

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

- 4) The detainee stated he met Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri three or four times and they had a very good relationship
 - 5) The detainee stated once he was a member of al Qaida, he met regularly with multiple senior al Qaida leaders.
 - 6) The detainee stated he met with Abu Musab al Zarqawi several times about logistics and personnel issues for the fight against the Northern Alliance.
 - 7) The detainee stated he swore the third level of bayat to Usama bin Laden. The third level of bayat is called the Bayat of Death and it is a commitment for life.
- d) Intent
- 1) The detainee states he still remains loyal to al Qaida.
 - 2) The detainee states America is ruled by the Jews, therefore Israel and America are his enemies.
- e) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated he executed a man suspected of spying on jihadists in Afghanistan for a foreign government.
 - 2) The detainee stated he asked Muslim leaders and religious scholars about jihad training in Afghanistan.
 - 3) The detainee communicated with his classmate, one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers, via hidden ink in postal mail and faxes from stores. This was done when they were discussing jihad to avoid detection
 - 4) The detainee stated he was proud he came to Afghanistan to be a Mujahedin, and stated if he had not lost his leg, he would still have fought.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee insisted he was not a member of al Qaida.
 - b) The detainee stated he doubted the viewpoints of al Qaida because some of their operations contradict Islamic principles and go against Islamic laws.

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c) The detainee denied receiving any training on how to manufacture or use explosives, improvised explosive devices, or booby traps.

d) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 January 2008

To: BIN HADIDI, ABDUL HADDI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HADIDI, ABDUL HADDI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee was identified as an al Qaida associate.
 - 2) Around November-December 1999, the detainee encountered the Jamat-al-Tabligh, who convinced the detainee to abandon his wayward lifestyle and return to his Muslim roots.
 - 3) The Preachers of Islam, also known as the Jamat-al-Tabligh organization, has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia, under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
 - 4) The detainee obtained a visa from the Pakistani embassy in Casablanca, Morocco, with the assistance of the Jamat-al-Tabligh. The detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan in January 2000.
 - 5) The detainee stayed at a mosque in Karachi, Pakistan for two weeks. The detainee stated that instead of going to the Jamat-al-Tabligh center in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, the detainee went to Peshawar, Pakistan.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BIN HADIDI, ABDUL HADDI

- 6) The Armed Islamic Group is designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States Department of Homeland Security. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group is described as an Islamic extremist group whose aim is to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state.
- b) **Connections/Associations**
 - 1) The detainee, the detainee's brother and other extremists belonged to an Armed Islamic Group terrorist support group. The group specialized in document forgery, and counterfeit currency, recruitment of individuals to form terrorist cells, logistical support to terrorist groups operating in North Africa and associated European cells, and harboring wanted criminals.
 - 2) In June 1998, the detainee was a member of a radical Islamic support network based in Bologna, Italy and issued a warrant of arrest.
- c) **Other Relevant Data**
 - 1) The detainee was arrested, while walking in the streets late at night. The detainee led the police to a house where others were also arrested.
 - 2) The detainee was a suspected terrorist facilitator who has a history of criminal activity that dates back to the 1990's.
 - 3) In 1999, the detainee and others were charged for having promoted, constituted, organized, and directed an association to conduct violent terrorist acts against democratic institutions. The charges included furnishing logistical support to Islamic terrorist organizations, supplying refuge and fake documents, financing the organization through fake currency, using stolen vehicles, possessing Algerian Armed Islamic Group propaganda, training individuals towards the armed struggle and other terrorist acts, promoting and inducing individuals to participate in military training in Afghanistan and Bosnia, recruiting men to participate in the armed struggle in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, and promoting activities aimed at carrying out terrorist acts in France during the 1998 World Cup tournament.
 - 4) On 20 February 1999, the detainee was sentenced, in absentia, by the Permanent Military Tribunal of Tunis to ten years in prison, without possibility of review, for belonging to a terrorist organization active on foreign soil in times of peace. Several warrants against the detainee were issued by the Tunisian Department of National Security.

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- 5) The detainee was a dangerous terrorist.
 - 6) The detainee stated that the United States can do whatever it wants with him. Neither he nor the United States Government is going to change posture.
 - 7) The detainee stated he found the Jamat-al-Tabligh to be too strict and abandoned the organization's mission and went his own way once he was in Pakistan.
 - 8) The detainee applied for United Nations refugee status in Islamabad, Pakistan in March 2000. The detainee eventually received a valid United Nations refugee card.
 - 9) The detainee stayed from early August to November 2001 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he studied the Koran.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied any affiliation with terrorism or extremism, to include membership in al Qaida. Despite admitting being of Libyan origin, he similarly denied any association or in-depth knowledge of the Libyan Islamic fighting group or any other terrorist organization. The detainee claims to be opposed to Usama bin Laden and al Qaida's use of violence against civilians, which he says is un-Islamic.
 - b) The detainee denied any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - c) The detainee denied any affiliation with the extremist network in Italy, or any complicity in any plot against Tunisia.
 - d) The detainee denies having undertaken any military training or being a Mujahedin.
 - e) The detainee denied receiving military-type training in any camp in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The detainee stated that he hates armies and such training, and because of that, he was never in the military service.
 - f) The detainee stated he has never seen Usama bin Laden, heard him speak or read about his statements to be able to make a judgment about him.
 - g) The detainee denied any familiarity with or expertise regarding the Internet or computers.

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h) The detainee maintained that he is not a member of al Qaida and that he would not join them if released. The detainee stated he would only follow fatwas issued by an imam or Sheikh, not Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated that if a Sheik issued fatwah, telling the Muslims to attack American and Jews he would need to base the fatwah on religious doctrine. The detainee further stated he has no problems with Americans, and if released, he would have no ill feelings about the United States Government. The detainee related he only wanted to be left alone.

i) The detainee claims to have no associations with the Taliban, calling them bad Muslims because they are unjust to people, too strict, and practice bad Islam.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

02 January 2008

To: ZAHIR, ABDUL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHIR, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he fought the jihad in Tajikistan for two to three months.
 - 2) The detainee stated he worked as a translator for an al Qaida commander in charge of training the Taliban for fighting the Northern Alliance.
 - 3) The detainee stated that during the three to four years he worked for the al Qaida commander, he was tasked by the al Qaida commander to distribute money to a group of Mujahedin fighting in Pakistan.
 - 4) The detainee stated he was involved in an incident when an associate threw a grenade into a car with foreign journalists.
 - 5) The detainee stated that after the Taliban fell, the al Qaida commander tasked the detainee with distributing money to a new Taliban cell.
 - 6) The detainee stated the mission of the new cell was to terrorize the foreigners out of Afghanistan and then topple the new government through the killing or hurting of all foreigners.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZAHIR, ABDUL

- 7) The detainee stated that during a meeting he attended for the new Taliban cell, the detainee was tasked with finding anti-American Afghans who could conduct small operations against American soldiers.
- 8) The detainee stated he obtained a copier to reproduce anti-coalition propaganda.
- b) Connections/Associations
 - 1) The detainee was identified as knowing everyone in al Qaida and having met with Usama bin Laden many times.
 - 2) The detainee was identified as a member of al Qaida and as an associate of an al Qaida explosives expert.
 - 3) The detainee stated he met several times with a member of a group that fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
 - 4) The detainee stated he met several times a Finance Minister for al Qaida.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detainee stated he is not part of a terrorist organization.
 - b) The detainee stated he was not a military man, and worked for the al Qaida commander only in the capacity of translator. The detainee stated he worked for money, not for political views or purpose.
 - c) The detainee stated he did not have knowledge of any plans to harm American government officials or their family members in the United States.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

13 December 2007

To: SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee was active in two Islamic organizations during his youth in Mauritania: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamat-al-Tabligh. The Muslim Brotherhood originated in Egypt and believes that all the problems in the Islamic world stem from the abandonment of Islamic principles and that Islam has the answers for all economic, social, and political problems.
 - 2) The preachers of Jamat-al-Tabligh have been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani Terrorist Organizations and the al Qaida network.
 - 3) The detainee stated he swore bayat to an al Qaida military attaché in March 1991.
 - 4) While in Afghanistan, the detainee stated that his goal was to become a martyr by dying for Islam.
 - 5) While in Afghanistan in 1992, the detainee traveled to Gardiz to fight and was assigned to a mortar battery. The detainee was responsible for cleaning the mortar and to make sure the shells were clean and dry.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLAHL, MOHAMEDOU OULD

- 6) The detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan in 1992 to help the Afghans fight the Commies.
 - 7) The detainee admitted to actively recruiting for jihad from 1992 to 1997. The detainee felt it was an important function and would often speak of jihad while he preached at two mosques in Germany.
 - 8) The detainee received tasks from Abu Hafs al-Mauritani, to complete for al-Qaida, from 1993 to 1999. The detainee was tasked to set up a radio broadcasting station in Sudan, to assist in counterfeiting money, especially United States currency, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and to help establish greater internet connectivity between Sudan and Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 9) Abu Hafs is one of Usama bin Laden's key operatives. United States authorities have wanted him since 1998 for his association with the United States Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
 - 10) In April of 2000, the detainee traveled from Germany to Mauritania. Mauritanian government officials seized his passport and detained him after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. After approximately eight months in Jordanian custody, the detainee was taken to Afghanistan.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee attended the University of Duesberg in Duesberg, Germany from 1990 to 1995 and received a degree in electrical engineering.
 - 2) In late 1990 and early 1991, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan for six weeks of military training at a jihad camp.
 - 3) In January 1991, the detainee trained for six weeks at Camp al Farouq, located near Khowst, Afghanistan. The training consisted of physical exercises and weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle, Seminoff, Uzi, M16, Makaroff pistol and rocket propelled grenades.

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- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he prayed at a mosque in Germany whose director was the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the area.
 - 2) Egyptian Islamic Jihad extremist group has been active since the late 1970s, and merged with Osama bin Laden's al Qaida organization in June 2001, but may retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Its primary goals are to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack United States and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.
 - 3) While in Germany, the detainee worked with a friend who was an active high ranking member of Jamat-al-Tabligh and recruited people to go fight jihad in Afghanistan.
 - 4) The detainee is an al Qaida facilitator who played a part in recruiting jihadists to fight in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and to become suicide hijackers in the west. The detainee convinced three future world trade center suicide hijackers to undergo al Qaida basic military training in Afghanistan.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated that shortly after his arrival in Montreal in December 1999, he was asked to become the temporary imam at the Abawiya Mosque. The detainee thought that the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist might have a presence at the mosque.
 - 2) The Armed Islamic Group has been designated by the United States Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. An Islamic extremist group, the Armed Islamic Group aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. Since 1992, the Armed Islamic Group has conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres.
 - 3) The Salafist Group for Call and Combat has been designated by the United States Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. The Salafist Group, an outgrowth of the Armed Islamic Group, appears to have eclipsed the Armed Islamic Group since approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. The

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Salafist Group continues to conduct operations aimed at government and military targets. Such attacks include false roadblocks and attacks against convoys transporting military, police, or other government personnel.

- 4) The detainee facilitated the individual's initial travel to Afghanistan and his initial introductions to Usama bin Laden and Abu Hafs, in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 5) The detainee was involved in money laundering activities. The detainee wired money for Abu Hafs al Mauritani three times, in sums of 2500, 5000 and 5000 United States Dollars.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- 1) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - 2) The detainee stated that he did not know of Abu Hafs' involvement in terrorism when he transmitted money for him.
 - 3) The detainee strongly denied that he had helped anyone travel to Chechnya or Afghanistan.
 - 4) The detainee denied knowing an al Qaida operative source who claimed to have received assistance from the detainee with travels to Afghanistan and introduction to Usama bin Laden.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

03 December 2007

To: ROHULLAH, MULLAN HAJI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ROHULLAH, MULLAN HAJI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin had several weapons caches in an area that was under the detainee's control. The detainee was responsible for the establishment of the caches. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin members were planning to attach time-detonated magnetic mines to vehicles of local government officials, United Nations officials, and Coalition forces.
 - 2) The detainee was identified as receiving weapons and supplies from al Qaida through the Nawa Pass on trucks returning from Pakistan.
 - 3) The detainee was provided money to hire a group of men to fire a rocket into a United States compound near Asadabad, Afghanistan.
 - 4) A source stated the detainee was involved in various illegal activities including weapon smuggling, prostitution, and bribery.
 - b) Training
 - 1) The detainee stated he knows how to use an AK-47, pistols, and grenades.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ROHULLAH, MULLAN HAJI

- 2) A source stated the detainee was actively involved in two Jamaat Ud Dawa Il Al Quran Training Camps.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he is a member of the Jamiat al-Dawa al Quran.
 - 2) The detainee stated he knew Najeebee, the leader of Jamiat Ul-Dawa, for approximately 12 years.
 - 3) Malawi Sami Ullah Najeebee was the leader of Jamiat Ul-Dawa Islamic extremist group operating in Pakistan. Najeebee believes in promoting Islamic values worldwide through armed struggle and condoned the worldwide jihad declared on the United States.
 - 4) The detainee was part of an alliance between the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and Wahhabi groups in the Konar valley of Afghanistan. The purpose of the alliance was to coordinate efforts to drive out the United States presence in Afghanistan, reverse Afghanistan Transitional Administration, and to return Afghanistan to an Islamic fundamentalist state.
 - 5) The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden and has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.
 - 6) The detainee was identified as having close ties to fundamentalist Arab groups and receives financial aid and support from such organizations.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee provided the commander of Afghan border forces in the Konar Province, Afghanistan, money and instructions to smuggle Arabs into Pakistan.
 - 2) The detainee created a new division to destabilize the new Afghan government. The sub commanders of this new division included Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin leaders.
 - 3) An admitted al Qaida member stated the detainee was involved in the transfer of money between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
 - 4) In July 2002, a group consisting of the detainee and two others, planned to assassinate both a General and the Vice President. The Vice President was assassinated on 6 July

