Aid Trust in 1999. After 11 September 2001, the British government wanted proof that the money was used in support of charitable functions. Because of this scrutiny he stopped collecting money.
    5. The detainee knew that U.K. authorities would realize he knew of Abu Qatada's arrest, and more importantly, was close enough to Abu Qatada to know where he lived and in a position to help his spouse. The detainee had been planning a trip to Gambia and discussing it with associates. The arrest, however, significantly sped up his time frame for travel.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1

Page 1 of 3

000728

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF**

6. On 1 November 2002, the detainee and two others associated with Abu Qatada were detained and later released at Gatwick airport in the U.K. All three individuals were due to fly to Banjul, Gambia. A significant amount of literature regarding weapons, making explosives, and a book detailing how one could hide his/her identity and "disappear" were found during a subsequent search of their residences.

7. In early November 2002, the detainee was detained in Banjul, Gambia.

### b. Training

In 1980, at the age of 18, the detainee was drafted into the Jordanian military. At a 2-3 month basic training course he learned how to march and use the M-16 rifle.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee began working for Abu Qatada collecting donations from a rented hall, known as Mosalla, on Baker Street that Abu Qatada used as a Mosque.

2. Abu Qatada is a known al Qaida operative, arrested in the United Kingdom as a danger to National security. He has been identified as an extremist Takfiri among the jihadi movement. He spreads jihadist literature and recruits for al Qaida. He is known for the joint fatwa titled "killing of children" with sheikh Abu Musab al-Suri. The fatwa allowed mujahadin to kill children since there is no other way to hurt the enemy.

3. Both the detainee and Abu Qatada have been linked to al Takfir Wal Hirja [Hijra] members in Spain.

4. Takfiris hold that Muslim rulers who do not follow their strict interpretation of Islam can be condemned as apostates and killed. Because of their purist approach to Islam, many Takfiri elements have engaged in violence, against both Muslims and non-Muslims.

5. The detainee has been described as one who loved and admired Abu Qatada and was one of the thousands of Qatada's followers.

6. The detainee was identified as one of the closest friends and students of Abu Qatada.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. During his youth, before and after his military service the detainee associated with a gang of criminals and took part in a variety of crimes, including robbery, armed robbery, assault, gambling and rape.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1

Page 2 of 3

000723

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF**

2. A foreign government service has formally requested the extradition of the detainee. The government's judicial authorities have charged the detainee with participation in a terrorist organization.

3. The detainee acknowledged being arrested in the U.K. and spending nine months in prison there for credit card fraud.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said he had heard Abu Qatada's angry sermons at the mosque and admitted Qatada was dangerous because he "hates the world".

b. The detainee stated he blamed Abu Qatada for introducing him to the man who got him involved in the credit card fraud.

c. The detainee stated after his release from prison he told Abu Qatada that he would not collect donations for him any longer because he did not want to get in trouble again.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 December 2005

TO: AL RAWI, BISHER AMIN KHALIL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAWI, BISHER AMIN KHALIL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee was reported to have attended weekly meetings at an activity hall in London from 1996 to 1997 where anti-America speeches by a radical Muslim Cleric with suspected ties to al Qaida were offered every Friday.

b. Training

The detainee was reported to have trained in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A London Imam is one of the detainee's favorite speakers. The detainee described the Imam as a dynamic speaker who also preaches against the West. The detainee met the Imam approximately five years ago and they became friends.

2. Over the course of his association with the al Qaida cell leader, the detainee came to know of an Islamic Nongovernmental Organization in London under the direction of the al Qaida cell leader that raised money for and distributed to the needy. The detainee suspected a portion of the money may have been diverted to militant Islamic individuals or groups.

3. The detainee saw the al Qaida cell leader once every 1-2 weeks on average for a year. The detainee last saw the al Qaida cell leader the day the al Qaida cell leader was arrested.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000731

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAWI, BISHER AMIN KHALIL**

4. The detainee made financial transactions for a radical Muslim cleric with suspected ties to al Qaida in 1999 or 2000. The cleric asked the detainee to transfer money from the Arab Bank in London to other branches of the Arab Bank in Jordan and Palestine.

5. The detainee's pocket litter included the phone number of an individual who the detainee claimed has links to North African Islamic extremist groups and most likely the Armed Islamic Group.

6. The detainee was in the chain of command of the London al Qaida cell.

### d. Intent

1. The detainee was detained at the Gatwick Airport with his associates when they arrived at the gate. The detainee stated the suspicious item found was a battery charger he had altered to allow batteries of various sizes to be charged. The detainees and his associates were questioned for ten hours and released.

2. A significant amount of literature regarding weapons, instructions for making explosives and a book detailing how one could hide his/her identity and disappear were found during a subsequent search of the detainee and his traveling companions' residences.

3. The detainee stated that several people had suggested that he go to Afghanistan. The detainee thought that if he did go, it would not be as a fighter but almost in a tourist mode.

4. The detainee understands electrical concepts reasonably well although not an electrician or electrical engineer. The detainee produced the battery charger found in his luggage at Gatwick Airport as a hobby even though he owned a commercial battery charger.

### e. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee traveled with an Iraqi passport originally issued in London on 4 April 1996 which expired 3 April 2000 and contained "student" for profession. A Gambian visa was issued in London on 22 October 2002. The current passport was issued in place of a prior passport issued in London on 5 May 1988.

2. The detainee refused to reveal the London Imam's hideout when questioned by the British because he did not consider the Imam a threat to anyone.

3. The detainee admitted he had been involved in a credit card fraud scheme and didn't consider it a real crime.

4. The detainee identified and described the leader of a credit card fraud scheme in which he had become involved. The detainee stated that the leader of the scheme and a radical Muslim

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAWI, BISHAR AMIN KHALIL**

Cleric with suspected ties to al Qaida knew each other but did not know if they had any sort of special relationship..

5. The detainee admitted using the stolen credit cards to purchase merchandise with the full knowledge of the al Qaida cell leader.

6. The detainee rarely dressed in traditional Islamic clothes and preferred western styles. When coming to the Gambia, the detainee decided to wear traditional Islamic attire and keep his long beard to demonstrate clearly that he was an Arab and was reasonably religious.

7. The detainee was always willing to provide the al Qaida cell leader with assistance. The detainee made a point of avoiding being seen with the al Qaida cell leader in public, in order to avoid the notoriety that accompanied the al Qaida cell leader's movements.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any knowledge of Salafists in England.

b. The detainee did not consider the al Qaida cell leader his spiritual guide as he had his own ideas regarding the practice of Islam.

c. The detainee disagreed with some of the al Qaida cell leader's proclamations as the best way to forward the Muslim cause and objected to killing innocents.

c. The detainee stated he had no desire to fight anyone.

d. The detainee claimed to have never worked with explosives or detonators in his life. Although he was interested in the chemistry of explosives and his father was a chemist, the detainee was not good in chemistry courses in school.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 August 2005

TO: ULLAH, FAIZ

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ULLAH, FAIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee planted land mines for the Taliban during their reign and was the mine specialist for Mullah Naseem, the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander in Madr, Afghanistan.

2. The Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar in 1977, as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Usama Bin Ladin.

3. HIG commanders Mullah Naseem and Mullah Zoi sent the detainee to Bamian, Afghanistan, to kill Afghan Military Forces General Toufon, who worked closely with United States Forces in Bamian.

4. The detainee was responsible for laying land mines found near the fighting positions in Madr, Afghanistan. He has also been known to make improvised explosive devices and is considered an expert.

5. Mullah Zoi was the HIG commander in Kahmard, Afghanistan, and a former Taliban commander who provided safe haven to Arabs in the area of Kahmard.

6. The detainee traveled to Bamian, Afghanistan, to possibly conduct mining operations against United States forces.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000734

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ULLAH, FAIZ**

7. The detainee traveled to Bamian with a hand-written message from Mullah Naseem and Mullah Zoi to Audil requesting him to contact Naseem. Audil, the Security Chief for the Bamian Province Governor, was attempting to coordinate safe haven for weapons caches that belonged to Naseem in Madr and Kahmard.

