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**The documents in this
folder continue from the
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March 20

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime
Minister's Office
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
Eli Mizrachi, Deputy Director, Prime
Minister's Office
Brig. Gen. Ephraim Paron, Military Secretary
to the Prime Minister
Dan Patir, Prime Minister's Spokesman
Col. Aryeh Bar-On, ADC to Minister Peres

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Amb. Kenneth Keating, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
Amb. Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the
Secretary for Press Relations
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff


DECLASSIFIED *State Dept*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5 *Review SF 9/17/03*
NSC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HR*, DATE *10/02/03*

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, March 20, 1975
9:50 a.m. - 12:35 p.m.

PLACE:

The Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem



~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

Kissinger: What you said on Friday about the Egyptian proposals being unsatisfactory and inadequate was rebroadcast on Tuesday to Riyadh by Voice of America, the official voice of the U.S. Government.

[Photographers were admitted]

Rabin: How was the trip to Riyadh?

Kissinger: It was interesting.

Patir: With the King? Does he speak English?

Kissinger: He understands it, but he doesn't speak it. Asad's comprehension is improving.

Sisco: He speaks with a German accent. [Laughter].

Kissinger: That's my joke! I told Asad he would be the first Arab leader to speak English with a German accent.

[The Photographers left.]


I think it is safe to say it was the friendliest reception we have had in Saudi Arabia. We talked about the Syrian problem. The last time he had said it had to be simultaneous. I told him it couldn't be done. This time he said: "Whatever your judgment is. Just keep in mind the moderate forces in the area will have a problem."

I warned him it might break up. This was beyond his comprehension. I didn't go into details. That upset him. I told him we would continue the efforts even if it broke up.

They are making efforts to improve relations with Iraq. Prince Fahd is going there in April. They think there is a chance of moving Iraq away from the Soviets. Two Iraqi radios stopped broadcasting to Saudi Arabia. Prince Fahd is being sent on a mission to Baghdad April 5, and then he is going to Iran. It is a coordinated policy between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iraq has agreed to the demarcation of the border with them. That is all of significance.

[Rabin motions to Gen. Gur].

Gur: We told you a week ago about the anti-aircraft missiles along the eastern side of the Canal. Unfortunately, we have new information about many new positions of that kind -- well digged-in, well built, camouflaged in



different ways. Not only didn't they do anything about the old ones, but there are many new ones.

Rabin: Concrete structures.

Gur: In a very hasty way.

Kissinger: We are familiar with five sites, and he promised us that UN observers could inspect them, and that anything that was in violation would be dismantled.

Gur: There is no problem of UN observers to see those places, only that they say it is artillery places and that is nonsense.

Kissinger: No, we showed them pictures. They first said they were hospitals, and we showed them the pictures. Gamasy said the people would be punished and they would be dismantled.

Gur: If anyone agrees it's anti-aircraft missiles, they have to be destroyed because they are in violation.

Kissinger: They promised us an answer by Monday night.

Rabin: Now, to the subject.

We promised you a Cabinet meeting. We had a Cabinet meeting.

Kissinger: You promised us a Cabinet meeting, we got a Cabinet meeting!

Rabin: We met, with an interval, ten hours.


Peres: And some Ministers even gave up the right to speak.

Kissinger: You mean they all have a right to speak?

Rabin: In our system, the Cabinet Ministers have to explain the policy of Government to the members.

Kissinger: Adenauer had a Cabinet member who was violently opposed to his foreign policy and he always refused to recognize him. Once he insisted on being recognized. Adenauer said: "You don't need my permission to go to the toilet." [Laughter].

Peres: DeGaulle was once told by a Minister that he opposed one of DeGaulle's policies because all of his friends were opposed. DeGaulle said, "Change your friends." [Laughter.]



Rabin: We presented your proposal. There was not a warm welcome. There were three issues: (1) the political quid pro quo, (2) duration, (3) the lines. There was a fourth, the question of demilitarization. And a fifth.

Allon: Syrian involvement.

Rabin: Where do we stand? On the question of the political quid pro quo, I said the Egyptian formula -- I said it was your impression but everyone got it as the Egyptian proposal -- was unsatisfactory, and the decision was to leave it as Yigal gave you before you left.

On duration, I wouldn't say there was no appreciation of Egypt's readiness to take the duration away from the peace-making process, but there is still a demand to have a commitment, even an indirect one, to a certain number of years.

Kissinger: In addition to what Yigal gave me?

Rabin: Yes.

Third, on the lines, the intention is to have it in the middle of the passes.

Kissinger: These are all cumulative demands? All related to each other?

Rabin: Yes.

On Abu Rudeis, we kept it vague but put it in terms of three parties being there.

Peres: As a Member of the Cabinet, I got it that the Egyptians would get the oil, and sell it through the U.S. or the companies or to Israel.

Rabin: I don't think that they will insist on this if other parts are unsatisfactory.

Allon: They will break down earlier?

Rabin: On the fifth point, Syria.

Allon: [Reads from Fahmy paper] "Israel and Egypt should give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to undertake military or paramilitary operations for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions. Israel should undertake not to initiate military or paramilitary operations against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations toward Syria."



Kissinger: This is superseded. They are willing to give it as much more unconditional.

Rabin: Maybe this problem is solved.

Kissinger: What they say now is they're willing to make their non-recourse to force unconditional on the peace process or on what happens in Syria.

It makes no difference. There will not be an agreement. Let's not play games. Let's be clear, when the propaganda battles start, what was proposed.

They would make it unconditional, but they also wanted an assurance that Israel would not start a preemptive war.

Rabin: I don't ask them for commitment of what the Syrians will do.

Kissinger: I think the Syrian part is handleable in this document, quite easily. That they've made very clear.

OK, so these are the Cabinet points?

Sisco: You mentioned demilitarization.

Rabin: The Egyptians will extend to all along the UN line the same amount of forces they have now in the limited area of forces, and the area between the blue line now and the Israeli line will be demilitarized.

Kissinger: Let me sum up where we stand and take a five minute break to consult with my colleagues.

Incidentally, I assume there will be no press briefing while I am in Aswan.

Mizrachi: There is a meeting of the Security and Foreign Affairs Committee today.

Rabin: When will you be here tomorrow.

Kissinger: 11:00 a. m.

Rabin: We'll have it in Jerusalem tomorrow.

Kissinger: With respect to non-belligerency, you insist on the Allon formula.



Rabin: We put two formulas -- the cessation of belligerency, or what Yigal suggested as a substitute for it.

Kissinger: It had everything in it. What is missing?

Allon: That a state of belligerency exists.

Kissinger: Either the state of belligerency includes the things that remain, or else there is nothing they can do.

Peres: You said Sadat says Israeli ships can go through the Canal.

