



S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20330421

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

21 April 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for
Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-001017DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Omar Mohammed Ali al-Rammah
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Omar Muhammad Ali al-Rammah, Isa, Handhala, Abu Amr, Abu Zakaria al-Yemeni, Ali Husayn, Mikhlaifi, Mustapha Boudsila, Zaghul, Zakaria,
- Place of Birth: Al-Bayda, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1975
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-001017DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for CD on 20 April 2007.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is a member of al-Qaida and is assessed to have held a key role in al-Qaida linked plans to conduct explosives operations in Georgia and Chechnya. Detainee was captured by Georgian authorities possessing explosive detonators and a large sum of US currency. Detainee received tactical explosives training while in Afghanistan (AF) and probably trained others at the al-Faruq Training Camp during 2001. Detainee is connected to numerous extremists and known al-Qaida members. Detainee may

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REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20330421

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have been involved in al-Qaida efforts to develop poisons as weapons. **[ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THIS DETAINEE IS AVAILABLE IN AN SCI SUPPLEMENT.]** JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **MEDIUM** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnote.)

- Added detail to detainee's prior history
- Added detail to detainee's recruitment and travel
- Added detail to detainee's training and activities
- Added detail to detainee's capture information
- Added photo-identification of detainee in Afghanistan
- Added reason for detainee's continued detention
- Added information on money detainee was reported to be carrying when initially captured.

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee attended school for eight years.¹ In 1990, at the age of 15, detainee left home due to his father's harshness and his disapproval of detainee's drug use. Detainee resided in numerous prostitution houses and small apartments around Sanaa, YM, rarely staying in any house more than two weeks. Detainee attributed his frequent movement to his involvement in drugs.² Detainee was a dealer in hashish and cocaine for approximately eight years until he was 23 years of age.³

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In the summer of 2001, detainee met with his uncle, Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Ali Mousa al-Baidai, who convinced detainee that his lifestyle was bad and helped him become a devout Muslim. His uncle sent him with the *Jamaat*

¹ ➤ IIR 6 034 1103 03

² ➤ 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003

³ ➤ IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 001017 MFR 09-MAY-2003, IIR 6 044 5142 03, 001017 302 10-MAY-2003

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Dawa (a religious missionary group)⁴ where detainee performed *dawa* (missionary work) for three months in Sanaa, attending mosques in Sanaa and Hededa, YM.⁵ Soon after, al-Baidai gave detainee \$10,000 US and instructed him to deliver it to an individual named Sulieman in Baku, Azerbaijan (AZ).⁶ Detainee was told the money was for feeding and clothing Muslim refugees from the conflict in Chechnya. Detainee then went to Taiz, YM and paid 23,000 Yemeni rials for a passport.⁷ In late summer 2001, detainee departed Sanaa and traveled to Damascus, Syria (SY). He then traveled by bus to Aleppo, SY, and on to Istanbul, Turkey (TU), via Ankara, TU. While en route to Istanbul, detainee met a person named Mustafa, who spoke Arabic and who recommended a hotel in the Circagy district of Istanbul.⁸ Detainee stayed at the hotel for three weeks waiting for a bus to take him to Baku. Detainee arrived at Suleiman's home in Baku and gave him the money from al-Baidai. Suleiman then convinced detainee to go to the Pankisi Gorge area of Georgia (GG).⁹

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: After approximately three weeks at Suleiman's house, the two traveled to Duisi, GG, where detainee stayed one night in another house owned by Sulieman, before renting an apartment of his own. Detainee distributed relief to people in the Pankisi Gorge for approximately one month before traveling to the Esvahan Gorge to assist in the transport of 400 to 500 Chechen refugees from the Pankisi Gorge to the Esvahan Gorge. Detainee remained in the Esvahan area for one month and then returned to Pankisi.¹⁰ At some time during this period, detainee claimed to have viewed a video documenting the Russians killing Muslims in Chechnya. He told Sulieman he wanted to go to Chechnya and fight the Russians. Suleiman told him that he needed to receive training first.¹¹ During Ramadan 2001 (17 November to 16 December 2001), Suleiman introduced detainee to Hamza Gelayev at his house in Omalo, GG.¹² Detainee later traveled to Gelayev's home two additional times. During one of these visits, detainee received light weapons training, including weapons assembly and disassembly, from Gelayev near his home.¹³ One of these times, he saw four people he described as Americans.¹⁴ In the weeks

⁴ ➤ TRRS-03-04-0946, Analyst Note: Jamaat translates to group in Arabic. *Dawa* is an Islamic dedication or donation that includes religious instruction. This communal duty entails either organized efforts by missionary groups to spread the faith or personal testimony from a Muslim to those around him or her to join the religious community. A number of detainees claimed to have been involved in this activity as a cover for their jihadist activities abroad.