## b. Training

The detainee served in the military from 1984 to 1986, as the Servant to the Commander, Bamian City Military, Bamian City Airport, Bamian City, Afghanistan.

## c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified as the Minister of Transportation for Bamian during the Taliban reign. He was described as an operative that would execute Mullah Naseem's orders that consisted of making the streets unsafe in Bamian.

2. The detainee was captured on 25 December 2002 by United States forces in Bamian.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated he is very happy that United States force liberated Afghanistan from Taliban control.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 July 2005

TO: RAZZAQ, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAQ, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee fought against the Russians in the Jihad.

2. The detainee admitted to being a member of the Taliban.

3. The detainee was apprehended by Afghan Security Forces at his bakery shop. Although no weapons were found, a letter describing the character of approximately 24 men and recommending they be admitted into the Taliban II Commando Corps was found. The letter was signed by former Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar.

4. The detainee and two other men are reported to have been plotting to attack United States personnel in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in late December 2002.

5. The group also planned to conduct mortar attacks on the Kandahar, Afghanistan airfield at a later undetermined date.

6. The intent of the attacks was to gain support from the Sayyef Organization.

7. Some Abu Sayyaf Group leaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet war and are students and proponents of radical Islamic teachings.

8. An unknown individual from Pakistan, sent by, or associated with, Zabit Jalil, a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commander in Quetta, Pakistan, provided radio-controlled detonators. The man also instructed the detainee on the proper use of the devices.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000736

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAQ, ABDUL**

9. The Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks to force United States troops to leave Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

10. The Hizb-I Islami was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets and has long-established ties with Bin Laden.

11. Zabit Jalil was reportedly involved in planning to lay remote control detonated explosives along the route to a U.S. military installation in Qandahar, Afghanistan.

12. HIG Commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Zabit Jalil, and Mullah Ghaffor were providing funding for planned attacks against United States military personnel.

13. The detainee reportedly purchased 100 bars of wet gunpowder; twelve 82 millimeter mortar rounds; 25 to 30 rocket propelled grenades; two or three Enfield rifles; and four anti-tank mines.

### b. Training

1. The detainee received some military and hands-on training while fighting against the Russians in the jihad, but denied any training at a formal camp.

2. The detainee can fire AK-47s, pistols and shoulder-fired rockets.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee worked for about one year for Mullah Abdul Ali, a member of the Taliban. The detainee would pick up groceries and personal items for his employer.

2. The detainee admitted knowing Zabit Jalil, but only during the time of the Russians.

3. The detainee admitted involvement with the Sayef Group during the Russian jihad.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied knowing Mullah Omar and having any knowledge of a letter reportedly discovered in his residence.

b. The detainee denied any association with the HIG, Taliban, and involvement in the planning of attacks on U.S. or Afghan Forces.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAQ, ABDUL**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Page 3 of 3

**000738**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 August 2005

TO: GUL, KHI ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, KHI ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Training

The detainee is a former mujahedin soldier and fought in the jihad against the Russians from 1984-89.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was an intelligence chief during the Taliban regime.
2. The detainee was a member of the Union of Mujahedin. This group detonated an explosive device in a Khowst bazaar.
3. The detainee was imprisoned for his affiliation with Jalaludin Haqqani.
4. Jalaludin Haqqani is the former Taliban Minister of Frontiers and Tribal Affairs and conducted Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) activities in the Khowst Province.
5. The detainee worked with Abbas Khan.
6. Abbas Khan collaborated with Jalaludin Haqqani to conduct Anti-Coalition Militia activities.
7. The detainee reportedly met with Usama Bin Laden in Khowst during the Mazir-I-Sharif bombing campaign.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000739

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, KHI ALI**

**c. Detainee Actions and Statements**

1. The detainee was one of the commanders of the Gorbaz Medani Regiment.
2. The detainee was involved in the planning of a rocket attack on a U.S. base. The planning meeting was held at his house.

**d. Other Relevant Data**

1. The detainee was part of a Taliban assassination team.
2. The detainee was captured on 23 December 2002 while riding in a minibus to the Khowst bazaar at an Afghan Military Forces checkpoint.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. Detainee stated he had no animosity towards U.S. Forces and had no desire for jihad or revenge.
  - b. Detainee plans to return to Afghanistan, re-unite with his family, and work on a farm.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 August 2005

TO: KHAN, SWAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SWAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Training

The detainee received three months of police training, where he was taught drill and ceremony, AK-47 and RPG operations, and general police and security tactics. He also received a 30-minute lesson on how to use a GPS.

b. Connections/Associations

1. It has been reported that the detainee used to meet daily with Mualim Jan and Pacha Khan Zadran.
2. Pacha Khan Zadran maintains a checkpoint on the Kabul-Gardez(sp) road where his forces charge tolls and arrest personnel who are disloyal to him.
3. In addition to his illegal checkpoints, Pacha Khan Zadran has raided houses to raise money and supplies, recruited soldiers, and made statements on the radio saying that he does not accept the Karzai government.
4. The detainee believes that Pacha Khan Zadran wants to regain Khowst, Paktia, and Paktika provinces in order to control the entire eastern portion of Afghanistan.
5. The detainee admits that he knows Mulem Jan because he was the commander of his division in Khowst, and that he used to be a soldier under Mulem Jan. The detainee claims he has not seen Mulem Jan for over six months prior to his arrest, and denies any knowledge of the crimes that Mulem Jan has reportedly committed.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000741



## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SWAR

6. In early September 2003, Malem Jan coordinated the movement of 75 men for a planned attack on a border guard checkpoint.

7. As of 10 June 2003, up to 13 people have been trained for suicide bombing operations. Malem-Jan, who is affiliated with Jalaluddin Haqqani has been responsible for the specific training.

8. In mid-April 2005, it was reported that several Anti-Coalition Militant (ACM) commanders, including Malem Jan, met to discuss attacks on Khowst in order to build morale amongst the declining Taliban fighters. Malem Jan has been reported to be one of the two commanders responsible for the attacks on a Border Check Point on 22 March 2005.

9. Three Union of Mujahedin documents were captured at Little Taktabeg, Afghanistan. The detainee is listed as a "Commander" on the first document. On the second document, the detainee is listed as receiving payments on at least two occasions from this group. On the third document, the detainee is listed as having 30 personnel assigned to him.

10. As of 12 August 2002, Union of the Mujahidin of Afghanistan operatives had met to discuss operations targeting United States forces and Afghan leaders.

11. According to the detainee, the "Union of Mujahideen"(sp) is an informal attempt on the part of Mustafa, Pacha Khan Zadran, and Zakhim Khan to get money from United States forces in exchange for cooperation. As far as the detainee knows, the three men never met. They came together to fill the political vacuum in Khowst province.

12. United States forces apparently paid the three leaders who then coordinated with their followers, such as the detainee. The detainee explained that this is why he had a document outlining his responsibilities and privileges in Khowst province.

13. The detainee admits to receiving money from the Union of Mujahedin, but denies membership in the group.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee is reported as selling weapons and ammunition illegally from his security post to be used against coalition forces.

2. Habi Noor is a former general during the Afghan/Soviet war who worked with the Americans to conduct patrols of the Khost region in order to confiscate illegal weapons.

3. The detainee claims that for approximately two months he worked a checkpoint at Zary Tarkha in Khowst.

UNCLASSIFIED

000742

Page 2 of 3

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SWAR**

4. On 12 January 2003, Habib Noor came through the detainee's checkpoint and asked why he was charging people money to cross. The detainee showed Noor a letter that he had from the government instructing him to collect ten Pakistani rupees from each vehicle passing through the checkpoint. Noor then detained him and took him to the security center in Khowst where he stayed until he was handed over to the Americans.

