



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330526

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

26 May 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9PK-001461DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mohammed Ahmad Rabbani
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Ahmed Ghulam Rabbani, Abu Badr, Abu Rahman al Pakistani, Muhammed Husayn Shah, Farida, Bader al-Madany, Sir Tum
- Place of Birth: Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 1970
- Citizenship: Pakistan (PK)
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9PK-001461DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 21 September 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is an admitted al-Qaida facilitator, who had the full trust and confidence of al-Qaida leadership. Detainee admitted working directly for senior al-Qaida operational planner Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, aka (KSM), US9KU-010024DP (KU-10024). Detainee provided support to multiple al-Qaida sponsored terrorist operations and plans throughout the greater Middle East and possibly the US while maintaining several safe houses in Pakistan (PK). Detainee received basic and advanced

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training at al-Qaida associated training camps. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **HIGH** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Included senior level extremist comments regarding detainee's involvement in the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) plot and the plots targeting hotels in Karachi
- Added corroborating reports from senior level extremists indicating detainee is a member of al-Qaida
- Added a report detailing detainee's knowledge of a plot targeting a train in the US
- Added a report indicating detainee assisted in the shipment of assessed anthrax related materials

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee was born in Saudi Arabia and is of Burmese decent. Prior to traveling to Pakistan in 1991, detainee lived in Saudi Arabia for about 23 years, although he never obtained Saudi citizenship. Detainee was expelled from Saudi Arabia for numerous alcohol-related arrests in three different countries.¹

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: Detainee stated because a jihad had been declared in Burma, he wanted to return there to fight. Detainee decided to go to Afghanistan (AF) for training in 1994.²

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: In 1994, detainee initially trained for seven months at a militant camp near Khowst, AF and then went to the Khaldan Training Camp for a two-month training session in tactics. Detainee then attempted to go to Kashmir, PK but was arrested at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, for which he spent 1995 and 1996 in prison.

¹ TD-314/18742-03

² TD-314/18742-03

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After detainee's release, a snowstorm prevented him from traveling to the Kashmir region, so instead he returned to the Khaldan Camp for three months. In 1997, detainee traveled to Kandahar, AF where he met Usama Bin Laden (UBL) for the first time, but stated he did not swear *bayat* (oath of allegiance) to UBL. In late 1997, detainee traveled to Karachi, PK where he married and began working as a travel facilitator for al-Qaida.³ In 1998, UBL instructed detainee to support al-Qaida fighters moving between Karachi and Kandahar. In 1999, detainee began working directly for UBL's chief of operations, Abu Hafs, aka (Abu Hafs al-Masri), aka (Muhammad Atif), (deceased). Detainee would transport al-Qaida fighters for Abu Hafs from Karachi to Quetta, PK, where another driver would take them to Kandahar. Detainee next met senior al-Qaida operational planner KU-10024 who offered detainee a job driving him around in a taxi for 200 Pakistani rupees a day.⁴ Detainee stated he felt close to KU-10024, believing they fought for the same cause. In 2000, Abu Hafs ordered detainee to rent a house with two floors, one for detainee's family and one for his guests, but he was frequently away per KU-10024's instructions to be vigilant.⁵

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate (ISID) captured detainee along with his driver, Muhammad Madni, on 10 September 2002 at detainee's safe house in Karachi. Detainee was held in Pakistani custody and was transferred to US custody at Bagram, AF in May 2004.

- (S//NF) Madni provided the identification and location of detainee's brother, Abdul Rabbani Abd al-Rahim Abu Rahman, ISN US9PK-001460DP (PK-1460). He also provided information on other safe houses, which led on the following day to the arrest of 11 September 2001 terrorist attack planners Ramzi bin al-Shibh, ISN US9YM-010013DP (YM-10013), Hassan Muhammad Ali Bin Attash, aka (Muhammed Tawfiq), ISN PK9SA-001456DP (SA-1456), and other al-Qaida members. During the second ISID raid, a group of eight suspected members of al-Qaida resisted arrest resulting in the deaths of two of the cell members. The remaining six were taken prisoner and weapons and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were confiscated.⁶

b. (S) **Property Held:** None

c. (S) **Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 19 September 2004

³ TD-314/46009-02

⁴ Analyst Note: 200 Pakistani Rupees (PKR) is approximately \$4 US.

