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WITHDRAWAL ID 017133

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation

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House, Midrasha, Tel Aviv, Saturday,
August 23, 1975, 9:00 - 9:50 p.m.

CREATION DATE 08/23/1975

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REPORTS ON USSR, CHINA, AND MIDDLE EAST
DISCUSSIONS

BOX NUMBER 4

FOLDER TITLE August 21 - September 1, 1975 - Sinai
Disengagement Agreement - Vol. I (4)

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~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Israel: Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister
 Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
 Minister for Foreign Affairs
 Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
 Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to U. S.
 Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of
 Staff, IDF
 Amos Eran, Director of Prime Minister's
 Office

U. S.: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
 and Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
 for Political Affairs
 Malcolm Toon, U. S. Ambassador to Israel
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
 of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
 Affairs
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *OWR*

DATE & TIME: Saturday - August 23, 1975
 9:50 - 11:55 p. m.

PLACE: The Guest House, Midrasha
 Tel Aviv



[Following dinner, the group moved downstairs to the office.]

Rabin: First, the name. It cannot be another disengagement agreement.

How do you want to proceed? Better that you tell us. I suggest a short meeting now, and we meet tomorrow in the afternoon.

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*
 E.O. 12958, 50 USC 3605 9/18/03

NSO MEMO, 10/24/00, 10/24/00, 10/24/00, 10/24/00
HR 10/19/03
~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (3)
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. To Det.

Kissinger: What time tomorrow?

Rabin: Five o'clock.

Kissinger: Five?

Rabin: Four o'clock.

Kissinger: Four. In any case we'll go to Egypt Monday morning and be back here Monday evening. Then we'll go to Saudi Arabia Wednesday.

First, on the discussions with the Egyptians, my overall impression is that they want an agreement, and will extend themselves to do it. I warned Sadat that if this agreement were followed by a crisis in the Middle East, or an explosion, it would have serious consequences for our whole relationship with the Arabs. And he said he wanted it in part because he thought it would transform the atmosphere in the area -- for whatever that is worth.

We discussed almost exclusively the northern part. We did not get into much discussion on the corridor. First I told them that it was in both parties' interest, in my view, not to raise issues that were politically so difficult that even if they could be done by either side they would present unmanageable or serious long-term problems. I put the Beta Line into that category.

But we first discussed the Passes. Have you got a map here?

Peres: How did you find Sadat? Did you find him in a good mood?

Kissinger: I thought he was not in the best physical shape. He was in a reasonably good mood, but in my view, not in good physical shape. [To Sisco:] Did you?

Sisco: I thought he looked pretty good.

Kissinger: Well, at dinner he didn't.

On the passes, I showed him your line on the map. We showed him the aerial maps because they couldn't tell from the map what it was. Gamasy denied that this was out of the passes in either place, and he was quite eloquent about that. Of course, in the Giddi he said it is absolutely



ridiculous. In the Mitla he says that on all Egyptian maps they show it out here. [The Secretary takes out an aerial map and indicates.] At a minimum he said here [indicating]. I am talking now about Gamasy. On the Giddi, well, they say the earliest you can reasonably say it is out of the passes is here, down there [indicating]. And they say it is all total nonsense because as long as you are sitting up there you cover that whole area anyway. I am quoting Gamasy.

Rabin: Where is our line?

Peres: Where is Parker?

Kissinger: The forward line is about here. The Parker Memorial none of the Egyptians ever heard of.

Peres: True.

Kissinger: Was he an Israeli tank commander named Parker? [Laughter] At any rate, they asked us where the Parker Memorial is, and we said we think it is about here [indicating]

Peres: Let's not be confused by maps.

Kissinger: I then made the point that on the Giddi it was my impression that it might be possible for Israel to go back to where -- I want this map because I want to show you on this where they want their station [referring to map on wall] -- to where the face of the mountain turns off to the north.

Rabin: In the Giddi.

Kissinger: In the Giddi. Since I don't know exactly where it is, I figured it was about here [indicating].

Peres: It is farther west.

Rabin: Where the cliff turns to the north.

Kissinger: Here. And I said in my judgment it is about near that green line, either just before or just after. That green line is a road, not a line.

Gur: This is a road. The red one is a road. This is a certain way up on the cliff.



Kissinger: All I am saying is that on this map that green line doesn't show a line but a road.

Gur: That is the cliff, the rock that turns north.

Kissinger: So I told him wherever it turns north, and I couldn't draw it exactly, about 500 yards from where you were, it was my impression you might be willing to go.

Gamasy says among military men there can be no dispute about where the exit of the Giddi pass is, that there can be a certain dispute about where the exit of the Mitla pass is. And he said it is total nonsense because as long as Israel controls this ridge it controls everything along here too. I am just quoting what he said. And they are not contesting your controlling this ridge. So [to them] it is simply a political maneuver to make it impossible for them to say that you are out of the Giddi pass on the road. I am trying to report as accurately as I can.

I then talked to Sadat privately, and I said, "Look, if we argue about every hundred yards in both passes we will be here three weeks. Can you find a solution to it?" He said: "The solution is to let you say the end of the Mitla pass is wherever it is. If you say it is there, we will accept it. We will say that is the geographical determination, and that is a confused area." But he cannot accept the Giddi exit where it is, because no sane person will accept that that is a reasonable description of the end of the Giddi Pass. Gamasy hasn't accepted it yet, but Sadat told me he will accept that when I come back and tell him I have checked with my geographer and that is a reasonable definition of the end of the Mitla Pass, he will accept it. But he said: "I can't do it in the Giddi Pass, because I will be the laughing stock of everyone in the Arab world if I do that."

So that is where we are on the pass. Though I think I would recommend something further west.

Now let's go to the Beta Line. I told him I had the impression that the Beta Line was a matter of great political importance to Israel and would create very serious problems politically and symbolically in Israel. He said if the other things can be dealt with satisfactorily, he will accept the major part of the Beta Line -- all of this, incidentally, to the visible displeasure of his Vice President, Mubarek.



[The Secretary gets up to a hanging map.] What Gamasy is very eager for is something up here [indicating on the map], just a very short thing up here to straighten out that bend [on the Mediterranean coast]. And Sadat said if he can get something here [in the dip near the Bitter Lakes] it would help him, but he isn't bleeding on the barricades for it. He says if he accepts the Beta Line, he would appreciate some generosity in adjusting your line somewhat, primarily in this area [indicating].

Allon: Exactly opposite the Refidim Airfield.

Kissinger: I am just telling you. He did not draw a line. Down here [in the southern line to the corridor] he says you can afford to be generous because it's total nonsense. There is nothing in that mountain range and no road into it. You have a road back there. And he says if he leaves you in the Beta Line you ought to straighten out this line a little bit or as much as you possibly can, just to make it look better. It doesn't do him a lot of good, and Gamasy claims it doesn't do you any good. He says there is nothing in it. You wouldn't be in there; they wouldn't go in there. They can't go anywhere from there. I am repeating the argument as best I can.


With respect to Umm Khisheiba, they agree now to Israeli manning with an American presence. Israeli management, with an American presence.

Sisco: Israeli operation, not management, not that it makes any difference.

Kissinger: Israeli operation, but technically American management. Technically an American station but everything in it would be done by Israelis. No dispute about that.

Allon: The same applies to the Egyptian station?

Kissinger: The same applies to the Egyptian station. With the Egyptian station they said their first preference had been to put it here somewhere [in the passes area]. But they can't do that when you haven't given them any mountain from which they can see anything, which isn't within a hundred yards from yours, which would present insuperable problems during construction, and so on. So they want to put it in this area [indicating]. They say there is a hill in here, about a kilometer or two, they didn't know exactly; they are going to give us the coordinates. In fact, they did give them to us, but they were garbled.



Sisco: The damn telegram was garbled.