5. Habib Noor has been accused of being a member of the Watan Gund (translated as "Country Party"). Their goal is to unite former Mujahedin to destabilize Afghanistan and defeat the United States' efforts in the country. They have possible ties to Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin(sp) (HIG).

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee feels that Noor had him arrested because he has a vendetta against the detainee. Previously, the detainee had arrested one of Noor's commanders for auto theft, and the detainee felt that his arrest was in retaliation.

b. The detainee stated that he had never been associated with an anti-coalition organization nor had he sold weapons to anyone.

c. The detainee denies knowing any Taliban members.

d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th.

e. The detainee's behavior during detention includes only minor infractions.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000743

Page 3 of 3

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 November 2005

TO: GHANI, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

An individual approached the detainee when he was coming out of a local mosque one night and asked the detainee to help him fire rockets.

b. Connections/Associations

An individual stated that he was sent to find the detainee to fire rockets against the United States air base at Kandahar.

c. Intent

1. The detainee took part in a rocket attack on the Kandahar airfield in November 2002.
2. The detainee walked with another individual to a place where several rockets were buried. They took the rockets and walked to where they would set them up for launch. The two prepared the rockets for launch and then ignited them. Following that, they left and didn't witness the launch.
3. The detainee and another individual fired rockets on two consecutive nights.
4. The detainee was arrested by Afghan Forces for assisting an individual in a rocket attack against United States Forces at Kandahar airfield.

d. Other Relevant Data

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000744

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL**

1. The detainee was identified as part of the 40-man unit.
2. One of the tasks of the 40-man unit was to provide protection to al Qaida for travel in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee was seen launching a rocket against a United States aircraft near the Kandahar airport.
4. According to the detainee, when he fired the rockets, he was not following a commander; he was just doing it for money.
5. An individual states that the detainee was paid money from al Qaida for the missile attack. He also stated that the detainee's military expertise was missiles.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

N/A

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 2 of 2

000745

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 July 2005

TO: AMEUR, MAMMAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEUR, MAMMAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Training

The detainee was conscripted into the Algerian army for a mandatory term of two years. He received training on the Kalashnikov, grenades, rocket propelled grenades and a small pistol.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at the Algerian Guesthouse, located in the Hayatabad portion of Peshawar, Pakistan.
2. The guesthouse may have been funded by the Maktab al-Khidmat office in Peshawar, Pakistan.
3. The detainee worked in Peshawar for a Non-governmental Organization (NGO) named Afghan Reconstruction, or ARCON.
4. In 1993, the detainee worked for the Egyptian Human Relief Organization (EHRO).
5. In May 1994, the detainee left Afghanistan and traveled to Kenya to work for the African Muslim Agency NGO.
6. The African Muslim Agency (AMA) is an Islamic NGO with ties to extremist activities.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000746

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEUR, MAMMAR

7. In 1994, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to work as the office manager of an NGO hospital.

8. In 1996, the detainee resigned from the EHRO and remained unemployed afterward.

9. The detainee was arrested with an individual, who worked for several years for a Saudi organization called WAMY.

10. The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is an NGO operating in Afghanistan and may be associated with Usama Bin Ladin and/or al Qaida.

11. The detainee is associated with Abu Oua'il, a former leader of the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the information section within the NGO Muslim World League.

12. The IIRO is an Islamic NGO with ties to extremist activities.

13. The detainee is associated with Abu el Abbes, the former leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. On September 23, 1996, he applied for and was granted status as a United Nations Refugee.

2. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani authorities at his residence on 18 July 2002 because his house was a suspected al Qaida safe house.

3. The detainee had 400 United States dollars when he was arrested.

4. According to a foreign government, the detainee is a fugitive from Algeria, where he has been wanted since 1993 for belonging to an armed group. The detainee left Algeria for Pakistan in July 1990 where he worked for the NGO Muslim Aid for Afghan Refugees.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that as a Muslim, he felt that he should go out and do good deeds for other people and found he could best do this by joining a NGO.

b. The detainee stated he has nothing against Americans and he has no reason to fight against Americans if he is released, because it is against his religion to kill innocents.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AMEUR, MAMMAR**

Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Page 3 of 3

**000748**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

28 June 2005

TO: ADEL HUSSEIN, HASSAN

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ADEL HUSSEIN, HASSAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee related he joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan during the early 1980's. He stated he was a student in school and his friends joined the group, so he did as well.
    2. The detainee was a member of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood until 1986.
    3. The detainee took a teaching job with the Hira Institute in 1986 where he worked until 1999.
    4. The detainee worked for the Hira Institute as a teacher at the Jelazee Refugee Camp. The Hira Institute is run by an organization named Lajnat Al-Da'wa al Islamia (LDI).
    5. Lajnat Al-Daawa Al-Islamiya (LDI) is a non-governmental organization that operates in Afghanistan and may be affiliated with Usama Bin Laden and al Qaida operations.
    6. In 1996 the detainee received a promotion and moved from Hira Institute to the LDI office in Peshawar, Pakistan. In 1997 the detainee was promoted again to the head of the Public Relations Division of LDI in Peshawar, Pakistan.
    7. After being laid off from LDI in 1999, the detainee was hired as the Director of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) Hospital in Afghanistan.
    8. WAMY is a non-government organization operating in Afghanistan that may be affiliated with Usama Bin Ladin and al Qaida operations.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

000749  
DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3



**UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ADEL HUSSEIN, HASSAN**

9. According to top WAMY officials, both the United States and Israel must be destroyed. WAMY provides financial support to the Palestinians fighting against Israel. In addition, WAMY has put forward a proposal that the Palestinians should declare open war on Israel.

10. After the 9-11 attacks, and due to the war and increased violence in the area, the detainee was told by Afghan government officials to leave Afghanistan.

11. A 23 September 2001 copy of "The Brotherhood Letter" published by the Muslim Brotherhood Information Center was found during the capture raid in the detainee's home.

12. Several identification documents were seized from the detainee's home at the time of the raid and his arrest, including a U.N. refugee card for his downstairs neighbor.

13. The detainee initially claimed neither the Muslim Brotherhood newsletter nor copies of his neighbor's United Nations refugee cards reportedly found at his home were his.

14. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) developed as a fundamentalist Islamic belief community in Egypt. Foundations of organizations under the umbrella of the Egyptian MB were in other Arab countries and started the armed fight by MB activists. They attacked what they considered to be un-Islamic representatives of the government of Egypt based on its cooperation with Russia. The MB developed into an underground organization.

15. The detainee stated he did have copies of "The Brotherhood Letter" in his residence, as he was a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood.

**b. Connections/Associations**

1. The detainee met Khalid Sheikh Mohammed at the Jelazee Refugee Camp in 1987. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed operated a "cultural center" located at the camp. The center was used to prepare Afghan people who had been recruited for the jihad against the Russians.

2. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's older brother, Zahid Al-Sheikh, was the director of the Jelazee Refugee Camp and LDI in Peshawar, Pakistan.

3. Zahid Al-Sheikh has been identified from other sources as an extremist with terrorism ties.

4. The detainee stated he was familiar with Shemshatoo Refugee Camp. He distributed food to the camp on two occasions. The detainee stated the camp was run by Gulbiddin Hekmatyar.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**000750**  
Page 2 of 3

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ADEL HUSSEIN, HASSAN**

5. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (variant of Gulbiddin Hekmatyar) founded Hizb-l Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-l Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Laden.

6. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee took a vacation to Sudan in June 2002. Before he returned to the office, detainee called his supervisor to find out about the situation of NGOs in Peshawar, Pakistan after hearing about the arrests of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society workers. He was told that everything was normal, and that they needed him back at work.

b. The detainee stated Al-Zawahiri and Usama Bin Laden were not Muslims and any acts their groups perpetrated were against the Muslim faith.

c. The detainee did not know of any connections between WAMY and al Qaida.

d. The detainee did not like what the al Qaida stood for.

e. The detainee believed the al Qaida/WAMY connection to be a false accusation.

f. The detainee did not know any al Qaida individuals through relationship or just meeting.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000751  
Page 3 of 3

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 August 2005

TO: DIN, JUMA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DIN, JUMA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. As of mid-November 2002, the local commander for the Hizb-1 Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), Haji Abdul Ghafour, had a bodyguard identified as the detainee.