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2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detainee stated he supported the Northern Alliance in their efforts to defeat the Taliban, al Qaida, and Usama bin Laden.
 - b) The detainee stated he is a friend of the Americans and he was glad to see the Northern Alliance come and get rid of the Taliban.
 - c) A source stated the detainee doesn't have an extreme Islam background and his knowledge about Islam is very limited.
 - d) The detainee states he never worked with the Arabs or against the Americans.
 - e) The detainee stated he never smuggled drugs, was against drugs, and was destroying drugs with the coalition forces.
 - f) The detainee stated he never collected any money for the Jama'at Ul Dawa al Quarani. The detainee stated he collected money for wells and mosques.
 - g) The detainee stated nobody influences the Jamiat al-Dawa al Quran and that they are not affiliated with the Taliban or al Qaida.
 - h) The detainee stated he denied having any association with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

05 December 2007

To: SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated he was recruited in June 2000 in Yemen by a well-known jihad recruiter. The recruiter told the detainee it was his obligation as a Muslim to learn to fight and to defend Muslim children. The detainee stated he agreed to join the jihad and go to Afghanistan for military training.
 2. The detainee stated he was told that if he stayed in Afghanistan for less than a year he would have to pay back any money given to him for the trip to Afghanistan, but if he stayed for a year, he would not have to pay anything.
 3. The recruiter bought the detainee a plane ticket to Karachi, Pakistan, obtained a legal Yemeni passport for him, and gave him 200 United States Dollars for incidental purchases.
 4. The detainee stated he flew with a group of four Yemenis from Sanaa, Yemen, to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and then on to Karachi, Pakistan. In Pakistan the detainee traveled to Quetta, where he stayed in a house that also contained Taliban people. The detainee and his group of four were then taken across the border along with five Saudi men into Afghanistan.

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5. The detainee stated he stayed for one week in an al Qaida safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, prior to attending an al Qaida training camp.
6. The detainee stated he attended al Farouq for two months; however, he could not finish the training because he became sick with malaria. The detainee returned to the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan for one month and recuperated in a clinic adjacent to the guest house.
7. After the detainee recovered from malaria the detainee traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed in several guesthouses in the area.

b. Training

1. During July and August 2000, the detainee attended al Farouq training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee completed most of the basic training course, training on the Kalashnikov rifle, Molotov cocktails, topography, crawling, signals, and explosives. The detainee also ran, lifted, completed an obstacle course, and played various sports at the camp for physical fitness.
2. A source stated the al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore more advanced than other training camps. All students who take basic training class at al Farouq get the same type of training regardless of what class they are in. The students are there a total of eight weeks. They have two weeks of weapons training, two weeks of basic commando course, two weeks of topography, and two weeks of explosives. After eight weeks, students go back to their safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where they are given a choice to sign up for advanced training or go to the front line and fight jihad.
3. The detainee stated he attended two more months of training at a camp in Kabul, Afghanistan. One month of training was for artillery training and the second month he was for first aid.

c. Connections/Associations

1. While in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee stated he stayed at the Hajj Habash guesthouse.
2. A source stated the Hajj Habash guesthouse is owned by Usama bin Laden.
3. The detainee stated he stayed at several guest houses to include the Madafat Karti Bawan.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI

4. The Karti Barwan guest house was used as a training facility for electronics and as a storage facility for materials used in a chemical explosives course. The same guest house was used to store an assortment of women's hand bags rigged with explosives.
 5. An al Qaida member attempted to smuggle the detainee from Karachi, Pakistan, to Yemen via Iran and Oman. The detainee traveled from Karachi to Quetta to the Kuh-I-Taftan border crossing into Iran. The detainee then traveled to Iranshahr to Chabebar, Iran. The detainee returned to Karachi after learning the Iranian police were arresting all Arabs they could find.
 6. The detainee was given first aid training in the house of an individual who for eight years was the personal assistant and driver for Usama bin Laden.
 7. On 11 September 2002, the detainee was arrested by Pakistani police at an apartment in Karachi, Pakistan, with five other Arabs. The detainee was arrested following a firefight between the Arabs and the Pakistani police.
 8. One of the Arabs killed in the firefight when the detainee was arrested was had been a body guard for Usama bin Laden.
 9. Passports belonging to Usama bin Laden's family were recovered in the raid of the detainee's apartment on 11 September 2002.
- d. Other Relevant Data
1. The detainee stated he brought a computer to the apartment in which he was arrested. The detainee stated the computer was given to him by a Yemeni he lived with in Lahore and Karachi, Pakistan.
 2. The detainee stated he asked a senior al Qaida leader to teach him how to use the laptop.
 3. As a joint team of Pakistani authorities approached the apartments, six Arabs armed with rifles and hand grenades opened fired and injured three police officers and an undisclosed number of police.
 4. The Arabs in the apartments reportedly resisted the joint team for two and a half hours, threw four hand grenades and fired hundreds of rounds at the Pakistani forces. At the end of the firefight, two Arabs were killed and five were arrested, including the detainee. Two handguns, three grenades, one submachine gun and

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI

one Kalashnikov rifle were recovered from the scene.

5. The detainee stated he saw at least one AK-47 in his apartment and assumed there were more weapons, but he did not know whose they were or who was responsible for using them.
-
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee stated he never fought at the front line, and waited in Kabul, Afghanistan, until after the bombing started.
 - b. The detainee stated is not a member of al Qaida and has never planned nor does he have any knowledge of any prior or pending attacks.
 - c. The detainee denied being recruited by anyone to go to Afghanistan to learn how to fight. The detainee stated he left Yemen to help other Muslims and religious people by calling them to Islam. The detainee also denied ever being in the al Farouq training camp, and stated he received training at a camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan.
-
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 December 2007

To: AL-MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee decided to join the jihad in Afghanistan after talking to an individual he believes to be connected with the USS Cole bombing. The individual helped the detainee go to Afghanistan. He gave the detainee an airline ticket and 500 Saudi Riyal. The detainee paid 17,000 Yemeni Riyal for a passport and obtained a visa to Afghanistan.
 - 2) The detainee stated he made his first trip to Afghanistan in September 2000, with three other Yemeni individuals. The group traveled from Yemen, to Afghanistan via the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan.
 - 3) In Quetta, Pakistan, the detainee stayed at the Daftar Taliban, a Taliban-controlled safe house. In Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at Haji Habash guesthouse before going to al Farouq training camp.
 - 4) According to a senior al Qaida facilitator, the Hage Habash temporarily houses individuals going to and coming from training camps.
 - 5) The detainee and others were taken to al Farouq training camp in September 2000.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

- 6) After the USS Cole incident, the al Farouq camp was moved to Kabul, Afghanistan, and the detainee was taken to a guesthouse in the Karty Barrawan district of Kabul. The detainee stated that after two weeks he was taken to the Malek Center, located outside Kabul, to complete his basic training. The detainee completed six week of training in November 2000.
 - 7) The detainee decided to go back to Afghanistan again to get trained to fight in Chechnya. On 13 August 2001, the detainee traveled from Yemen to Kandahar, Afghanistan via Karachi, and Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee stayed at the Nibras guest house for three days before going to al Farouq training camp.
 - 8) On 12 September 2001, the detainee and other trainees were evacuated from al Farouq to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee spent approximately four weeks moving back and forth between two guest houses, one in Kabul and the other in Bagram, Afghanistan. The detainee and about 400 others then went to Khowst, Afghanistan.
 - 9) The detainee retreated from Kabul, Afghanistan through Brumal and Wazirestan, Afghanistan, to Karachi, Pakistan, where stayed in a safe houses from July to September 2002.
 - 10) The detainee was captured on September 11, 2002, in an apartment in Karachi, Pakistan.
 - 11) Passports belonging to Usama bin Laden's family were recovered in the same raid.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he trained for two weeks at al Farouq and for six weeks at the Malek Center. The detainee trained on the Makarov pistol, the Dragonov sniper rifle, the PK machine gun, rocket propelled grenades and hand grenades.
 - 2) The detainee stated he received advanced infantry training on his second trip to al Farouq.
 - 3) The detainee was identified as a trainee at the Khalden Training Camp and Jihadwal Training Camp.
 - 4) The Jihadwal Camp is an advanced training program for promising trainees from the basic course. The program covers advanced courses in explosives, topography, weapons, and tactics. Jihadwal is reserved for sworn al Qaida members.

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c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated that about two weeks before 11 September 2001, the al Farouq camp was visited by Usama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
- 2) The detainee stayed with a senior al Qaida operational planner for five months prior to the detainee's capture.

d) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee made a will prior to a suicide operation. He mentions his plan to be a martyr, that God ordered us to kill the infidels, and asks God for success as a Mujahedin and to accept him as a martyr.
- 2) A senior al Qaida operational planner acknowledged detainee's intent of becoming a martyr.
- 3) The detainee stated he originally left Yemen to go to Afghanistan to receive training so that he could go to Chechnya and help the Muslim brothers fight.
- 4) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to fight jihad and that he fought for religious reasons.
- 5) The detainee stated that he never went to the front lines, but stayed in the rear near Bagram, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he found the attacks of 11 September 2001 as beyond imagination and was saddened by the deaths of so many people. He stated the United States has helped many Muslim countries and helped the Muslims in Bosnia gain freedom.
- b) The detainee stated that he has no allegiance to Usama bin Laden or al Qaida.
- c) The detainee stated that he has never volunteered for a martyrdom mission.
- d) The detainee stated that he was not a criminal, nor a terrorist, and insisted that he knew within himself that he had committed no crimes and had killed no one.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

e) The detainee stated that he does not know why he was imprisoned, that he had not committed any crimes, and that he had just been trying to get home.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 December 2007

To: BA-ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BA-ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he joined the jihad in April 2001.
 - 2) The detainee stated he left for Afghanistan around April or May of 2001. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan after viewing a video about Chechnya, and became concerned about the Palestinian struggle for independence.
 - 3) The detainee stated that he and three others left for Karachi, Pakistan on 6 June 2001. The detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan on 9 June 2001 and stayed at the Daftar Taliban guest house.
 - 4) The detainee stated he traveled via motorcycle across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and then traveled via taxi to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee lived at the al Nibras before training at al Farouq.
 - 5) The Nibras guest house was the place where new students gathered before deploying via bus to al Farouq camp for basic training.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BA-ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD

- 6) The detainee stated he turned in his passport and valuables for safekeeping prior to entering the training camp.
 - 7) The detainee stated he arrived at al Farouq camp in June 2001. During this time, new recruits underwent a background check and were screened and tested for endurance and alertness. Trainees were awakened in the middle of the night by gun fire or grenade explosions nearby to see how they would react.
 - 8) After the 11 September 2001 attacks, the detainee and about 20 others stayed in several safe houses in various towns of Afghanistan – Kabul, Jalalabad, Khowst, Kandahar and Zarmot.
 - 9) The detainee stated he fled to Afghanistan in December 2001 after the fall of Kandahar and lived with a group of about 60 Arabs in the mountains of Afghanistan near Zormat.
 - 10) The detainee stated he lived in Karachi, Pakistan for about two months and then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee and others were smuggled through Zahedan, Iran and went to Shabahar, Iran for about one month. The detainee lived in a safe house in Shabahar.
 - 11) The detainee stated that after receiving word that it was alright to travel back through Pakistan, the detainee and his group traveled from Shabahar, Iran to the Pakistan border. The detainee and others stayed in a one level residential house for one month while in Quetta, and moved to another house near a rail road track for another month.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he received training on the Kalashnikov, pistol, Uzi, PK machine gun, RPG, RPK rifle, dynamite, and hand grenades. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden visited the camp and gave a speech to encourage the trainees.
 - 2) The detainee went back to al Farouq for one month and received training on the 82 mm mortar, 75 mm mortar, SBG9, Narem Jack Mortar, and BM mortar. The detainee went to the Said Center for two days and then on to the front line in Bagram, Afghanistan.
 - 3) A source related the Said Center was a Taliban run Training Camp for Arab recruits and consisted of small arms familiarization and range qualification.
 - 4) The detainee stated he left the front line and went back to al Farouq training camp and was trained in infantry tactics for about three months. During this time, approximately

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BA-ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD

one month prior to the September 11 attacks, Usama bin Laden visited al Farouq again.