Kissinger: [to Gur:] You must know where it is. [to Rabin:] At one point I proposed as my own idea: "Why don't you put something here and maybe let the Israelis keep Umm Kasheiba in their line?" And Sadat was sort of intrigued by this, but Gamasy said no, because you will then fortify this. And secondly, from back there, I said: "In my judgment of the Israelis"-- I wasn't authorized to say anything --"they will never let you have this crossroads."

Rabin: You are right.


Kissinger: And from behind the crossroads they said they can't see anything. So from this, since I said it has to be electronically useful, they said they can look down this way and up this way. That may not fill you with overwhelming joy. They want it about here. You will know where it is. You must know the hill, about here a kilometer or two, he didn't know exactly, north of this road.

Sisco: The Secretary at that point made your point that it had to be off the road.

Kissinger: Off the East-West road. And I told them no arms would be at this place except personal arms and it couldn't be fortified.

We had a long and passionate discussion on the subject. And they say the idea of the stations is that they will be accused of having brought American bases there. They said the Israeli station can be a U.S. station but their station ought to be a UN station. I turned it down. They have now accepted that their station should be a U.S. station, but that takes time. So these two stations, except for the location, which you have to tell us, are accepted by them as nationally operated, technically U.S.

With respect to the American presence, six stations he said is totally out of the question. My judgment is that with respect to the American stations he is at the same point as he was with Umm Khisheiba before this trip. I think he will agree to it. He has not yet said yes but I explained to him in great detail how they might work, how they might be presented. And what he would like -- that was without having accepted it -- he said for them it would be easiest if this all related to the Umm Khisheiba complex as outposts of Umm Khisheiba rather than as a series of separate stations.



I think you should operate on the assumption that if everything else is reasonable, this will not be an obstacle. He has not yet authorized me to say yes, but in order to save time I think we should assume that he will accept some stations, with the number yet to be determined. But not six.

Rabin: Not six manned.

Sisco: That's right.

Kissinger: Yes, not six manned.

Now, to sum it up, I think on the Beta Line, Gamasy can certainly be kept happy by giving something up there, and substantially nothing, except maybe if you want to do something generous in here, that is a question.

I think we can get him to accept the Beta Line substantially unchanged.

I can get him to accept the Mitla Pass by going back and saying I have checked with our geographer and we have come to the determination that this is a possible definition of the exit of the Pass.

He will not accept the Giddi even plus 500 yards. So here I would think you would have to do something.

He'd like an adjustment in your line [south of the passes] here which he says is not significant. He'd like an adjustment here [in the Giddi] which he admits significant which he admits means something. He admits that here. Down here he wants it primarily to make it look...

Peres: You didn't yet suggest the fall-back position?

Kissinger: I indicated to him, yes. Because at this session I had to speed this thing up. And so he is talking beyond the fallback position. The Chief of Staff... Well, you all know whether what they are saying about this area is correct or not. In here is the area they are most concerned with, and where if they don't ask for a forward movement they would appreciate a backward movement.

Rabin: And you didn't go to this area?

Peres: The corridor.



Rabin: No, "land connection." Don't call it a corridor.

Sisco: Is that the term you are using?

Rabin: Yes, I used it in my explanation to the Cabinet, "the land connection between Suez and Abu Rudeis."

Kissinger: We went through that area. And they confined themselves to a number of points. We did not have a systematic discussion of that area. They would like to have it said in the agreement, or wherever it is written, that the joint use of the road is temporary. We have said "temporary pending the construction of another road." They would rather not say "pending the construction of another road." They would rather say "temporary," which I think is...

Rabin: I think that is a good idea.

Kissinger: I thought that was a wise move. I asked them what their concept is of how this area would operate. They would say it is an area of no military forces. The UN is there only for the function to check that there are no military forces in the area, and they have the administration of the area. It would operate in their view by having UN road blocks at the entrance to the zone and at various places through the zone plus freedom of movement for the UN to check whether there are military forces in there. And they say with what you have outside and these road blocks and with freedom of movement for the UN, it is impossible for them to hide military forces.

Rabin: Yes, but not only on the road. The UN can go anywhere?

Kissinger: The UN can go anywhere in the area. The posts must be on the road but I think they would probably agree to some other fixed posts.

Rabin: Maybe the UN will have to have a camp.

Kissinger: I just asked how they visualize it. They said through fixed posts and freedom of movement plus what you have outside. They wanted to make clear that the UN isn't doing civil administration in this zone and that the only function of the UN in the zone is to make sure it is demilitarized and that there are no Egyptian military forces there.

Rabin: We agreed to Egyptian civilian administration.



Kissinger: They repeatedly agreed to UN roadblocks.

They recognize that this road will have to be used jointly for a considerable stretch and I frankly don't believe they have any intention of building a road down here. They are thinking of building one over here.

Rabin: There is a road down there.

Gur: There is a connection.

Kissinger: All right. Well, that is what they intend to do. They are nervous about being harassed by Israelis while they are on that road. They also agreed there will be UN checkpoints on the Israeli road when you use it. I told them there was no need to have UN checkpoints on the day you use it because you have free use of the road anyway, which did not fill Gamasy with enormous joy. But their biggest problem is that they are going to be harassed, as they claim they were on the Suez road.

Gur: During the separation agreement?

Kissinger: Before that.


Gur: Yes, during the discussions.

Kissinger: And that there will be visible Israelis along the side of the road while they are using it. And they'd like some understanding that when they are using it, you keep out of sight and no harassment, on the stretch of road which they use. That was their major concern. They agreed to UN checkpoints along the road while they use it. And they had no problem with UN checkpoints throughout the territory. That is all we discussed about this.

Sisco: One other point, if I may mention it. They emphasized that they would not want destruction of property by you before you get out.

Kissinger: They want assurance that there would be no destruction. In fact, it would be very helpful if when I go back I could tell them there are explicit assurances.

Rabin: They are talking about civilian? We would have to destroy military.



Kissinger: I don't know what your definition of military is. Things you build?

Rabin: No. Let's say whatever is related to oil production is not destroyed.

Kissinger: What is your definition of military?

Rabin: We will have to discuss it and let you know tomorrow.

Kissinger: Okay, just give me a definition.

Rabin: Fortified positions, headquarters, camps.

Peres: And some roads of strategic importance, I mean military importance.

Kissinger: Roads they will take very ill.

Peres: Then we will want assurance they won't make of it another Kuneitra, a show for the rest of the world that everything is destroyed.

Allon: I think everything shall be agreed to beforehand. We will have photos.

Sisco: Roads is very difficult, Shimon.

Kissinger: I think if you start tearing up roads, they will take it very ill. If you talk about fortifications, there is no problem, I am sure.

Rabin: There might be a certain airstrip, but not in Abu Rudeis.

Peres: Roads with civilian meaning we won't touch. Roads that don't have civilian meaning we will consider.

Allon: I think there should be a determined list of what is being destroyed and what is not, so there are no problems or misunderstanding.

Rabin: I don't think the problem is here but there might be in other areas in the buffer zone.

Kissinger: They are not so concerned about the buffer zone. They are talking about this area primarily.



Peres: There is not much there.

Gur: Other than the old Egyptian camps, there is nothing there.

Rabin: What is in the camps?

Gur: Old Egyptian buildings.

Sisco: Why can't you just leave them there?

Gur: Who says we have to destroy them? I am just saying what is there.

Kissinger: My own view is that this area can be either a source of constant irritation or the beginning of some practical cooperation between Israel and Egypt. Because frankly I don't see how it can operate without practical cooperation. And my recommendation would be to do it on the most generous basis possible if it is going to be done at all.

Peres: So there are three points: I think there are some buildings or roads that were constructed by the Egyptians, that we won't touch. Roads that were constructed by us that have civilian meaning we won't touch. Only roads and military installations put in by us and just for military purposes we will consider.