2. HIG was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), and establish a fundamentalist state.

3. In addition to his brothers, the detainee was a main advisor to Ghafour in the Kantiwa.

b. Training

1. The detainee was trained on the AK-47.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brother-in-law has been identified as an al Qaida operative.

2. The detainee lived with his sister and brother-in-law three months prior to the time of his capture.

d. Other Relevant Data

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000752

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DIN, JUMA**

1. The detainee was captured in the house associated with a known al Qaida operative.
2. The detainee was arrested with \$400 USD.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee was never interested in the Taliban. He would like to return to his home country of Afghanistan someday.
  - b. When asked about al Qaida, the detainee denied any knowledge.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 August 2005

TO: RAZZAK, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAK, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said he was forced to serve the Taliban three months out of every year since they came to power in 1992.

2. The detainee stated he fought with Abdul Wahed in the Russian jihad for approximately five years. He was a driver for Abdul Wahed, a commander of approximately 800-1000 soldiers. After the jihad, Wahed became the military commander of the Helmand Province.

3. As of January 2005, Taliban fighters were regrouping at Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani's compound in Helmand Province. The fighters received money, supplies and orders at the compound.

4. The detainee was the number two commander of a 40-man unit of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The unit was formed in approximately November 2001 and was supported by al Qaida. The group continually plans to kill Americans. The Supreme Commander of the unit was Haji Raes Abdul Wahed.

5. The detainee was high in the al Qaida hierarchy and acted as a smuggler and facilitator. Al Qaida's operational leader provided him with weapons.

6. The detainee received weapons shipments, plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, missiles, small arms and ammunition from Syria. The weapons come from Syria to Zahedan, Iran. From there they were smuggled into Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000734

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAK, ABDUL

7. The detainee aided in weapons distribution to the terrorist team. He also had a night vision and telescoping optical device to use during mission preparation. The terrorist group used it for surveillance on United States forces.

#### b. Training

1. The detainee reportedly attended the training camp near Khotal-e-Morcha mountain pass outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee provided guidance at the terrorist training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan and was directly involved in assassination attempts. He also attempted to have other personnel participate in suicide missions and he provided training on how to use explosive vests.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was originally a freedom fighter against the Soviets, a member of Hezb-E-Islami, Taliban, and then al Qaida. He is currently instructing other detainees on how to resist interrogation tactics.

2. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has long established ties with Usama Bin Laden. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force US troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

3. In January of 2005, Taliban and HIG elements in Afghanistan were beginning to regroup and plan actions against the government of Afghanistan and coalition forces deployed in the country. Abdul Wahid Rais Baghrani, also a major narcotics trafficker, was one of the key commanders involved.

4. The detainee was part of the main security escort for Usama Bin Laden.

5. The detainee provided information on a number of Taliban personalities in the Helmand Province being protected by Governor Sher Mohammed.

6. The detainee was paid to smuggle 50 Arab family members out of Afghanistan and into Zabul, Iran, through Afghanistan's Nimroz Province. He was associated with Taliban commanders.

7. The detainee admitted to having knowledge of weapons shipments and weapons smuggling routes as well as knowledge of the Jamiat Islami.

8. The Jamiat Ulema E Islami or "Assembly of the Scholars of Islam" is a radical Sunni religio-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama Bin Ladin, and sponsorship of some 3,000 religious schools (madrassahs).

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAK, ABDUL**

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was knowledgeable of an assassination plot against President Karzai the day before it occurred and knew the specific route Karzai was to take.
  2. The detainee attempted to have another individual kill Governor Gul Aaga Sherzai and told him he would go directly to heaven if he completed the attack.
  3. In 2002, the detainee told another individual that there were still suicide pilots in the United States who could carry out their missions.
  4. The detainee planned and executed the escape of Ismail Khan from a Taliban prison.
  5. Ismail Khan is an exiled Afghan commander.
  6. The detainee was arrested as a suspected member of Abdul Wahed's Taliban organization on 21 January 2003.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee says that the Taliban is a stupid organization.
  - b. The detainee vehemently denies that he is currently associated with the Taliban.
  - c. The detainee claims he is not a Taliban member.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 October 2005

TO: GHANI, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was a student of the Koran for five years at the Hayez Tajudin Madrassa in Quetta, Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated that the madrassa he attended taught Jihad against Americans.

3. A senior Taliban member and the detainee were reported to be recruiting members to fight Americans and the Afghanistan Government. This senior Taliban member and the detainee were reported to be entering villages in the region and preaching in mosques.

4. The detainee and a senior Taliban member held individuals at gunpoint and preached Jihad against the illegitimate Afghanistan Government and the Americans.

5. The detainee was reported to be recruiting males under the age of sixteen to fight Jihad. Furthermore, the detainee was identified as the assistant to a senior Taliban member and responsible for facilitating finances and recruiting.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he knows the senior Taliban member because they are both from the same village. The detainee claimed that he was in charge of the compound in Adi Ghar.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000757



# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL

2. This senior Taliban member operated in the Spin Boldak Province. He was identified as the leader of the Taliban Terrorist Group Sola Orgzan (Bringers of Peace).

3. The detainee's father told him his brother was with this senior Taliban member in the Adi Ghar Mountains and to go get his brother and bring him home. The detainee arrived at the senior Taliban member's compound and was greeted by an armed guard. The detainee asked the guard if he could see his brother

4. The detainee's brother came out of the camp and the detainee said to him, "Lets go home." The detainee's brother was carrying a rifle with a shoulder strap and two grenades in his pockets.

5. The detainee was identified as a Taliban member and he was reported being seen in the Spin Boldak region.

### c. Detainee Actions and Statements

The detainee was arrested after he and his brother tried to avoid being stopped by an American convoy. The detainee's brother appeared to be armed with a rifle and a grenade. The detainee's brother attempted to use the grenade against the American soldiers.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said that he does not know if all Americans are non-believers because prior to coming to Guantanamo Bay the detainee had never seen an American. The detainee also said that he has no love for non-believers but would not kill them in the name of Allah or Islam

b. The detainee claimed that he is not angry with the United States personnel who shot and killed his brother. The detainee also claimed that he has never tried to hurt or harm any United States persons.

c. The detainee stated that he has only heard Usama Bin Laden's name but knows absolutely nothing else about him.

d. The detainee claimed that he never knew or heard of Usama Bin Laden until his was in United States custody in Bagram.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 July 2005

TO: LNU, SHARIFULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LNU, SHARIFULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. During the occupation of Afghanistan by the Russians and the rule of the Taliban, the detainee stated he and his family fled to Pakistan. He was housed in the Kacha Garai refugee camp and the Shamshato refugee camp.

2. A Hezb-e Islami/Gulbuddin (HIG) member was recruiting men from Shamshato refugee camp.

3. The first group was recruited circa summer 2002 and consisted of 30 to 35 men between the ages of 17 and 20. After training, the men fought against U.S. and Afghan forces in Shahi Kowt, Paktika Province, Afghanistan.

4. HIG has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. HIG founder Gulbuddin Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force US troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), and establish a fundamentalist state.

b. Training

1. After the fall of the Taliban the detainee became a soldier for General Said Agha before going to Kubal to train as an officer.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3  
000739

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LNU, SHARIFULLAH

2. The detainee stated he completed two months of training at the Gund Talimi Military School, Kabul, Afghanistan and was tasked as a soldier on the Afghani National Assembly Presidential Palace detail, but not commissioned as an officer.

3. The detainee's training for the Presidential detail involved the Kalishnikov, physical training, low crawl, and using riot gear such as helmets and shields.