Allon: By this formula he can still claim, and we shall not deny it, that there will be further Israeli withdrawal in the next step and that he has not given an end to belligerency. This is what you said would give us the elements without changing the status. We can change a word here and there, but our aim is to find a formula that will not annoy them from the political point of view.

Kissinger: But they already told you it would annoy them from a public relations point of view. So you understand what this decision means.

First, you insist on the Allon formula on non-recourse to force.

On demilitarization, everything between the blue line and your line will be demilitarized.

Rabin: We haven't given you the deployment of our installations. It will take between two to three years to rebuild.

Kissinger: This will be true whether the line is in the middle of the passes or at the eastern end.


There is no sense debating it, because there is a Cabinet decision.

Fourth, with respect to Abu Rudeis, since the line is where it is, it means there will have to be an enclave. Have I covered everything?

Sisco: The Syrian point.

Kissinger: That's not a problem.

Sisco: Duration.



Kissinger: On duration, you want a fixed period of duration of more than two years. Is that a fair statement?

Rabin: Yes. It might be flexible on the formula of Yigal.

Kissinger: All right. Can we take five minutes?

[There is a long break from 10:22 to 10:53 a.m.]

Allon: Now we understand what is five minutes.

Kissinger: It's straight PR. I need to tell you we didn't need a half hour to discuss your points. We spent this time partly for public relations reasons so the meeting would not be too short.

I think I'd prefer it if the supernumeraries on both sides would leave the room. To reduce the danger of leaking.

[The meeting was reduced to seven on each side].

And we wanted to permit some time to elapse to make sure our second assessment was the same as the first.

Now, we have to consider the decision of the Israeli Cabinet as a deliberate strategic decision probably to go to war this year, to have a confrontation with the Arab states this year, and second, as a decision to have a confrontation with the United States.

There is not the slightest attempt to deal with any of the points made to you over many months.

There is no need to explain that these points will all be rejected in Egypt. There is no need to explain that to come back to Egypt after Egypt has made clear its position will be seen as a provocation by Sadat. There is no need to discuss each point because each point is unacceptable in itself and you know they are unacceptable. There should be no illusion.

I'd like to review for a moment how we got to this point.

When your Foreign Minister visited the United States in July, we proposed a negotiation with Jordan and a negotiation with Egypt, and we thought the Geneva Conference would have to be reconvened. We were urged by your Foreign Minister to delay the negotiations with Jordan



until the middle of this year, to delay the Geneva Conference, and on an urgent basis to meet Israeli military demands. We have done all these things, unconditionally.

Since our first meeting with you as Prime Minister, we have made it clear that non-belligerency was unattainable in any form.

We committed the United States to the step-by-step approach. We went through meetings with the Soviet Union in Moscow and Vladivostok, confronting them over the step-by-step approach. We could at any time have sold Geneva to them, if we knew this would fail.

We let it be known on several occasions that a significant move was necessary, and we let it be known exactly what in our assessment it had to consist of. Having made this clear over several months, the objective result is that we were misled, even if it was not your intention -- having committed our prestige, having risked confrontation with the Soviet Union, having risked our position in the Arab world.

This will have serious consequences. Since you undoubtedly took this into account, it can only be seen as deliberate decision, a blow against the strategic position of the United States, taking advantage of our domestic situation. After we carried out every nuance of our commitment to you.

I was asked to make a statement to you the other day, but I did not, because I wanted you to make your decisions without pressure. What I'm saying now is not to make you change your position -- because we wouldn't accept it. I am summing up a phase of our relationship.

[He reads from talking points approved by the President in HAKTO 78 and TOHAK 133]:

"I have reported fully to President Ford on the details of our last meeting and the position taken by the Israeli Government.

"Failure to achieve a second-stage Egyptian-Israeli agreement, after months of arduous preparatory discussions in which the U.S. has been so directly involved, affects the vital interests of the U.S. and of Israel. In the Middle East, there is going to be a sharp swing away from the West and moderation, with radicalism and the USSR the only beneficiaries. The hopeful shift towards peace, even in Syria, will be lost. This will touch such countries as Saudi Arabia and Western Europe to protect its position



in the Arab world, will dissociate from us. Iran, which has been betting on us, will accelerate its own cause. The Soviet Union will remerge in an increasingly strong position. There will be a very great risk of a costly war of attrition between Israel and its Arab neighbors. I am convinced after my talks in Syria, Egypt and Jordan that this is the case.

"Failure of these negotiations will also have an adverse influence going well beyond the Middle East. The economic repercussions for the West could be disastrous, as well as the ensuing political shifts in Western Europe. We are being asked to finance a stalemate threatening our interests in all parts of the world.

"Israel's inability to be responsive enough to achieve a successful negotiation cannot but have far-reaching repercussions in the U.S. Failure of these negotiations will require an overall reassessment of the policies of the U.S. that has brought us to this point.

"I have been asked to make these points with the full authority and approval of President Ford."

I have been asked to make one other point. [He reads from TOHAK 133].

"We cannot be in a position to isolate ourselves from the rest of the world simply in order to stand behind the intransigence of Israel."

I didn't read this to you the other day because I didn't want you to take a decision under pressure. So as not to play the good guy, I must say I concur fully.

I take what we heard this morning as a deliberate decision to have a confrontation with the Arab world, at the moment of maximum domestic difficulties in the United States. And this is unacceptable.

We will break off the talks, in a manner that causes the minimum embarrassment to Israel.

But I must say you've taken a decision which seems to us totally wrong.

On the substance of the matter, I have watched with dismay for the last two weeks how Israeli public opinion has been steered in the direction that agreement is impossible. I came here under an illusion -- and my colleagues,



and even the press traveling with me believed -- that non-belligerency was impossible but could be replaced with provisions for the non-use of force. I've seen in the newspapers that Egypt has offered nothing. I believe Egypt has.

Allon: We brief the Cabinet differently.

Kissinger: I'm not debating with the newspapers. I'm sorry that after six years we've reached this point.

The positive elements in the Egyptian position are: It is the first time an Arab state has pledged that disputes will be solved by peaceful means and there will be no recourse to force for the duration of the agreement -- which you can control. The formula on non-recourse to force, which we pressed on the Egyptians on the illusion that it was something new -- only to be told yesterday morning that it was less than what was in the disengagement agreement. All military contingencies could have been handled.

And the fact that the non-recourse to force was pledged, not just to each other but through the United States, was, I believe, stronger. I have to say the average American would not understand the difference between non-belligerency and non-use of force -- though for four weeks it could be confused.

And the commitment to renew the UN was as open-ended as we could make it, plus a commitment to the United States that it will continue.

And I must say the Egyptian statement yesterday (Tab A) was not quite all bad. We will look back with nostalgia -- unless you have a very successful war this year -- on the period when Egypt was willing to make these concessions, when Saudi Arabia says to us, "You do what you think is right and we'll support you."

I've always told you your quid pro quo was not in the details, but in the process, in the willingness of the moderate Arabs to let the U.S. run it, in our ability to shield you from international pressures.