⁵ ➤ 001017 302 10-MAY-2003

⁶ Analyst Note: A variant of Suleiman is Soleiman.

⁷ ➤ 001017 IN T544-01-0404, Analyst Note: In 2001, 23,000 Yemeni rials was equivalent to \$154 USD

⁸ ➤ IIR 6 034 1103 03

⁹ IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 001017 MFR 09-MAY-2003, IIR 6 044 5142 03

¹⁰ IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 001017 MFR 09-MAY-2003, IIR 6 034 5142 03

¹¹ 001017 302 10-MAY-2003.

¹² IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 001017 MFR 09-MAY-2003, IIR 6 044 5142 03, IIR 6 034 1277

03, Analyst Note: A variant of Gelayev is Ghulaiev.

¹³ ➤ IIR 6 034 1277 03, IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 302 10-MAY-2003,

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after his return from Pankisi, (and aside from his training in Omalo), detainee distributed food and medical supplies to the Chechen refugees in the areas surrounding Duisi. While tending to the refugees, detainee lost his passport and on Suleiman's advice, consulted Gelayev. Gelayev contacted a man named Muhammad who asked detainee to provide several passport photos. Detainee did so and was provided a Moroccan passport stolen in Istanbul.¹⁵ Detainee was also given two other passports to give to Gelayev. As Gelayev was in Tbilisi, GG, detainee held onto the other passports. Detainee's original passport was eventually found and returned to him.¹⁶

5. (U) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) On the morning of his capture, detainee claimed he was sent by Sulieman to deliver some religious pamphlets to a man named Abd al-Halim in Pankisi. Detainee stayed with Abd al-Halim for a few hours and ate. Detainee then decided to go out and get groceries.¹⁷ Detainee later admitted he was given two explosives detonators by an Arab named Khidr, and that detainee was to deliver the detonators to Sulieman, who would in turn deliver them to Gelayev.¹⁸ Detainee hailed a taxi driven by a man named Saleh, whom he had met previously. The other passengers included Soufian and Abd al-Haq.¹⁹ Detainee inquired if the passengers were traveling to purchase groceries, and when Soufian answered in the affirmative, detainee got into the front seat of the vehicle. As the vehicle crossed a bridge, it was hit in the side by another vehicle. The passengers from that vehicle got out and began shooting at detainee's vehicle. Soufian and Abd al-Haq were wounded, and Saleh was shot dead.²⁰ Detainee's group was ordered to get out of the vehicle, and detainee subsequently fainted.²¹ When detainee awoke, he was handcuffed and being beaten in the back of another vehicle. He was taken to a parking lot where he was transferred to another car and then taken to a warehouse where he stayed for four days. After the four days, detainee was driven to another location where he was examined and later taken to an airport and put on a plane. When detainee landed, an American interrogator told him he was in Afghanistan.²² Detainee was held in the Afghan National Directorate of Security Prison

¹⁴ IIR 6 034 1108 03

¹⁵ IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 0010017 MFR 09-MAY-2003, IIR 6 044 5142 03

¹⁶ IIR 6 044 1614 03

¹⁷ 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003

¹⁸ > IIR 6 034 1108 03, Analyst Note: In one account, detainee stated he was sent by Suleiman to deliver religious materials and then to get groceries. In a later debriefing, detainee admitted he was sent to deliver explosives detonators, likely his real mission that day prior to his capture by Georgian authorities.

¹⁹ Analyst Note: Detainee is likely referring to Abu Gharib aka (Abd al-Haq), aka (Jamal Eldin Boudraa), noted below.

²⁰ 001017 IN T544-01-0404, IIR 6 044 5142 03

²¹ IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 001017 MFR 09-MAY-2003

²² IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 001017 MFR 09-MAY-2003

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Number Two for one year. Detainee was transferred to US custody at Bagram, AF, on 9 April 2003.²³

b. (S) Property Held:

- Clothing
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRD) Registration Card No. 101312
- Analyst Note: Though the following property is not held at JTF-GTMO, they were reportedly in detainee's possession at the time of his capture. See SCI supplement for additional items:
 - 2 explosive detonators²⁴
 - 4 passports (1 Yemeni, 3 Moroccan)

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 9 May 2003

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: There are no reasons for transfer in detainee's file.