4. The detainee also trained for 10 days at a military camp in Zakar Khel Village, Pakistan.

#### c. Connections/Associations

The brother of the detainee, Qari Naqib, had brought Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to the compound at an unknown time.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee, his brother and two others decided to join Haji Qadir's campaign in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban. The detainee stated he assisted Haji Qadir in Afghanistan for approximately three years.

2. On 27 January 2003 coalition personnel learned of an impending attack involving a four man bombing cell utilizing remotely detonated IEDs mounted to bicycles.

3. The detainee had purchased a motorcycle and had the bill of sale when he was captured.

4. When the detainee was arrested, a search revealed the storage of IEDs.

5. IEDs recovered included two bombs in propane tanks, two bombs in wooden boxes inside "Nice Sweet" candy boxes, two bombs located in a wax box, one box of igniters and fuses, two Nokia cell phones wired as an igniter, one portable cellular base station, one motorcycle, two bicycles and 15-20 82mm mortar rounds.

6. The detainee admitted during initial questioning the morning of his capture that he was going to place the bombs last night but was convinced to wait until morning.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he holds no resentment toward Americans and will not harbor any bad will to Americans if released and returned to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he would not hurt Americans, even if he believed he could get away with it and no one would see or know about it.

UNCLASSIFIED

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF LNU, SHARIFULLAH**

b. The detainee then stated that he has never nor would ever fight the Americans, because the Americans came to Afghanistan to help the people, not hurt or kill them.

c. The detainee had denied any knowledge of the plan to use the IEDs.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Page 3 of 3

**000761**

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

30 August 2005

TO: JAN, SAID AMIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, SAID AMIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee and three others were identified as planning terrorist attacks against United States forces in the Jalalabad area. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were made in Pakistan and transported to a military compound where these four men were going to use bicycles and motorcycles as delivery systems. A raid on the compound resulted in the discovery of the IEDs and associated material to include two bicycles and one motorcycle.

2. The IEDs were found in some bathrooms located adjacent to Qari Naqibullah's (aka Qari Naqib) room, both of the bathrooms were non-operational and used for storage.

3. The other two individuals reportedly involved in the planned attack arrived at the compound before dark wearing civilian clothes, and reportedly were the ones who transported the IEDs to the compound.

4. The detainee was very resistant and was in control of the IEDs at the time of capture. The detainee admitted to spending some time at a madrassa in Pakistan.

5. The detainee admitted that he was going to place the bombs the night before his arrest but was convinced to wait until morning. The detainee is believed to have received training in al Qaida compounds in Pakistan.

6. The detainee originally claimed that the IEDs in the room had been left by the Taliban years prior. He later changed his story, claiming that Qari Naqib had brought the IEDs to the compound.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000762

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, SAID AMIR**

7. Kari Naquib was the leader of the bombing cell, and all members received training on the use of the bombs from the builder of the bombs at a madrassa in Pakistan. The group worked for M. Kabir's organization within the Taliban.

### b. Training

The detainee received military training on the Kalashnikov, but claims he does not know how to operate RPGs, grenades, bombs, machine guns, and land mines.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. A four-man cell was planning to detonate bombs on 28 January in Jalalabad, targeting United States, United Nations, and non-Afghani support personnel. The bombers were promised participation in the operational planning cell of Kari Mohadin, deputy of Maulawi Kabir, once the bombing was completed successfully.

2. Mullah Kabir is the former Governor of Jalalabad and a Taliban Deputy.

3. Naqib is friends with two al Qaida members who worked for a Taliban man named Noor Mohammad in Pakistan.

4. Maulawi Noor Mohammad is the former Taliban district chief of Deh Bala and a trusted associate of the former Taliban Governor of Nangarhar Province, Maulawi Kabir. Noor Mohammad stockpiled weapons and recruited Afghans to agitate against the Afghan Transitional Administration.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, the detainee served as a "freedom fighter" for Haji Qadir, governor of Jalalabad, and enemy of the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee had four men under his direct supervision.

2. During a fight with the Taliban and al Qaida near Jalalabad, the detainee was captured along with 120 other soldiers. The detainee eventually was taken to the Sarpuza prison in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he was beaten and tortured by the Taliban, resulting in the loss of his two front teeth.

3. The detainee was in the Sarpuza prison for no less than five years. He was freed from prison by coalition forces when the Taliban fell from power.

4. After his release from the Sarpuza prison, the detainee became an officer in a military division assigned to patrol and protect the city of Jalalabad. The division was responsible for fighting smugglers of weapons and opium.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF JAN, SAID AMIR**

5. The detainee took seven of his men and weapons to the Kandaki Toupchi military base, where he was ordered to rotate with some of the men assigned there. Upon arriving at Kandaki Toupchi, the detainee was unable to locate the base commander, so he secured rooms for his group to spend the night.

6. The morning after his arrival at the compound, the detainee was arrested along with one other suspect, although other suspects escaped.

7. Mir Agha Jan was working as an intermediary to Qari Naqib, a senior Taliban leader, and coalition forces by way of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Qari Naqib was attempting to secure the release of the detainee and another unnamed man.

8. One of the detainee's brothers is named Mir Aghaa Jan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee adamantly denied any prior knowledge of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) found in Kandaki Toupchi post near the detainee's room.

b. The detainee indicated that he did not support the Taliban or al Qaida forces.

c. The detainee expressed positive feelings toward the United States as he indicated that United States Forces in Afghanistan freed him from Sarpuza prison. He stated that from the beginning he took up arms to fight the Taliban and al Qaida forces.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2005

TO: KHAN, ANWAR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ANWAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said that he was a security guard in Punjab, Pakistan during the winter. He returned to the village of Shomasht, Afghanistan during the summer months.

2. The detainee was asked about the documents he was captured with such as the oath, the various ID cards, and the note with the description of a British man. The detainee stated he did not know about those documents.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee had an old friend who was the district leader in the Noorgal District.

2. The detainee's old friend, formerly Taliban and now against them, wanted the detainee and two others to take one handgun and two rifles (machine guns) across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan. They were to get these weapons from the commander in Jalalabad.

3. The old friend is a Taliban supporter and has arranged for at least 50 Taliban fighters who are hiding in the mountains near Shomasht to visit the town once a week.

4. The detainee had another friend who lived in Mazar, in the Noorgal District.

5. The detainee claims that prior to his capture, he had delivered two machine guns to this other friend in Afghanistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000765



## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ANWAR

6. The detainee told the Bagram guards that his old friend and the other friend, the detainee's uncle and his father all belonged to the Taliban.

7. The other friend was last known to be a Taliban commander.

8. The detainee's name appears in a phonebook recovered from a Mansour compound in Zormat, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee's name appears in a notebook found in the possession of an Afghan suspected of arms dealing and ties with the Taliban. The detainee is listed as being associated with the Office of Director of Logistics.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee wore an all black uniform for his job and carried a pistol. He claimed not to know anything about the pistol other than its size.

2. The detainee later said he did not carry a weapon while working as a security guard and only carried a police stick.

3. The detainee said the reason he possessed many identification cards when he was arrested was for his job as a security officer.

4. The security ID card was a picture of him in his security uniform and the epaulets were put on the uniform so that the ID would appear to be a government ID.

5. The detainee states it's a standard watchman ID card. The only thing he had different in his picture were the decorations. The decorations were borrowed from a friend of his who was a police chief in Pakistan.