⁵ TD-314/18742-03

⁶ TD-314/37098-02, Analyst Note: These six taken as prisoners are known as the Karachi Six, who were transferred to US control, and subsequently to JTF-GTMO.

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d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- Provide specific information on UBL, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Muhammad Bin Laden, and al-Qaida leaders in Kandahar and Taliban leadership
- Provide information on safe houses in Karachi and Quetta
- Procurement of supplies
- Al-Qaida training facility in the vicinity of Khowst, AF and the Khaldan Training Camp
- Travel itineraries of al-Qaida and Taliban members
- Route of ingress/egress from Pakistan to Afghanistan

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee's account is accurate and his timeline is consistent with other reporting. Detainee has been forthcoming in the past about his role as a facilitator and his associations among the highest levels of the al-Qaida organization, which has been corroborated by numerous JTF-GTMO detainees reporting. Detainee has also provided details of multiple terrorist operations, yet he may still be withholding information regarding these plots. Detainee downplays the fact that he received advanced military training at terrorist training camps and he has become non-cooperative with interrogators since late 2004.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed as a high level al-Qaida facilitator with close ties to the highest levels of al-Qaida leadership. Detainee worked directly for KU-10024 and provided support to multiple al-Qaida-sponsored terrorist operations throughout the greater Middle East and possibly the US while maintaining several safe houses in Karachi. Detainee admitted attending basic and advanced training at extremist camps.

- (S//NF) Detainee is a senior level al-Qaida facilitator with direct ties to the highest levels of al-Qaida leadership.
 - (S//NF) Senior al-Qaida facilitators Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka (Abu Zubaydah), ISN US9GZ-010016DP (GZ-10016), Hassan Ghul, Said Memon,

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aka (Abdul Latif), detainee's brother PK-1460, and JI facilitator Gun Gun Ruswan Gunawan all identified detainee as a member of al-Qaida.⁷

○ (S//NF) Detainee reported meeting with UBL on 6 to 12 occasions.⁸ Detainee also claimed he was selected by senior al-Qaida planner Walid Muhammad Salih Bin Attash, aka (Khallad), aka (Silver), ISN US9YM-010014DP (YM-10014), to provide logistical support for UBL's command center in Tora Bora. YM-10014 informed detainee that UBL, Aiman al-Zawahiri, Abu Gayth, aka (Sulaiman Abu Ghaith), and UBL's son Muhammad Bin Laden remained at the cave complex through the middle of December 2001, when Coalition forces attacked the region.⁹

▪ (S//NF) In approximately July 2001, YM-10014 was tasked with obtaining supplies and construction materials from Karachi and sending them to Afghanistan to prepare the cave complex in Tora Bora for occupation by UBL and his family. YM-10014 requested detainee help him with the logistical requirements for this location.¹⁰

○ (S//NF) In addition to UBL, detainee has provided logistical support to the highest levels of al-Qaida leadership to include former Military Chief of al-Qaida, Abu Hafis al-Masri, aka (Mohammed Atif), (deceased), senior al-Qaida maritime planner, Abd al-Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al-Nashiri, ISN US9SA-010015DP (SA-10015), senior operational commander KU-10024; YM-10014, and lead al-Qaida planner in Karachi in 2002, Hamza al-Zubair (deceased).¹¹

○ (S//NF) YM-10014 identified photos of detainee and PK-1460, stating these brothers managed several guesthouses and safe houses for militants in Karachi. According to YM-10014, the brothers primarily managed the Gulshan Iqbal Guesthouse, which they opened first and maintained the longest, as well as the safe houses at Tariq Road and the Defense Area of Karachi.¹²

▪ (S//NF) YM-10014 described detainee and PK-1460 as Karachi-based facilitators who were well known to all the militants, including al-Qaida members, and who could assist with travel and housing arrangements. Senior al-Qaida members KU-10024, Abu Musab al-Baluchi, and detainee's brother-in-law Hassan Ghul, stayed at various guesthouses run by detainee and PK-1460.¹³

○ (S//NF) Detainee facilitated the travel of more than 50 al-Qaida fighters between December 2001 and his capture in September 2002. KU-10024, YM-10014, and