- 5) The detainee stated Usama bin Laden visited al Farouq with Abu Hafs al Mauritan, Abdallah al Nafsi, and 'Ayman al Zawahiri. Usama bin Laden spoke of a big event soon would take place against non-believers. During the remainder of his training period at al Farouq, the detainee received training on light weapons, explosives, topography and physical education. The detainee's training was interrupted by the events of 11 September 2001. The detainee and other Mujahedin were ordered to scatter and hide in the mountainous areas near Khowst, Afghanistan.
 - 6) The detainee stated that Usama bin Laden and Abu Hafs al-Masri, member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, talked about the importance of unity with Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee and other personnel arrested at the apartments that were raided on 11 September 2002 were heavily armed and were reportedly part of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi, Pakistan.
 - 2) The detainee is one of the al Qaida members, who were detained by Pakistani authorities following a firefight at an apartment in Karachi Pakistan, on 11 September 2002.
 - 3) The personnel in the apartment were there to conduct a "special mission" and were armed with rifles and hand grenades, which they proceeded to fire and throw at the Pakistani officials when the officials were approaching the safe house.
 - 4) According to a source, the detainee was one of the Mujahedin who fled to Iran after the American invasion.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) After raiding the detainee's residence, Pakistani forces found several envelopes containing several passports belonging to several members of Usama bin Laden's family.
 - 2) The detainee did not deny that he lied and gave incomplete information to interrogators.
 - 3) The detainee stated he hates Americans because he feels he is being detained unjustly.
 - 4) The detainee stated he fabricated information while being interrogated in Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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- a) The detainee stated that he was not involved in armed resistance to the Pakistani police who attempted to arrest the group of Arabs living on the apartment.
- b) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001 and also has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or their interests. The detainee stated he had no knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 December 2007

To: AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he wanted to receive military training in Afghanistan because it was his duty as a Muslim to be trained.
 - 2) The detainee stated he left Yemen in July 2001 and flew to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee stayed at Riyadh the Facilitator's guest house in Karachi for one night before traveling to Quetta by bus. In Quetta, he transited through the Daftar al Taliban guest house before heading into Afghanistan later that day. Upon reaching Kandahar, the detainee stayed at the al Nibras guest house for seven days before heading to the al Farouq training camp.
 - 3) The al Nebras guest house was identified as being used by fighters heading to al Farouq training camp. Occasionally Usama bin Laden would visit the guest house to greet the fighters before they went to training.
 - 4) The detainee explained the Farouq camp closed due to U.S. bombing. The detainee said he and a group of trainees fled to Kabul, where they were directed to head to Khowst because it was safer there. After two and a half months in Khowst, the detainee returned to Kabul for a couple of days before heading to Zurmat, Afghanistan. The detainee then traveled to Pakistan, staying first in Lahore, then in Karachi. The detainee also stayed in Chabehar, Iran for a period of time.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

- 5) The detainee was captured on 11 September 2002 during a raid. The detainee and others individuals were part of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi, Pakistan.
 - b) Training
 - 1) The detainee trained at Camp al Farouq and received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, the RPG and the PK machine gun.
 - 2) The al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
 - c) Connections/Associations
 - 1) The detainee saw Usama bin Laden at al Farouq where bin Laden gave a lecture on the war with Russia. The detainee saw him and twice in Khowst, Afghanistan where bin Laden lectured about food and money shortages a month before the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 2) The detainee was among a group of al Qaida operatives who listened to a religious speech given by a senior al Qaida operative.
 - 3) The detainee and others received instruction from a senior al Qaida operative in matters related to travel and support issues.
 - 4) The detainee was a trainee at the al Farouq camp.
 - 5) The detainee was identified as participating in explosive training and is knowledgeable on the al Qaida explosives training program.
 - d) Other Relevant Data
 - 1) A letter containing instructions on attacks to specific targets and financial support was in the detainee's apartment.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he had no information regarding imminent terrorist attacks anywhere in the world.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MUDWANI, MUS'AB OMAR ALI

- b) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.
 - c) The detainee denied he trained on explosives.
 - d) The detainee denied being involved in terrorist plots against the United States.
 - e) The detainee did not believe a letter existed which listed his name as being part of a terrorist plot.
 - f) The detainee wants to return to Yemen when he is released and is not looking to fight jihad in the future.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

06 December 2007

To: AL-MAYTHAL, HA'IL AZIZ AHMAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MAYTHAL, HA'IL AZIZ AHMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he traveled from Sanaa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan, and his travel was arranged in Yemen by another person.
2. The detainee stated that while in Quetta, Pakistan, he stayed for approximately 15 days at the Daftar al Taliban guest house.
3. The detainee stated that in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he spent about ten days at a guest house located in the Haji Habashi area of Kandahar near an Islamic Institute.
4. The detainee stated he turned in his passport, money and possessions to the administrators at the guesthouse in the Haji Habashi area of Kandahar, Afghanistan.
5. The detainee stated he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, in late February or early March 2001, and resided at the number Ten guest house and was encouraged to join the fight with the Taliban.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MAYTHAL, HA'IL AZIZ AHMAD

6. The detainee stated he was sent to the front lines of the fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance and was there for about two months.
 7. The detainee stated he served as a guard for about 25 days at the Kandahar Airport Compound in Afghanistan.
 8. The detainee stated the house located twenty minutes past the Kandahar Airport, was called, the Airport. The Airport guest house was a gathering place where members of al Madalfa guest house could celebrate Fridays, holidays and to make sacrifices.
 9. The detainee stated he fled after the fall of Kandahar, Afghanistan, in November 2001, to the Loghar Province, Afghanistan, then onward to Khowst Province, Afghanistan, to Gardez and Zornat, Afghanistan, and finally into Pakistan.
 10. The detainee stated that after fleeing Afghanistan, he traveled and moved through several different safe houses in Lahore, Pakistan, for a one month period.
 11. The detainee stated he was ordered to travel to Quetta, Pakistan, in preparation for onward travel to Iran, due to the unstable security situation in Pakistan.
 12. The detainee stated he fled from Pakistan to Iran but was forced back to Pakistan because of pressure from the Iranian Police.
- b. Training
1. The detainee stated he received basic training at al Farouq in Afghanistan in December 2001, and learned how to use an AK-47, rocket-propelled grenade, PK, and Makarov pistol. Additionally, he was taught how to dig trenches, escape and evasion, disguise himself, orienteering, and reading map features.
 2. The detainee stated he returned to the al Farouq camp in Afghanistan for the tactical course.
 3. The detainee stated that during advanced training at al Farouq in Afghanistan, he learned how to be more independent in the field and perform reconnaissance.
 4. The detainee stated he received additional light weapons training at the Malik Center outside Kabul, Afghanistan.
 5. The detainee stated he took a security course at the Airport near Kandahar, Afghanistan, and was trained in personal security, survival skills, how to obtain a

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passport without drawing attention to yourself, how to get through customs by having knowledge of local hotels and attractions.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated his travel was facilitated in Pakistan by a man who he met upon arrival in Karachi, Pakistan.
2. The detainee stated he stayed in the Madalfa guest house prior to attending advanced training at al Farouq in Afghanistan.
3. The detainee stated he saw and heard Usama bin Laden lecture on three separate occasions while he was at al Farouq in Afghanistan.
4. The detainee stated he returned in April 2001 to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he retrieved his passport from an individual who was in charge of arranging travel documents and itineraries for al Qaida operatives in Kandahar.
5. The detainee stated he stayed with a group of Yemenis at the number Ten guest house following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.
6. A source stated the Number Ten guest house is also known as the Ashara guest house. The guest house was used by people going back and forth from the front lines.
7. A source stated the Ashara safe house was in Kabul, Afghanistan, and was owned and operated by al Qaida.
8. The detainee stated he was led by a man who was an al Qaida operative and a former al Qaida military trainer.
9. The detainee stated that during the time that he lived in the apartments, a known al Qaida member would bring money for the group.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested at a terrorist safe house in Karachi, Pakistan.
2. The detainee claimed everyone staying at an unknown mud house in Kabul, Afghanistan, had an AK-47, and that some people had rocket-propelled grenades, grenades, and PKs.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-MAYTHAL, HA'IL AZIZ AHMAD

3. The detainee admitted the guest house where he was apprehended was an al Qaida house.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a. The detainee claims he never became a member of al Qaida even though he attended al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan.
 - b. The detainee stated he never participated in security training at the airport near Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee claims he made up his involvement in the course because he was forced to tell interrogators something after his capture in Pakistan.
 - c. The detainee claims he was in Karachi, Pakistan, waiting for assistance in traveling back to his country and was being hidden in the apartment to avoid arrest by Pakistani authorities.
 - d. The detainee changed his story to say that he never saw Usama bin Laden while the detainee was at al Farouq in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he was pressured into saying that he had seen Usama bin Laden at al Farouq by interrogators in Pakistan.
 - e. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 January 2008

To: HASHIM, MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASHIM, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he began fighting at the age of 16 during the jihad against the Russians.
 - 2) The detainee stated he was paid two and a half million Rupees in return for fulfilling another man's military service obligation with the Taliban. The detainee stated he was stationed at Takhir, Afghanistan for approximately five days before the Taliban regime fell.
 - 3) The detainee stated he was arrested and taken to a military prison in Punjsheer, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was in prison for approximately one year and four months. The detainee stated he was released after another prisoner, who had known the detainee for many years, wrote a letter requesting the detainee's release. The detainee stated he then returned home to tend to his father's sheep and goats.
 - 4) The detainee stated he was offered a job as a spy. The detainee stated he was initially paid 600,000 Rupees with a promise of more money at a later date. The detainee stated he was to observe American aircraft and troop movement, to assess the level of security at U.S. military sites, to identify any vulnerability and then report back to his superiors with his findings.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF HASHIM, MOHAMMED

- 5) The detainee stated he joined the Taliban for monetary reasons. The detainee stated he was receiving between 200,000 and 300,000 Afghani dollars per year after joining the Taliban.
- 6) The detainee stated he was typically paid between 5,000 and 20,000 Pakistani Rupees for each of the missions. The detainee stated that his payment came in the form of cash, clothing and food. The detainee stated he supplemented his income from the Taliban by selling hashish and growing opium.
- 7) The detainee stated he was a member of the 40-man group, which was also known as Jihad Kandahar. The detainee stated Jihad Kandahar was formed in the month of Ramadan, approximately November 2001. Jihad Kandahar was an off shoot group of the Taliban that received financial support from Arab members of al Qaida and Taliban. The detainee stated Jihad Kandahar was composed of four branches, each of which operated in separate provinces.
- 8) The detainee stated the 40-man unit attempted to assassinate Afghanistan President Karzai, and that the leader of the 40-man unit had planned the attempted assassination.
- 9) The detainee stated the Kandahar, Afghanistan Taliban Police Supervisor directed him to work on a new training camp South of Kandahar, towards the Pakistani border. The detainee stated they brought a welding generator with them in order to build shelters and perform other improvements on the compound. The detainee stated the purpose of the camp was to house and train many Arabs.
- 10) The detainee stated the Kandahar, Afghanistan Police Supervisor paid him between 7,000 and 8,000 Pakistani Rupees for delivering the generator to the Arab compound outside of Kandahar. The detainee stated that the Arabs at the compound also paid him the equivalent of 2,000 to 3,000 Pakistani Rupees and fed the detainee dinner.
- 11) The detainee stated he attended a training camp located 45 minutes outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan, in approximately January 2001. The detainee stated only the best fighters were selected to attend the camp where they received training in the poisoning of water systems, suicide attacks and the use of explosives.
- 12) The detainee stated he was shown a house located in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan, used to store poison intended for being placed into water storage tanks.
- 13) The detainee stated he knows the location of a school in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where training in the use of poisons is given.

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- 14) The detainee stated he served as a security escort during a visit by Usama bin Laden and members of his family circa January 2002.
- 15) The detainee stated he made two trips to Charykarkar City, Afghanistan, to distribute al Qaida funds circa spring of 2001. The detainee stated he delivered the equivalent of almost 7,000 United States dollars to a commander with ties to the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee stated the commander had 10 to 15 soldiers at the meeting place armed with Kalashnikov rifles and rocket launchers. The detainee stated the commander informed him that there were 20 commandos that would be giving their lives for their cause in about eight months to a year.
- 16) The detainee stated his superiors sent him to Quetta, Pakistan, to see if there were any American forces present. The detainee stated he arrived at Quetta and saw American soldiers and fighter aircraft. The detainee stated he reported his findings to his superior.
- 17) The detainee stated his commander sent him to Nimroz, Afghanistan, a province near the Iranian border, to see if there were any American forces present. The detainee stated he located the American base in Nimroz, and saw American soldiers driving in the city. The detainee stated he reported his findings back to his commander and was paid a total of 10,000 Kaldar, Pakistan rupees.
- 18) The detainee stated he went on a mission to Sar Shela, a town on the border of Afghanistan and Iran that took four days to complete and began approximately 10 days prior to being captured by United States forces. Based on his findings, the detainee stated his recommendation to his commander was to carry out an attack on a government building that had a larger concentration of United States personnel.
- 19) The detainee stated one of his assignments as a spy was to hide in the mountains near Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, and track the number and types of aircraft that would take off and land during day and night operations. The detainee stated the objective for this assignment was to provide Taliban forces with information to launch a surface to air attack on American planes. The detainee stated he was instructed to use white chalk to mark locations for Taliban forces to lay in wait and attack American soldiers. The detainee stated he completed this mission and reported back to his superiors.
- 20) The detainee stated his commander paid him the equivalent of 500 Pakistani Rupees for the scouting and marking of positions to carry out the attacks against United States forces at the airfield in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 21) The detainee stated he witnessed a member of his 40-man team, and now a fellow detainee, launch a rocket attack on a United States cargo aircraft taking off from Kandahar, Afghanistan airport with a number of detainees on board. The detainee stated

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his team member was paid by al Qaida to carry out the attack. Regardless of the presence of detainees on board the aircraft, the detainee stated the attack was executed because they would do anything for money.