Rabin: We have fortifications and we have places built for keeping stores for the army.

Peres: There won't be vandalism as such.

Kissinger: Just vandalism in general! [Laughter] Or as the Jerusalem Post said, unlimited violence against a Secretary of State is not right.

Rabin: Immeasurable violence.

Kissinger: Measurable violence is all right.

Rabin: Let's sum up. We have a problem with the Giddi. We have a problem -- a small problem let's say -- north of the passes, mainly not in the Umm Khisheiba area but north. We have got a problem south of the Mitla pass. There are problems related to the Beta Line, and you mentioned two areas. In addition to the general statement, the general Beta Line will remain...



Kissinger: If...

Rabin: ...except the northern tip, in relation to whatever will be done in the other areas.

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: And along the axis or along this bulge in the southern area.

Kissinger: I think, you know, if you don't want to let him move forwards, they might take it in your withdrawal.

Rabin: I understand. Then we have the problem of Umm Khisheiba, which in principle is settled.

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: But we haven't got the exact Egyptian location where they do want it.

Kissinger: But apparently the Chief of Staff knows where it is. I will get you the coordinates tomorrow as soon as I get them. It is a hill one or two kilometers north of that East-West road, but Gamasy said "Don't tell them one or two kilometers because they will hold me to it." There is a hill there, and he will give the coordinates.

Rabin: If you can transfer the exact location to us before the meeting, it would be very helpful.

Kissinger: We will send a flash when we get back urging them.

Rabin: That is on the question of geography. On the American stations...

Kissinger: And I think to speed things up we should assume they will agree to an American presence even if they have not formally agreed to it. Less than six stations.

Rabin: When it comes to the [southern] area, they accept the basic principle of Egyptian administration, UN control, in the way you explained it.

Kissinger: UN control for the purpose of enforcing no military forces. They agree there will be no military forces.

Rabin: And there will be checkpoints. There might be not only checkpoints along the north-south line but wherever the UN will need.



Kissinger: What they wanted to avoid was any impression that it was a zone administered for civilians by the UN. That they couldn't explain. If they can explain no military forces and they will have the appropriate UN posts, and they agree to freedom of movement by the UN to check violations and just to make general inspections, to fix posts, and they said along the road.

Rabin: But it will be called a UN zone with Egyptian civil administration?

Kissinger: I did not frankly try out a name on it. I first wanted to define who was going to do what and to tie down that they are in charge of the administration of the zone, and the UN function is to police the demilitarization.

Rabin: They are responsible for the civil administration.

Allon: This is an extension of the UN buffer zone with the difference that they have the right to maintain a civil administration which they don't have in the other parts of the buffer zone. The UN should have the same responsibilities in both areas but since there are civilians...

Rabin: No, the UN buffer zone has overall responsibility. In this area it is responsible for the purposes of mainly supervising the demilitarization.

Kissinger: If we can tie down that the UN has no other function except to supervise the demilitarization...

Allon: They accept the term "demilitarization?"

Sisco: He used the phrase "no military forces."

Kissinger: They will accept the phrase "no military forces." I frankly spent more time on discussing how no military forces was to be enforced than on the other aspects, because I wanted to make sure there was freedom of movement. And it is my impression that the UN with respect to enforcing the no military forces provision has the same rights as in the buffer zone.

Allon: A few weeks ago they used to describe this connection as an Egyptian-controlled area with UN presence, while we consider it as a UN area with Egyptian presence, namely civil administration, including...



Kissinger: My recommendation is to write out exactly what everyone is going to do in the zone first and then see what name we get to.

Allon: Terms of reference.

Rabin: Now we have heard it, we will study it. I would like to stress again the importance of the public agreement or the agreement that will be signed between Egypt and ourselves. Secondly, the letter in relation to that. When it comes to the bilateral paper or the bilateral issues, I believe it is almost ...there are some points here and there not yet agreed.

Kissinger: Obviously everything that is agreed stays agreed.

Rabin: But let's discuss. This will come in due time, in addition to what we discussed yesterday. But the real problem is that we can not go on with the arrangements on the ground without relating it to these two issues.

Kissinger: On the other hand, we couldn't present an agreement to them before there was enough of an agreement.

Rabin: On the other hand, you can say this is the agreement that will be agreed to if you will be satisfied. We can't wait and we cannot proceed without knowing what is the context of the open agreement.

[Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Sisco leave the room for a brief private discussion.]

Gur: We have the point of their station. It is the 185 point, about two kilometers north of the crossroads. It is the highest hill in the area. It is two kilometers north of the main road.

Saunders: How far east of the intersection?

Gur: The main thing is the north, not the east. It is about half a kilometer east.

Saunders: The telegram was garbled but it seemed to be two kilometers.

Gur: This is the most important crossroads of the whole area. We checked before, and there is a very good group of hills here [to the north] from which they would be able to see the same thing electronically. But sitting on that crossroads he is sitting on the main crossroads of the whole of Sinai. And no doubt they wanted that hill because of that and not so much for any other reason.



[Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Sisco return.]

Kissinger: Let me make a number of points. First, about what I brought you, and second, about the status of our papers.


First, what I brought you. I urged Sadat not to start merchandising everything, not to start haggling. I said it is obviously a difficult, searing problem for the Israelis to do this, and don't ask this government that has the courage to do this to make all the decisions on all sectors simultaneously. And I urged him very strongly to leave the Beta Line alone, even though if he squeezed long enough he might get a kilometer or so, or maybe not. And I said that then you might be generous with respect to some of his concerns, or maybe not.

So this morning in fact, unbelievable as it may sound to you, Fahmy came to me and said it would be psychologically helpful since Gamasy has only sat in at Aswan and Mubarek has not sat in before, if I would begin next time by presenting what Egypt is getting and not only what Israel needs. Because there was some discussion afterwards that I seemed to be acting as the lawyer for Israel. So I wish you would keep in mind in preparing your response that framework in which I presented it.

On the lines, etc., if I add up what resulted from this trip, it is the agreement on Umm Khisheiba, the agreement to all practical purposes on the American presence, and the agreement not to press for a forward movement on the Beta Line. And no specific demands in the other areas except in the Giddi, although there is no very specific demand there either.

Now on the agreement itself, Joe did not understand -- and I certainly did not understand -- that in working on this agreement with you, we were preparing anything other than something to be submitted to the Egyptians to which they would have a right to react. It never occurred to us that this was a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. In fact, we were rather generous in including Israeli ideas, partly because you know Fahmy cannot just accept it; he will have to cross something out; he has to draft some counter-proposals. It is inevitable; I haven't discussed his ideas with him specifically. This paper will be the framework, but I cannot promise you that...

I can promise you which points will be in there -- non-resort to force given to the U.S. must be in and must be in the preamble. The assurances of the disengagement must be in. So I have no problem with the points we have agreed to. I have trouble with the specific formulation as the only way of approaching it. That doesn't mean you have to accept whatever Egyptian



counter-formulation, if any will be made. For all I know Fahmy will accept it and Sadat will accept it with great jubilation. I have not heard from them what they want.

Allon: Do they have an idea about the paper?

Kissinger: I left it with Eilts, and my instructions to him were to discuss with Fahmy not so much the draft but boycott and similar matters to see what form of assurance he could elicit from them. Because that was the impression -- boycott, political warfare, etc. And I told Sadat as I left yesterday that it has to be an agreement that the Israeli government can be proud to show if we are going to have some stability in the area. I also left with Eilts a draft of the agreement in which in fact I put a number of bracketed things like extending your formulation of the disengagement agreement to blockade, the Gazit addition. Frankly, on the theory that Fahmy has to cross something out.

Sisco: At least we ought to try it out because this is what you wanted.

Kissinger: On the formulation of Bab el-Mandeb I put in yours even though I disagreed with it.