⁷ TD-314/58389-04, TD-314/59812-05, TD-314/25878-03, TD-314/50635-03

⁸ TD-314/19309-03, TD-314/25875-03

⁹ TD-314/45771-02

¹⁰ TD-314/45771-02

¹¹ TD-314/18742-03, TD-314/19304-03, TD-314/40959-04, TD-314/67976-04

¹² TD-314/39587-02

¹³ TD-314/36039-05

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Ammar al-Baluchi, ISN US9PK-010018DP (PK-10018), financed detainee's operations.¹⁴

- (S//NF) Detainee ran an al-Qaida safe house near the Karachi Airport at the end of Faisal Street. This safe house was used to print news derived from the Internet, which detainee forwarded to al-Qaida safe houses located in Afghanistan.¹⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee worked directly for KU-10024 and provided support to multiple al-Qaida-sponsored terrorist operations and plans against the US and US interests within Pakistan and Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) Detainee worked directly for KU-10024 and knew of KU-10024's strategies and plans for attacks.
 - (S//NF) Detainee recalled plans for KU-10024 to use US citizens in attacks inside the US. Detainee also believed KU-10024 was in contact with operatives within the US as early as 2002.¹⁶
 - (S//NF) Detainee indicated through interactions with KU-10024 and SA-10015 that he was aware of impending attacks geared towards damaging or destroying the economy of the United States. One such target was the rail system using US citizens vice Arabs, and the other was to destroy the oil industry by targeting large oil tankers.¹⁷
 - ◆ (S//NF) KU-10024 told detainee there were 10 mujahideen active in the US for every one the US authorities detained.¹⁸
 - ◆ (S//NF) Detainee believed KU-10024 had initiated plans to conduct a terrorist operation in Pakistan utilizing poisons.¹⁹
 - (S//NF) Detainee provided logistical support for the manufacturing of IEDs, possibly for use against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) Pakistani authorities recovered 25 radio-controlled remote detonating devices, each built inside of a black "SEGA" videogame cassette cartridge. Three of the devices were found at a house used by detainee, and 22 were recovered from the Tariq Road House.²⁰ Schematics and programming information for remote detonation devices were also recovered from a laptop computer hard drive in the safe house raids.²¹
 - (S//NF) Al-Qaida member Ahmad Haki Fawzan al-Qasim, aka (al-Bari al-Filistani), identified detainee as the emir of a house in Karachi where Filistani

¹⁴ TD-314/38434-02

¹⁵ TD-314/39587-02

¹⁶ TD-314/44478-02

¹⁷ >TD-314-42287-02

¹⁸ TD-314/44478-02

¹⁹ TD-314/41583-02

²⁰ TD-314/40307-02

²¹ TD-314/38215-02

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- and other al-Qaida members lived and made SEGA remote control firing devices.²²
- (S//NF) Detainee was part of a related operation involving the smuggling of IED components from Pakistan into Afghanistan for probable use against US and Coalition forces within Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) Detainee claimed he was to ship up to eight timing components to Bashir, who was to be located in Afghanistan. Detainee met Bashir in Pakistan and was instructed to send Bashir the timing devices once Bashir arrived in Afghanistan. Detainee would utilize couriers to deliver the devices to Bashir once detainee was told to deliver them to Afghanistan.²³
 - (S//NF) KU-10024 identified detainee's alias (Abu Badr) as being a part of a 10 to 12 man cell operated by Hamza al-Zubair, intending to bomb hotels in the Karachi area. Detainee was tasked to purchase cars, provide casing of the hotels, and purchase and build explosive devices. Detainee partially confirmed KU-10024's reporting, indicating he had been tasked by Zubair to buy two vans to transport families.²⁴ (Analyst Note: Detainee may have lied to interrogators to hide his direct involvement in the operation.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee was captured while harboring members of an al-Qaida cell planning to attack US interests in Karachi and possibly in the US.
 - (S//NF) On 10 September 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested detainee and PK-1460 for being al-Qaida facilitators. The next day, Pakistani officials raided three other al-Qaida safe houses in Karachi.²⁵ Detainee and PK-1460 had managed these safe houses and provided the Pakistani officials with their locations.²⁶
 - ◆ (S//NF) The raid on the first safe house, located on Tariq Road in the Pechs area of Karachi, resulted in the capture of three al-Qaida members including YM-10013 and SA-1456. Passports, documents, and detonating devices were also seized at this location.²⁷
 - ◆ (S//NF) Associated raids followed at two apartments in Karachi's Defense II commercial area, where eight heavily armed Arab extremists were located. This group was believed to be part of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi.²⁸