If we'd known this was your position, we could have gone to Geneva last fall, used Rabat as an excuse, and sold Geneva to the Russians at Vladivostok. But having committed prestige of the U.S., we have to conclude you have made a strategic decision to face a war this year -- or soon -- in which we will have to assume a certain responsibility toward the Soviet Union.

We cannot willingly give up the position we've built up with the Arab states, (a) because it is in your interest, and (b) even if you think it not, it is in the American interest and we will not give it up.

We will not do anything rash; we will not say anything critical. There will be no public confrontation.

I want to tell you as a friend, as somebody who has carried out meticulously our every commitment to you, that we do not feel Israel has carried out its side of the strategy. Israel has taken a decision of a grave nature, and there will be serious consequences.

Rabin: There is no doubt we were and we are for the interim agreement. We know, and you said it to us, that non-belligerency could not be achieved. But if there is something much less than non-belligerency, the question is what is the price, and what we are given in return. But let's say the question of formulation can be solved; is that the only issue?

Allon: What are the points....

Kissinger: It is senseless. It might as well break up on this issue as any other. That a man [Sadat] who has a bet on the United States should be so exposed is a setback to United States foreign policy. The formulation is impossible, the line is impossible, the duration is impossible.

I tell you quite honestly, and so do all my colleagues, for whatever it is worth, I interpret the Cabinet decision in two ways: first, as a deliberate decision to have a confrontation with the Arabs and to go to war, and second, as a decision to have a confrontation with the United States, because if you respected us you'd have at least made an effort to show you heard us.

Allon: It's a different question if it's the result intentionally or unintentionally. So I have to say we informed our Cabinet that we highly valued your good offices of the United States. If you'd heard our reports to the Cabinet, you'd know that. Second, if there is anything we want to avoid -- I don't say at any cost -- it's another war, and even more a confrontation with the United States. So, even if it's an objective result, don't take it as intentional.

Kissinger: It's irrelevant of the intention.

Allon: Now, as to the points. Yesterday you said it might be possible to strengthen the non-use of force by better wording.



Kissinger: In the context of other things.

Allon: Maybe not legally, but psychologically and educationally it's very important.

Second, we told you we are not insisting on termination of belligerency. So if you think the phrasing I gave you is termination of belligerency in fact, then I told the Cabinet this morning we could still consult about how to phrase the non-use of force and move to peace, to solve the problem.

I must say I see a problem with the other elements -- economic warfare.

Kissinger: You realize the statement I read to you, I was supposed to read on Tuesday.

Allon: No, it was very good you didn't read it the other day. It's important we got this information. We thought our formulations could satisfy Egypt.

Kissinger: You couldn't have thought it would satisfy Egypt.

Allon: It is possible to improve the wording, and it is possible to achieve something even through the United States.

Kissinger: Yigal, you're talking about a negotiation; I'm talking about a termination.

Allon: I'm telling you Israel is ready to continue the negotiation, not for many weeks.

Kissinger: It will terminate tomorrow.

I tell you, I'll present this to Sadat, with no recommendation. For once you'll be right -- I won't advocate it, I'll just be a messenger.

Allon: Duration -- this has been an element since the beginning in Washington.

Kissinger: But I told you what the problems were.

Allon: But there must be some understanding, at least, that there will be a commitment not to ask Israel to do something not in its interest.

Kissinger: [laughs] Whoever asks you for the '67 borders will say it's in Israel's interest!

Allon: A number of years is essential -- even as an understanding with you, not as agreement between the United States and Egypt.

So on these three items, why don't we reach an understanding on formulas we can present the Egyptians?

Now let's turn to the lines, so we can see what we get.

Kissinger: What are we doing around this table? To prepare propaganda positions?

Allon: To revitalize the negotiations.

Kissinger: It is impossible on the basis of your Cabinet decision. I can't spend another week here demonstrating the impotence of the United States, or to beat Israel over the head next week at another point, to produce an agreement that is met with mourning in the streets of Israel and by Jews everywhere.

Maybe if I present this to Sadat, he'll cave. But he'll interpret it as a declaration of war -- maybe not a war now, but as the end of a serious peace effort.

Rabin: I think the formula can be negotiable. I doubt if the lines can be negotiable. I think there is a need for some sort of assurances of duration. On the political, I see it, on the lines, very little.

Kissinger: That's right.

Rabin: Because I see no need to say 10 kilometers, five kilometers. I don't want to mislead you.

Kissinger: I don't say you had a Cabinet meeting saying, "Let's mislead the Americans..."

Rabin: We have made a decision that gives the oil and the western end of the passes. For what, that I can justify it to myself? And it's a matter of confidence, not between you and us but between us and the Egyptians. A matter of 39 bodies makes us wonder what kind of people they are.

Kissinger: They say the same about you.

Rabin: But they have to prove it.

And we face a threat from Syria.

Let's leave public opinion, but I'd like to know why, for half of the passes, for changing all the installations, and even the oil might be considered -- to rely on Sadat willing not to use force and not willing to say two years?

Kissinger: But if you get non-belligerency, how can you rely on his word?

Rabin: Or peace.

Kissinger: That's true. That's a serious problem. That's why you have to consider the environment. I've never said any course was not dangerous.

There is a phrase -- "it could be a turning point to peace" -- I don't know if he'll accept it. Maybe 1%.

If you had decided not to dribble out the concession one at a time, but to do something dramatic, he could see something worth it. Now that he's committed himself so much. Gur can tell you he won't accept this line.

While you were out, I was going to tell Sadat only your non-use of force point so it would break on that and they wouldn't see all your other points. If I give the rest, their bitterness will be compounded. But my colleagues said, since you would put it out anyway, it would hurt us with the Egyptians.

The first one he could see was a Rosenne draft.

Allon: That's true.

Kissinger: The second one he said was a Rosenne version of the first.

Peres: I must say this is like sitting in a Rashomon situation. I can't see how we're sitting at the same table. The Egyptians started by saying non-belligerency was unattainable, for a long time. Actually we gave up non-belligerency.

Kissinger: Not in any way anyone but a Talmudic student could understand.

Peres: No, in a clear way. We didn't specify it and we didn't make it conditional.

Rabin: One of the decisions of the Cabinet which I didn't report to you was that they want a report on this meeting. I will convene to the Cabinet.

Kissinger: I don't want it to leak out.

Rabin: I told the Cabinet I thought it was a 98% chance it would break up the negotiation. There were others who disagreed, but it was my view. We won't change it.

Kissinger: I don't think it's desirable.

Allon: Why not desirable?

Kissinger: Because there is not enough conviction here to carry an agreement. Because there will be massive problems of implementation, and massive, costly, difficulty in carrying out the strategy. I think we should let things take their course. Incidentally, my colleagues disagree.

Sisco: It's 99%, not 98% sure, that this will be rejected.

