




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20320109

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

9 January 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000259DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Fadil Husayn Salih Hintif
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Fadil Bin Hussien Bin Saleh Bin Hautash, Mansour al-Dahhi, Mansur Muhammad Salih
- Place of Birth: Al-Jawf, Yemen (YM)
- Date of Birth: 1981
- Citizenship: Yemen
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000259DP



2. (U//FOUO) **Health:** Detainee is in good health.

3. (S//NF) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

- (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) with Transfer Language on 19 January 2006.
- (S//NF) Executive Summary:** Detainee is assessed to be a possible member of al-Qaida. Detainee is linked to known al-Qaida recruiters and guesthouses. Detainee was arrested trying to flee from Afghanistan (AF) to Pakistan (PK). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20320109

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- A **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **LOW** intelligence value.

c. **(S//NF) Summary of Changes:** There were no significant changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation.

4. **(S//NF) Detainee's Account of Events:**

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a. **(S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee completed elementary school and part of middle school in Yemen. Detainee left school in 1995 because he started fights and got into trouble at school. Detainee worked on the family farm for four or five years.¹ In 1998, detainee's cousin, Moussaed Muhammad Naji, won a scholarship to the University of Damascus. That May detainee along with his cousin traveled to Damascus, Syria (SY). While there, detainee met Muhammad Hussein al-Waili (NFI), a fellow Yemeni attending the university. Detainee accepted an invitation from al-Waili to travel to Iran (IR). The two stopped in Tehran, IR, for two days, rarely leaving the hotel room. They proceeded to Mashad, IR, for 10 days, where they attended an annual Shia pilgrimage.² Detainee left al-Waili in Mashad and returned to his hometown al-Jawf.³ In July 2000, detainee received his share of inheritance from his father's estate and then moved to Sanaa, YM. In Sanaa detainee purchased a taxi to make his living. Detainee lived in Sanaa with three students from the University of Sanaa.⁴

b. **(S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** While living with the students in Sanaa, detainee attended the Abu Bakr al-Saddiq Mosque where he met Abu Yasser who was applying to study at the mosque. Yasser suggested detainee could help the poor in Afghanistan. Detainee agreed, thinking it would be a good way to honor his father. While in Sanaa, detainee took a ten-day course in religion, prayer, and the Hadith taught by Sheikh al-Wadii.

¹ 000259 302 16-APR-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee has provided conflicting accounts during separate interviews. In a July 2003 interview, detainee stated he left school in 1997 at the age of 17 due to disagreements with his classmates, the majority of which were from a different tribe. He also claimed to have worked for two years on the family farm, which he stated was 100 donems, which is approximately 62 acres. See 000259 SIR 28-JUL-2003 and 000259 SIR 11-AUG-2003.

² Analyst Note: Mashad is considered the holiest city in Iran, and is home to the shrine of Imam Ridha (variant: Reza), a figure that many Shia believe was killed by a jealous Sunni ruler. Millions of Shia travel every year to visit the shrine.

³ IIR 6 034 1628 03

⁴ 000259 MFR 11-AUG-2003 Analyst Note: His father died when detainee was four years of old.

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Detainee also met Omar al-Sharqi (variant Sherqi aka Abu Omar al-Shamali), who also encouraged him to travel to Afghanistan.⁵ After approximately one month of driving the taxi and making very little money, detainee sold his taxi. Detainee informed his brother Ghaleb of his intention to travel to Afghanistan. Ghaleb gave detainee 3000 Saudi Riyals for the trip. Detainee promised his family he would stay in Afghanistan no more than three months.⁶ In July or August 2001, detainee departed Yemen for Afghanistan. While waiting for his flight, he met Khuttaiba al-Adani (NFI), who also was traveling to Afghanistan.⁷ They flew to Karachi, PK, and continued to Quetta, PK. Al-Adani led detainee to a guesthouse where they met Daoud (NFI).⁸ Al-Adani and detainee departed Quetta later that day and traveled to Kandahar, AF. They stayed five or six days at a guesthouse for Arabs in Kandahar run by Abu Khoulouh al-Yemeni.⁹ He stated that he kept all his travel documents on his person, and that al-Yemeni was the only armed individual at the house.¹⁰ Al-Yemeni told detainee that al-Sharqi, his recruiter from Yemen, was at Hamza al-Ansari's house in Kabul, AF.¹¹ Detainee and six Afghans left in a taxi for Kabul, leaving his acquaintance Khuttaiba al-Adani at the Kandahar guesthouse.¹²