²² TD-314/67976-04

²³ TD-314/45962-02

²⁴ TD-314/17985-03, TD-314/46009-02

²⁵ TD-314/37098-02

²⁶ TD-314/39587-02

²⁷ TD-314/37098-02

²⁸ TD-314/37098-02, Analyst Note: After a nearly three hour long firefight in which the Arabs threw four hand grenades and fired hundreds of rounds at the Pakistani forces, two Arabs were dead and six captured. Several

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- (S//NF) Discovered among the papers at the raided residences was an undated letter addressed to al-Qaida operational leader Hamza al-Zubair from an individual named Mukh.²⁹ (Analyst Note: Mukh is assessed to be KU-10024. Hamza al-Zubair was one of the Arabs killed in the Karachi raids.)
 - ◆ (S//NF) Detainee, who is familiar with the code terminology used by KU-10024, provided an interpretation of the undated letter. Detainee said the letter, addressed from KU-10024 to Hamza al-Zubair, contained specific and final instructions for al-Zubair to speed up the execution of a planned terrorist attack on multiple targets, likely using poisons and remote detonators. Detainee added that the tone of the letter to al-Zubair indicated he was an operational leader in Karachi and was given responsibility of a significant operational task.³⁰
- (S//NF) In 2003, KU-10024 expanded upon the meaning of this letter, dubbed the “Perfume Letter,” stating the attack was to take place using military grade explosives against the “Midway and Airport Hotels” in Karachi. Al-Zubair had discussed with KU-10024 the viability of conducting a car bomb attack against the hotels because they held a large number of US troops on a regular basis. KU-10024 commented the operation was postponed because it was compromised when the Pakistani ISID raided al-Qaida residences tied to al-Zubair’s cell in early September 2002 and arrested a number of cell members.³¹ (Analyst Note: It is assessed that KU-10024’s reference to the arrest of cell members was to detainee, PK-1460, and the Karachi 6.)
- (S//NF) Detainee had direct involvement in a plot aimed at attacking oil tankers in the SOH.³²
 - (S//NF) According to al-Qaida operative Ahmad Muhammad Haza al-Darbi, ISN US9SA-000768DP (SA-768), SA-10015 informed KU-10024 in February 2002 that SA-10015 was preparing an operation to take place in the SOH. They also discussed operations against US personnel, including kidnappings and killing Americans in small arms ambushes in Saudi Arabia.³³ On the orders of SA-10015, detainee flew to the United Arab Emirates (AE) in order to locate a boat with which to conduct the attack. The plot was supposed to shut down the SOH and halt the transport of oil coming from the Arabian Gulf countries to the West. UBL provided the funding for the SOH attack, but the attack was not

Pakistani officials were also injured. Two handguns and three Russian style grenades were recovered from the scene. A Kalashnikov rifle and a submachine gun used by the Arabs were seized by police officials.

²⁹ TD-314/37823-02

³⁰ TD-314/39649-02, TD-314/41583-02

³¹ TD-314/17985-03

³² TD-314/06945-03

³³ TD-314/06945-03, Analyst Note: The SOH connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabia Sea. The plan’s goal was to disrupt all shipping through the Straits.