6. One of the identity cards the detainee was captured with was a Pakistan police ID card. The detainee has denied any affiliation to Pakistan police.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. When asked what he thought about the Taliban, the detainee stated he has never supported the Taliban. They are not good people. He thinks Americans are good, because they have opened schools and provided shelter for Afghans. The Taliban has not done this for the people.

b. The detainee blames the Taliban for the death of his brother.

c. The detainee also stated numerous times that he was just a poor farmer.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ANWAR**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 3 of 3

000767

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

22 July 2005

TO: ZAHOR, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHOR, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee had a girlfriend by the name of Layla. Layla is one of his wife's sisters.
    2. Layla told the detainee that her friends, Khalid and Hamed were possibly planning on bombing one of the buildings in Kabul.
    3. The detainee went to an American post and informed an American contact about the plot. The American contact told him to come back the next day at 11 AM; he did and the detainee was promptly arrested.
    4. The detainee was confused as to why he was arrested. He knew that the authorities had raided Khalid's house, but claims he did not know that they had found any bombs.
    5. After several questions, the detainee mentioned that the bomb had been found on the roof of Khalid's house, inside of a duffle bag.
    6. The detainee struggled to keep his story straight. He would tell multiple stories, sometimes in the same sentence and was deceptive about the real Layla. We believe the detainee planted the bomb or knows who did.
  - b. Connections/Associations

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000768

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHOR, ABDUL

1. Khalid was planning to attack either the United States or the United Kingdom Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. He has worked for the Hezb-E Islami, Gulbuddin and Taliban members in the past, and could be acting for either organization.

2. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

3. The detainee has ties to Agha Shireen Salangi, an infamous Taliban commander from Charikar, Afghanistan. He admitted to having command of troops while under Agha Shireen Salangi's control.

4. Agha Shereen was once aligned with the Taliban and specialized in assassinations and other terrorist operations.

5. Agha Shereen was also identified as being a famous Hezbe-I Islami Gulbuddin commander supported by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior police chief for Kabul.

6. While Agha Shireen was in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee came to visit him. The detainee was Agha's assistant commander during the time of the Taliban and was a Talib himself.

7. During the reign of the Taliban, Agha Shereen was imprisoned by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Northern Alliance Commander. He was jailed for working with the Taliban.

8. The detainee was imprisoned, for approximately five years, by Mr. Masood. One of the detainee's brothers was a commander for Masood's group, a group called Shura Niza.

9. The Shura Niza group was another of the many Afghan groups formed to fight against other Afghan groups.

10. Shura-e-Nazar is a leadership council formed by the late Ahmad Shah Massoud in 1985. It is the consultative body within the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan.

11. A foreign government service said that Iranian officials had trained a group of commandos belonging to Shura-Ye Nazar. These commandos have allegedly been tasked to attack the United States and its allies in Afghanistan so that the Taliban and al Qaida members will be blamed for the attack.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. Documentation was found in the detainee's possession addressing him as Commander Zahoor Khan.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHOR, ABDUL**

2. The detainee had documentation that listed personalities identified as his troops. He also had documentation that discussed Blowpipe and Stinger Surface to Air Missiles.

3. The detainee has a history of harming himself and harassing guards.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee said, "If I am guilty of this, then I would want to be hanged right now."

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 July 2005

TO: KHAN, ABDULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee fought approximately two years in the jihad against the Russians. He was responsible for distributing ammunition.

2. The detainee cooked for the Taliban for approximately two and a half months.

3. New documentation found on the detainee says he is pro-Taliban. He may have shared this information with other detainees.

4. The detainee is suspected of moving weapons.

b. Connections/Associations

1. During the two years the detainee supported the jihad against the Russians, his commander was Namatullah Khan.

2. During the two and half months the detainee cooked for the Taliban, he worked for Mullah Omar's brother who was one of the Taliban Commanders.

c. Other Relevant Data

1. United States Forces arrested the detainee with two other detainees in Kandahar Province.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2  
000771

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, ABDULLAH

2. The detainee believes that Mullah Jan (his enemy) betrayed him for money. When the U.S. announced they would pay money in exchange for a Taliban leader, the detainee believes that Jan told the Afghanistan Army and the U.S. that he was a Taliban leader.

3. The detainee states that Mullah Nor Jan is from his village. The detainee's family has been enemies with Jan's family for 30 to 40 years. The feud was from years ago when Jan's family killed two of the detainee's uncles over a land dispute.

4. In the September-October 2001 timeframe, a foreign service prepared a list of Arabs and Afghans who were issued visas from the Pakistani Embassy in the United Arab Emirates. The detainee was issued a visa on 15 September 2001.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any association with the Taliban and denied ever being conscripted by them. After being confronted by the same question about his association with the Taliban, he changed his story and said that he was conscripted by the Taliban and worked as cook. He said that he did not volunteer and that it was his first and only time he was associated with the Taliban.

b. The detainee claims that members of the Taliban kidnapped him. He informed the unknown Taliban members that he was not familiar with weapons and could not do anything but cook.

c. The detainee stated that he did not receive any military training, to include firing a gun or using explosive devices, and never fired any weapons throughout the Russian invasion.

d. The detainee was asked if he had ever worked for the Taliban, killed any coalition soldiers, or participated in the planning of attacks on coalition people. The detainee answered no to all three questions.

e. The detainee claims that after he returned home to his family from serving with the Taliban he decided to move his entire family to Pakistan to avoid the Taliban.

f. The detainee stated that he did not know why he was being arrested. He asked why he was being taken away and what his crime was. He was not given an answer.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 August 2005

TO: NASIR, ALLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASIR, ALLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Abu Faysal, former director of the Herat Wafa office, sent the detainee to Herat, Afghanistan with money.

2. According to a foreign government service, the non-governmental organization "Wafa" was believed to have connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan Mujahidin.

3. The detainee was to travel from Lebanon to Abidjan to assist in a planned attack against an Embassy.

b. Training

1. The detainee served two years in the Afghan military during King Zair Shaw's rule. He claims he only received basic military training, except for the Kalashnikov.

2. The detainee says he was assigned to a transportation unit where he received driver's training and was responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the vehicles.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is a representative in his local village and an assistant to Sher Agha.

2. Shir Agha is a powerful Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin commander from the time of the jihad against the Soviets.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1

Page 1 of 2

000773



## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASIR, ALLAH

3. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.

4. Haji Shah Zada had a dinner at his house the night prior to his arrest. He met an old acquaintance, Abdullah Khan, and asked him to his house for dinner.

5. Zada also invited Nasorllah, also known as Ghnow, to the dinner.

6. Gano and Nasrullah Hussain are aliases of the detainee.

7. Abdullah Khan, aka Kheirullah, was visiting Haji Shah Zada. Abdullah Khan was the individual that two contacts said was a former commander at Bagram, Shindand and Kandahar, Afghanistan airfields.

8. Contacts said the detainee worked as an intelligence agent for Kheirullah.

9. Soldiers arrested the detainee, Zada and two others at Zada's house.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee has harassed guards verbally and non-verbally and occasionally has failed to obey rules.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee advised he and the other men never talked about doing harm to the Americans during the card game the night before his arrest.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 July 2005

TO: GHAFOUR, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFOUR, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was the former district officer for the Taliban in Zormat, and was part of the leadership for the Zormat district Taliban network under Saifullah Rahman Mansur.

2. Saifur Rahman was the deputy commander of the Kargha garrison west of Kabul during the Taliban rule. He returned to his native Zurmat district in Paktia after the Taliban defeat.

b. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. The detainee was the commander of a group of 50 former Taliban in Neka, Paktika province, Afghanistan. The group was part of Saifullah Rahman Mansour's troops.

2. In late July 2002, Mansour's group attacked locations in Gardez and Zormat including the United States' compound in Gardez.

3. On 7 Feb 03, when United States and Afghan Military Force forces attempted to search the detainee's home, the detainee went to the roof and fired shots from his AK-47. United States and Afghan Military Force forces returned fire.

4. The detainee's neighbor fired upon the forces and United States and Afghan Military Force forces returned fire to both locations.