- 22) The detainee stated he and another 40-man team member participated in a rocket attack on the airfield in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee carried the battery and wires used to ignite the rocket. The detainee and the 40-man team member split up after the rocket was fired to evade capture.
- 23) The detainee stated he was paid 20,000 Pakistani Rupees to find a member of the 40-man team to assist him in conducting an attack on Kandahar airfield, Afghanistan. The detainee stated they targeted the Kandahar airfield because it had a lot of Americans and airplanes, and they wanted to kill the Americans, but wanted to hit the airport whether they killed Americans or not.
- 24) The detainee stated one of his missions was to reconnoiter a residence being used as a base, named Fire Base Gecko, for American soldiers. The detainee stated he was to report the type and number of weapons at the base and to assess the security. The detainee stated the objective for this mission was to provide information to assist Taliban forces in attacking the base. The detainee stated he was spotted by a security guard while performing his surveillance of the base, and the security guard told the detainee he had no business near the base and warned the detainee not to return. The detainee stated he debriefed his findings and was instructed to return to the base and approach it from the other side of the compound. The detainee stated he arrived at the rear of the base the next day and observed American soldiers running in formation. The detainee stated he was spotted by security guards and attempted to flee but was quickly apprehended by three American and three Afghani soldiers. The detainee stated he was recognized by the security guard that saw him the day before and was taken into custody.
- 25) The detainee stated his efforts to collect information on Fire Base Gecko were in preparation for attack that was to be executed by 15-20 Taliban fighters.
- 26) The detainee stated he was paid the equivalent of 500 Pakistani Rupees for the first day of monitoring Fire Base Gecko and was to receive an additional payment after completing the mission.
- 27) After being taken into custody by United States forces at Fire Base Gecko, the detainee confessed that he was under a lot of pressure to attack the base and was continuously being asked to be a martyr. When asked how he would have carried out the attack, the detainee stated he would have hid a land mine under his jacket, depressed the pressure plate and run into the Range Entrance of Fire Base Gecko, which the detainee identified as being the easiest place to attack. The detainee stated after he made it into the

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compound, he would have released the pressure plate causing the mine to explode.

- 28) The detainee stated his commander wanted the detainee to use an explosive vest to perform a suicide bombing mission against Karzai or American targets.
 - 29) The detainee stated he was with the Taliban for four and one-half years. The detainee stated he initially worked for the Taliban police force in Kandahar, Afghanistan informing on people who watched television or smoked hashish. The detainee stated ambush attacks against military personnel and suicide attacks were the most favored by the Taliban. The detainee also stated the downing of United States helicopters with rockets or missiles was often discussed. The detainee stated that Mohammed Shah was able to strike a United States helicopter as it was trying to land at Kandahar Airport.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he received weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle and rocket propelled grenade launcher.
 - 2) The detainee stated he was taught hand grenade techniques, use of plastic explosives with detonator cord, and how to blow up cars circa November 2001.
 - 3) The detainee stated he attended a training camp near the Khotal-e-Morcha mountain pass, outside the city of Kandahar, Afghanistan, approximately three times. The detainee stated his visits normally took place at the end of the year and consisted of training with weapons, such as the AK-47, Kalacov, land mines, and plastic explosives. The detainee stated they would also discuss the use of rockets and missiles against vehicles and helicopters.
 - 4) The detainee stated he was trained on how to use an explosive vest.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated the individual who facilitated the detainee's release from prison was a member of the 40-man Taliban unit.
 - 2) The detainee stated that he considered one of his superiors to be a weapons expert, including the use of the Kalashnikov rifle, rockets and heavy machine guns. The detainee stated that his former superior fought United States forces in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and attacking the first shipment of detainees out of Kandahar, Afghanistan by firing machine guns at the plane.

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- 3) The detainee stated a commander in the group Hezb-E-Ilami is a language specialist that was working as a spy and saboteur in Karzai's government.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001, prior to them taking place. The detainee also denied any knowledge of information regarding future attacks against the United States or its interests. The detainee stated he has no knowledge of planned uprisings at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
 - b) The detainee stated he never shot at an American soldier.
 - c) A source stated there was no such thing as Jihad Kandahar.
 - d) The detainee stated only the most stupid people would agree to use an explosive vest.
 - e) The detainee was assured that his family would be cared for if the detainee conducted the suicide attack with an explosive vest, but the detainee did not accept.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 November 2007

To: NASRULLAH, FNU

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASRULLAH, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) **Commitment**
 - 1) The detainee is identified as part of a 40-man unit after the end of the Taliban regime. The detainee reports to his cousin who was a sub-commander in the 40-man unit. The 40-man unit is an organization supported by al Qaida.
 - 2) The detainee is identified as part of a 40-man unit of the Taliban that fought against United States Forces at Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee is identified as knowing how to use rockets and AK-47 assault rifles.
 - b) **Training**

The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and a handgun while he was at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
 - c) **Connections/Associations**
 - 1) The detainee is identified as having been a member of the Taliban for five years.
 - 2) The 40-man unit receives money and weapons from al Qaeda.

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3) The detainee stated that his cousin, who is also detained, is the only member of his family who he knows to be associated with the Taliban.

d) Intent

The detainee told another individual that when he got back to Afghanistan, he would get even with the interviewers.

e) Other Relevant Data

1) The detainee claimed he was a tailor and was conscripted into the Taliban for only two months.

2) The detainee stated he was conscripted into the Taliban sometime between 1997 and 1998. The detainee worked for approximately 60 days as a clerk and a guard.

3) The detainee told another individual that he lied to his interviewers and actually did fight for the Taliban against United States forces while at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

4) The detainee told another individual he was part of the uprising at the compound that was surrounded by the United States and Northern Alliance forces and was later used as a prison.

5) The detainee told another individual he retreated with Taliban forces to the compound and was able to escape with approximately 80 others after the uprising.

6) The detainee and two other individuals were captured after delivering a letter to a former Taliban Brigade Commander. The letter was from a high-ranking Taliban Commander who requested the Brigade Commander report to Quetta, Pakistan to fight and avoid capture by the Americans.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a) The detainee claims he was conscripted into the Taliban by force.

b) The detainee denied being involved with any extremist groups.

c) The detainee stated he is not willing to sacrifice for any one Taliban person. The detainee is not sure how important Islam is to the Taliban. The detainee claims he would die for his religion if given a fatwa, however he would not honor a fatwa from the Taliban.

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- d) The detainee denied knowledge of a 40-man unit, that weapons were found at his home, or that he had any further association with the Taliban other than the two months he was a conscript.
 - e) The detainee denied that he had ever heard of Jamat-al-Islamia or al Qaida. The detainee also stated that he had never heard of the al Farouq Training Camp.
 - f) The detainee states he was a soldier and did not know the political or military issues. The detainee claims his commander was an authoritarian who ruled the Taliban soldiers by force. The detainee claims he had no options and did what he was told.
 - g) The detainee stated he heard about the 09/11/2001 terrorist attacks on the United States from people in his village who heard about the attacks on the radio. The detainee stated he was saddened by the attacks because he heard that many people died.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 November 2007

To: ESMATULLAH, FNU

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ESMATULLAH, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he received advice that he should visit Abdul Razzak, the local Taliban Commander. Taliban Commander Razzak convinced the detainee had to serve as a reservist in the Taliban military. The detainee stated he was required to serve three or four rotations as a watchman in Mazar Province of Afghanistan. The detainee's direct Taliban commander reported to Razzak.
 - 2) Mullah Abdul Razaq was identified as the Taliban supreme commander for the province of Helmand, Afghanistan and received weapon shipments from Syria.
 - 3) The detainee stated an immediate benefit from joining the Taliban was a letter issued to him from the Taliban that advised readers of the letter not to bother the detainee. The letter allowed the detainee to keep living in the house in district five. The detainee stated he joined the Taliban because he wanted the same rights as the others who lived in that location.
 - 4) The detainee stated during his one year with the Taliban, he was part of a 40 man team that that carried Kalashnikov AK-47s but never engaged in physical fighting against the Northern Alliance.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ESMATULLAH, FNU

- 5) The detainee stated his first assignment in the Taliban reserves lasted four months. The detainee stated he served as a guard for the Taliban lines in Mazar Province, Afghanistan reporting any suspicious activities to his supervisor. The detainee's second period of Taliban duty lasted three months and the third period lasted two months. The detainee stated each time he was called up to work for the Taliban, he would perform the same duties.
- 6) The detainee was identified as being a Taliban commander and was issued a station wagon by the Taliban. The detainee and five others were fighting against United States Forces in the province of Uruzgan and were backed by al Qaida.
- 7) The detainee was identified as having an official taxi used for transporting Taliban personnel between Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand, Afghanistan. The detainee possessed a Kalashnikov and possibly other weapons.
- 8) The detainee stated he was a Taliban soldier but not a commander, nor anyone in charge.
- 9) The detainee was identified as planning to kidnap the Uruzgan Province governor's son in exchange for releasing prisoners in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee also talked about killing the governor by bombing his office.
- 10) The detainee was identified as operating against United States personnel in the Uruzgan Province, Lashkar Gah, and Helmand areas of Afghanistan. The intent was to bomb or strike soft targets, primarily using AK-47s.
- 11) The detainee was identified as having a satellite telephone to stay in contact with other commanders of the 40 man unit.
- 12) The detainee stated while he was with the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, there were no cell, satellite, or other electronic telephones used by anyone.
- 13) The detainee was identified as being assigned to a Taliban unit in the Uruzgan Province, which was a front line location for fighting the Northern Alliance.

b) Training

The detainee stated that the Taliban taught them how to use AK-47's in Dara Sufe, Afghanistan.

c) Connections/Associations

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- 1) The detainee was identified as being affiliated with Iaman Zawaheri, an Egyptian terrorist who was involved in the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat.
- 2) The detainee and another individual were reported to be part of Usama bin Laden's main security detail assisting Usama bin Laden out of Afghanistan to Pakistan in late 2001.
- d) Other Relevant Data
 - 1) The detainee stated Abdul Razzak told him he was looking for a man to deliver a letter for him to a man in Oruzgan, Afghanistan. The detainee stated Razzak offered him 1000 Rupees to deliver the letter for him. The detainee stated he left the following day.
 - 2) In another interview the detainee stated Razak insisted on paying the detainee 10,000 Rupees to deliver the letter.
 - 3) The detainee stated he read the letter Razzaq gave him. The detainee stated the letter was written in Pashtu and read "Please come one time to Quetta."
 - 4) The detainee stated he traveled by car to the border then crossed on foot. The detainee stated he then walked to his sister's house. The detainee then traveled to the letter recipient's house with his cousin and a friend. The detainee stated he gave the recipient the letter, which he tore up and threw on the ground after reading.
 - 5) After delivering the letter, the detainee stated he was pulled over by Jan Mohammed's security detail while he was driving to Oruzgan City, Afghanistan with his cousin and a friend. The detainee stated Jan Mohammed was the governor of Oruzgan Province. When the security detail found an AK-47 in the car, they took the detainee, his cousin, and the friend into custody.
 - 6) The detainee stated the governor and his entourage then took the detainee, his cousin, and his friend back to the letter recipient's house. The detainee stated his friend was released at this time. The detainee stated the letter recipient was also taken into custody, and all three were taken to the city offices. The detainee thought his friend was released because he was from Jan Mohammed's tribe.
 - 7) The detainee was identified as being tasked to deliver four letters to an individual from high-level Taliban leaders in hiding. Three of the letters were of high importance. The fourth letter was not that important and was a simple invitation from Mullah Obaidullah to the individual for him to visit with him in Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee was identified as reading the three important letters and destroying them before he met with

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the individual. Only the last letter was given to the individual.