Sisco: The access to the Red Sea. At least we had to try it.


Kissinger: To give some cushion to take something out. It isn't that we have presented our document. In fact, it is closer to your document than we have presented than to our document. But I think undoubtedly, if I know Fahmy, he will come back with something. Now I am not asking you to accept what he will come back with. I am just saying we cannot operate on the proposition that this is a joint U.S.-Israeli document and if they don't accept it, that's it. All I am asking you is to look at it.

Rabin: I reported to the Cabinet that this is the understanding between our two governments. It hasn't yet got the Egyptian agreement.

Kissinger: All right. But there will certainly have to be a negotiation on it.

Rabin: The sooner the better, because it may decide the whole future.

Kissinger: That is fine with us. If it can't be, let's find out quickly. For us the less time we spend in the area, the better it is, if there is no agreement possible.



Rabin: Because it is the only thing we get from the Egyptians. You are talking about process; we need something more seen than just the process you are talking about.

Kissinger: I must say that no one can be in Damascus and feel that that is all you are getting out of the agreement.

Rabin: We are not talking about the question of the Egyptians and the Syrians.

Allon: The formal Egyptian quid pro quo is this document.

Kissinger: For all I know he may kiss Eilts on both cheeks and sign it right on the spot, in blood. Then you will probably check the blood type and say that isn't satisfactory.


Sisco: You want us to get their reaction, and I think the quicker we do that the better.

Kissinger: We will get their reaction on our next trip to Egypt and report back to you.

Rabin: What is the problem? The political quid pro quo. Not political, but whatever quid pro quo. We have no assurances until today what it is. We are negotiating lines which cannot be but related to what we get back.

Kissinger: I understand. All we are resisting is the proposition that the Egyptians have no right to make a counter-proposal, and that the fact of a counter-proposal breaks off the negotiations. If we bring it and you want then to break off, fine with us.

Dinitz: If I may, while I think we understand that not every word is ironclad, I do distinguish in our discussions with you between those assurances that we asked you to get from the Egyptians, which you did not have or did not have ironclad -- this is in the bilateral document on the part of the Egyptian assurances -- and the agreement between us and Egypt, which when we formulated it... I don't say now, Mr. Secretary, that we at any point thought that that has been approved as such by the Egyptians. That is not the point we make. But Joe and I, and I am sure Joe will admit it, were trying to stick as closely as possible to the formulations you already got from Egypt. I am not talking about the things we added. I am talking about the non-resort to force.



Sisco: We were trying to reflect in that document what you and I thought might be essentially the consensus plus the specific points we left in brackets.

Kissinger: That's why we thought it would not be a problem. On a number of points it is more specific than I remember the consensus. The particular formulation of non-resort of force is sharper than anything the Egyptians gave us.

Rabin: For example?

Kissinger: It is separated into two parts. [Reading:] "The parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle disputes between them by negotiations or other peaceful means." They never gave us anything in treaty language with that precision.

Rabin: After every meeting in March, in all your briefings after March, you stressed one point, that you get from Egypt non-resort to use of force.

Kissinger: Yes, but that doesn't mean... There is nothing in there that was not agreed to in March. It was not drafted in March in detail. I have no reason to suppose they won't accept it.

Rabin: Dr. Kissinger, allow me to say with all frankness. We have to understand what is the basis of this agreement? The lines?

Kissinger: Allow me to say with all frankness I don't understand what we are arguing about. All I am saying is that we have acted here as mediators working first with you. We want to see what they come up with.

Rabin: Fine.

Kissinger: You have every right to reject anything they come up with.

Rabin: I would like to make it clear that the basis of this agreement is an Egyptian-Israeli commitment not to resort to the use of force or the threat of use of force.

Kissinger: Of course.

Rabin: That's all.

Kissinger: I have made that clear.



Allon: And that conflicts should be settled by peaceful means.

Kissinger: That is a point I have made on innumerable occasions so you can hardly get into difficulties by sticking to that point.

Rabin: Yes, but it has to be explicit.

Allon: I had the impression that that was not a problem at all. It was a mistake not to clarify this before.

Kissinger: I am not saying it is a problem. I am saying this formulation has no precise basis in anything the Egyptians have given to us. We are not dealing with each other as friends. We are dealing with each other as adversaries trying to work something out. It is mad! I am telling you my best judgment. I don't know what the Egyptians are going to say. I did not present an agreement with you, because I wanted to get the lines. And on the lines I didn't deviate two percent from what we agreed in Gymnich. So why should you assume that we are necessarily going to deviate from this?

Rabin: We are not assuming but we would like to make it clear.

Sisco: I think it is clear, and let's just now wait and see where we are.

Kissinger: All I say is that you have to be willing to look at what they are going to give us. Maybe I will tell you it is unacceptable. It can't be in my interests to have an agreement emerge in which I press you now to give up nonresort to force. It is the whole basis of the agreement. There will be no compromise on that issue. There may be ways of phrasing with which both parties are satisfied. I don't know what they are, and for all I know, the Egyptians will accept every word of this. I thought it was the best strategy, when we did not have Umm Khisheiba or anything else settled, not to have Sadat break it up on the grounds that political concessions were being extorted from him that he didn't want to give. I believe that on the two key issues of nonresort to force and duration of the agreement, it must come with a solution. We have always backed you on this.

Allon: Anyhow, there is an understanding between you and us.

Kissinger: There is an understanding between us. There is no question that you will not be asked to give up the nonresort to force in an explicit formulation. Whether it is this formulation or another formulation, I just want to leave it open.



Rabin: Because if it will be a general statement and not between Egypt and Israel, it makes the whole difference.

Kissinger: No, it has to be.

Rabin: I am not arguing.

Kissinger: The general formulation, as I understand it, is in the preamble. The specific one is the text, and the two are related to each other. The preamble has a general formulation about conflict in the Middle East. Therefore it seems senseless to repeat that general formulation in the text of the agreement. I agree with you that the text of the agreement must have Egypt and Israel agreeing "with each other" not to resort to force.

Rabin: All right.

Kissinger: There is no disagreement whatsoever except some flexibility in formulating this precise thought, if anybody asks for flexibility. I haven't heard an Egyptian view on it. I didn't think yesterday was the right time to raise that issue. Also I had not understood that we were authorized to give this agreement to them since there were still bracketed parts in it.

Sisco: We were not clear on that, quite frankly, Mr. Prime Minister.

Kissinger: I am happy to hear you say that you would like us to go ahead and make sure that this is all confirmed. My concern was that we might have moved too rapidly on this.


Dinitz: Joe, you were referring to the bracketed parts?

Sisco: To the whole document.

Kissinger: In every other negotiation we have conducted between the Israeli government and another government, we first agreed on the lines, and the drafting did not start until all of it was completed with you.

Rabin: That was disengagement. It was not this kind of agreement.

Kissinger: My impression was, quite frankly, that we were not authorized to give it. I insisted last night on giving it, against the advice of my colleagues, and I solved the problem by adding almost every Israeli formula that we had agreed upon to the proposal, such as on the Red Sea



approaches and the blockade, if only on the theory that it would give Fahmy more to cross out if necessary. Since he has to cross out something.

Sisco: Like your phrase, Mr. Prime Minister, "the UN force is essential." If you go back to your formulation in March, that phrase is not there. But we put it in because you added that in Washington.

Kissinger: That sort of thing he might want to take out.

Sisco: Why not get it for you, if you want it and they don't create any difficulties?

Kissinger: We haven't told them which part is Israeli and which part we discussed. We told Hermann to go over this document with them, even though I was not sure I was authorized to do it.

Sisco: You should be aware of the sensitivity of the other side who have read in the press that Simcha and Gazit and I got together for a full week and together have pre-empted the situation in terms of this agreement and they have been on the sideline. There is sensitivity on this point.