Kissinger: 100% sure. The line, duration, and non-use -- all three.

Allon: But we told you three times non-use can be redone so it is better and sounds good. We'll sit together and reformulate it -- so what remains?

Kissinger: The line, duration, the oil fields.

I already raised with him an American company. He said he doesn't care where it ends up. He said, "Why not sell the oil to Italy and let Italy sell it to Israel?"

Peres: May I continue? The Cabinet thought if we can't get non-belligerency, why not have instead a small agreement of 30-50 kilometers? Then we heard from you on the passes and the fields, and -- we can't be expected to go 100% on every issue -- but we went quite a way to meet this demand.

About the duration, there were two problems you emphasized: One, that it doesn't have a chance to remain alive more than two years.

Kissinger: No, no.

Peres: And second, in that two years we have to go to Syria.

Rabin: But the process will start.



Kissinger: But it depends a lot on what the circumstances are. Some Communist leaders must be mortal. If there is a leadership change in the Soviet Union, maybe nothing will happen in '77. If the constellation of forces remains the same, I said I saw a crisis in '77.

Peres: But we shall be under pressure.

Sisco: This is separate from the disentanglement of the agreement; it's the objective conditions.

Peres: There were two changes we made after you came. A change in the blue line.

Kissinger: It makes no difference, if the numbers are the same.

Peres: And the oil fields, since it was a political decision. And non-use of force.

These are three new decisions, which I do not see as a decision to go to war.

Kissinger: When is your Cabinet meeting?

Rabin: I called it for 1:00.

Kissinger: Do you want me to wait for it?

Rabin: When was it you planned to leave?

Kissinger: 3:00. If we delay our departure, we have to inform them right away. How long will it be?

Rabin: It will be very long.

Kissinger: I can delay it until 4:00. Or even 5:00.

Or should we delay it to tomorrow morning?

Rabin: 5:00 will be fine.

Kissinger: My meeting with Sadat is for 7:00. It can be delayed 1/2 hour. Hal [Saunders], can you call Parker?

Rabin: I don't want to create illusions. I don't think there will be a change on the two points.

Kissinger: No, it is a practical point. If the Cabinet meets again while I'm in the air, if I'm there and can say this is your next-to-last word and any minute there will be another word.... I'd rather you complete the process here. [To Saunders]: I'll arrive at Aswan at 6:30. Tell them not to scramble their North Korean fighter pilots. [Mr. Saunders goes out to inform Parker Borg.]

Peres: Now, why do we distinguish between the two territorial positions? Were we to have non-belligerency, we would be able to keep a smaller army in the Sinai peninsula.

Kissinger: I doubt it.

Peres: But we could take the chance. I believe we've met the political position of Sadat and the military demand of Gamasy. I certainly wouldn't describe it as a decision to go to war.

On non-belligerency, the Prime Minister told you it's a negotiable matter. We didn't make it ultimative.

The matter of duration is a very serious matter because you said it wouldn't last two years.

Kissinger: Not that strongly; I tried to point out what you're facing.

Peres: But if we had even an American commitment for a reasonable duration, even in an indirect way, I would support it.

Kissinger: What is a reasonable duration?

Peres: The Prime Minister said more than two years. I'd say five years. There is a minimum guarantee. We can't be a nation with mobile lines, every year to build new lines, a new infrastructure. We can't tell the people we're completely mobile on the most sensitive part of our country -- the frontiers. On the installations we've spent a billion pounds.

Gur: With your permission, I'd like to explain why I think you underestimate the military proposition.

What Gamasy is afraid of is that we'll put out of action the Canal, because we are sitting very close to him, although we're sitting there

with a small force. What we're talking about is for him to go into a good ridge -- and both sides spent a lot of blood for a ridge -- and once we go out of the western end, we cannot use the passes.

He's right. If the UN is there, we'll have to fight through them.

Kissinger: That will exhaust the Israeli army!

Dinitz: It's symbolic.

Rabin: Politically.

Gur: It will be much easier for them to stop us moving out than for us to move forward. I say what Gamasy said to you, and he's right.

As Gamasy said, the area north of the passes is the main area. He's right. I knew some of his plans, and most of our plans.

So if we go back and the UN line is 8 kilometers, and in the north 5 kilometers, and they're 15-18 kilometers from the Canal, believe me, it's a big change in the military point of view. No artillery can reach that.

Kissinger: He says the LANCE can reach it.

Gur: The SCUD can reach Tel Aviv. I'm talking about military weapons; those are strategic and political weapons. We would have to move forward 40 kilometers to start an attack -- that's nonsense. From a purely defensive point of view, it makes a lot of change.

The second point is about a warning system. We feel if both sides truly do not have warlike intentions, both sides should have warning systems. We can't give this up, especially for so small a distance. He can have one forward. If he reduces his standing army, we can go to two-and-a-half years military service. And both should have warning systems.

Kissinger: Let me understand: You have a warning system?

Gur: We have one. Umm Khisheib we keep.

Kissinger: You are already satisfied with what you have. But they could have one in the UN zone?

Gur: Yes. We said it the first day.

Kissinger: No, you said both had to be in the UN zone.

I'm convinced they won't accept that line. But if one can say to Gamasy that he could put a warning installation into the western end of the passes...

Gur: Yes.

Kissinger: Then he could say he's got the western end.

Saunders: Eastern.

Kissinger: Western.

Gur: No, Saunders is right.

Allon: Let's assume a solution can be found, that they will have in the buffer zone a very high, well-placed warning system.

[They confer].

Rabin: Let's be careful not to create other misunderstandings. We have not discussed it. But they can have warning systems in the UN zone, at least in the western end.

Gur: Then they can have a big defensive position, with an early warning system and a big buffer. It's an important ridge in this area, and he knows it.

Kissinger: I appreciate it. It's very useful. I didn't know it was a ridge; I thought it was in the middle of sand.

Gur: It is. It's mostly sand but in some places there are ridges. If they take it, it makes a big change and they know it.

Kissinger: I don't doubt it.

[To Allon:] And what is the formula you're thinking of for non-use?

Allon: To make it non-use of force without the other areas of warfare which we can take care of through you.

[Gazit gives paper to Allon. See Tab B.]

First, there is a preamble which you thought could be put in the agreement.

Kissinger: That is conceivable.

Allon: About "the Middle East conflict will be solved only through peaceful means."

Then "Israel and Egypt hereby undertake in the relations between themselves not to resort to the use of force...."

Kissinger: The phrase "in the relations between themselves" produced an uproar from Fahmy.

Allon: Wasn't that in there before?

Gazit: No. Take it out.

Allon: Let me read it: "Israel and Egypt hereby undertake in the relations between themselves not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means."

Kissinger: You might have to take out "in the relations between themselves."

Allon: The other points: "They will refrain from the signing of this document from all military or paramilitary actions against each other."