c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: Detainee moved into al-Sharqi's house in Kabul, where he remained for approximately two months. Al-Sharqi reportedly secured detainee a job transporting patients for the Afghan Red Crescent. Through his work as a Koran teacher, al-Sharqi knew an Afghan named Abed al-Kahar al-Afghani (NFI) that worked as a driver for the Red Crescent. Al-Sharqi informed al-Kahar that detainee wished to work for a humanitarian organization. Detainee started working directly with al-Kahar on a daily basis. Detainee's daily duties were to ride with al-Kahar and pick up medical supplies, food, and blankets, then deliver them to different locations around Kabul. A white Toyota cargo van with a red crescent on the side was used for deliveries. An individual named Qary (variants Kari, and Qari) Bilal supervised al-Kahar and other Afghani workers at the supply warehouse in Kabul. Detainee reported that he saw no other Arabs working for the Red Crescent.¹³ Detainee denied attending any training camps in Afghanistan, saying he had already received

⁵ 000259 302 16-APR-2002

⁶ 000259 MFR 11-AUG-2003

⁷ 000259 MFR 11-AUG-2003

⁸ 000259 302 16-APR-2002

⁹ 000259 SIR 30-SEP-2003, Analyst Note: Khoulouh al-Yemeni is assessed to be Ibrahim Ba'alawi aka (Abu Khulud), a known al-Qaida recruiter and manager of an al-Qaida safe house in Kandahar. Ba'alawi was reportedly killed during the bombing of the Kandahar airport in November 2001.

¹⁰ 000259 MFR 18-AUG-2003

¹¹ 000259 302 16-APR-2002

¹² 000259 MFR 18-AUG-2003

¹³ IIR 6 034 1545 03

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training in Yemen (NFI).¹⁴ After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, but before the US invaded Afghanistan, detainee, al-Sharqi, and al-Sharqi's wife left for Logar Province, AF, where al-Sharqi rented a house. One month later, the group learned that Kabul had fallen to the Northern Alliance (NA), so they moved to the residence of Abd al-Sattal (NFI) in Jalalabad, AF, where they remained for 20 days.¹⁵ Detainee denied having ever heard of Tora Bora.¹⁶

5. (S//NF) Capture Information:

a. (S//NF) Locals in Jalalabad reportedly told al-Sharqi and detainee that NA forces were killing Arabs and they should go to Pakistan. An unidentified Afghan helped guide them into Pakistan. The guide told al-Sharqi and detainee to sanitize themselves of any papers indicating they were Arabs. Detainee gave his passport to al-Sharqi. The Afghan reportedly took families first, and planned to escort al-Sharqi and his wife to Peshawar, PK, and then return for detainee. The Afghan returned and took detainee by car to the mountains. From there, detainee was to walk into Pakistan. On his way, detainee met another Afghan who assumed responsibility as detainee's guide. They stopped at a house where detainee saw other Arabs. The guide told detainee to eat and rest before they crossed into Pakistan. Several days later they arrived at the border, where detainee observed Pakistani police. The guide directed him to surrender, and informed detainee that he would be returned to Yemen.¹⁷ Detainee complied with the advice, but Pakistani authorities ultimately transferred detainee to the custody of US forces in Kohat, PK, on 3 January 2002.¹⁸

b. (S) Property Held:

- Casio model A159W watch
- 8,000 Pakistani Rupees

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 26 April 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: To provide information on the following:

¹⁴ 000259 SIR 30-APR-2004

¹⁵ 000259 302 16-APR-2002, Analyst Note: NA forces entered Kabul on 13 November 2001

¹⁶ 000259 SIR 09-OCT-2003

¹⁷ 000259 302 16-APR-2003

¹⁸ TD-314/00845-02

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- General information on safe houses used by Arab fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including points of contact and transport procedures
- General information on personnel who worked in safe houses in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as personnel who worked for the Red Crescent

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee has provided varied accounts of his activities with inconsistent details. Detainee has attempted to minimize his probable role as a medical assistant in support of Taliban and al-Qaida combat operations. In a late December 2001 custodial interview, detainee admitted to dispensing medicine for the Taliban.¹⁹ Since his arrival at JTF-GTMO, detainee has diverged from his earlier confession. In a November 2002 interview, detainee stated he served as a medical assistant only to sick children and landmine victims. When asked if any of these patients were members of the Taliban or al-Qaida, detainee said they were not, but could not articulate why he believed that to be the case. Detainee's stated timeline and route of travel roughly mirror that of many mujahideen; however, aspects of his story are questionable. For example, it is doubtful that detainee entrusted his passport to al-Sharqi, as al-Sharqi was also an Arab. Detainee has not accurately accounted for several months between his travel to Afghanistan in early 2001 and his purported work with the Red Crescent beginning in July or August of 2001. Detainee's pilgrimage to a major Shia shrine is highly questionable, and possibly a cover for unidentified activities while in Iran.

7. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a possible member of al-Qaida. Detainee associated with known al-Qaida members, who recruited him and facilitated his travel. Detainee admitted to providing aid and comfort to the Taliban, and his name appeared on a recovered al-Qaida document. Detainee possibly attended training at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq training camp and stayed in various al-Qaida and Taliban guesthouses.

- (S//NF) Detainee was recruited and assisted by known al-Qaida recruiters and facilitators in Yemen. Detainee attended course instructed by Abu Yasser Naji, Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadii, and Abu Omar al-Sharqi; each played a role in recruiting detainee and facilitating his travel. Naji and al-Wadii are known al-Qaida recruiters and facilitators.

¹⁹ TD-314/00963-02

²¹ IIR 6 034 1533 03, IIR 6 034 1440 04

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- Detainee was recruited by Abu Yasser Naji, a graduate of the al-Farqan Institute and a travel facilitator who worked with Shaykh Muqbul al-Wadii.²¹ Naji also recruited Majid Mahmud Abdu Ahmad, ISN US9YM-000041DP (YM-041).²²
- (S/NF) Detainee admitted being instructed by Shaykh Muqbil al-Wadii. Al-Wadii operated the al-Farqan Institute in Damaj, AF. Al-Wadii was pro-jihad and financed the travel of many mujahideen to Afghanistan.²³
- (S/NF) Abu Omar al-Sharqi recruited detainee and helped to facilitate his travel.²⁴ Detainee claimed he gave his passport to al-Sharqi, with whom he stayed while in Kabul and Logar prior to crossing into Pakistan.²⁵
 - (S/NF) Abd al-Rahman Maadha Dhafir al-Hilala al-Umari, ISN US9SA-000199 (SA-199), identified al-Sharqi, aka (Abu Omar al-Shalami), as fighting along side him in Tora Bora.²⁶ (Analyst Note: SA-199's account suggests that detainee may also have been in Tora Bora with al-Sharqi.)
- (S/NF) Detainee associated with Qari Bilal, an individual identified as a Taliban leader and guesthouse manager. Detainee stated Qari Bilal was detainee's supervisor at the Kabul Red Crescent warehouse. Other detainees identified Qari Bilal as a Taliban commander and guesthouse manager in the Kabul area of operations.
 - (S/NF) Abdul Rahman Atah Allah Mahmood Shubutti, ISN US9YM-00224DP (SA-224), reported that Qari Bilal ran a Taliban guesthouse just outside of Kabul.²⁷
 - (S/NF) Toufiq Saber Muhammad al-Maraw I, ISN US9YM-000129DP (YM-129), admitted he stayed for several months at a Taliban guesthouse called al-Said. An Arabic speaker named Qari Bilal operated the house, which was reportedly 30 km from the front lines.²⁸
 - (S/NF) Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Abid al-Haythani al-Qurashi, ISN US9SA-000214DP (SA-214), reported that Bilal was an Afghan Taliban commander reportedly in charge of approximately fifteen people on the Bagram, AF, front line.²⁹
 - (S/NF) Ali Moshen Salih, ISN US9YM-000221DP (YM-221), reported that Qari Bilal was a leader of his fifteen man unit on the front lines near Bagram and responsible for assigning positions to new arrivals.³⁰