Rabin: It is a pity we did not discuss it because we could have agreed that certain documents could have been put forward to the Egyptians before.

Sisco: We were being timid.


Kissinger: Fahmy said to me this morning that whatever I bring next time it would make a better impression if I started by listing the things Egypt is getting.

Rabin: And they get a lot. Just listen to the opposition speaking here and give them the points.

Allon: But I think it is a good tactic to start with what they get.

Rabin: Now, what were your impressions in Syria?

Kissinger: My impression of Syria was calmer than last time. Asad. He would like a negotiation with Israel. He does not see what is going to come out of it, given what you have said publicly. He doesn't see how



we can make an agreement on the lines of what you have said publicly, but that still leaves open other possibilities. You know, he said what he always says, that he is willing to make peace and that was a big step for Syria but you are not giving him any possibility to make peace. I am just telling you what he said. I did not this time explore the possibility of a separate peace negotiation between Syria and Israel.

Rabin: Why not?

Kissinger: Because I didn't know whether I was authorized to do that.

Rabin: I said it to you in March.

Kissinger: Yes, but a lot of things have happened since March. So I did not pursue it. But it is Sadat's view, and also mine based on conversations with Asad, that if there is an agreement, it would be useful to go to Damascus at the end of it once more, for prestige purposes, and on that occasion I will raise it with him. I warned him very seriously against any crisis -- privately -- and I told him we would have no choice under those conditions but to give full support to Israel.

I don't have the impression that he is going to rush to Geneva.

So I think if we develop a common approach, Syria might prove to be handleable. That is my impression. We talked for three and a half hours.

Rabin: Do you think Syria can be the first one to enter into negotiations about peace with Israel?

Kissinger: He claims he is in a better position to make peace. He says he is the only one that can make peace because no one doubts his Arab nationalism.

Rabin: Can he do it separately from the other countries?

Kissinger: In March he said yes. This time I didn't explore it. He said again today that the difference between him and Egypt is that every Syrian absorbs Arab nationalism with his mother's milk and that therefore nobody questions, once a Syrian is more than two years old, that he is an Arab nationalist.



Rabin: I'd be very interested.

Kissinger: I can only repeat what he said. I am quoting. I avoided it this time. I can tell you that there is no agreement among the U.S. contingent as to whether the news that the Syrians are willing to have separate peace talks was evaluated as a positive or negative factor here, and whether that made you less or more reluctant to reach agreement in March.

Peres: For our own evaluation, can you give us some idea as to where the Russians stand? Suppose we have an agreement with Egypt, then where do we stand? Will we go to Geneva? Who will be there? The Russians? The Syrians? And also where do the Russians stand on the Syrian and Egyptian agreement?

Kissinger: I myself think if we pursue towards Syria a strategy which I could imagine, that we may be able to avoid Geneva. Because I do not have the impression that he is overeager to go to Geneva unless he is completely blocked everywhere. You know, he asked me what are those "delicate negotiations" that are needed to prepare Geneva? And I said it is an excuse for people who don't know what they will do there. And I said: "What about you?" He said they are always in favor of the immediate assembly of Geneva. It's the second time he tricked me with that one. Two minutes later I asked him: "Will you be there?" He said: "I didn't say we will be there." He pulled that on me once before! I said "You win a gold star. I usually don't get tricked twice!" [Laughter]

So he said he might need delicate and sensitive preparations prior to Geneva as long as he has any vision of peace. I don't have the impression that he will push towards Geneva. As far as we are concerned we have no overwhelming need to go to Geneva unless the pressures become unmanageable.

As far as the Soviets are concerned, I think there are a number of factors. I am assuming, incidentally, that this is not all going to be reported to the Cabinet and that this part of the discussion is leak-proof. My assessment is that if -- and you might be able to help us on that -- if we can get the unions to load grain again, that we can get a year. We know what the Russians need; they need about 15 million tons more of grain on top of the 10 million they have. We know it from them. So it is a catastrophe. They have now set it up in such a way that there is no... That is why we sold 10 million, because it doesn't solve their problem but it keeps our farmers quiet. They have already bought everything there is to buy everywhere in the world. There is no other place they can get it except from us.



Allon: Drought?

Kissinger: Yes. So we can perhaps get ourselves a year's quiet at least.

Allon: Would it help Jewish emigration? They would have to feed less people.

Kissinger: You screwed up Jewish emigration. Or your friends did. We had 38,000 guaranteed last year. 60,000 was Jackson's figure. I never agreed to it. He wrote it in his letter. They told us a guarantee of 38 to 40,000. And it was not accepted by Jackson. That they would have let us put in our letter.

Now there could be a change of leadership in Russia over the next 18 months which will gain some more time. I think the situation is very good right now.

Allon: What is good about it?

Kissinger: If we play it intelligently. If they are going to have a domestic crisis, they will blame us and not themselves, and there will be a high potential of a foreign crisis.

Allon: The Jewish problem in Russia is worse than it used to be years ago.

Kissinger: Because of the Americans.

Allon: Don't blame the Americans, blame the Russians. They are anti-Semites.

Kissinger: That the Russians are anti-Semites is not a new event. That includes, by the way, Solzhenitsyn.

Allon: They got from the West in Helsinki recognition of the acquisition of territory.

Kissinger: That is total unmitigated nonsense.

Allon: I knew that would make you mad!

Kissinger: All the heroes who didn't have the guts to do anything in any specific crisis, who the minute we start moving towards the Syrian front



are going to scream and call us warmongers, are saying we recognize the acquisition of territories. The frontiers in the Balkans were accepted by the 1947 peace treaties, which we signed. The western frontier of Poland was accepted provisionally at Potsdam, which we signed, and formally by West and East Germany. Nothing in Helsinki was considered of an obligatory nature to begin with. This is one of the myths that people who want to run a Kennedy-type campaign -- and who are going to have a detente afterwards the like of which we haven't seen yet -- it isn't being tough to talk now. There are two problems in Eastern Europe. One is the frontiers; this is nonsense. The second is the Soviet political domination and military domination of Eastern Europe. That depends on 40,000 tanks; we have 14 divisions, and until we are willing to build 40,000 tanks and use them, we are just talking nonsense. Until we are willing to do that, our policy is the only means of somewhat reducing the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe within narrow margins, and that is what we are doing. And those who are attacking Helsinki are playing American domestic politics and would pee in their pants the minute a real first-class crisis started. Those are the facts.

Peres: What is your impression of the Syrian-Russian relations?

Kissinger: Cool.

Peres: And Egyptian-Russian relations?

Kissinger: Substantially non-existent. [Laughter] In Syria -- and this time this was not a meeting with the Syrians in which they were begging us or there was any great advantage to them -- they don't even pretend. The Egyptians sometimes over-play their anti-Russian feelings, although they are genuine enough. The Syrians just talk of them with disdain. Incidentally, they say that America is so insane now that they want to put in an application for F-16 airplanes, that since we turned down Hawk missiles to our only friend in the Arab world, maybe we will give the F-16 to them. Since we pushed Turkey away and infuriated Hussein, maybe we'll give them the F-16, since everything we do is totally irrational.

Rabin: Is it true that Egypt expects you to supply them with arms?

Kissinger: If they expect it, they have no basis for it, either directly or indirectly. They have no reason to expect that.



Allon: They will get it from Saudi Arabia.

Kissinger: I said they have no reason to expect to get them indirectly from us either. In any case, any quantity they could get from Saudi Arabia cannot significantly affect the military situation.

Allon: What was the reaction about the vessel, the Israeli cargo?

Kissinger: They thought the 25th was not convenient. But I think it is not a closed issue.

Allon: But it may raise a problem because it was agreed between us and you that only when they fulfill all the obligations of the previous agreement...

Kissinger: They understand that. I made it clear to them, but they felt to do it at the very beginning of the shuttle...