Kissinger: This is a pure drafting problem. It might be better to say, "They will continue to observe paragraph 1 of the disengagement agreement."

Sisco: And it gives you the ceasefire.

Allon: Article I of the disengagement agreement. [He searches for it and reads:]

"Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea, and air called for by the UN Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military or para-military actions against each other."

Kissinger: I think you would be better off reaffirming that article instead of stating a new obligation. This is a drafting problem.

Gazit: There is no difference.

Kissinger: If you state they will refrain, it implies they had the right to do it before the agreement.

Allon: Now, from the military point of view --

Rabin: Let Gazit and Simcha work to prepare ourselves for the Cabinet meeting.

Kissinger: All right. Let me say a word to the Defense Minister, because he made a very important point. It will, indeed, be psychologically difficult for any state to live with shifting frontiers. Because if you keep moving your installations, it deprives a state of one of the key attributes of a state, namely clearly-defined limits at which it defends itself. I think the period of interim agreements is coming to an end. It may be worth considering a peace settlement.

I never wanted you to be easy to deal with -- nerve-wracking as it is. One reason for this process was to get to this point. I was struck by Faisal yesterday -- he didn't even mention Jerusalem.

Rabin: Why should he mention it now?

Kissinger: It used to be his standard speech.

I think that at some point in the next few years you should consider a sweeping proposal. Especially when you still have something to give. And before you're seen to be acting under pressure.

We should speak for three minutes about the break-up scenario.

Allon: We should also discuss a bilateral agreement.

Rabin: There will be a bilateral agreement.

Allon: If there is an [interim] agreement, or even if there is not.

Kissinger: No, there will be a bilateral agreement between us.

Why don't we get this typed up? It's more like talking points. [He reads from draft:] "We have been seeking, in response to the desires of the parties, to help them achieve an interim agreement as a further step toward a peace settlement. We believe both sides have made a serious effort to reach a successful outcome. Unfortunately, the differences on a number of key issues have proved irreconcilable so far. Secretary Kissinger has accordingly informed the parties that he is returning to Washington to report to the President and the Congress on the present stage of the negotiations. He will remain in close touch with the parties,

the UN Secretary-General, and the Co-chairman of the Geneva Conference during the period ahead." I'll be glad to drop out the Secretary-General.

Dinitz: Why do you need the Secretary-General?

Kissinger: It eludes the co-chairman. We can drop him.

Allon: What can we say about Syria and the boycott? How can you, America, on our behalf, commit the Egyptians -- you said "to ease", I'd like a stronger word -- the boycott?

Kissinger: I haven't talked to them about it. In the agreement I think we can do a bit better. They have mentioned only three companies they plan to let in -- Ford, Xerox, and Coca Cola.

Allon: Out of hundreds.

Kissinger: I've never proposed it in detail. It would be on a selective basis, but I have the impression we could do better.

Allon: And what if Syria attacks Israel?

Kissinger: My conviction is they will feel no obligation to join, but I have to admit the Prime Minister is right: if it's prolonged, they will find it increasingly difficult to stay out. I have told you what they have said -- that they will feel no obligation.

Dinitz: How can we formalize it in a commitment to you?

Kissinger: Maybe an oral commitment which we can transfer to you.

Dinitz: You told me they have said that to you, that Egypt would not join.

Kissinger: Both Sadat and Fahmy said it to me. But it is difficult to do it in a commitment. If he says it to me, it's no good unless I can give it to you. If he says it to you, it's no good unless you can tell your Cabinet. And it means it will be in Ha'aretz in 24 hours.

Allon: Not only in Ha'aretz.

Kissinger: What do we say to the press?

The Prime Minister wants to get ready for the Cabinet.


Peres: I suggest we shall say that, in the wake of the Cabinet meeting, we asked for some clarification from you and we will now report it to the Cabinet.

Kissinger: And I delayed my departure so you could complete the Cabinet meeting.

Incidentally, even these lines will be rejected, in my view. I don't want to mislead your Cabinet.

[Kissinger and Rabin conferred alone from 12:23 to 12:35. The Secretary then departed. Remarks to the press by the Secretary and Minister Peres are at Tab C.]

#



(A)

Egyptian Government Statement, Aswan, March 19, 1975

It is understood that the Arab states approval of Security Council Resolution No 338 included their agreement to end the state of war in a general settlement of the Middle East crisis, to establish a just peace. Consequently, the Arab states do not refuse to sign a peace agreement with Israel when Israel not only becomes ready but also capable of facing the facts of a just peace concerning all elements of the problem and, therefore, willing to carry out its international obligations under Security Council Resolution No 338.

Therefore, it is important before going into this stage to produce a new disengagement agreement as an important basic step toward peace; because, a new agreement will serve as the "birth" of and the test for confidence between the conflicting parties on which real peace could be founded.

During the new disengagement it will be natural for the parties concerned not to use force as long as the provisions of the disengagement agreements remain valid and are respected by the parties so that progress could be made on all front toward peace. All this forms the real meaning of the importance of the new move without obliterating facts or confusing the bases of a final just peace with agreements paving the way for this peace, agreements which are essential for creating the feeling of confidence, which is the foundation of peace.



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
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(B)

NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves, not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. They will refrain from all military or paramilitary actions, from any warlike and hostile acts and any other forms of warfare.

NOTE : This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975



UNCLASSIFIED
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Department of State
TELEGRAM

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March 20, 1975

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (Kissinger, Henry A.)

SUBJECT: Remarks of Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger following a Meeting of the American and Israeli Negotiating Teams on March 20, 1975 in Jerusalem

DEPT PASS NSCE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN;

1. Following are the remarks of Israeli Defense Minister Peres and Secretary Kissinger following the ~~meeting~~ meeting of the Israeli and American negotiating teams during the morning and early afternoon of March 20, 1975.

2. Peres: BEGIN QUOTE: As you know, the cabinet yesterday empowered the team of ministers that is

DRAFTED BY: DRAFTING DATE: TEL EXT.: APPROVED BY:

USIS: *D. Walton*:gd 3/20/75 S/S-S:RHecklinger

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S/PRS:RAnderson

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negotiating with the Secretary of State to continue the negotiations, and in order to do so we had to clarify some points. This was done at the morning meeting which was, as usual, ~~conducted~~ conducted in a very friendly and serious air. Once we have the clarifications we are now returning to the cabinet to report. That is the best news I can give you for the time being. Thank you.

^{Secretary}
3. /Kissinger: I can add nothing to the statement that the minister of Defense has made. We had a good, constructive and friendly meeting and I will stay in Jerusalem until after the cabinet meeting and meet again with our colleagues before I return to Egypt this evening. Thank you.

4. Q: Dr. Kissinger, are you more confident now that you received the assessment of the Israeli cabinet, ~~unimpressive~~ that an agreement can take place?