²² IIR 6 034 1440 04, 000041 SIR 02-AUG-2004, 000041 SIR 23-AUG-2004

²³ 000259 302 16-APR-2002

²⁴ 000259 302 16-APR-2002, IIR 6 034 1628 03

²⁵ 000259 302 07-MAY-2003

²⁶ 000199 302 20-FEB-2002

²⁷ IIR 6 034 0338 02

²⁸ 000129 302 14-OCT-2002, IIR 4 201 2570 04

²⁹ IIR 2 340 6151 02, IIR 2 340 6432 02

³⁰ 000221 SIR 21-FEB-2002

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- (S//NF) Muhammad Ali Abdullah Muhammad Bwazir, ISN US9YM-000440DP (YM-440), stated that Qari Bilal operated a guesthouse in Kabul about fifty minutes from the Said Center.³¹
- (S//NF) Analyst Note: The preceding bullets substantiate Bilal as a member of the Taliban, guesthouse operator, and front line commander. Detainee worked directly under Bilal in the Red Crescent and can probably provide more information on Bilal's connection within the Taliban, personnel that stayed at the guesthouse, and actions that Bilal conducted on the front lines.
- (S//NF) Detainee admittedly stayed at al-Qaida's al-Ansar Guesthouse in Kandahar for five days prior to traveling to Kabul. The emir of al-Ansar was Abu Khoulood, aka (Ibrahim Ba'alawi).³² (Analyst Note: Al-Ansar Guesthouse was a known transit point for known Islamic extremists en route to al-Faruq and other training camps in the Kandahar area.)³³
 - (S//NF) Detainee's name, Fadel Hussein Hantaf, and alias, Monsour al-Dahhi, appeared on a list of 324 Arabic names, nationalities, and trust account contents recovered during raids of al-Qaida safe houses in Karachi. The list associates detainee with trust account number 615 353, and indicates that he possessed a Yemeni passport and an ID card.³⁴ (Analyst Note: Such lists are indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to travel to the front lines or abroad. Trust accounts were simply storage compartments such as envelopes or folders that were used to secure the individual's personal valuables until completion of training or other activity.)³⁵
- (S//NF) Detainee possibly attended paramilitary training at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq training camp near Kandahar in the fall of 2000, months before detainee's admitted travel to Afghanistan.
 - (S//NF) A variant of detainee's alias, Abu Mansour, was found on a large document from the Military Committee of the Office of Mujahideen Affairs recovered from an al-Qaida house in Kandahar. According to the document, Abu Mansour was from al-Jawf (variant al-Jouf), had a high school education, and was referred by Abu al-Abbass (NFI) and Anagashah al-Makki (NFI). The individual was scheduled to arrive at the camp on the 3rd day of the 7th month in the Hijri year 1421. On the same document, the name Mansour al-Yamani is on a list of individuals to be

³¹ 000440 MFR 24-MAY-2002

³² 000259 302 07-MAY-2003

³³ TD-314/50977-02

³⁴ TD-314/40693-02

³⁵ IIR 6 034 0844 03

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- registered for a "Tactical Course."³⁶ (Analyst Note: The date converts to 30 September 2000. The tactical course is assessed to be basic paramilitary training.)
- (S//NF) Detainee was captured with a Casio model A159W watch. (Analyst Note: This model of watch is linked to al-Qaida and radical Islamic terrorists which use the watch to design improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Reports indicate that al-Qaida distributed Casio watches to students in the "Watch Timer Course" which is included in explosives training. There is no additional information to confirm that detainee completed explosives training.)³⁷

c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and hostile toward the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 40 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, four of which are for assaults. The most recent occurring on 6 December 2006, when detainee was found in possession of food rolled up in letters from his attorney. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include assault, medication misuse, participating in a mass disturbance, unauthorized communications, failure to follow guard instructions, damage to property, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. Detainee has one Report of Disciplinary Infraction for assault in 2006 occurring on 31 August 2006, when detainee repeatedly spat in the face of guards while they escorted him back to his cell.

8. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

- a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **LOW** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 14 November 2006.
- b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee probably received basic paramilitary training at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq training camp. Detainee spent several months in Taliban guesthouses, which would have afforded him access to personalities at those guesthouses, information on guesthouse operations, and possibly limited and indirect exposure to al-Qaida command and control information. No reporting indicates detainee served in a leadership or operational planning capacity. Detainee has not been identified by any senior al-Qaida or Taliban figures.
- c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee should be able to provide information on al-Qaida guesthouses, personalities, and operations. If detainee did serve in a humanitarian

³⁶ AFGP-2002-800321

³⁷ 000002 MFR 24-APR-2002, Casio Watches MFR 24-Apr-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee claimed he purchased the watch in Sanaa, YM, when he first started working as a taxi driver. See 000259 SIR 23-SEP-2003.

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
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or medical capacity, detainee could provide information on Taliban battlefield medicine. While the detainee has provided conflicting accounts with questionable veracity, there is no additional reporting to confirm or refute his story. Further investigation is necessary to verify detainee's possible training at al-Faruq and his alleged employment with the Red Crescent in Kabul. The information available indicates detainee's involvement with al-Qaida elements was limited.

d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Al-Qaida guesthouses, associated personalities, and operations
- Activities and personnel within the Afghan Red Crescent
- Recruitment and facilitation in Yemen

9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 11 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.
Rear Admiral, US Navy
Commanding