- 8) Mullah Obaidullah is one of the persons responsible for keeping the Taliban in weapons and ammo. He is said to be infamous for his cruelty and reserves considerable time for the suppression of his opponents.
 - 9) The detainee was identified as knowing how to use rockets, heavy machine guns, AK-47s, and being a good driver. The detainee was identified as being a member of the Taliban for six years and had been a member of the 40 man unit since its creation in 2001.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he is not against the Americans and is not aware of any planned attacks against the Americans.
 - b) The detainee stated he was never asked to be a courier and did not remember specific people or messages sent. The detainee stated he never received any training in covert message coverage and never knew any spies.
 - c) The detainee denied ever having a satellite phone or driving a Taliban vehicle, stating only commanders had vehicles. The detainee also denied being part of the team that escorted Usama bin Laden out of Afghanistan. The detainee stated he did not know anything about Usama bin Laden.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

08 January 2008

To: RAHMAT-ULLAH, (FNU)

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAT-ULLAH, (FNU)

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he was the Supreme Commander in Kabul, Afghanistan, when he fought the Russians. The detainee also fought against the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. The detainee was Kabul's defender during the civil war in Afghanistan. The detainee had shifting alliances with the Northern Alliance and the Taliban.
 - 2) The detainee stated he met with Mullah Omar, the Supreme Leader of the Taliban, who provided him with a four wheel vehicle.
 - 3) The detainee stated he was Commander of over 500 Taliban Soldiers in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 4) The detainee became the director of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin cell operations in Kandahar, Afghanistan in November 2002.
 - 5) Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin is described as a foreign terrorist organization that was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets, has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden, and has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAT-ULLAH, (FNU)

- 6) The detainee stated he led many troops before the United States arrived in Afghanistan.
 - 7) In April 2002, the detainee and four other Taliban leaders were actively seeking to reestablish Taliban control in Afghanistan. The group was in hiding and coordinating with al Qaida elements in Oruzgan Province.
 - 8) The detainee planned biological and poison attacks on United States and Coalition forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was in possession of anthrax powder and an unspecified liquid poison that he planned to distribute to al Qaida and Taliban operatives in preparation for future attacks on United States and Coalition forces. The poison attacks were to target water sources, to include reservoirs.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he joined the Mujahedin to fight the Soviet Union when he was very young. The detainee has many wounds and scars from the fighting. He was trained in the use of hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, AK-47, and the Sakil machine gun.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee was a staff member in the Taliban's Ministry of Defense. The detainee was commander of the Tagab, Kabul province front-line division in Afghanistan.
 - 2) The detainee was the Taliban's National Guard Commander in June 2000. The detainee was deployed to the frontlines to supplement existing Taliban forces that were to participate in a summer offensive against the United Front in Afghanistan.
 - 3) The detainee was one of the Taliban military commanders who were allied with the Taliban deputy leader in planning a coup against the leader of Afghanistan. At that time, the detainee was the Commander of the Badam Bagh Division, with 4,000 armed soldiers.
 - 4) The detainee was the Taliban Commander of the Tagab and Nejrab Divisions with an estimated 1,500 soldiers.
 - 5) The detainee was also known as Habibullah. The detainee was once a Taliban leader and soldier in the 40-Man Unit. The detainee primarily operated against United States personnel by bombing or striking soft targets in Urozgan Province, Lashkar Gah and Helmand, Afghanistan using AK-47s.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAT-ULLAH, (FNU)

- 6) The detainee was a Taliban commander of 400-500 troops during the Taliban regime.
- d) Other Relevant Data
 - 1) The detainee stated that after the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan he went to Oruzgan, Afghanistan. The detainee was told to turn his equipment in to the Governor of the Oruzgan Province and show American forces the receipt he would receive from the governor. The detainee received a receipt listing six small cars, one truck, two mounted anti-aircraft weapons, 39 Kalashnikovs, two RPG-7s, four PKs, two 82-series machine guns, and six radios. The receipt was signed by district council members and the commission.
 - 2) The detainee stated he received a letter inviting him to go to Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee believed he was being framed so he did not go.
 - 3) The detainee stated he was told provide information about enemies of the Afghanistan government. The detainee was then turned over to the United States government. The detainee stated he knows he must cooperate, and that he is not upset at the United States government.
 - 4) The detainee was captured in his home in November 2002.
 - 5) The detainee stated that when he was captured he turned over the receipt listing the weapons he had turned in.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detainee stated he never went by the name of Habibullah.
 - b) The detainee stated he was innocent of any wrong doing and that he believed that he was handed over to the United States government to provide intelligence information and not for suspicion of being a terrorist.
 - c) The detainee stated that if he were released he would go home to Urusxza district of Afghanistan to work as a laborer.
 - d) The detainee stated he was not against U.S. forces and supported the new Afghanistan government.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAHMAT-ULLAH, (FNU)

unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 December 2007

To: GHANI, ABDUL

Subject: **UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he did join the Taliban voluntarily, but was not sure when he joined.
 - 2) The detainee stated that fighting against that Americans was every Muslim's duty.
 - 3) The detainee stated he and his friend were involved with the rocket attacks at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airfield.
 - 4) The detainee stated that he and his friend have known each other their whole lives having grown up together in their home village of Khoshab, Afghanistan. The detainee's friend offered the detainee 1000 Pakistani Rupees to help carry two rockets into the desert near the Kandahar airfield.
 - 5) A friend of the detainee stated that the detainee told him, when United States forces arrived in Afghanistan, they had to fight against the United States.
 - 6) A friend of the detainee stated that he knew the detainee was involved in fighting the United States, but couldn't provide any specifics.
 - b) Training

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL

- 1) The detainee stated that everyone in Afghanistan knows how to use a gun. The detainee stated he could operate any weapon a soldier could carry in his hands.
 - 2) The detainee was identified as a person from a village called Khoshab and that the detainee's military expertise was with missiles.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee was identified as a person who worked for one of the commanders of a 40 Man Jihad Kandahar Unit. The 40 Man Jihad Kandahar Unit were an off shoot group of the Taliban.
 - 2) The commanders of a 40 Man Jihad Kandahar Unit had planned an attack on United States aircraft and explained it to the detainee. The detainee fired a shoulder fired rocket at a United States Aircraft carrying new detainees out of the Kandahar, Afghanistan airfield.
 - 3) The detainee was identified as a person who was paid money by al Qaida for the attack against a United States aircraft.
 - 4) The detainee was identified as the person that one of the commanders of 40 Man Jihad Kandahar Unit paid Pakistani Rupees to find and assist in attacking the Kandahar Afghanistan airfield.
 - 5) The detainee stated that the rockets that were fired at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport came from the Taliban.
 - 6) The detainee stated he worked with a driver for the Taliban, delivering coats, blankets, shoes, etc. to Taliban soldiers in the Madrassa of the Taliban located in Kabul, Afghanistan.
 - 7) The detainee's boss was identified as a Taliban commander who wanted to fight the Americans.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee was identified as the person who took a man to an abandoned garden in a village and retrieved two batteries, wire, and two American made missiles. The detainee and the man carried the batteries, wire and the missiles to a mountain area that overlooked the Kandahar Afghanistan airfield. The detainee and the man hid behind a rock and the man fired the missiles against United States Forces.

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- 2) The detainee was identified as the person who launched a rocket attack against a United States aircraft carrying detainees using a delayed fired BM-12 missile. The attack took place at sunrise near the Kandahar, Afghanistan airfield as the United States transport aircraft was taking off.
- 3) The detainee stated that after the Americans started bombing the Kandahar, Afghanistan airfield, which is near his village, the Taliban left the Kandahar airfield and hid in the village garden. Kandahar fell and the Taliban left the area completely, leaving behind military equipment and weapons.
- 4) The detainee stated his friend found six rockets left by the Taliban in a creek bed and hid the rockets by burying them in the ground in the village garden. Later the detainee was asked to help carry four of the rockets. The detainee stated all six rockets were the same type and approximately three feet long.
- 5) The detainee stated six Toghondi Rockets, of Russian manufacture, were hid in the ground of an old grape garden that was not in use. The rockets were so big that a single person could only carry two rockets at a time.
- 6) The detainee stated a man hired him to help carry two rockets into the desert near the Kandahar, Afghanistan airfield.
- 7) The detainee stated holes were bored into the bottom of the rockets and gunpowder was poured into the holes, letting the gunpowder form a trail from the rockets. The gunpowder was then lit with a cigarette.
- 8) The detainee admitted to being a lookout but refused to admit to having the knowledge that the rockets were going to be fired at that time.
- 9) The detainee stated that only he and his friend were involved in the rocket attack.
- 10) The detainee stated that he knew the rockets were going to be fired at Americans at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airfield.
- 11) The detainee stated that when he fired the rockets, he was not following any commander but was just doing it for money.
- 12) The detainee was offered 1000 Pakistan Rupees to help carry two rockets. The detainee carried the two rockets into the desert near the Kandahar airport. The detainee then changed his story and stated that he was never paid for carrying the rockets.

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- 13) The detainee stated approximately one month after the rocket attack, upon exiting the village mosque, six Afghan Military Forces soldiers were waiting for him and took him in custody. The detainee stated he was asked questions about who hired him to carry missiles and the rocket attack. The detainee denied the fact that he knew anyone but admitted he knew who hired him to carry missiles after the Afghan Military Forces beat him.
 - 14) The detainee stated he then took the Afghan Military Forces to the garden and the Afghan Military Forces dug up the two rockets remaining and confiscated them.
 - 15) The detainee stated he was in Afghan Military Forces custody for about one week then was turned over to the United States Forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he accepts that he did something wrong and he has no motivation to lie further.
 - b) The detainee stated he had the right to defend his country.
 - c) The detainee stated he didn't know he was carrying the rockets near the airport. The detainee thought he was carrying them for some reason having to do with the sale of the rockets. Further, the detainee stated he did not see the man fire the rockets.
 - d) The detainee stated if he knew that the man would fire the rockets at the airport, he would not have helped him.
 - e) The detainee stated he did not fire any of the rockets.
 - f) The detainee stated he remembered the elders talking about the Americans coming and building things. Because of this, the detainee was in favor of the Americans coming. The detainee stated that he even volunteered to work on construction projects for the Americans at the airport.
 - g) The detainee stated he could not recall exactly when, but a group of men who had joined the Taliban took him to the airport after the detainee had cursed the Taliban, and beat him.
 - h) The detainee stated he left the Taliban after two months because he was a poor man and wanted to go home to support his family.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting

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Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

04 December 2007

To: UNKNOWN, BISMULLAH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF UNKNOWN, BISMULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee was identified as part of the 40-man team that conducted operations against American forces.
 - 2) The 40-man unit was known to be tasked with carrying out several political assassinations.
 - 3) The 40-man unit was identified as part of the Taliban, and was known to receive money and weapons from al Qaida. The detainee was identified as having been a member of the Taliban for six years.
 - 4) The detainee was identified as having provided some tactical information for the 40-man team and having used a short-range radio and a long-range satellite telephone to communicate.
 - 5) The leaders of a terrorist organization were known to have directed the detainee to find the local Afghans that were helping the Coalition Forces and kill them. The detainee was augmented with 25-armed personnel and three trucks from a known Taliban supporter. The detainee traveled the streets of a city in Afghanistan at night, asking questions about

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF UNKNOWN, BISMULLAH

Coalition Forces and those who spoke to them.

- 6) Afghan Military Forces soldiers on duty at checkpoints throughout the city immediately reported Coalition Forces activity, no matter how trivial, to the detainee. The detainee would then radio his insurgent counterparts to notify them that the Coalition Forces were coming and warn them that they should hide. The detainee would also pass reports of Coalition Forces activity to Sher Mohammed.
- b) Connections/Associations
 - 1) The detainee stated he was appointed Director of Transportation for Gereshk, Helmand Province through family connections with the Governor of Helmand Province, Sher Mohammed.
 - 2) Sher Mohammed headed a communications network that compromised operations by Coalition Forces in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
 - 3) Sher Mohammed stated publicly that he was, and always would be, Taliban.
 - 4) The detainee stated he would die for Sher Mohammed if he had to.
 - 5) The detainee was known to have worked for the commander of the 40-man unit.
 - c) Other Relevant Data
 - 1) The detainee stated he affected the release of six people who were captured with four to five AK-47 rifles and no identification. The detainee stated he was expected to negotiate the release of the captured individuals by virtue of his position in the village and his relationship with Helmand's governor, Sher Mohammed. The detainee stated that on the day he was detained, he was visiting Sher Mohammed in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan and had met some of the Americans who later arrested him. The detainee stated he was captured on 12 February 2003. The detainee stated he was detained while helping the six captured individuals because he had a satellite phone.
 - 2) The detainee stated he was last in Pakistan in November 2002 to take his mother to a doctor.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he had no knowledge of Taliban in his region. The detainee stated his satellite phone was used only to report problems within his department to the governor and

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to talk to friends.

- b) The detainee stated he has never heard of Abdul Wahed. The detainee stated he has never conducted night surveillance searching for information relating to Afghanistan citizens assisting United States Armed Forces. The detainee considers himself a friend of the United States and would not do anything to damage this relationship.
 - c) The detainee denied having any affiliation with the 40-man unit headed by Abdul Wahed and denied knowing Wahed. The detainee stated Wahed was his enemy and so was the Taliban.
 - d) The detainee stated he never spoke on his satellite telephone with others suspected to be on the 40-Man terrorist unit.
 - e) The detainee stated he has never had any association with the Taliban. The detainee stated he never used the Department of Transportation to provide any service to the Taliban. The detainee stated he has never provided armed guards for any Taliban tasking.
 - f) The detainee stated he had no reason to watch Americans or tell anyone what Americans do because he considers the Americans his friends.
 - g) The detainee stated that before he was arrested, he did not know of any Taliban, al Qaida, or Fidayan Islam members or sympathizers in the area. The detainee stated everyone was happy in the area and there was no anti-coalition activity taking place.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

12 November 2007

To: KARIM, BOSTAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, BOSTAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he departed Khowst, Afghanistan during the Russian invasion. The detainee stayed at a refugee camp in Miram Shah, Pakistan for approximately 10 to 13 years. While living in Miram Shah, Pakistan, the detainee aided the Mujahedin against the Russians and their supporters.
 - 2) The detainee stated he served with the Mujahedin during the Russian-Afghan War while he was a refugee in Miram Shah, Pakistan. The detainee stated he spent time at a Mujahedin command post known as Srobai. The detainee stated his uncle was a very well known Mujahedin commander for an individual.
 - 3) A source, who was a Hezb-e-Islami commander, stated the individual the detainee's uncle worked for was the leader of Hezb-e-Islami, one of the seven al Qaida terrorist groups operating in Pakistan.
 - 4) The detainee stated he went to a compound in Srobai near Tanai, Afghanistan in approximately 1988. The detainee stated he was there for guard duty and did not participate in any fighting. The detainee stated he attended this compound approximately four or five times for approximately ten days to two weeks at a time. After attending the

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KARIM, BOSTAN

compound each time, the detainee returned to his home in Pakistan.