A. Sec. Kissinger: Well, I have told you all along that I wasn't going to give you estimates. I do feel that each side is making a very serious effort to try to take into account the considerations of the other, and this is certainly true of the Israeli side.

5. A Q: Sir, do you have plans to see Mr. Gromyko in



the next few days?

S: See Kissinger: I do not have any firm plans at this moment. END QUOTE.

KISSINGER



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON*Pres
-
seen*~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

March 20, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*

Secretary Kissinger asked me to provide you with the following report of his latest meeting with Prime Minister Rabin:

"Rabin communicated the result of ten hours of Cabinet deliberations yesterday and presented us with a position which in our judgment is substantially unchanged and would lead to a suspension of the negotiations tomorrow. The formulation on no resort to force is what Sadat has already rejected; the withdrawal line would be cut through the middle rather than out of the passes; and they are still insisting on a five-year commitment that they will not be pressed to make any further withdrawals. After I informed the Israeli negotiating team that it was certain to be unacceptable to the Egyptians, Rabin said that he, too, had informed the Cabinet that it was "98 percent certain that Sadat would reject this latest proposal" and that the negotiations would be suspended.

"I then utilized the talking points that you authorized me to make two days ago, pointing out the serious consequences that would ensue. I underscored that we believe the Cabinet position constituted a strategic Israeli decision to go to war in 1975, and to confront the U. S. I said a reassessment of American policy was now inevitable.


"Rabin had previously agreed to report my views to the Cabinet, and the Israeli Cabinet is now in an afternoon session. Rabin has acted extremely well, and he himself wants an agreement. He deeply appreciated the strong statement I made with your approval at this morning's meeting, and will use it to press for reconsideration of the Cabinet decision. He is not sanguine -- nor am I -- that there will be sufficient change in the Israeli position, particularly on the

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12065, SEC. 3.5

NSD MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *10/02/03*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

- 2 -

question of the line, to come up with a position that Sadat will find acceptable. We expect to meet with the negotiating team again later in the day, and I have therefore delayed my departure for Aswan."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~



HAK/Rabin
Merncon

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
Mordechai Gazit, Director General,
Prime Minister's Office
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Amb. Kenneth Keating, U.S. Ambassador to
Israel
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, March 20, 1975
5:30 - 6:45 p.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem

Rabin: Have you had any rest?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *5F 9/17/03*
BY *1672*, NND, DATE *10/02/03*

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
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~~SECRET/XGDS~~

Kissinger: I managed to take a nap.

Dinitz: Did I wake you up?

Peres: We had a thriller.

Rabin: Let's come back to the points we discussed in the afternoon -- I mean this morning. I'm getting mixed up on dates and time.

Kissinger: I told our press you accepted a bizonal solution for Cyprus.
[Laughter]

Rabin: We discussed four points.

One is political -- nonbelligerency, or nonuse of force. We're ready to find out a modification of nonuse. Let's be frank -- we didn't have enough time. [He hands over Tab A.]

Allon: This is in addition to the preamble.

Kissinger: One of them will have to replace . . . I think this is doable.

Dinitz: We have taken away any reference to what looks like non-belligerency.

Kissinger: You want them in sequence?

Peres: We haven't thought about it.

Allon: We repeated the disengagement words.

Kissinger: That's fine.

Rabin: Should it be "confirm" or "reconfirm"?

Kissinger: All right, "reconfirm." [The change is penciled in.]

Sisco: Is that the same language?

Kissinger: Let's not worry about that.

Rabin: The second point was the lines. No change.



Kissinger: Can you tell us exactly where the line is? We have a map here . . .

Rabin: We have not worked it out. You're talking about the line to which the Israelis will withdraw?

Kissinger: Yes. Let me tell you what the problem is. Hal [Saunders], show me the map.

It's going to wind up like the original proposal -- 30-50 kilometers.

Rabin: Thirty-to-fifty kilometers did not include the passes and the oil fields, for a small agreement.

Allon: The previous one.

Kissinger: It will make some difference if you draw the line in the middle of the pass, which is here. [He indicates on the map.]

Rabin: No, the middle is here. [He indicates.] I know it's a very difficult definition.

Kissinger: But this is behind your lines. I'm just trying to get an idea.

Allon: Wherever the line is, we would like to include Khisheiba [the monitoring installation] in our side.

Kissinger: So it's either an enclave, or you make the line here -- which is about 15 kilometers from the original line.

Rabin: The enclave is fine, but what we want is this way [indicating], basically the same distance all along. We've got a problem because the only communication is along this road.

What do they have in mind in the line, when they said middle?

Kissinger: They never said middle. They said they'd be in the western passes and you'd be in the eastern passes.

On our map, it shows the Gidi Pass here.

Rabin: When we talk of west of Mitla, it's here. East is here.

I know it's a very difficult definition.



Kissinger: When you said 30-50 kilometers, what were you thinking of?

Rabin: It makes a lot of difference. We could give more here and here [in the northern and southern parts]. We could build a road here. But with Abu Rudeis . . .

Let's make it clear: If they want a line like this [north from Abu Rudeis], this is not what we have in mind.

Kissinger: What do you have in mind?

Rabin: I tell you frankly, we have not discussed it.

Kissinger: But I need to know approximately. I won't hold you to the exact kilometer.

Allon: We don't ask that they follow us when we withdraw our line.

Rabin: That's a different problem. [He indicates a line.]

Kissinger: So what happens to Abu Rudeis?

Rabin: It's a civilian enclave.

Kissinger: With military roads?

Rabin: No.

Peres: Egyptian administration.

Kissinger: Can they have any soldiers? Military police?


Does it include El Tor?

Rabin: No.

Allon: The oil is located at two spots, far north of El Tor. And north of El Tor is real topographic area.

Kissinger: You'd say in Abu Rudeis there is no kind of defense?

Rabin: No. It would encourage them to make peace.



Peres: Actually today the situation is very similar. There are the Morgan oil fields, which are not defended. The whole situation in the Gulf of Suez is based on a complete understanding that neither side interferes with the activities of the other. If there is another war, no interference. In all the wars, there was no stopping of shipping of oil. So it's not a military problem. A sort of demilitarization. In no occasion since '67 has either interfered.

Kissinger: How would you have drawn the line if you got nonbelligerency?

Rabin: The eastern end of the passes.

Peres: The whole thing.

Kissinger: So you're going back to your December proposals.

First of all, the Egyptians won't consider it handing over, and second, they won't consider it half of the passes.

Rabin: We asked for nonbelligerency, then for elimination of acts of belligerency. We put it under various terms, but basically it had to be a change in political attitude.

Allon: Even the opposition would have accepted it.

Rabin: They'll oppose everything.

The Egyptians tried to get from us the territorial withdrawal we offered for nonbelligerency. For peace they get something near the international boundary.

Kissinger: The difference between nonbelligerency and peace will elude everyone.