5. After a firefight, United States forces negotiated with the detainee to surrender.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000775

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFOUR, ABDUL**

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee denied having any position as a district officer in Zurmat, though he was a leader at a time when the area was technically not a district.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee stated the occupation by United States forces was very good because he felt safer with United States forces providing security.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

28 June 2005

TO: QUASAM, MOHAMMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QUASAM, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee was suspected of involvement in rocket attacks against the United States or coalition forces and participation in the manufacturing of false visas.
    2. The detainee was part of Saifullah Rahman Mansur's network in the Zormat District of Paktia Province.
    3. Saifullah Rahman Mansur is an al Qaida exfil contact and former Commander of the Taliban's 8th Division in Kabul, Afghanistan.
    4. The detainee met Noorullah, a member of Saifullah Rahman Mansur's network, in November 2002. Noorullah has been identified as launching rockets at United States forces in Gardez during November 2002.
    5. The detainee was identified as Mullah Qasim, nicknamed "The Punisher", Chief of Investigations and Interrogations for the Taliban in Zormat, Afghanistan.
    6. The detainee was identified as being in charge of Hisb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) operations in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan.
    7. HIG has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States Department of Homeland Security.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000777

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QUASAM, MOHAMMED

8. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahadin groups in the war against the Soviets. The HIG has long established ties with Usama Bin Ladin. HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), and establish a fundamentalist state.

9. On 9 August 2002, Mohammed Qasim attended a meeting in which two arms of the Union of Mujahadin were established. One arm would carry out clandestine attacks and the other guerilla style attacks.

10. The Union of the Mujahadin of Afghanistan is newly formed and alleged to plan attacks against the United States and Afghan entities.

11. Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar provided the overall leadership for the Union of the Mujahadin of Afghanistan with support, guidance, and funding provided by al Qaida.

12. In early August 2002, a meeting of the Union of the Mujahadin of Afghanistan was held. During this meeting Mohammed Qasim was named sub-commander for the District of Jajamaidan.

13. The detainee was present at a December 2002 meeting during which members of the Hizb-I Islami (HIG) and Taliban discussed waging Jihad against United States military forces in Afghanistan.

14. The detainee was found and captured at a compound by United States and Afghanistan Military Forces.

#### b. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee worked for the Taliban for five years.
  2. The detainee admits working for the Taliban as "an organizer" on a road construction project.
  3. The detainee had 18-20 Taliban soldiers working for him.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee denied getting weapons or explosives training at the Alizai refugee camp.
  - b. The detainee continues to deny committing any crimes or being involved with anyone who has.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QUASAM, MOHAMMED**

c. The detainee denied owning any weapons and he did not have access to weapons of any kind or anywhere.

d. The detainee insisted that he has had no involvement with anti-coalition actions.

e. The detainee denied meeting Jalaiuddin Haqqani.

f. The detainee said his intentions if released were to go back to his country and work for a wage.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3 of 3

000773

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 September 2005

TO: AHMAD, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMAD, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Training

The officers in the 856th Brigade trained at an unknown location in Pakistan for three to four months.

b. Connections/Associations

1. Once Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, the detainee was assigned as the Commanding Officer, 2nd Platoon, 2nd Company, 856th Battalion, Roy Sang Village, Bamian Province, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee commanded sub-unit two of the 601st Battalion, which is part of the 856th Brigade.

3. The 865th Brigade is commanded by Rahmatullah.

4. Ramatullah has very close ties to the Taliban.

5. A letter was found in the detainee's home in Roysang, Kamard District, Bamian Province, Afghanistan, prior to his detention. The content of the letter contained instructions for the detainee and his forces to attack American troops, should they return to the area.

6. Two people standing between American soldiers pointed to the detainee and exclaimed that the detainee was al Qaida.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 2  
Page 1 of 3  
000780

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMAD, ABDUL**

7. The detainee is a commander for the Ittihad-E Islami. Ittihad-E Islami was recruiting for potential volunteers to receive training in conducting suicide bomb attacks against United States troops. The detainee was supposed to command some of the trained recruits.

### c. Detainee Actions and Statements

1. During the Taliban regime, the detainee was nominated by his village to become its spokesman. He provided the names of local villagers who could be called into military service with the Taliban.

2. The detainee received the order to attack the Americans if they entered his region approximately forty days before he was captured. He did not make any effort to follow up with the Americans and warn them that they could be targets of an attack plan.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee received weapons from Rahmatullah; however, the detainee also indicated his weapons came from the Russian jihad.

2. The detainee says that he is given access to his weapons any time he wants.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was receiving the military orders in his area at the time of his arrest because there was no military commander in the area and the military needed a point of contact in Roy-E-Sangh.

b. The detainee insisted he has not been in the military since the Taliban took over, did not fight for the Taliban, and did not join the Afghan National Army when the Taliban fell.

c. A document found in the detainee's house identified the detainee as the Commander of the 2nd sub-unit. This document is actually 10 years old, and it was from the detainee's days in the Afghan National Army, prior to the Taliban.

d. The detainee thinks the Taliban are wild terrorists who come into a village and destroy things.

e. The detainee has heard of al Qaida. They were terrorists who destroyed people's homes. The detainee heard of the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. He shares the sorrow and sadness with Americans.

f. The detainee claims he is not Taliban or al Qaida, and has never killed anyone or witnessed any killings.

UNCLASSIFIED



## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMAD, ABDUL**

g. The detainee claimed he did not prepare for an attack on the Americans. He claimed that he likes the Americans and thinks that the American presence is a positive development for the country.

h. The detainee is the sub-Governor of Kahmard District. One of President Karzai's Vice President's specifically requested the detainee to be appointed to this post.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 August 2005

TO: BAGI, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAGI, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

The detainee admitted to being part of the attacks (ambush) on United States Forces in the vicinity of Lejay, Afghanistan.

b. Connections/Associations

1. A known Taliban member identified the detainee as Taliban.
2. As U.S. elements approached the village of Lejay (Abdul Rais Wahid stronghold) on the morning of 10 February 2002, they were viciously ambushed from the high-ground on both sides of the road. The enemy fired from well-prepared ambush positions, and employed a high volume of RPK, PKM, AK and RPG fire in an effort to kill as many U.S. personnel as possible.
3. Haji Raes Abdul Wahed, is the Supreme Commander of a forty man guerrilla unit. He was identified as teaching hand grenade techniques, plastic explosives with detonator cord, and how to blow up cars.
4. Detainee was captured on 10 February 2003 in a dugout/hole 100 meters from the compound.
5. The detainee was apprehended wearing an Olive Drab (OD) green jacket consistent with the eyewitness accounts of the individual responsible for the attacks.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2  
000783

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BAGI, ABDUL**

6. OD jackets were worn by several men captured, on the same day as the detainee, at a checkpoint on the north side of town in a taxi and on motorcycles. The men all suffered from hearing loss assessed to be from firing activity.

7. During the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, the detainee called two witnesses other than his uncle, Alif Mohammed and Bari Dad, that testified for him.

8. Alik Muhammed is assessed as a security/military commander of Lejay/Wahid compound and it is believed he orchestrated the attack on American Forces.

9. Bari Dad was captured on the same day as the detainee. He suffered from hearing loss assessed due to firing activity.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee does not know any Taliban members.

b. Detainee believes the Americans have come to bring peace and stability to the people. He feels it is good, the Americans help rebuild roads and water systems and help establish education for the people, he is happy with that.

c. Detainee denied any knowledge/involvement in the attacks on United States Forces.

d. Detainee claims to never have owned or fired any kind of weapon.

e. The detainee admitted growing poppies, however, agreed it was a good thing the American forces and Afghanistan government was stopping farmers from growing poppies.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 July 2005

TO: RAHMATULLAH, FNU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMATULLAH, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was traveling home to celebrate the Eid holiday and caught a ride in a taxi with seven other people.

2. While in the taxi traveling from Saychow to his home in Lerak, the taxi passed through the town of Lejay. The detainee advised that outside of Lejay, he heard explosions and saw airplanes and helicopters flying overhead.

3. As U.S. elements approached the village of Lejay (Wahid stronghold) at approximately 0200Z the morning of 10 February 2003, they were ambushed from the high ground on both sides of the road. The enemy fired from well-prepared ambush positions, and employed a high volume of RPK, PKM, AK, and RPG fire.