- 5) The detainee stated he was recruited by Jamat-al-Tabligh when he returned to Afghanistan after the Russians lost control.
- 6) The preachers of Jamat-al-Tabligh organization have been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
- 7) The detainee stated he was a member of the organization Jamat-al-Tabligh for approximately seven years. The detainee attended the Markaz Tabligh for approximately four months to become a member of Jamat-al-Tabligh. The detainee explained Markaz Tablighi means "center of Tablighi" and is located in the Raiwind area of Lahore, Pakistan. An individual must attend a Markaz to learn how to teach in order to become a member of Jamat-al-Tabligh.
- 8) A source stated the detainee was a member of Jamat-al-Tabligh.
- 9) A source observed the detainee trying to recruit men to join Jamat-al-Tabligh.
- 10) A source stated it was common knowledge that Jamat-al-Tabligh was responsible for assisting foreigners to flee Afghanistan.
- 11) A source stated that on 1 January 2001, Jamat-al-Tabligh members provided assistance to him and other unarmed Taliban Arab fighters. The Jamat-al-Tabligh members transported Taliban Arab fighters across the border from Zormat, Afghanistan to Lahore, Pakistan. Jamat-al-Tabligh also provided the source housing in Lahore, Pakistan.
- 12) The detainee stated that around November or December of 2001, he and other Tablighis went to an al Qaida-run hospital and helped the wounded fighters. The detainee stated this was the only time the detainee has helped out al Qaida.

b) Training

The detainee stated he stayed a few nights at a compound call Sroobi. The detainee stated some people at the compound wanted to participate in jihad and others did not. The detainee further stated he participated in target practice and several men at the compound hunted with their AK-47s.

c) Connections/Associations

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- 1) The detainee admitted to meeting an individual during the time of the Taliban when all of the shops in the bazaar were closed for a meeting that the individual attended.
 - 2) The individual from the previous statements and a second individual were identified as forming an alliance with support, guidance, and funding provided by al Qaida and the Jamat Ulma Islami.
 - 3) The second individual from the previous statement founded Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin as a faction of the Hezb-e-Islami party in 1977. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden.
 - 4) A source stated the Jamiat-Ulmar-Islam political organization was a Pakhtoon tribe from Pakistan which regularly recruited from a mosque in Abdabot, Pakistan. After Friday prayers, members of the organization solicited for volunteers to fight in the jihad.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) In August 2002, the detainee and another individual were detained at a checkpoint in Pakistan. The detainee and the other individual did not have identity papers. The detainee and the other individual had in their possession a Satellite Telephone, 2,700 United States Dollars, 3,600 Pakistani Rupees and 70,000 Afghan Rupees.
 - 2) The detainee and another individual were identified as planning to carry out command-detonated mine attacks against American Forces.
 - 3) The detainee was identified as preparing to conduct command-detonated mine attacks against United State Forces in revenge for the detention of an individual and his other family members.
 - 4) A source stated the detainee, along with others, set up an ambush site for an American convoy somewhere in Khowst, Afghanistan consisting of 30 anti-tank mines that were constructed to detonate remotely.
 - 5) The detainee's palms were significantly scarred. A doctor's examination stated the scars would be consistent with a blast injury that occurred when something burst or exploded while held by the hands.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated that he had never been to a terrorist training camp, trained on weapons, participated in any fighting in Afghanistan, or knew anyone that was affiliated with

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the al Qaida or Taliban.

- b) The detainee denied having ever worked with explosives while at Sroobi compound near Tanai, Afghanistan.
- c) The detainee stated he knew nothing about Arab smuggling in Pakistan.
- d) The detainee stated he never saw the papers or notebook containing the bomb schematics, nor a car to transport a bomb.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 November 2007

To: AL-KAZIMI, SANAD YISLAM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-KAZIMI, SANAD YISLAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a. Commitment
 1. The detainee stated that an al Qaida member advised him to join the Chechnya jihad and gave the detainee two Chechnya jihad videos to watch. The al Qaida member told the detainee that he would need to go to Afghanistan to receive training and provided the detainee with a letter of introduction.
 2. The detainee stated he had contacted an al Qaida facilitator because he wanted to go to Afghanistan to be involved in the jihad.
 3. In approximately October 1999, an al Qaida member provided the detainee money to get a passport to Afghanistan.
 4. The detainee stated he came to Afghanistan for two reasons to be killed in a way which honored Allah or to survive fighting in Afghanistan and receive the financial security al Qaida would provide upon his return.
 5. In May 2000, the detainee stated he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan via Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan using the passport he received from an al Qaida facilitator.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-KAZIMI, SANAD YISLAM

6. While traveling in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at al Qaida operated guest houses.
 7. The detainee stated that he had to say, under oath, that he would fight with Usama bin Laden against those aggressors from the Jews and Christians, under the law of God. The detainee further stated that this was not just an oath, but also a covenant that he was bound by.
 8. The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan planning to become a Usama bin Laden bodyguard and he was very surprised and honored when he got the job. The detainee stated he worked for Usama bin Laden for six to seven months.
 9. The detainee stated he would have been willing to die for Usama bin Laden at the time.
 10. The detainee stated that he and his family left Kandahar, Afghanistan with an entourage of three vehicles. The detainee stated that after 30 minutes the group stopped, the husbands gave their wives money and then the husbands returned to Kandahar to rejoin the fight.
 11. The detainee stated that an al Qaida operative asked him to case a road from the United Arab Emirates via Oman to Yemen. The detainee stated the individual told him that he intended to use a truck to transport explosives along the route and wanted him to report on the security situation to include the presence of roadblocks and the level of security at the borders.
 12. A government source stated the detainee went to Afghanistan with the help of an individual, trained in al Qaida camps, and was later selected by Usama bin Laden to be a bodyguard.
 13. A source stated the detainee knew and was with all the high level al Qaida members with knowledge about chemical weapons.
- b. Training
1. The detainee stated he had been in special operations in Yemeni Army and was in the reserves from 1989 to 1994.
 2. The detainee stated from 1989 to 1990, he attend the Sawaydya Training Camp in the Alidal province and had two months of special forces training at al Houdqeda Training Camp in Yemen where he served with the Ali Nasser unit.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-KAZIMI, SANAD YISLAM

The detainee stated his rank was equivalent to first lieutenant.

3. The detainee stated he arrived at al Farouq at the end of May or the beginning of June and he went through the basic training, which lasted for 45 days. The detainee stated that the training focused on weapons, such as the AK-47 and the Beka, and other areas, such as topography, camouflage, formations, and mountain tactics.

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that a senior al Qaida facilitator arranged for his transportation to Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was associated with Usama bin Laden's private secretary who arranged the detainee's bodyguard interview with Usama bin Laden.
3. The detainee stated he first met Usama bin Laden in August 2000 when he interviewed for the bodyguard job.
4. The detainee stated that he met an al Qaida operative in Afghanistan and who was trusted by Usama bin Laden.
5. The detainee was associated with numerous al Qaida operatives and leaders, due to his position as a Usama bin Laden bodyguard.

d. Intent

1. Detainee stated he would like to tell his friends in Iraq to find his interrogator, slice him up, and make a shwarma sandwich out of him with his head sticking out of the end of the shwarma.
2. Detainee stated that all Muslims are against the U.S., even Muslims within the U.S. Detainee stated he could raise 100,000 United States Dollars in any mosque in the U.S. in 30 minutes using Koran passages, which Muslims could use to fight Americans in any country.

e. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated the detainee was a militant, an extremist, and a violent individual with strong opposition to a foreign government.

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2. The detainee stated in 1994 he was arrested for destroying tombstones. The detainee stated a fatwa had been issued stating it was illegal, according to Islamic law, to have tombstones above ground.
 3. The detainee stated that he was relieved when the senior al Qaida operative was arrested, as he had not wanted to pursue the explosives transporting operations. He further commented that the al Qaida operative was crazy.
 4. The detainee stated that bodyguards functioned as if they were brain washed. Due to their close proximity to Usama bin Laden they were constantly exposed to bin Laden's message and beliefs. The detainee stated that many of the guards became little versions of bin Laden.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he was not interested in helping the al Qaida operative and was trying to do the least amount of work possible while taking the individuals money.
 - b. The detainee stated that he had never been asked to purchase the explosives and further added that he did not know who was going to provide the explosives.
 - c. The detainee stated he never heard of the al Qaida operative planning an attack against Port Rashid, United Arab Emirates.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 January 2008

To: MOHAMMAD, BINYAM AHMED

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD, BINYAM AHMED**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he attended the Baker Street Mosque in London, England three to four times, beginning in June 1998.
 - 2) An Islamist with ties to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was known to regularly preach at the mosque.
 - 3) The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is a designated foreign terrorist organization. The GSPC conducts operations aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to al Qaida.
 - 4) The detainee stated he began to carry out his religious duties in October 2000 under the influence of Jamat-al-Tabligh, who would sermonize in London.
 - 5) A Pakistani website reported that Jamat-al-Tabligh has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of religious activities. The organization is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and al Qaida.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHAMMAD, BINYAM AHMED

- 6) The detainee stated that in approximately November 2000, he met two individuals with whom he watched videos and listened to audio cassettes about the jihad in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.
- 7) The detainee stated he agreed to join the volunteers in Afghanistan in May 2001. The detainee obtained his friend's passport to travel.
- 8) The detainee stated that an individual helped falsify the passport by substituting a photo of the detainee in place of the detainee's friend. The individual also obtained a forged visa for a three-month stay in Pakistan.
- 9) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to obtain jihad training in preparation for combat in Chechnya.
- 10) The detainee stated he arrived in Islamabad, Pakistan and contacted an associate of the head of the Algerian Training Camp outside of Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee and the associate then traveled together to the Algerian guest house in Jalalabad.
- 11) The Algerian guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan is known to have hosted an explosives course. The course involved training on the theory of electronic circuitry involved in explosives.
- 12) The detainee stated he attended the Algerian Training Camp. The camp was shut down while the detainee was there, so the detainee was sent to Kandahar, Afghanistan to attend the al Farouq Training Camp.
- 13) The al Farouq training camp was an al Qaida camp that provided a general program consisting of a fundamental or basic course lasting 40 days. This course consisted of a basic review of relevant military topics.
- 14) The detainee stated he saw Usama bin Laden speak approximately ten times while at al Farouq.
- 15) The detainee stated that after completing training at al Farouq, he traveled to the Moroccan Training Camp, aka Tarik Camp, in Bagram, Afghanistan.
- 16) The detainee stated that once training at Tarik Camp was complete, he was sent to the front lines in Bagram, Afghanistan.
- 17) The detainee stated that while staying at the Moroccan house in Kabul, Afghanistan, he discussed an explosives camp, called the Turkish Camp, with Richard Reid who was later convicted of attempting to detonate a shoe bomb on an airplane. The detainee and

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Richard Reid decided to go to the camp, which was located outside Bagram, Afghanistan.

- 18) The detainee stated that while he was in Khowst, Afghanistan, he joined a group of volunteers who were heading to Kandahar, Afghanistan to fight.
- 19) The detainee stated he met both a senior al Qaida lieutenant and Jose Padilla at a guest house in Bermil, Afghanistan. The detainee spoke privately with the al Qaida lieutenant, who told the detainee that the detainee's purpose was to train Afghans how to build explosive devices. If the Afghans did not build the devices, the detainee was to assist in building them.
- 20) The detainee stated a senior al Qaida lieutenant promised him remote control explosives training in Pakistan. The detainee was then to return to Afghanistan to train Afghans on how to build the devices. The detainee was told that the remote control devices would be used for booby traps, mines, and other improvised or homemade explosive devices.
- 21) The detainee stated he and the convicted al Qaida terrorist Jose Padilla traveled to meet with a senior al Qaida operative to discuss their plan. The detainee and Jose Padilla also met with one of Usama bin Laden's closest associates during the trip.
- 22) The detainee stated the senior al Qaida operative tasked the detainee and the convicted al Qaida terrorist with studying the feasibility of an alternative operation in which they would set fire to a hotel or gas station in the United States. The plan was dropped and the operative instead directed the convicted terrorist to devise a plan to destroy a building with explosives in the Central United States. The detainee was tasked to build the detonator. The plan initially involved blowing up 20 buildings simultaneously, but was scaled down to two to three buildings.
- 23) The detainee stated that following the meeting with the al Qaida operative, the detainee and the convicted al Qaida terrorist were taught how to falsify travel documents. Later in the day, another senior al Qaida operative taught the detainee and the convicted terrorist how to encode phone numbers to pass to others covertly.
- 24) The detainee stated he surrendered his passport to a senior al Qaida planner. The senior al Qaida planner falsified the passport and provided the detainee with money. The detainee then met with the senior al Qaida operative, the al Qaida planner, and the convicted al Qaida terrorist, and exchanged contact information. The detainee attempted to leave the country using his airline tickets, but security officers detained him when they realized he had falsified documents. The detainee was released the next day after he told the officials he was a Mujahedin.