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has been less than forthcoming and most of the information he has provided is assessed as false data. Information available in detainee's SCI supplement clarifies his role in Georgia, as well as highlights the extent of his activities and connections to other extremists.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is a member of al-Qaida and assessed to have held a key role in al-Qaida linked plans to conduct explosives operations in Georgia and Chechnya. Detainee was apprehended with explosives detonators and a large sum of US currency. Detainee was trained in explosives and possibly trained others at the al-Faruq Training Camp during 2001. Detainee is connected to numerous extremists and known al-Qaida members. Detainee may have been involved in al-Qaida efforts to develop poisons as weapons.

²³ Kabuli eight 7, Kabuli eight 8, Kabuli eight 12. Analyst Note: These documents accompanied the transfer of the detainees, including YM-1017, from Afghan to US custody.

²⁴ IIR 6 034 1108 03

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- (S//NF) Detainee is a member of al-Qaida involved in unidentified plans to conduct explosives operations in Georgia and Chechnya. Detainee was apprehended by Georgian authorities with explosives detonators and a large sum of US currency.
 - (S//NF) According to al-Qaida operative Abu Hamza al-Nadji, in 2001 al-Nadji spent two weeks teaching religious studies at al-Faruq and was then directed by Usama Bin Laden (UBL) to join forces in Chechnya. Al-Nadji participated in weapons training with several individuals including Umr Muhammad Ali Husayn al-Rammah (aka Zakariya, a variation of detainee's alias) under the trainers Zaid al-Khair and Abu Nasir al-Tunisi.²⁵ Also attending this training were al-Faruq trainer and known al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator, Ibrahim al-Harithi aka (Anjasha al-Mandani), a Saudi national Usama al-Twajiri aka (al-Zubair) aka (Julaybib), Saudi national Abd al-Rahman al-Udah aka (Bishir), and a Saudi national named Umair.²⁶
 - (S//NF) Zubair and Umayra are reportedly detainee's brother and relative respectively.²⁷ Upon completion of training, al-Nadji traveled from Afghanistan to Georgia with these two men and one other individual from the course.²⁸ (Analyst Note: Umayra is likely a variant of Umair. If these men are indeed brother and relative of detainee, detainee may have information about their whereabouts, their activities in Georgia, and their connections to terrorism. Additionally, detainee is likely the third individual who traveled with them.)
 - (S//NF) In May 2002 al-Nadji learned of the arrest of detainee by the Georgian authorities via a sting operation whereby the Georgian authorities arranged a meeting to negotiate the release of Chechen extremists.²⁹
 - (S//NF) Detainee had two explosive detonators in his possession when he was apprehended by Georgian authorities.³⁰ Detainee also was reported to have \$2,700 US on his person at the time of his initial arrest.³¹
 - (S//NF) According to Tariq Mahmud Ahmad al-Sawah US9EG-000535DP (EG-535), detainee had a basic knowledge of the Russian language and that he received training at al-Faruq, which included basic knowledge of explosives and tactics associated with placing explosives.³²

²⁵ Analyst Note: A variant of Nasir is Nassir.

²⁶ TD-314/30811-02 (Analyst Note: UK-10007 stated that UBL came to al-Faruq in February 2001 to speak about the importance of jihad. This is possibly when UBL directed al-Nadji to join forces in Chechnya. Based on the details of Abu Hamza al-Nadji and detainee's timelines and dates of the training courses identified below, it is assessed that the training under Zaid al-Khair was conducted sometime between late February and April 2001.)