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- conducted due to SA-10015's inability to acquire the amount of explosives needed.³⁴
 - (S//NF) SA-10015 added that in addition to assisting in the purchasing of the boat for the SOH attack, detainee also conducted studies of entry and exit procedures in the Port of Karachi.³⁵
- (S//NF) Two laptop hard drives were recovered during the raids on safe houses managed by detainee and PK-1460.³⁶
 - (S//NF) The hard drives contained images of instrument approach charts for major US and European airfields, along with flight simulator software. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) analysts assessed that a hijacker could use the data on the hard drives to study the proper approach to a commercial airfield, helping disguise his intent to crash an aircraft into a building or facility at or near the airport. In addition, terrorists could use the charts and software on the hard drive to study incoming aircraft patterns, assisting in targeting with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).³⁷
 - (S//NF) In addition to the aviation chart data mentioned above, the laptop computer hard drive contained procedures for kidnapping smuggling money, weapons, ammunition and personnel; lectures and essays on terrorist training, executions, assassinations, and guerrilla warfare; remote control and electronics training programs; Stinger anti-aircraft missile assembly instructions; and other al-Qaida affiliated documents and videos.³⁸
 - (S//NF) Passports belonging to UBL's family were also recovered in the raid of detainee's Karachi safe house.³⁹
- (S//NF) Detainee has provided logistical support to al-Qaida's anthrax program. KU-10024 reported Abu Harith al-Masri contacted him (KU-10024), indicating lead anthrax researcher for al-Qaida, Yazid Sufaat, and Muhammad Atif needed help with moving a roomful of crates purchased in Pakistan to Kandahar. KU-10024 offered the services of PK-1461 and PK-1460 to move the crates. KU-10024 claims he was later told by Sufaat about the anthrax program.⁴⁰
- (S//NF) Detainee trained at two militant training camps.
 - (S//NF) In 1994, detainee initially trained for eight months at a militant camp near Khowst. He then went to the Khaldan Camp for a two-month training session in

³⁴ TD-314/47202-02, TD-314/13836-03, TD-314/25879-03, TD-314/38682-02, TD-314/16901-03, Analyst Note: Detainee is referred to by his alias Badr al-Pakistani, aka (Muhammad Husayn Shah).

³⁵ >TD-314/11991-03

³⁶ TD-314/37121-02, Analyst Note: Ayub Murshid Ali Salih, aka (Akramah), aka (Safar), refers to ISN US9YM-000836DP (YM-836).

³⁷ Al-Qaidas possible study of aircraft approach charts - 26-SEP-2003

³⁸ TD-314/37121-02, TD-314/37833-02

³⁹ TD-314/37103-02, TD-314/40307-02, TD-314/37823-02, TD-314/37098-02

⁴⁰ >TD-314/19304-03

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tactics. Detainee then attempted to go to Kashmir, but was arrested at the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, for which he spent 1995 and 1996 in prison. Detainee returned to the Khaldan Camp for three months.⁴¹

○ (S//NF) Detainee's brother, PK-1460, corroborated detainee's statements of having trained at Khaldan Camp. PK-1460 added that detainee trained in tactics, weapons, and explosives.⁴²

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 25 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 18 October 2007, when he was in possession of contraband. He has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault occurring on 16 July 2005, when he threw food at the guard force. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, damage to government property, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 13 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and none so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **HIGH** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 2 April 2008.

b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee had access to the highest members of the al-Qaida organization. Detainee worked directly for al-Qaida operations officer KU-10024, facilitating the movement of al-Qaida members between Karachi and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Detainee participated in the planning and preparation phases of terrorist operations and had knowledge of attacks before they occurred.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee should have a wide range of intelligence information connected with al-Qaida and its supporters. Detainee shows a high degree of knowledge concerning al-Qaida operations and personnel. Detainee should be able to provide general and specific information about the facilitation process of terrorist movement from Pakistan to Afghanistan and back.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

⁴¹ TD-314/46009-02, TD-314/18742-03

⁴² TD-314/25878-03

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- Al-Qaida personnel, training, logistics, operations, propaganda, and recruitment techniques
 - Al-Qaida leadership, facilitators, and operatives to include: UBL, Zawahiri, Saif al-Adl, KU-10024, PK-10018, Mustafa Faraj Muhammad Muhammad Masud al-Jadid al-Uzaybi, aka (Abu Faraj al-Libi), US9LY-010017DP (LY-10017), GZ-10016, SA-10015, YM-10014, YM-10013, PK-1460, SA-1456, SA-768, Yazid Sufaat, Hassan Ghul, Abu Yasir al-Jazairi, and Abu Hafs al-Masri
 - Al-Qaida plots: Maritime plots, plots directed by KU-10024 inside the US, attacks on US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, the Karachi hotel bombing plot, 1998 Embassy Bombings in Africa, 11 September 2001 attacks
 - Al-Qaida anthrax program
 - Extremist training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan
 - Details regarding the Karachi 6
- Terrorist and extremist guesthouses and safe houses throughout in Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Facilitation of terrorists and extremists including leaders, recruiters, methods, and facilities.
- Terrorists and extremists means of communication in Afghanistan and Pakistan

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 17 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.