Peres: There are four differences between the 30-50 kilometers proposal and the present one:

First, the Egyptian army will move to the blue line, which we didn't agree previously.

Second, we evacuate half of the passes.



Third, it is a demilitarized zone here.

And, fourth, where we can serve each other is in a thinning out of forces, which will reduce the tension in the whole area, mutually agreed.

Rabin: You see what's the problem: Sadat thinks psychologically about another disengagement agreement, with nothing politically, for which he wants to get the maximum. This is the gap.

Kissinger: Another gap is what you see as political, and that you see it as legally. Formerly you made considerable demands for the legality, now you're compensating for it by the line.

Maybe he'll accept it, but I see no chance of his accepting this line. [To Sisco:] Do you think?

Sisco: No.

Kissinger: Do you think he'll accept it?

Gur: Yes.

Rabin: Because he has no other way.

Kissinger: By that theory he'll accept anything.

Allon: If he knows this is Israel's last proposal, he'll accept it, because the alternative to him is as bad for him as for us. We're making concessions; he isn't making much.


Kissinger: He considers he's made great concessions. Only to Rosenne . . .

Dinitz: He didn't participate in the drafting. He'd commit suicide if he saw this.

Sisco: There is more than disengagement in here; it's solving the problem by peaceful means.

Allon: This is limited to military force.

I think they will accept the line we're proposing because it's really a great concession.



Kissinger: It's a great Israeli concession in terms of the Israeli domestic debate.

Allon: You'll come back tomorrow with a smiling face.

Kissinger: I'm just trying to understand.

Will Israelis be able to go through the Abu Rudeis area?

Rabin: Probably, yes. If not, we'll have to build another road around there.

Kissinger: Can this be a UN road so they can use it? Can some arrangement be made so they can use this road to get to the area?

Rabin: Arrangements can be made: that's no problem.

Kissinger: So they can go through UN checkpoints and not Israeli checkpoints?

Rabin: I'm not saying it's a UN zone.

Kissinger: Is it conceivable? My concept is: I know he won't use the road if the Israelis check Egyptian trucks. But if the UN checks the trucks . . .

Rabin: Not Israelis.

Kissinger: Not Israelis.

Rabin: It might be possible. I don't want to give any final assurance. I don't exclude it.


Kissinger: It won't be accepted, so it doesn't make any difference.

Allon: The use of the road?

Kissinger: The whole concept.

Rabin: As Yigal said, he'll buy it.

Allon: Don't present it negatively.



Kissinger: I won't present it either positively or negatively; I'll just present it.

Allon: The more I compare it with what we presented on my trip in January and your trip here, we're giving up a lot.

Kissinger: You didn't present a line.

Allon: The Cabinet didn't agree to give up the passes and the oil fields.

Kissinger: Your Cabinet will look back with nostalgia on this when they see the history.

Any more?

Rabin: At least as a minimum, an Egyptian commitment that at least three times, four times, they'll renew the UN.

Kissinger: There is a commitment to us that it's annually -- that it's unlimited.

Allon: But you said you didn't expect it more than two years.

Kissinger: I think it's a great mistake to ask them how many years, since they have said it's open-ended.

Rabin: It would help if they could say five years mandate; it would be a great help.

Kissinger: He can do five years de facto; he can't do it publicly.

Allon: Not even to you?

Kissinger: Three years?

Rabin: It's not enough.

It's a very small disengagement agreement, politically or militarily.

Kissinger: I seriously do not believe they will do all that they offered last time for this line, even if they accepted this line.



Allon: They'll do less?

Kissinger: They'll do less.

Allon: If you take their commitment as seriously as you do . . .

Kissinger: No, I take it as seriously as a three-year commitment. I take them all equally seriously.

Allon: I sincerely hope they do do it. But can we have a commitment from the U.S., as we discussed this morning, that for five years . . . ?

Kissinger: You have it de facto. That's what we're doing now. To ask for a five-year commitment, for this kind of agreement, would cause an unholy mess with the Arabs.

You told me in July that in return for certain things you'd move from a position of confidence.

Allon: We couldn't offer such a concession in July. We're more confident now.

Kissinger: Is there anything else? There is no point debating it. At this point I'm a messenger.


Rabin: On Syria?

Kissinger: At this point he has not asked for anything in the document. Since I think it will break up, I don't want to add to the catalogue of his reasons a ground on which he can rally the Arabs. Since he hasn't asked for anything in the agreement.

Dinitz: We weren't thinking in terms of the agreement; we were thinking of what happens if Syria attacks Israel.

Kissinger: I strongly recommend we defer that to the phase of exchanging assurances. Because each assurance we give to one, we'll have to give to the other. If he announces to his National Assembly the breakup of this negotiation -- which he said he would do. A breakup couldn't happen at a worse point.

Peres: Where does he stand on opening of the Suez?



Kissinger: Oh, he'll open it after this, and he may open it now.

Rabin: That's his problem.

Kissinger: Is there anything else?

Allon: In addition to what we discussed in the morning -- economic warfare.

Kissinger: Yigal, you live in a dream world.

All right, we shall make one more effort. Let me sum up the positions. One, they didn't understand -- that 4-5 year thing, is that a condition or something you'd like to have?

Rabin: I don't like to make conditions.

Kissinger: Has any consideration been given to giving the Egyptians a forward observation point?

Rabin: It's negotiable. We didn't discuss it. Not 20 observation points.

Peres: We frankly didn't have time.

Kissinger: An installation similar to this one in the buffer zone.

Rabin: If it's one installation, it's negotiable.

Allon: In addition to a new line, if it's negotiated successfully, they they should consider it another achievement.

Kissinger: He has so nailed himself to the passes and the oil fields.

Rabin: Why did he nail himself?

Kissinger: He started with El Arish. He's been going back from that. He's always taken that position. Just to complete the concept. These are exhausted oil fields here [at Ras Sudr]. Any civilians here?

Peres: No, just Bedouins.

Kissinger: Does the concept of Egyptian civilian administration have any meaning in the buffer zone?



Peres: You said there would be police in the oil fields.

Kissinger: In the buffer zone.

Peres: Usually they'd carry their oil anyway from Abu Rudeis.

Kissinger: I'm talking about how he can present this in the best possible way. Like with the Syrians, to shade the area and say it's under Egyptian sovereignty.

Rabin: The oil field area?

Kissinger: The buffer zone.

Rabin: We never argue about who has sovereignty of the buffer zone. There is a buffer zone; no one argues sovereignty.

Kissinger: But there is no point where you withdraw 50 kilometers.

Rabin: If we gave the fields but not the passes, we could have come back here [north] and here . . .

Kissinger: You made us transmit 30-50 kilometers. There is no place here where you withdraw 30, much less 50.

Rabin: It's a change in the political conditions.

Kissinger: Where were you going to move 30-50 kilometers anywhere, without it affecting the passes? I'm beginning to wonder about your original proposal.