²⁷ TD-314/12410-02

²⁸ TD-314/30811-02

²⁹ TD-314/30811-02

³⁰ IIR 6 034 1108 03

³¹ > 302 9may03 1016

³² > 000535 SIR 05-SEP-2006,

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- (S//NF) According to Abd al-Rahim Abdul Rassak Janko, ISN US9SY-000489DP (SY-489), detainee claimed he trained at al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan and was fighting in Chechnya prior to 11 September 2001. SY-489 further stated detainee claimed, after training in Afghanistan, he went to Georgia via Istanbul and then to Chechnya to fight with Ibn Khattab (deceased).³³ (Analyst Note: There are approximately 10 years missing from detainee's account. He likely traveled to Afghanistan and received training during this time period between 1998 and 2000.)
- (S//NF) In mid-March 2002, a Georgian government service again provided a physical description of Zakaria (detainee alias), who was located in the Pankisi Gorge and resided in the village of Duisi with Zubair and Umayra. The individual was described as being approximately 155 cm tall with a thin, oblong face, dark eyes, a narrow head, high cheekbones with sunken cheeks, and an Arab appearance. He had an average build and reportedly walked like Charlie Chaplin.³⁴ The suspect was further described as using his hands when talking, having a thin, feminine voice, and always wearing a long, black Arab robe.³⁵ (Analyst Note: Additional information is available in the SCI supplement.)
- (S//NF) Detainee not only received explosives training but was probably a subsequent trainer at the al-Faruq Training Camp. (Analyst Note: This assessment is based on the determination that the aliases Zakariya, Abu Zakariya, and Zakaria al-Yemeni belong to the detainee.)
 - (S//NF) A variation of detainee's alias, Abu Zakariya al-Yemeni, appears on an al-Qaida associated document found in al-Qaida operative Abu Hafis al-Masri's (aka Muhammed Atef) home in Kandahar in 2001. The document listed al-Qaida operatives in an apparent order of precedence. Detainee is approximately 130th out of 170 individuals on the list.³⁶
 - (S//NF) EG-535 photo-identified detainee, who he knew by his alias Zakaria, and stated detainee trained at al-Faruq.³⁷ (Analyst Note: EG-535 taught explosives at al-Faruq. Detainee's possession of explosives detonators possibly indicates his complicity and role as a probable facilitator for terrorist bomb operations in the Georgia region.)
 - (S//NF) Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fahkri aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212) stated an individual by the name of Zakariya al-Yemeni

³³ IIR 6 034 1314 03, Analyst Note: Ibn Khattab aka (Emir Khattab), was a well known leader of Chechen fighters and military Commander of the Islamic International Brigade who was active against the Russians from 1995 until his death in 2002.

³⁴ Analyst Note: Detainee has a distinctive walk as referenced by other sources, which is likely a result of a previous injury. Detainee has also had surgery on his knee.

³⁵ TD-314/12410-02

³⁶ IIR 7 739 3294 02

³⁷ > 000535 SIR 05-SEP-2006,

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- was a member of the al-Qaida Training Subcommittee and taught weapons and explosives.³⁸
- (S//NF) Martin Mumbanga, ISN US9UK-010007DP (UK-10007, transferred), attended al-Faruq from January to February 2001, and was trained in mountain tactics and heavy weapons. He remembered only one trainer's name, an Arab named Zakariya.³⁹
 - (S//NF) In June 2001, al-Qaida/Jamaat Islamiyah (JI) intermediary Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan participated in a twenty day explosives course under Abu Zakariya al-Yemeni. This training included TNT, C-4, and dynamite.⁴⁰
 - (S//NF) Shawqi Awad Balzuhair, ISN US9YM-000838DP (YM-838), stated he attended training for three months starting in late June 2001 at al-Faruq. YM-838 indicated that his explosives trainer was Zakariya al-Yemeni.⁴¹
 - (S//NF) Ali Yahya Mahdi al-Raimi, ISN US9YM-000167DP (YM-167), stated he arrived at al-Faruq in late August 2001 and one of his trainers went by the name of Zakariya. YM-167 explained that Zakariya was a skinny Saudi, about 26 years old, with short hair and beard.⁴² (Analyst Note: Extremists often refer to Saudi and Yemeni nationalities interchangeably due to their linguistic and cultural similarities. These similarities often result in the misidentification of Yemeni nationals as Saudis, as in the case of YM-167's and MO-237's description of detainee.)
 - (S//NF) Detainee is connected to numerous extremists and known al-Qaida members.
 - (S//NF) According to SY-489, detainee claims to have fought with Ibn Khattab in Chechnya.⁴³ Ibn Khattab was a close associate of Shamil Basayev, who treated him as a brother due to Basayev's father, Salman, who reportedly declared Ibn Khattab his adopted son.⁴⁴
 - (S//NF) In February 2002, several prominent mujahideen extremists were living and probably involved in logistical and financial activities in support of mujahideen extremists in Duisi. The most influential mujahideen in this area was Amjad and Abu Gharib aka (Abd al-Haq), aka (Jamal Eldin Boudraa). In addition to these individuals, there were three men whose relative rank within the local mujahideen was unknown—detainee, Abu Gharib's brother Takhid aka (Taqi al-

³⁸ TD-314/32220-02, Analyst Note: At the time of his capture, detainee had two explosives detonators in his possession, suggesting his possible familiarity with these devices.