4. U.S. forces seized and conducted cordon and search of Wahid compound and took 70 personnel into custody initially in/around town. All personnel were screened and 11 were recommended for detention.

5. The 11 individuals were apprehended returning from the ambush sites or in fighting positions in/around Lejay. They were deaf, had powder burns, and had blood on their clothes.

6. Personnel were observed standing in a group where the ambush positions were located. The personnel got into a white car or onto motorcycles and proceeded down the road to the traffic control point. The personnel, including the detainee, were questioned and detained.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000785

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMATULLAH, FNU**

7. All occupants of the vehicle were wearing OD green jackets. The detainee was assessed to be suffering hearing loss when captured, caused by firing weapons.

b. Connections/Associations: None

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claimed to not know the difference between al Qaida and Taliban. He had only had heard of Abdul Wahid, thinking that he had disappeared.

b. The detainee states that he does not know any of the travelers in the vehicle when he was captured. He professes to be a poor farmer.

c. The detainee denied traveling to any location outside Afghanistan and no farther than Kandahar.

d. The detainee denied being part of the Taliban or any other militia group.

e. The detainee likes the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, because he believes the U.S. is there to help rebuild the country.

f. The detainee advised that his brother bought the jacket at a bazaar and later gave it to him.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 August 2005

TO: HAFIZULLAH, FNU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAFIZULLAH, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The Bagran valley region has provided a continuous safe-haven to hostile Taliban forces. In time of attack all males pick up arms in defense of the valley against "invaders" (U.S. or coalition forces).

2. In the early morning hours of 10 February 2003, a United States Special Forces (USSF) convoy approached the village of Lejay in the Baghran valley. Shortly thereafter, the USSF were ambushed with small arms fire to include AK, PKM, and RPGs.

3. At the conclusion of the conflict, USSF seized and conducted cordon and search of the area. Eleven personnel were apprehended returning from the ambush sites or in fighting positions in/around Lejay. Those returning from the ambush sites were deaf and had powder burns, with blood on their clothes.

4. The detainee was one of the 11 personnel detained after the ambush at Lejay.

5. The detainee was arrested at a checkpoint established north of the town. USSF observed several individuals descending the mountain. They cached their weapons and tried to leave by taxi, but were detained at the checkpoint.

6. All of the men who were stopped and arrested at the checkpoint were wearing green jackets and suffered from hearing loss. The hearing loss was assessed to be the result of their firing activity.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000787

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HAFIZULLAH, FNU**

**b. Connections/Associations**

1. Two of the individuals arrested at the checkpoint along with the detainee included Rahmatullah and Bari Dad. Both were wearing green jackets and were suffering from hearing loss.

2. Mullah Ramatullah attended a meeting in May 2002, led by an Iranian and senior Taliban officials in Helmand Province, to discuss military operations against the Afghan Interim Administration and plans to derail the Loya Jirga Process.

3. Mullah Bari Dad was one of the operators of the intelligence collection network in Deh Rawud for the former Taliban Chief of Intelligence in Qalat, Afghanistan.

4. A meeting of Taliban leaders was held on 18 October 2002 to discuss the upcoming jihad against the Coalition and the Afghan Transitional Authority. A second meeting of the Taliban leaders, to include Bari Dad Khan, was planned for 23 October 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee has continually professed that he is only a farmer and wants only to go home and back to farming and caring for his family.

b. The detainee denied any knowledge of using or possessing firearms.

c. The detainee has continually denied any involvement in shooting at Americans.

d. The detainee has continually denied any Taliban associations.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 August 2005

TO: BARIDAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARIDAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee is a combatant involved in the ambush of U.S. Special Forces (USSF) in Lejay, Afghanistan. He has knowledge of HIG and Taliban early warning systems and may have courier information.
    2. Hizb-1 Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) has long-established ties with Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996.
    3. The Baghran Valley region extends through Lejay. The region has provided a continuous safe-haven to hostile Taliban forces providing C2 nodes, supplies, guerrillas, training and staging areas. In time of attack all males pick up arms in defense of the valley against "invaders" (United States or coalition forces).
  - b. Connections/Associations
    1. The detainee stated he had met Taliban member Abdul Wahid once a long time ago briefly in the Shinai village.
    2. Abdul Rais Wahid is a Mullah and is very closely linked with the Taliban and HIG.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 2

000789



## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARIDAD

3. The detainee was detained during a United States/coalition force(s) muster of suspected individuals involved in a series of defensive attacks against US forces attempting to apprehend Abdul Rais Wahid.

#### c. Other Relevant Data

1. On 10 February 2003, USSF observed enemy at the top of the mountain. They stopped, appeared to cache weapons, then maneuvered down the mountain. There the enemy entered taxi or mounted motorcycles. They then proceeded to the checkpoint.

2. Capture data indicates the detainee was apprehended at a checkpoint in a taxi.

3. The detainee was wearing clothing that matched that of the attackers.

4. Detainee suffered from hearing loss (assessed due to firing activity).

5. The detainee said that USSF arrived in Lejay that morning, surprising everyone. This directly contradicts his previous statement that USSF had arrived in Lejay two days prior to the detainee's arrest.

6. The Baghran Valley provides a ready financial source to hostile Taliban forces courtesy of robust poppy growth with subsequent opium and heroin production.

7. The detainee is thin and feels weak. He requested a serum shot be given to him intravenously. The detainee received three of these from a doctor while living in Afghanistan. He does not know what these shots contained.

8. The detainee said that on the day of his capture when he awoke he felt ill. He then had his wife give him a shot of penicillin.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he prays for American people because they provided wheat to him and other poor people in his village. He does not pray for the Taliban, because they have never done anything to help the people.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 June 2005

TO: NASERULLAH, FNU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASERULLAH, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was captured outside Lejay Village, Baghran District, Helmand Province, based on suspicion of belonging to a group that had just fired on U.S. Forces.

2. There were indications that the group cached their weapons, maneuvered down a mountain, entered a taxi or mounted motorcycles and proceeded to a checkpoint. The detainee, along with others, was captured at that checkpoint.

3. The detainee, and those with whom he was captured, suffered from hearing loss. It is assessed that the hearing loss was due to their firing activity.

4. The detainee was captured with about 14,500 Pakistani funds, and had multiple documents in his possession, including letters addressed to mid-level Taliban commanders.

5. The detainee denies that he knew any of the other occupants of the vehicle from which he was captured.

6. The detainee displays deception when providing information relative to his capture.

b. Training

1. The detainee said that after September 11, 2001, he worked for the Helmand Government as a security guard at the ~~Helmand Airport~~. He shared a weapon with another guard, but he did not know how to use it.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit 1  
Page 1 of 3

000791

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASERULLAH, FNU**

2. The detainee was identified as being a trained bodyguard for a known leader of Taliban fighters.

3. This Taliban leader had a group of about 40 fighters, one of whom acted as a spy, and collected information on U.S. and coalition forces in Kandahar, Helmand and Oruzgan.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was captured with an individual who operated an intelligence collection network in support of a former Taliban Chief of Intelligence.

2. The detainee was captured with an individual who was scheduled to meet with other Taliban leaders to discuss an upcoming jihad against the coalition and the Afghanistan Transitional Authority.

3. The detainee was captured with an individual who organized a meeting of senior Taliban officials to discuss military operations against the Afghan Interim Administration.

4. The detainee is also known as Mullah Nasirullah Akhund.

5. The detainee was captured carrying records of payments made by Mula Nasrullah Akhund to Mula Sahib.

6. Mulam Sahib has been identified as a long time Taliban member and fighter.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he never fired a weapon at U.S. forces.

b. The detainee claims he was given the documents which were in his possession at the time of capture. He was unaware they were addressed to Taliban commanders, and did not know the person who gave him the documents.

c. The detainee denied that he had any connection to the Taliban government, or that he passed documents for them.

d. The detainee states he would like to return to his country of origin, where he would continue to support the U.S.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASERULLAH, FNU**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3 of 3

000793