Rabin: Can we arrange, if it is possible -- on the assumption that towards the end of the week we will reach something or not; I hope we will -- that after we initial the agreement but before we come to our Parliament to have this vessel crossing the canal? Forgive me for saying it bluntly.

Kissinger: No. I am quite confident on the basis of my discussions with Sadat that that can be arranged if you can find a vessel.

Rabin: Even on the day we discuss it.

Allon: Even if we take a vessel from Eilat to Haifa.

Kissinger: I wouldn't do that, but if you can find a vessel to go through the Suez Canal prior to the initialling. But his objection to the 25th was that it would look as if on my first shuttle he...

Rabin: ...gave in.

Kissinger: ...gave in. But I am confident that I can get it done probably even before the initialling but certainly before the Knesset.

Rabin: Not even before the initialling. I need it after the initialling but before the debate in the Knesset.



Kissinger: I think we can do that.

Allon: Psychologically it is of tremendous importance.

Kissinger: I think we can definitely do it.

Peres: Anything new on the Libyan-Egyptian front?

Kissinger: Sadat talks as if he now had access to the inner Councils of the Revolution. But he is worried about Galloud.

Peres: Jaloud.

Allon: They don't pronounce the "J's."

Gur: Like Giddi. The others call it Jiddi.

Rabin: I think you're tired and need some rest.

Kissinger: Then we can't go to Egypt tomorrow.


[To Gur:] I asked Gamasy what he thought of you and he said you were a great combat commander. He said he had no judgment of you as Chief of Staff but that you were a great commander.

Peres: Do you know anything about Syrian-Jordanian developments?

Kissinger: Asad said that -- as someone who after all, as he claims, is not uninterested in the American position in the Middle East -- what we have done to the Jordanians with the Hawks is a disaster which will affect us in Jordan and in Saudi Arabia. He said it was one of the factors that made Jordan go there. And he said he has promised Hussein SAM-2s, that he doesn't have to go to Russia and he can get them from him. Incidentally, he raised this issue. I never raised it. And he raised it again when we were alone. He said "it will hurt you in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan."

I said to him: will this be an operational command or an intention? He said it is an intention. He didn't claim anything excessive for it.

Sisco: He was very careful, very careful.



Kissinger: Gamasy said they have two armored divisions facing Iraq.

Can I see you alone for three minutes?

[The Prime Minister and the Secretary conferred alone from 11:29 to 11:55 p.m. The meeting ended. The Secretary's party departed for Jerusalem by helicopter. The Secretary's and Minister Allon's remarks on returning to the King David Hotel are attached.]





DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

Memo

SECTO 10072

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INDICATE
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 CHARGE TO

FROM SECTO CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

N/A
 PFOR, IS,

Q AND A WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON ON AUGUST 24 AT 1240 AM AT KING DAVID HOTEL JERUSALEM

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: AmEmbassy CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AmEmbassy AMMAN " "

AmEmbassy DAMASCUS " "

AmEmbassy JIDDA " "

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USDEL ALEXANDRIA " "

AmEmbassy TEL AVIV " "

AmConsul JERUSALEM " "

UNCLASSIFIED SECTO 10072

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

TRANSCRIPT FOLLOWS: QUOTE:

Q. MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU MAKING PROGRESS NOW WOULD YOU SAY?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAD USEFUL TALKS IN EGYPT AND I ABOUT REPORTED/THOSE TALKS AS WELL AS ABOUT MY CONVERSATIONS IN SYRIA TO THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM. WE HAD A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION THIS EVENING. AS YOU KNOW, THE ISRAELI CABINET IS MEETING TOMORROW, AND AFTER THAT WE WILL MEET AGAIN WITH THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM. WE WILL LEAVE FOR EGYPT PROBABLY NEXT FIRST THING MONDAY MORNING.

DRAFTED BY:

RAnderson;ajg

DRAFTING DATE

8/24/75

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

RAnderson

CLEARANCES:

S/S: R Sherman

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION



Q. How close are you to an agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to measure distances, but we are continuing to make progress and the difficulties continue to be removed. We have encountered no unexpected obstacles up to now.

Q. Did you wrap up some additional points tonight?

Secretary Kissinger: We went over some additional points tonight, yes. After the Israeli negotiating team has studied them, they will give us their answer tomorrow.

Q. Where were the talks held this evening? Were they in Tel Aviv?

Secretary Kissinger: I tell you the truth I do not know exactly where they were held. (Laughter)

Q. Would you please pursue your talks with President Asad?

Secretary Kissinger: I think no, except we reviewed the whole context of negotiations and the problems of an overall peace settlement. I think you better take over (to Foreign Minister Allon).

ForMin Allon: The Israeli ~~negotiating~~ negotiating team and Dr. Kissinger and his colleagues managed to combine pleasure and ~~meet~~ business tonight. We had a good dinner and we talked. After listening to the report which Dr. Kissinger gave us about his impressions from Alexandria and Damascus, we could clarify further ^{the} problems that are connected with the possible interim



agreement. And I couldn't but support what Dr. Kissinger told you just now that we are making progress, and every additional meeting brings us closer to hopeful results. But we had a brief meeting tonight and tomorrow after the weekly Cabinet session ~~making~~ we will meet ~~again~~ again with the American team. We asked Dr. Kissinger to postpone his visit to other countries until we have had sufficient time to discuss previous points as well as the ~~xx~~ new ones. By tomorrow afternoon we will be able to continue our talks.

Q: Mr. Allon, are you still ~~xx~~ talking about a three-year agreement? I mean is that still out in the open?

Foreign Minister Allon: Well, I think this is a basic mistake using this terminology. I believe that the agreement will be valid until it is superceded by another agreement. These limitations of years are connected more with the problems of the ~~xxxx~~ renewal of the mandates but not of the length of the agreement. The duration is unlimited, namely that we shall make the effort to achieve a better agreement later on, so this will remain in power until its being superceded by another one.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you raise the possibility of an interim ~~ag~~ settlement with Mr. Asad in Syria?

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the general context of negotiations,--of various possibilities. But one interim negotiation is all that my colleagues and I are capable of handling.



Q: Did you have the feeling that your talks with Mr. Asad would have any effect on the negotiations for an interim settlement in Sinai?

Secretary Kissinger: Well. I had useful talks with President Asad. And I continue to believe that we can make progress towards a Sinai settlement.

Q: Do you have agreement on American presence in Sinai?

Forbin Allon: We are still discussing it with America. It is an important item. There are a few remaining important items. We will tell you about them.

KISSINGER



Sunday, August 24, 1975

ISRAEL

CHECKLIST

August 24, 1975

1. On the main issues, you are going to listen to their Cabinet's reaction to your report of last night. Specifically you need for Egypt tomorrow:
 - Giddi Pass: new Israeli line.
 - North of passes: some further movement on the Israeli forward line.
 - South of the passes: new Israeli forward line.
 - Line B: change in Port Said area and some straightening in center.
 - Number of U.S. sites.
 - Negotiability of the draft agreement: you will be discussing with Fahmy tomorrow.

2. If the Israeli response on the above is sufficient to keep the negotiations going, you will want to review the work that needs to be done:
 - Fahmy will expect an Israeli reaction to the following points he wants incorporated in a U.S. Presidential letter to Sadat:
 - Israel will refrain from changing geographic character or demographic composition of Sinai, e.g., no Israeli settlements and no introduction of population not habitually residing there before June 5, 1967.
 - Israel will compensate Egypt fully for Israeli exploitation of the Sinai oil fields.
 - Israel will not destroy, dismantle or damage any construction, installations, roads, buildings or property in areas of Sinai it evacuates.
 - Agreement: you will discuss with Sadat and Fahmy tomorrow.
 - Letter on UNEF duration: you will discuss with Sadat tomorrow.