³⁹ TD-314/14784-02

⁴⁰ TD-314/50635-03, Analyst Note: JI is an NIPF Priority 1B target. Priority 1B targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US persons or interests.

⁴¹ TD-314/39082-02

⁴² 000167 302 20-MAY-2002

⁴³ IIR 6 034 1314 03

⁴⁴ EUCOM Assessment-Shamil Basayev

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Din) aka (Reeda Boudraaa), and Zubair aka (Zubaydah). The source stated that, although he did not know when detainee arrived in the Pankisi Gorge, there were rumors he fought in the October 2001 Chechen campaign and, prior to that, he was in Afghanistan.⁴⁵ (Analyst Note: This corroborates SY-489's information. The Zubaydah referenced is not high-level operative Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn aka (Abu Zubaydah), US9GZ -010016DP, (GZ-10016).)

- (S//NF) Abu Gharib, who was captured with detainee, has been identified as the commander of the "Battalion of Death", a specialized unit composed of both Arabs and Chechens.⁴⁶ Abu Gharib was also a deputy to Amjad.⁴⁷
- (S//NF) Upon news of detainee's arrest, the situation in the Pankisi Gorge became noticeably tense as Chechen field commanders attempted to determine who was responsible for the abduction of the detainee and the related death of Visergey Margoshvili aka (Saleh).⁴⁸ Detainee stated the Saleh was driving the vehicle in which detainee was riding when detainee was captured.⁴⁹ Saleh is also Abu Gharib's brother-in-law.⁵⁰ (Analyst Note: The concern detainee's capture created among the mujahideen in the area reflects the likely importance of detainee within the group.)
- (S//NF) Detainee appeared in a video clip of logistical and financial support personnel with Aslanbek Bagakashvili.⁵¹ Bagakashvili acted as an interpreter for Abu Gharib's brother Takhid and was said to have been very close to Abu Gharib until they had a falling out over money.⁵² Bagakashvili is identified as a Wahabist, and a member of the Bandit Group of Paranaoz Khangosvili.⁵³
- (S//NF) In early 2002, a Georgian government service identified an individual using detainee's alias Zakariya and fitting detainee's physical description as having been in the Pankisi Gorge and in Abkhazia, GG, for a long time, and playing a significant role in the Pankisi Gorge, although not a leading or commanding role. Zakariya was believed to have been a member of Abu Malik's Jamaat aka (Mazhadov Unit). He was a member of a suicide paratrooper unit, known as a "kamikaze unit," under the leadership of Shamil Basayev (deceased) and Ibn Khattab (deceased).⁵⁴

⁴⁵ TD-314/08443-02

⁴⁶ IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 0010017 MFR 09-MAY-2003, Analyst Note: Detainee's capture event is also included in IIR 6 044 5142 03, TD-314/01440-02

⁴⁷ TD-314/12410-02, Analyst Note: A variant of Amjad is Amjed.

⁴⁸ TD-314/21441-02, IIR 6 034 0213 05, Analyst Note: Visergey Margoshvili was the driver of the vehicle in which detainee was a passenger when captured.

⁴⁹ IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 001017 MFR 09-MAY-2003

⁵⁰ 001017 T544-0404, IIR 6 044 5142 03

⁵¹ TD-314/13606-02

⁵² TD-314/08443-02

⁵³ TD-314/12410-02

⁵⁴ TD-314/13714-02

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- (S//NF) As of April 2002, a Georgian government service reported that Abu Malik was providing security for mujahideen living in the Khalatsani, GG, area in the Pankisi Gorge. Abu Malik is assessed to have been responsible for taking care of fighters in Pankisi Gorge, preparing them for combat and then sending them to Shamil Basayev and Ibn Khattab.⁵⁵ (Analyst Note: Detainee was likely among the fighters that Abu Malik assisted.)
- (S//NF) Detainee was identified as being a close contact of a man named Islam while in Abu Malik's Jamaat.⁵⁶ Islam is a Chechan believed to be the Chief of Security for the Omalo communications center. Following detainee's capture, a large number of mujahideen moved from the Pankisi Gorge to the communications center and set up 24-hour roving and static patrols.⁵⁷
- (S//NF) At the time of detainee's capture, Basayev was a field commander operating in Chechnya and identified as an Islamic extremist who would continue to work closely with mujahideen leader Ibn Khattab in support of creating an Islamic state in the Caucasus.⁵⁸ Basayev led a group known as the Chechen Islamic Extremists to include the Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM).⁵⁹
- (S//NF) In March 2002, detainee, Zubair, and Umayra were located at Abu Malik's compound in Khalatsani.⁶⁰ Additionally, Abu Gharib maintained a house in Khalatsani known as the Abu Malik base. He purchased the house prior to October 2001.⁶¹ (Analyst Note: The Abu Malik Jamaat noted above may possibly be the same as the house maintained by Abu Gharib. This source further corroborates reports tying detainee to the extremist network in Georgia.)
 - (S//NF) In late February 2002, detainee and Zubair were reportedly looking for a new residence. The source was not sure of the details but felt it had something to do with a dispute over money with their roommate, Abu Umer, who had moved out in early February.⁶² (Analyst Note: It is possible that Abu Umer and Umayra are the same individual.)