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- 25) The detainee stated he then met with the senior al Qaida planner a second time to have his passport falsified again.
 - 26) The detainee stated that on 9 April 2002, he attempted to travel, but was again arrested due to possessing falsified travel documents. The detainee was transferred to police custody in Karachi, Pakistan. During the interrogation and subsequent investigation, the detainee's true identity, membership to al Qaida, and dirty bomb plot were revealed.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated that while at the Algerian camp, he received training in weapons, physical activity, and prayer. The weapons training included instruction on all aspects of the DSHK anti-aircraft weapon, the Zukiyak AAA, Grenon, Kalashnikov, Makarov, PK, RPG, shotgun, Tokarev handgun, and M-16.
 - 2) The detainee stated that while at al Farouq, he received 40 days of paramilitary training that focused on light arms handling, explosives, and principles of topography. Religious talks were given by a senior al Qaida member who urged the volunteers to pledge their allegiance to Usama bin Laden. The detainee expected to pledge bayat to bin Laden when he visited the camp, but the occasion did not present itself due to the increased number of volunteers who wanted to pledge bayat.
 - 3) The detainee stated the Tarik Camp focused on city warfare. The typical training at Tarik consisted of ten days of pistol training, ten days of Kalashnikov training, and ten days of room-to-room training. The detainee's training group only attended the camp for ten days because the camp lacked the weapons with which to train.
 - 4) The detainee stated that while at the Turkish Camp, he was trained in detonators, explosive compounds, and homemade bombs. The training consisted of both classroom and practical applications.
 - 5) The detainee stated the senior al Qaida lieutenant ordered the detainee to stay in Bannu, Pakistan to receive additional explosives training. An individual visited the detainee at the house for two days and instructed the detainee in the creation of explosives and operation of remote-controlled detonators.
- c) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee was identified as having stated that America was the enemy and even if he was released, the United States would remain a big enemy. The detainee vowed to seek revenge against American and British interests upon release.

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- 2) The detainee stated he knew he was guilty and wished to bring his case to a peaceful resolution.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detainee stated he initially came to Afghanistan to leave his drug habit. The detainee had recently converted to Islam and saw leaving England as the only way to better himself.
 - b) The detainee claimed he did not swear bayat to Usama bin Laden because he did not fully understand the meaning of bayat and did not want to be under the control of al Qaida. The detainee stated that after he declined swearing bayat at al Farouq, the guards suspected the detainee was a spy.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 December 2007

To: GULAM RABBANI, ABU RAHIM MOULANA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GULAM RABBANI, ABU RAHIM MOULANA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he was arrested in 1988 in Medinah, Saudi Arabia for selling over 50 video cassette recorders and sentenced to two years in jail. In 1997, the detainee was again arrested in Medinah and charged with stealing hashish and heroin and again sentenced to two years jail time.
 - 2) The detainee stated after his release from his 1997 jail conviction his brother motivated and convinced him to go to Afghanistan to learn how to use weapons.
 - 3) The detainee stated he went to Bagram, Afghanistan after leaving Khalden Camp, where he remained for three months. The detainee stated he later returned to Karachi, Pakistan where he visited with and helped care for wounded al Qaida fighters.
 - 4) The detainee stated he cooked at safe houses and eventually began transporting individuals to al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan. He would travel to and from Afghanistan with a senior al Qaida operative and deliver letters and equipment from Pakistan to al Qaida members in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he delivered letters from the senior al Qaida operative directly to Usama bin Laden on four separate occasions.

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- 5) The detainee stated a senior al Qaida lieutenant tasked him to rent and live in several safe houses. The detainee stated he rented houses throughout mid-2000 until September 11th, 2002 when Pakistani authorities conducted a raid on his house. The detainee stated he lived with a senior al Qaida operative.
 - 6) The detainee was a manager of several guest houses for Mujahedin in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee was a Karachi-based facilitator who was well known to all the Mujahedin, including al Qaida. The detainee could assist with travel and housing arrangements. Senior al Qaida members stayed at various guest houses run by the detainee.
 - 7) The detainee stated a senior al Qaida operative came to his apartment and dropped off a package containing a large number of the electronic devices in early June 2002. The detainee described the devices as small black boxes to be used in attacks. The detainee stated he was directed by the senior al Qaida operative to put 15 of the devices in a bag and to take them a bus stop in Karachi, Pakistan where he would meet an unidentified man and give them to him. Approximately one week after passing the 15 devices to the unidentified man, the senior al Qaida operative directed the detainee to take another bag of the devices to a man who would meet him in Karachi, Pakistan. During raids conducted between September 9th and 11th, 2002 in Karachi, Pakistan, authorities recovered detonating devices from the detainee's house. The devices were recovered from a room in the safe house in which a number of personal effects, including family photos and letters, belonging to the senior al Qaida operative and a bundle of wrapped passports, most of which were valid passports belonging to the wives and children of Usama bin Laden.
 - 8) The detainee was part of a cell that was tasked to purchase cars, conduct casing of hotels, and purchase and build explosive devices to be used in car bomb attacks against United States troops.
 - 9) The detainee stated he harbored three of the September 11, 2001 hijackers briefly at a home in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee also stated he provided safe houses and logistical support to al Qaida operatives in Karachi, Pakistan from approximately early 2000 through September 2002.
 - 10) The detainee stated that he has either operated or resided at six different safe houses in Karachi, Pakistan with a senior al Qaida operative.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he had two months of training at the Khalden al Qaida training camp. The detainee stated he was trained on 11 types of weapons, which included the AK-47,

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PK machine gun, ZK-1 mortar, and rocket propelled grenades.

c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he was brought to Kandahar, Afghanistan by his brother in mid-2000 and briefly met Usama bin Laden and another senior al Qaida leader. He was then sent to the Khalden Camp near Khowst, Afghanistan for military training. Shortly after starting training, the detainee was thrown out of the camp for violating the rules. The detainee stated after being kicked out of the Khalden al Qaida training camp he returned to Karachi, Pakistan where he was introduced to another senior al Qaida operative.
- 2) The detainee attended meetings to deliver numerous items to Usama bin Laden from a senior al Qaida lieutenant. He delivered items such as food, computers, clothing, and holy water from Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
- 3) The detainee stated he met a senior al Qaida operative at a mosque in Karachi, Pakistan for a prearranged secret meeting. The detainee stated the al Qaida operative passed the detainee a package during the meeting that contained a large number of individually wrapped passports and instructed the detainee to safeguard them.
- 4) The detainee stated he worked closely with a senior al Qaida operative to coordinate support to Arabs who were being harbored in safe houses within Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated he was a trusted assistant of the senior al Qaida operative.
- 5) The detainee stated he was in the company of Usama bin Laden during several meetings with other al Qaida leadership. This happened in either May or June of 2001. The detainee also stated that he spoke with a senior al Qaida operative who spoke about different types of training, such as grenade training, that he wanted the detainee to attend.
- 6) The detainee stated he has met Usama bin Laden approximately 10-12 times.

d) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee stated he was captured in September 2002 during raids conducted against a series of al Qaida safe houses in Karachi, Pakistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he has never sworn bayat to al Qaida.
 - b) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or

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plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests. The detainee denied any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.

c) The detainee stated he did tell the Federal Bureau of Investigation he met Usama bin Laden, but the only reason he said it was because he was scared. The detainee stated he made the story up.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

08 January 2008

To: RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD GHULAM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD GHULAM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated that he was a senior al Qaida operative's assistant and was responsible for running safe houses.
 - 2) The detainee joined al Qaida while in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 1996.
 - 3) The detainee further stated that in the fall of 1997, he left the Khalden Camp with a group and traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to meet with Usama bin Laden.
 - 4) The detainee stated that after the East Africa Embassy bombings in August 1998, there was greater demand for his help in obtaining goods in Karachi, Pakistan, and transporting people and items to Afghanistan. The detainee also stated he became famous within Mujahedin circles in Pakistan and Afghanistan for being dependable because he spoke both Urdu and Arabic.
 - 5) The detainee stated that in 1998, Usama bin Laden instructed him to take a support role in assisting al Qaida fighters moving between Karachi, Pakistan, and Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee also stated he would sometimes act as a translator between the fighters and Usama bin Laden.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RABBANI, MOHAMMED AHMAD GHULAM

- 6) The detainee was identified as a recruiter of personnel for the jihad movement in 1999. The detainee was identified as traveling from Karachi, Pakistan to Afghanistan with another jihadist to receive firearms training.
- 7) The detainee took the same jihadist he recruited to al Qaida's Khalden training camp in 1998, explaining that it was mandatory religious training. The detainee and the recruit traveled from Karachi, Pakistan to a Taliban-affiliated guesthouse in Quetta, Pakistan. From Quetta, they traveled through Kandahar, Kabul and Khowst, Afghanistan, before reaching the Khalden training camp.
- 8) The detainee stated that in the late 1990's, he traveled to Afghanistan and worked for an individual who told the detainee to rent a house using Mujahedin money. The house was located in Karachi, Pakistan, and was run as an al Qaida guesthouse.
- 9) The detainee stated that in 2000 and 2001, his work as a travel facilitator for al Qaida increased as did his responsibilities to run the safe house.
- 10) The detainee stated it was through driving his taxi in an area of Karachi, Pakistan, known as Greentown, that he started his relationship with the Mujahedin. The detainee stated he was neither directed to drive a taxi nor help the Mujahedin, but did so because he wanted to.
- 11) The detainee stated that in July 2001, he helped with the move of Usama bin Laden's and his family to the Tora Bora region in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he assisted by obtaining food and construction material to fortify Tora Bora cave complexes.
- 12) The detainee stated he would often drive and accompany Mujahedin to their doctor appointments and operated in that capacity until the end of 2001. The detainee also stated he performed lots of jobs for the Mujahedin, including: buying supplies; taking Mujahedin to the airport; taking Mujahedin to hotels or safe houses; or couriering bags.
- 13) The detainee stated he operated a safe house in Pakistan for sick and injured Mujahedin coming out of Afghanistan. The detainee also stated that after 11 September 2001, the guesthouse he ran for sick and injured Mujahedin was also used to house Mujahedin fleeing United States Forces.
- 14) The detainee was working in hospitals and attending to injured al Qaida fighters.
- 15) The detainee stated he facilitated travel from Karachi, Pakistan, for roughly 50 or 60 al Qaida Arabs once the Coalition Forces air strikes against al Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan ceased in December 2001. The detainee also stated he received funding and

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instructions for his facilitation activities directly from senior al Qaida contacts.

- 16) The detainee stated he facilitated communications between senior al Qaida members and the groups of relatively junior Arabs who were to travel from Karachi, Pakistan, to other countries in December 2001.
- 17) The detainee was tasked in March 2002, with purchasing cars; conducting surveillance of hotels; and, purchasing and building explosive devices in support of a car bomb attack. The car bomb attack would target hotels in Karachi, Pakistan, where large numbers of United State troops were housed on a regular basis.
- 18) The detainee lived in a safe house he ran in Karachi, Pakistan, prior to his capture in September 2002.

b) Training

- 1) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan for training in 1994 and 1995 and also trained in a Pakistani camp where Kashmiri fighters were also training. The detainee also stated the Arabs at the camp sent the Kashiris to the Khalden Camp and the detainee was sent along as a translator.
- 2) Students received training in the following areas at the Khalden Camp: Kalashnikov and other automatic weapons, such as the American M16, German G13, and the Israeli light and heavy Uzi; mortars, such as the M40, M1, M12, and 82 and 75MM cannons; special courses, such as explosives; topography, tactical and first aid instruction. The training at the camp lasted approximately seven to eight months.
- 3) The detainee had five months of training in a camp, including instruction in weapons, explosives, and tactics.

c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee was the personal driver for a senior al Qaida leader in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee sometimes drove the senior al Qaida leader around in a taxi as a cover story.
- 2) The detainee met with senior al Qaida leaders on a regular basis.
- 3) The detainee stated he was a guest at the January 2001 wedding of Usama bin Laden's son in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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- 4) The detainee stated he had a chance to meet with and briefly talk to Usama bin Laden during his stay in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
 - 5) The detainee stated he met with Usama bin Laden on six or seven occasions and they usually talked about developments in Pakistan.
 - 6) The detainee possibly knows the general location of Usama bin Laden whereabouts. The detainee was a messenger between senior al Qaida leaders and Usama bin Laden.
 - 7) The detainee stated he was informed of Usama bin Laden's move to the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan by the same al Qaida operative who was responsible for the USS Cole bombing.
 - 8) The detainee stated that in early or mid 2001, he visited Afghanistan and met with another senior al Qaida leader who in turn offered the detainee a job finding and renting a two-story house in Karachi, Pakistan.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated that in approximately 1998, he attempted to purchase a false passport and visa for travel to Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
 - 2) The detainee stated that there were 10 Mujahedin still operating in the United States for every operative arrested by United States authorities. The detainee also stated he knew al Qaida leaders were actively planning terrorist attacks in the United States using American citizens as the operatives.
 - 3) During raids conducted between 9 and 11 September 2002 in Karachi, Pakistan, authorities discovered remote detonating devices at a house used by the detainee.
 - 4) The detainee stated everything he stated previously was a lie and that the only reason he talked before was because his interrogators brought him snacks, food and water.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denies ever being a recruiter or anything other than a taxi driver.
 - b) The detainee denied that he had any first hand information regarding any planned al Qaida attacks. The detainee stated that he would like to be free again and promised not to return to fighting if he is released.