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EO 12958-2
10/10/03



- Letter on non-use of force: you will discuss with Sadat tomorrow.
- There will need to be an Annex to the Agreement. We need to discuss what goes into this when we get the Agreement pinned down.
- Memorandum of Understanding: tell Israelis you have reviewed the M.O.U. and we are prepared for a further round of technical talks. (Suggest you offer to leave Atherton, Leigh and Oakley in Jerusalem Monday for these talks).
- This round should be limited to those matters concerning direct U.S.-Israeli understandings.
- Those matters concerning Egyptian assurances given through the U.S. will need to await further clarification from the Egyptians.
- Agreement on U.S. role in connection with surveillance sites and observation posts in the UN zone.
- Atherton and Leigh are prepared to present a U.S. draft of the agreement we will need to present to Congress.
- The wording of this agreement will obviously be very important in the context of obtaining Congressional approval (this is to enable you to establish the fact that the U.S. must be the final judge of how this agreement is worded).



SECRET/NODIS

August 24, 1975

TO: MESSRS. ~~TOON~~
EILTS
ATHERTON
OAKLEY
~~RODMAN~~

FROM: MR. SAUNDERS *hhs*

SUBJ: Additional Papers for Negotiating Book


Attached are additional papers which you will want to add to your negotiating book:

- The new draft Agreement between Egypt and Israel takes into account Fahmy's comments of August 23, the Secretary's reaction to them, and our new draft to be presented to Fahmy in Alexandria on Monday.
- The latest version of the letter on UNEF duration revised to conform to the latest version of the agreement.
- The latest version of the letter on non-use of force.
- Copies of Fahmy's letter of August 23 on assurances Egypt wants from Israel in the Sinai. I can only suggest that you keep this in the flap inside the cover of your book. At this point there is no existing tab to cover it.
- The August 24 version of the U.S.-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding.

Attachments:
As stated above.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5
DATE 10/10/03
hr



August 24, 1975

~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel:

Resolving that the conflict between them and in the Middle East will not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means;

Recalling that the Agreement concluded by the parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

Desirous of reaching a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

(1) The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiation or other peaceful means.

(2) The Parties have given a further written assurance to the Government of the United States of America to this effect.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, CFR 3.5
STANDARD PROCEDURES
HR 10/10/03



ARTICLE II

(1) The Parties reconfirm their obligation pursuant to the disengagement agreement of January 18, 1974, to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other or blockades against each other directly or indirectly.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III


The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line A on the attached map.

(2) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines A and D and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines B and C shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex.



(5) In the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines A and B, the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the land connection between the city of Suez and the line terminating at the coast south of Abu Rodeis on the attached map, the following principles will apply:

(a) Egypt will conduct civilian activities, including normal civil police.

(b) There will be no military forces.


(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military forces; it will establish check points and have freedom of movement necessary to perform this function in this area.

ARTICLE IV

This Agreement shall be implemented by both Parties in such a manner as to demonstrate their desire for peace. Roads, installations, or equipment of the oil fields, except for some military installations or equipment in the areas vacated, shall not be destroyed or transferred from those areas.

ARTICLE V

Egypt agrees that the United Nations Emergency Force is



essential and shall continue its function and that its mandate shall be extended annually.


ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission to be presided over by the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Middle East for the duration of this Agreement, in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with precepts established in the Annex.

ARTICLE VII

(1) All cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

(2) The Parties regard the Red Sea, its approaches and straits leading to it, and the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb as an international waterway for ships of all flags. Neither Party shall interfere with the free and unimpeded transit of any ship or cargo through those Straits or with the flight of aircraft over those Straits and other areas mentioned above.



ARTICLE VIII

The details concerning the new demarcation lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IX

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference.

ARTICLE X

Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent either Party from exercising the right of self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.



ARTICLE XI

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.

ARTICLE XII


This Agreement shall be deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the UN.

Done at _____ on the _____
1975, in four copies

For the Government of Israel

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

WITNESS



8/24

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of Egypt on the question of the duration of the second Egyptian-Israeli agreement on the Sinai.

The agreement includes language that the 'agreement shall remain in force until is superseded by a new agreement between the Parties.' With respect to the duration of UNEF, I have informed Secretary Kissinger of Egypt's undertaking to make every effort to extend the United Nations Emergency Force annually for the duration of the agreement.

However, should the Security Council, because of the action of a third state, fail to renew the UNEF mandate to assure continuous operation, Egypt undertakes to concert actively with the U.S. to have the General Assembly take appropriate action to bring about annual renewals for at least two renewals after the first annual mandate goes into effect.



In the event such affirmative General Assembly action did not prove possible, Egypt will request an augmented UNISO to continue the supervision responsibilities, and to have the joint Egyptian-Israeli Commission cooperate with it.

Sincerely yours,

Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.



August 24, 1975


LETTER TO PRESIDENT FORD ON NON-USE OF FORCE

Dear Mr. President,

In connection with the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of _____, and in accordance with the undertakings contained therein, we are herewith submitting the following assurance to you:

- A. Israel is resolved that the conflict between her and Egypt and in the Middle East will not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.
- B. Israel undertakes not to resort to the threat or use of force against Egypt and to settle all disputes with Egypt by negotiations or other peaceful means.
- C. Israel reconfirms its obligation to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or paramilitary actions against Egypt or blockades against Egypt directly or indirectly.

Yours sincerely,



Egypt
August 23, 1975

Dear Mr. President,

In connection with the agreement on further disengagement of forces in Sinai, I would like to convey to you the assurance we received from the Israeli government that it will refrain forthwith from taking, authorizing or allowing any actions or measures that could result in changing the geographic character or the demographic composition in Sinai. It is understood that such undertaking encompasses, inter alia, an injunction against the establishment of any settlements and/or allowing individuals or groups not habitually residing in Sinai prior to June 5, 1967, to reside or settle therein.

On the other hand, you may rest assured that Egypt will be fully compensated, at the proper time, for any loss it incurred as a result of the destruction of Egyptian public or private property and/or the exploitation of its natural resources following the occupation of part of its territory and territorial water.



9/14/4

ISRAEL UNDERTAKES:


FIRST:

To rescind immediately, and refrain forthwith from, the following:

- A. Any actions or measures that could result in changing the geographic character and/or the demographic composition in Sinai.
- B. Establishing settlements, authorizing or allowing individuals or groups of those who did not habitually reside in Sinai prior to June 1967, to settle therein.
- C. Destroying, dismantling or inflicting any damage on constructions, installations, roads, buildings or property in Sinai, be it publicly or privately owned.

SECOND:

To honor its obligation to pay full compensation for all unlawful demographic changes, destruction of property and exploitation of natural resources.





MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS


CABINET OF THE MINISTER

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT ON FURTHER
DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES IN SINAI, I WOULD LIKE TO
CONVEY TO YOU THE ASSURANCE WE RECEIVED FROM THE
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT IT WILL REFRAIN FORTHWITH FROM
TAKING, AUTHORIZING OR ALLOWING ANY ACTIONS OR MEASURES
THAT COULD RESULT IN CHANGING THE GEOGRAPHIC CHARACTER
OR THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION IN SINAI. IT IS UNDER-
STOOD THAT SUCH UNDERTAKING ENCOMPASSES, INTER ALIA,
AN INJUNCTION AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY
SETTLEMENTS AND/OR ALLOWING INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS
NOT HABITUALLY RESIDING IN SINAI PRIOR TO JUNE
5, 1967 TO RESIDE OR SETTLE THEREIN.

ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT
EGYPT WILL BE FULLY COMPENSATED, AT THE PROPER TIME,
FOR ANY LOSS IT INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE DESTRUCTION
OF EGYPTIAN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROPERTY AND/OR THE
EXPLOITATION OF ITS NATURAL RESOURCES FOLLOWING THE
OCCUPATION OF PART OF ITS TERRITORY AND TERRITORIAL
WATER.