⁵⁵ TD-341/15149-02

⁵⁶ TD-314/13714-02

⁵⁷ TD-314/21441-02

⁵⁸ EUCOM Assessment—Shamil Basayev

⁵⁹Analyst Note: RSRSCM is a Priority 2B Counterterrorism Target, which is defined as groups that maintain a capability to carry out terrorist operations against US interests but have not yet demonstrated intention to do so; groups that have demonstrated both capability and intention to attack US interests, but have been effectively constrained by their own governments; countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that are of moderate concern; groups that would otherwise be placed in Priority 3 but for the fact that one or more of their members are under indictment in the United States; or countries with safehavens where terrorist groups can operate with relative security.

⁶⁰ TD-314/13754-02

⁶¹ TD-314/08443-02

⁶² TD-314/08443-02

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- (S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL) In mid-April 2002, detainee and Zubair were collocated with suicide operative Taqi al-Din in Georgia (probably near Tbilisi). They were possibly planning a trip to meet Abdul Rahman on about 28 April 2002. Taqi al-Din was reportedly collocated with detainee in Georgia in March 2002.⁶³ (Analyst Note: Taqi al-Din is aka Takhid, Abu Gharib's brother.)
- (S//NF) Detainee claims Suleiman introduced him to Ruslan Hamza Gelayev and that detainee visited Gelayev's home at least three times, receiving training from him on at least one visit. Detainee admits calling Gelayev by his first name—Hamza.⁶⁴ Gelayev is referred to as the overall commander of the Pankisi Gorge.⁶⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee may have been involved in al-Qaida efforts to develop poisons as weapons.
 - (S//NF) According to Georgian security sources discussing events in the Pankisi Gorge, the April 2002 operation in which detainee was captured netted a total of three Arabs, one of whom was a "Poisoner."⁶⁶ (Analyst Note: It is unknown what is exactly meant by this descriptor, but it is possible that the individual was involved in the attempt to acquire poisons in collaboration with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It is also possible, given his connections, that detainee was the "Poisoner" identified.)

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been mostly compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 109 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 25 March 2008, when he used bodily fluids inappropriately. He has 11 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 17 June 2004, when he spat on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions/camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 17 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction and five so far in 2008.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of **MEDIUM** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 27 March 2008.

⁶³ 11627-02 Tearline 25-APR-2002

⁶⁴ IIR 6 034 1277 03, IIR 6 034 1103 03, 001017 SIR 12-MAY-2003, 001017 MFR 09-MAY-2003

⁶⁵ TD-314/15149-02

⁶⁶ TIME-Inside al-Qaida's Georgia Refuge, 19 OCT 2002

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
b. (S//NF) Placement and Access: Detainee's assessed training at al-Qaida facilities, as well as reported tenure as a trainer provided him with knowledge of training curriculum and organizational membership. Detainee's time in Georgia provided him with knowledge of extremist activities, logistics, and other facilitators operating in the region at that time. Detainee's reported association with high level al-Qaida leaders probably provided him with knowledge of their identities, security practices, movement, and related activities. Detainee may have knowledge of al-Qaida poison programs.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee is an assessed member of al-Qaida, who is assessed to have trained at al-Qaida associated facilities, and was reported to be a trainer by several detainees. Detainee served as an extremist facilitator, providing logistical support to mujahideen operating in Georgia and Chechnya. Detainee is connected to numerous extremists and other known al-Qaida members. Detainee may have been involved in al-Qaida efforts to develop poisons as weapons.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi-associated poison network
- Al-Qaida training camps, trainers, and trainees
- Key Georgian/Chechen mujahideen personnel, logistics, and operations.
- Terrorist travel facilitators
- Terrorist biographical/psychological information

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 30 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

MH

MARK H. BUZBY
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding

* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.