Rabin: I can show you 30-50 kilometers. With no passes and fields.

Kissinger: We certainly presented it to him wrong.

Rabin: We put it that it did not include the passes and the fields.

Allon: It was the red line, not the blue line.

Kissinger: We're going to look like fools. Without the passes, certainly, since you couldn't get to the passes in 50 kilometers.

Now it's a sausage here and a sausage here. Where is it 30 kilometers?



[Gur indicates on the map the extent of the 30-50 kilometers proposal.]

Kissinger: This is 2-8 kilometers. This is ridiculous.

We can't find that ridge on our map.

Rabin: The dunes.

Gur: [Indicates] All that area.

Kissinger: In contrast to this area, where there are no dunes.

Gur: It's all dunes!

Kissinger: No matter where you go, it's a ridge of dunes. The highest is, what, two meters?

Gur: Yes.

Rabin: We would have gone then, here. [Indicates in the north.]

Peres: A little bit more in the north.

The passes are more than 50 kilometers.

Kissinger: All right, let me talk with my colleagues for two minutes. This time I mean literally. I just want to check whether there are any questions I forgot to ask.

[There was a break from 6:24 to 6:34 p. m.]


Peres: We can show you the 30-50 line.

Kissinger: I don't think you had one.

It's totally irrelevant to this discussion.

Allon: No, you asked us. We can show you.

Kissinger: It's senseless. Essentially we're in the same position as this morning. You made some changes on the political side; you've compensated by changes in the line.



Dinitz: Since this morning.

Kissinger: I have to consider the consequences of a breakup -- in terms of the loss of our credibility. Your propaganda position is a little better because you've met some of his positions.

Rabin: Don't think this was the topic of our discussion. From a political point of view, this is much worse.

Kissinger: It shows this mediation effort cannot be conducted this way. There was a major misunderstanding. It is a setback for each side and a major setback for the United States.

In December, your 30-50 proposal set everything back and it took us three months to get everything back on track. In the process of getting it back on track, there were misunderstandings.

There is no possibility of another Cabinet meeting.

If we had started with this, we could have had a success -- particularly if we did it by January 15, which was important to him. We've been stringing him along for months -- at your urging, your request.

Even if he accepts it, the moral significance of this agreement will be negligible. He has two choices -- either reject it, or pocket it and seek his revenge later on. Either way, the psychological significance of the agreement is substantially lost.

Allon: We hope he pockets it.

Kissinger: I know you do. You know from history that it's possible to deliberate for a long time and still bring about the reality you most seek to avoid.

In any case, I'll return to the U.S. next week.

There was a point like this during the Syrian negotiation, but it was different because the consequences of failure were different.

What do we say to the press? Can we avoid this getting out?

Peres: We'll do our best.



Rabin: We'll have the same width of zone as he'll have between the Canal and the new line.

Kissinger: All right. That's a concept.

Allon: You're not announcing either here or in Aswan that you're going tomorrow to the U.S.?

Kissinger: The way we'll conduct it is, tomorrow I'll meet with this group, and I'll report to you. Then we'll make the announcement. We may have to give our press some indication on the plane that it will probably fail.


Dinitz: If you give an indication to the press, how do you expect Sadat to take it seriously?

Kissinger: No, not now but on the way back from Aswan. I believe I've put out more optimistic statements than anybody. I won't change.

All right.

[The meeting ended. Remarks to the press by the Secretary and Minister Peres are at Tab B.]





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Egypt and Israel resolve that the conflict between them shall not be solved by military means and can only be solved by peaceful means.


They hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. The Parties will give written assurances to the USG to this effect.

They ^{re-}confirm their obligation to scrupulously observe the ^{ce-}asefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other and from assisting in military or para-military actions against the other party.

(Non-use of force)



March 20, 1975



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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
SUBJ: REMARKS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND DEFENSE MINISTER PERES
FOLLOWING A MEETING OF THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN JERUSALEM
DURING THE EVENING OF MARCH 20, 1975

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A.
KISSINGER AND ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHIMON PERES FOLLOWING
A MEETING OF THE ISRAELI AND AMERICAN NEGOTIATING TEAMS IN
JERUSALEM ON THE EVENING OF MARCH 20, 1975.

2. SECRETARY KISSINGER: BEGIN QUOTE: WE HAVE HAD ANOTHER MEETING
WITH THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM AND THEY PRESENTED TO US THE
IDEAS AND PROPOSALS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN RESPONSE TO THE
PROPOSALS AND IDEAS OF THE EGYPTIAN SIDE THAT I BROUGHT HERE.
I AM NOW LEAVING IMMEDIATELY FOR THE AIRPORT AND WILL GO TO ASWAN
AND WILL BE DISCUSSING THESE ISRAELI PROPOSALS WITH PRESIDENT
SADAT AND HIS ADVISERS. THANK YOU.

3. Q: NEW PROPOSALS? ARE THEY NEW PROPOSALS?
A: SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK THERE ARE SOME NEW IDEAS, YES.

4. Q: IS AN AGREEMENT CLOSE, SIR? WOULD YOU SAY THAT IT WAS
CLOSER?
A: SECRETARY KISSINGER: I DO NOT WANT TO SPECULATE. I WILL BE
BACK, I HOPE, TOMORROW AND I WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE A BETTER AS-
SESSMENT THEN. THANK YOU
END QUOTE.



5. AT THIS POINT THE SECRETARY DEPARTED FOR THE AIRPORT.

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6. DEFENSE MINISTER PERES: BEGIN QUOTE: WE GAVE THE COMPLETE PROPOSAL OF THE ISRAELI CABINET TO DR KISSINGER.

7. Q: WERE THERE AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI GUIDELINES FOR A SETTLEMENT?

A: WE HAVE CONCLUDED OUR PROPOSALS THIS AFTERNOON.

8. Q: IS THE GAP CLOSING? IS THE GAP VERY WIDE? HAS IT NARROWED SOMEWHAT?

A: CAN I SEE FROM HERE UP TO CAIRO HOW MANY GAPS ARE THERE ON THE WAY? I WOULDN'T GUESS.

9. A: DID DR KISSINGER RAISE ANY OF HIS OWN IDEAS?

A: WELL, IT IS A DIALOGUE AND BOTH SIDES ARE SUGGESTING AND QUESTIONING AND ANSWERING. AS THE NATURE OF THINGS ARE.

10. Q: HAS HE INTRODUCED AMERICAN IDEAS?

A: WELL, HOW CAN I SPEAK FOR THE UNITED STATES? BUT, USUALLY IT IS A NEGOTIATION, A CLARIFICATION, AND IT WORKS IN A WAY OF CONVERSATIONS, YOU KNOW.

11. Q: WHEN DO YOU EXPECT HIM BACK TOMORROW?

A: I HOPE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, BEFORE SHABBAT COMES IN. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. END QUOTE.

DAY

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