.....





MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CABINET OF THE MINISTER

①
ISRAEL UNDERTAKES:

FIRST: TO RESCIND IMMEDIATELY, AND REFRAIN FORTHWITH
FROM, THE FOLLOWING:

- A. ANY ACTIONS OR MEASURES THAT COULD RESULT
IN CHANGING THE GEOGRAPHIC CHARACTER AND/OR
THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION IN SINAI.
- B. ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS, AUTHORIZING OR
ALLOWING INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS OF THOSE
WHO DID NOT HABITUALLY RESIDE IN SINAI PRIOR
TO JUNE 1967, TO SETTLE THEREIN.
- C. DESTROYING, DISMANTLING OR INFLECTING ANY
DAMAGE ON CONSTRUCTIONS, INSTALLATIONS,
ROADS, BUILDINGS OR PROPERTY IN SINAI,
BE IT PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY OWNED.

SECOND: TO HONOR ITS OBLIGATION TO PAY FULL COMPENSATION
FOR ALL UNLAWFUL DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES, DESTRUCTION
OF PROPERTY AND EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES.

.....



205-8
8/24


MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF
ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES

The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement of _____, (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That Agreement has full US support.

US-Israeli Assurances

1. The USG will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. In this spirit the Administration will seek authorization and appropriation of funds from Congress in FY76 in the total amount of \$ _____. It will thereafter submit annually for approval by the US Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to provide for Israel's economic, energy and military needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in FY76 and later fiscal years.
2. Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the US and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate US-Israeli memorandum.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES



To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within _____ days and will complete its work within _____ weeks.


In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the U.S. will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

3. Israel will seek to make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through purchases in the market. In the event Israel is unable to secure its essential needs in this way, the USG, upon notification, will for a period of three years (subject to review) and within an overall ceiling of 125,000 barrels per day, act to ensure promptly the supply and delivery of oil to Israel if (a) the oil Israel needs to meet its requirements is unavailable for purchase; or (b) an embargo prevents Israel from obtaining the necessary supplies of oil. (The foregoing is based on the application of the IEA conservation formula.)


The USG assures Israel of its intention to inform the Congress, based on existing legal authority, of its undertaking to act promptly to ensure the supply and delivery of oil to Israel in the above contingencies.

4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and under the overall annual figures in paragraph one above, the United States agrees:

a. To ask Congress for funds for oil supplies so as to assist Israel in meeting its additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would ordinarily have come from Abu Rodeis (4.5 million tons in 1975).



- b. To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined, to the GOI necessary for a project for the construction and stocking, of the oil reserve to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks now standing at approximately six months, up to one-year's needs at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments.
5. The USG will not expect Israel to begin to implement the Agreement before Egypt fulfills its undertakings under the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement including, inter alia, its commitment to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.
6. The USG will make every possible effort to assist in the establishment of an atmosphere in which the Agreement will be observed without being subjected to pressures or deadlines.
7. The USG agrees with Israel that it is not feasible to enter into a further interim agreement with Egypt and that the next agreement should be a final peace agreement.
8. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement in all its parts, the USG will consult with the GOI prior to determining what measures the USG will take in relation to Egypt in order to ensure corrective action.




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- 4 -

9. Should Israel take military action as a result of an Egyptian violation of the Agreement or any of its attachments, the USG, if it agrees that such action is reasonable, will lend Israel material and diplomatic support.
10. The USG will vote against any Security Council resolution which Israel and the US agree affects adversely or alters the Agreement.
11. The USG will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel.
12. Should a world power threaten Israel's security or sovereignty the US will lend Israel appropriate support and assistance, the nature of the support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance, will be subject to prompt consultations between the GOI and the USG.
13. The USG and the GOI will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible, within two months after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel.
14. It is the USG's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel Agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The USG regards the Agreement as standing on its own, and the USG has obtained this assurance from the GOE.
15. The USG shares the Israeli position that negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement at such time as conditions are conducive to such a negotiation. Any US

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


initiative concerning negotiations with Jordan will be fully discussed with the GOI well in advance, and every effort will be made to arrive at a coordinated position.

16. Should negotiations between Israel and Syria on an interim agreement develop, the USG will not expect Israel to make proposals that go beyond what Prime Minister Rabin outlined in his talks in Washington in June 1975 and what was reiterated by Ambassador Dinitz in his oral clarification of . . .

17. Should Syria initiate military or para-military action against Israel or should Syria undertake or tolerate acts that might threaten the ceasefire the USG will support Israel diplomatically. These acts include, inter alia, the infiltration of terrorists across the Israel-Syria ceasefire lines and the stationing of terrorist groups in frontal areas facing Israel.

18. In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States Government regards the Strait of Bab-El-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will strongly support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right. In the event of any interference with the passage of Israeli ships or cargos through such straits or with Israeli flights over the Red Sea or such straits, the United States Government will consult with Israel on how best to assure the maintenance and exercise of such rights.



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- 6 -

19. The USG will take all appropriate steps authorized by its domestic legislation to ensure that corporations controlled by US nationals do not cooperate with the Arab boycott against Israel in any form whatsoever nor practice any form of discrimination direct or indirect against Israel, Israel corporations or Israel nationals.


20. In connection with the Agreement the USG considers all the Egyptian commitments given to Israel, via the USG or otherwise, as binding and irrevocable.

21. In the event that UNEF or any other UN organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement and the US before this agreement is superseded by another agreement, the agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.

Without prejudice to the generality of this provision it is agreed:

- a. The Buffer Zone between the forces of Egypt and Israel in which UNEF is stationed will continue to serve as a Buffer Zone separating the forces of the two sides with unchanged status.
- b. The arrangements in the Zone, such as those relating to the warning system of both sides as well as the agreed movement of Egypt and Israel personnel in the Zone will not be affected by the withdrawal of UNEF.
- c. The demilitarized status of the UN Zone will remain unchanged.

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


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- 7 -

- d. The U.S. presence in the area of the Agreement will remain unchanged.
 - e. All other arrangements in the area, as defined by the Agreement, will remain unchanged.
22. If UNEF or any other UN organ is withdrawn because of an action by Egypt contrary to its undertakings in the Agreement and contrary to the views of Israel, the USG notes that Israel claims the right to take corrective measures.
23. The USG notes that Israel and Egypt have announced their agreement to aerial reconnaissance missions to be carried out by the US over the areas covered by the Agreement at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days. The USG will make the photographs available to both Israel and Egypt expeditiously. The area to be photographed is as agreed between the parties.
24. In the spirit of the special relationship existing between the U.S. and Israel and in light of the determination of both sides to avoid a situation in which the U.S. and Israel would pursue divergent courses in peace negotiations, the U.S. will take the position that these are negotiations between the parties. Should the U.S. desire to put forward proposals of its own, it will make every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposals with a view to refraining from putting forward proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory.
25. In case of lack of agreed intelligence data between the USG and the GOI concerning an Egyptian violation, the USG will give full weight to the Israeli intelligence data, bearing in mind the cruciality of the time element.

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


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- 8 -

26. The US and Israel agree that upon initialling by the parties, the Egypt-Israel Agreement shall become an accepted document and that no further changes shall be sought or made in the text of the Agreement. Moreover, the US and Israel agree that signature of the text and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the US Congress of the US role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the Agreement and its Annex. Upon notification that Congressional approval has been given, the parties will forthright (within 72 hours) sign the Agreement as previously initialled. During the period between initialling and Congressional action on this US role, Egypt and Israel agree to maintain the status quo, including their obligations under the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, and that UNEF shall continue in its function. The US has informed the GOI that it has obtained GOE agreement to the above.

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Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum

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