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5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 December 2007

To: MANFUD, SABIR LAHMAR

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MANFUD, SABIR LAHMAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he attended the Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia, from 1992 to 1996. The detainee received his degree in Islamic Jurist Prudence and Sharia law. The detainee stated he got a job offer to teach the Arabic language in Bosnia from the Saudi High Commission for Relief who came to recruit at the campus. The detainee flew to Sarajevo, Bosnia, from Medina, Saudi Arabia via Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Zagreb, Croatia.
 - 2) The detainee stated that in the fall of 1997, his first assignment for the Saudi High Commission for Relief was in Mostar, Bosnia, and then he transferred to Zenica, Bosnia.
 - 3) The Saudi High Commission for Relief in Bosnia had a big role in missionary, humanitarian and jihad activities.
 - 4) The detainee was a key officer in the Saudi High Commission for Refugees and was a suspected Armed Islamic Group member.
 - 5) The Armed Islamic Group is an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group is known for frequent attacks against civilians and government workers. This group uses

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assassinations and bombings, including car bombs.

- 6) The detainee was a former Bosnian and Afghan Mujahedin and a suspected Armed Islamic Group member. The detainee was vehemently anti-western and an Islamic extremist. The detainee applied for an Iranian visa so that he could travel to Afghanistan on 27 September 2001.
 - 7) The detainee was identified as being in a shootout with Bosnian police in 1997 at the time of his arrest. In 1997, the detainee was sentenced to five years in prison for his role in explosions that occurred in 1997 in Mostar, Bosnia. In 2000, after two years of incarceration, he was released from prison.
 - 8) The detainee stated that after his release in 1999, he returned to work for the Saudi High Commission in Sarajevo, Bosnia, as a supervisor of the library and also taught Arabic.
 - 9) The detainee supported the fatwa issued by Usama bin Laden against the United States.
 - 10) The detainee was identified as being weak in the area of firearms so the detainee asked a friend for assistance in honing his skills. The detainee was identified as looking for a suitable target and when he found an American to attack, the detainee was identified as saying that the fact that the target was American was even better reason to attack him.
- b) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee was identified as someone who associated with organizations which are directly linked to terrorist activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These organizations provided support to persons known to be involved in terrorist activities.
 - 2) The detainee was an Armed Islamic Group member who stated that attacks should be carried out against American troops in Bosnia because the detainee believed the United States was the number one enemy of Islam.
 - 3) According to North Atlantic Treaty Organization Stabilization Forces, al Haramayn is directly tied to terrorist activities in the Bosnia-Herzegovina area, and provides shelter and support to persons known to have committed terrorist activities.
 - 4) The detainee had a friend who was under investigation for assisting terrorists.

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- 5) The detainee was identified as being frequently visited by an associate of al Haramayn. The associate was identified as orchestrating the detonation of a car bomb in Mostar, Bosnia in 1997.
 - 6) The detainee was identified as knowing about the 11 September 2001 attacks before they occurred, and was also involved in Usama bin Laden's council that planned the attacks.
 - 7) The detainee was identified as associating with the al Ber Foundation. The source stated the al Ber Foundation sympathized with the Mujahedin and the call for jihad. The al Ber Foundation provided the Mujahedin with weapons, established training camps throughout Bosnia and maintained an office in Bosnia, in late 2000.
- c) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee is listed as an individual that is directly linked to terrorist activities or could be linked with terrorist activities in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
 - 2) The detainee expressed a desire to blow up American soldiers because they were enemies of God and blamed Americans for everything wrong.
 - 3) The detainee was identified as a close associate of an individual who was in charge of coordinating and carrying out terrorist attacks that were supposed to take place after 11 September 2001. The individual was in contact with Abu Zubaydah and was to become chief of operations for Usama bin Laden's terrorist network in case of Usama bin Laden's death or arrest.
 - 4) The detainee was arrested in 1998 for beating and robbing an American man in Bosnia. The American was a military instructor.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he has not worked for al Haramayn and knows no one who worked for al Haramayn.
 - b) The detainee denied he was affiliated with al Qaida.
 - c) The detainee stated he did not know anyone affiliated with al Qaida and denied having telephone conversations with anyone and later learning they were affiliated with al Qaida.
 - d) The detainee denied he ever supported Usama bin Laden's fatwa against American troops in Bosnia.

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- e) The detainee stated he did not know of any telephone communications that would link him and the five other Algerians who were also arrested.
 - f) The detainee stated he never planned to attack the American embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and had no knowledge of any such attack.
 - g) The detainee denied being a member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group.
 - h) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

13 December 2007

To: NECHLA, MUHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLA, MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he unsuccessfully attempted to obtain his bachelor's degree and then decided to work with his father in the fruit business from 1988 to 1990. The detainee stated that he left Algeria in 1990 due to political and economic problems. The detainee stated he decided to go to Pakistan after reading advertisements for educated individuals to work with different charity organizations. The detainee stated he traveled from Algeria through Tunisia, Moscow, Russia, and Karachi, Pakistan before arriving in Peshawar, Pakistan in November 1990. While in Pakistan, he enrolled at the Yemeni institute and obtained a degree in 1992 certifying him as an Arabic language instructor.
 - 2) The detainee stated he lost his job in Peshawar, Pakistan at the end of 1992, and traveled to the Philippines at the beginning of 1993 since non-government organizations were looking for Arabic instructors. The detainee traveled to Manila, Philippines and was offered a job as an Arabic teacher for nine months at a school named Emissa in Marawi, Philippines.
 - 3) The detainee stated he paid for his own travel from Pakistan to Philippines and taught the Arabic language. The detainee also paid for his travel from the Philippines to Albania.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLA, MUHAMMED

- 4) The detainee stated he traveled to Albania in late 1994 and worked as a supervisor for Bin Hamoodah, an Abu Dhabi based organization in Fere, Albania. The detainee stated he married an Algerian in late 1995. In late 1996, Bin Hamoodah merged with the Red Crescent, another Abu Dhabi based organization. When the civil war in Albania started in 1997, the detainee asked Red Crescent to transfer him to Bosnia Herzegovina, because he feared for his family's life.
 - 5) The Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates was identified as a state run international relief organization.
 - 6) The detainee stated there were several non-governmental organizations that operated in Bosnia, however, he did not associate with employees of non-governmental organizations since the Red Crescent is a governmental organization.
 - 7) The detainee was a suspected member of the Armed Islamic Group. The detainee and two others were arrested on 19 October 2001 by Bosnian authorities.
 - 8) The detainee stated his tenure with the Red Crescent ended in Bosnia when the authorities accused him of being a terrorist. The detainee stated he was incarcerated for three months prior to being released to the custody of United States authorities.
- b) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee was a suspected terrorist with ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group. The detainee was also suspected of having links to Usama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist organization.
 - 2) The detainee was identified by the government of Bosnia Herzegovina as a supporter of terrorist groups in Africa. The detainee was arrested and charged with threatening the security of the United States and British missions in Bosnia, and is wanted by the Algerian government on charges of terrorism.
- c) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated he decided to leave the Philippines because there was not an Algerian Embassy in Manila, Philippines and was afraid his passport would expire.
 - 2) The detainee stated his passport was issued on 14 October 1990, in Laghovat, Algeria and had an expiration date of 13 October 1995, and listed the detainee's profession as a

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLA, MUHAMMED

student. The detainee's passport contained multiple entry and exit stamps from Zagreb, Croatia, the Embassy of Pakistan in Algiers, Algeria and Peshawar, Pakistan, Tunisia, and the Philippines.

- 3) The detainee stated he was known as Sharaf al Din while living in Bosnia, because his real name has a strange meaning in Serbo-Croatian language.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
 - a) The detainee stated he did not have any knowledge of any plans to attack the United States prior to September 11, 2001, and denied any knowledge of rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - b) The detainee stated he was a clean person and that there was no reason for him to be detained.
 - c) The detainee stated it would be impossible for him to hurt anyone and he is not a terrorist and that he does not know any terrorists.
 - d) The detainee stated he has never been approached by anyone for recruitment into any terrorist organization. The detainee stated he was unaware of any plans to attack the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia, and is unaware of the location of the United States Embassy in Sarajevo.
 - e) The detainee stated he was not involved with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group.
 - f) The detainee stated the Bosnian government was lying if they accused him of being a Mujahedin and that there was no evidence.
 - g) The detainee stated he was wrongly accused of being involved in a terrorist plot against the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina.
 - h) The detainee stated he does not know if Usama bin Laden ever visited Sarajevo, Bosnia Herzegovina and that he has never seen or met Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he wants to burn Usama bin Laden alive if he is ever found, for causing him to be detained for the last year.
 - i) The detainee stated he has always hated terrorists, because terrorists had killed his aunt and had killed many of his friends.

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NECHLA, MUHAMMED

j) The detainee stated he has never had a problem with the Algerian government and that he has no enemies and can think of nobody who would want to frame him. The detainee stated there were some who were jealous of his job with Red Crescent and that people are always jealous of those with good jobs.

k) The detainee stated he knows of no Mujahedin currently active in either Bosnia Herzegovina or Algeria.

l) The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan or participating in any form of military training.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 December 2007

To: BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
 - a) Commitment
 - 1) The detainee stated he traveled to Pakistan in October or November 1990.
 - 2) The detainee stated he was employed by the Lejnat al Dawa Non-Governmental Organization in Peshawar, Pakistan from 1990 to 1993.
 - 3) The detainee stated he was arrested in 1999 when he returned to Algeria because he had been to Pakistan. The detainee stated he told Algerian authorities he went to Pakistan to help the Afghan refugees and orphans, and that he worked at the Islamic Hira Institute in Babi, Pakistan.
 - 4) The Hira Institute in Peshawar, Pakistan was identified as being funded by the Lejnat al Dawa al Islamia Non-Governmental Organization.
 - 5) The detainee was on a list of suspected terrorists who may have had ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and al Qaida.
 - 6) The detainee was a suspected Armed Islamic Group member.
 - 7) The Islamic Armed Group is as an Islamic extremist group that aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Islamic Armed Group

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

began its violent activity in 1992.

- 8) The detainee had Arabic language documents with the letterhead of Lajnat al Dawa al Islamiah when he was arrested. The documents stated the detainee worked as an administrator for Lajnat al Dawa in Peshawar, Pakistan from 1 March 1993 through 24 May 1993. The document was signed by Lajnat al Dawa's regional manager and the brother of a senior al Qaida lieutenant.
- 9) The detainee had photocopies of an article detailing an attack against the United States Information Service Office in Pristina, Kosovo in August 1998.

b) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he knew an individual who came to the detainee on three separate occasions seeking money while the detainee was working at the non-governmental organization in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The detainee stated he paid 500 Deutsche Marks to the individual's attorney when the individual was arrested on a previous charge in Bosnia.
- 2) The individual in the previous statement was arrested by Bosnian authorities on 8 October 2001 for criminal acts and involvement in threats against the United States Embassy in Sarajevo. Bosnian authorities also called for the investigation and arrest of the detainee for his involvement in these threats.
- 3) The detainee was a former Bosnian Mujahedin and was known to be a close associate of the individual in the previous statements. The detainee had planned to go to Afghanistan and join the individual as soon as arrangements were set up for the detainee's travel.
- 4) The detainee stated he was arrested in Bosnia in October 2001. The detainee stated he was arrested with three other individuals.
- 5) The detainee stated he knew the three individuals with whom he was arrested for between two and seven years.

c) Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he paid 5000 Deutsche Marks to illegally obtain his Bosnian citizenship in 1998. The detainee stated he knew it was illegal because in order to be eligible for Bosnian citizenship he was supposed to have lived in Bosnia for five years.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BOUMEDIENE, LAKHDAR

- a) The detainee stated he had no association with Taliban or al Qaida forces. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
 - b) The detainee stated he went to Pakistan for monetary reasons. The detainee stated he never went to Afghanistan and never had any dealings with the Mujahedin who were fighting against Russians and Afghani communists.
 - c) The detainee stated he was unaware of the charges accusing him of being involved in a plot to blow up the United States Embassy and denied being involved in any plot to blow up the United States Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The detainee stated he is not a member of al Qaida or the Armed Islamic Group. The detainee stated he knows no one in the Armed Islamic Group, nor does he want to. He has heard of the organization in the newspapers and he considers it an epidemic. The detainee indicated he has never been approached by any members of the Armed Islamic Group.
 - d) The detainee stated he never wished to meet a man who would perpetrate such horrific acts against humanity like the terrorist actions perpetrated by Usama bin Laden. The detainee state he did not support Usama bin Laden's manipulation of Islam to gather support for his actions. The detainee stated that if he was released, he would return to Algeria or Bosnia to be with his family.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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