




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300609

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

25 July 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo
Detainee, ISN: US9AG-000705DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mustafa So (Son of, Bin) Ahmed
Aliases and Current/True Name: Mustafa Walid Ahmed Hamlily, Abu
Abdullah Al Jazaieri, Abu Abdullah Al Bechari, Athman Farag Abed
Alha, Mustafa Ahmed Hamlily Hussein, Mustafa S. Abdullah, M.
Outhman F. Abdulla
- Place of Birth: Bashare, Algeria (AG)
- Date of Birth: 20 February 1959
- Citizenship: Algeria
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AG-000705DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health. He had surgery performed on his left knee and a partial medial meniscectomy in 2003. Detainee has no known allergies. His medications include Midrin and Motrin.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Retained in DoD Control (DoD).

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 02 August 2003. Based upon

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300609

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300609

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AG-000705DP (S)

information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Retained in DoD Control (DoD).

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a probable member of the Al Qaida global terrorist network. Detainee was a senior Wafa Humanitarian Organization official who served as deputy director of the Kandahar Wafa office under the Afghanistan/Pakistan director. Detainee has numerous historical and current links to Al-Qaida and likely served as Wafa's primary contact with the North African Extremist Network (NAEN) beginning as early as 1987 when he stayed in a UBL guesthouse in Saudi Arabia. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S//NF) Prior History: Detainee and his brother had "political" problems with Algerian authorities as a result of his their participation in a local mosque. They left Algeria in 1986 due to those problems. He traveled to Mali, then Mauritania and continued with a false Mauritanian passport to Saudi Arabia, where he lived at the Prophet's Mosque in Mecca. In Saudi Arabia, detainee became associated with the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) (an IICT Tier One NGO) that encouraged him to join the jihad in Afghanistan (AF). They provided him with the necessary funds and he traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan (PK), in 1987. He received weapons training at the Bajawar Camp near Peshawar. Detainee claims he then worked for the IIRO school for orphans in Hayatabad, PK. Detainee received one year of training in Peshawar, PK, in 1989. He returned to Algeria in January 1991, only to return to Pakistan about seven months later. In 1995, he used a false Iraqi passport to move his family to Yemen (YM), where he worked in the Mosque in Bumby, YM, under Sheikh Muqbil. Detainee returned to Peshawar, PK, in 1997, and moved to Jalalabad, AF, in 1998 where he farmed and began a "honey" business. Detainee claims he also owned a gas station in Peshawar.

b. (S//NF) Training and Activities: While living in Jalalabad, from approximately 1998 to 2001, detainee resided next to the Algerian guesthouse, which was established in about 2000. Detainee worked for the Kandahar office of the Wafa Humanitarian Organization, a Non Governmental Organization (NGO), from approximately June 2001 to September 2001. He stated that his duties in Wafa merely involved digging wells. Detainee claims he left Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks.

c. (S//NF) Capture Information: Pakistani police captured detainee and Abdul Aziz Naji around 26 May 2002 at his home outside of Peshawar, PK. (Analyst Note: Naji is Abdul Azia, detainee US9AG-000744DP (ISN 744)). Detainee possessed false Iraqi and

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AG-000705DP (S)

Afghan passports at the time of his arrest. Detainee was turned over to US forces within a week.

d. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 05 August 2002

e. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on the following:

- False travel documentation
- Al-Qaida personalities
- Wafa NGO

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

- (S//NF) Detainee has professional and personal associations with senior Al-Qaida personnel including Abu Zubaydah and possibly UBL. Detainee worked for the Wafa Organization, identified as an Al-Qaida front. Detainee has associations with extremist groups including Lashkar-E-Tayiba and the North African Extremist Network and likely provided assistance to them.
 - (S//NF) Senior Al-Qaida Operative Abu Zubaydah stated that detainee hosted him at his home in Jalalabad, AF, for three months until October 2000. During this stay, other residents included Al-Qaida Operatives Suleiman Al Jazaieri and Abu Jaffar Al Iraqi. Abu Zubaydah noted that during this time, he, Suleiman and Abu Jaffar raised funds and obtained false documents including passports. Abu Zubaydah left detainee's home when UBL sent a message for Abu Zubaydah to join him to discuss closing the Al-Qaida sponsored Khaldan training camp. (Analyst Note: During one session Abu Zubaydah mistook a photograph of detainee US9AF-000987DP for ISN 705. ISN 987 had no connection to Al Wafa, and Zubaydah had no known relationship with ISN 987. The image of ISN 987 shown was shorn and shaven, and was easily mistaken for ISN 705 due to similarities in appearance, as well as Abu Zubaydah's lack of exposure to the detainee sporting a beard and hair. Abu Zubaydah acknowledged knowing ISN 705, and identifies him by name throughout the interrogation process. All subsequent and prior reporting deals with the individual held at Guantanamo as ISN 705.)

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AG-000705DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee stated that although he saw Abu Zubaydah once in a mosque, he never met him or had any dealings with him.
- (S//NF) Abu Zubaydah stated detainee worked in Wafa with Abu Suleiman and that these two likely spent a lot of time together. (Analyst Note: Abu Suleiman is assessed to be Abu Suleiman Al Jazaieri, an Al-Qaida facilitator operating as a deputy to Abu Zubaydah in the North African Extremist Network. Detainee has denied any relationships with Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network are Tier 0 Counterterrorism targets defined as terrorist groups which pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. Detainee acknowledged that Abu Suleiman worked with him at the Wafa office.)
 - (S//NF) According to ISN MO-197, detainee served as director of Jalalabad's Wafa office during ISN 197's time in Jalalabad, 1999-2000. ISN 197 briefly served in the Jalalabad Wafa office. (Analyst Note: This report is consistent with detainee's timeline. Detainee admits to living in Jalalabad prior to going to Kandahar, but not having served with Wafa prior to moving to Kandahar in 2001. According to detainee's account he was in the "honey" business while in Jalalabad, which is a commonly used Al-Qaida cover story. Detainee's probably stayed in Abu Zubaydah's guesthouse during some of his tenure with Wafa in Jalalabad.)
- (S//NF) Detainee denied knowing Abu Jafar Al Jazaieri aka Omar Chabani. (Analyst Note: Abu Jafar was another Abu Zubaydah deputy in the Al-Qaida affiliated North African Extremist Network. Abu Jafar ran the Algerian guesthouse, which was located next door to the detainee's Jalalabad, AF, home. Detainee is likely withholding his true association with Abu Jafar in order to prevent incriminating himself.)
- (S//NF) In initial interviews, detainee stated he traveled with an unknown group to Mali and then alone to Pakistan. ISN 1452 stated that he, his father, brother, and other relatives (Mustafa -detainee, and Abu Yasir) traveled to Pakistan. ISN 1452 also noted that while in Mecca, SA, his father met with UBL and that the group stayed in UBL's guesthouse. (Analyst Note: The association of Mustafa and Abu Yasir as relatives to ISN 1452 indicates detainee is a Abu Yasir's relative. Abu Zubaydah corroborated the information that detainee and Abu Yasir were related. Detainee noted that his brother had to flee Algeria shortly before him, and it is possible that Abu Yasir is that brother. Abu Yasir is assessed to be captured senior Al-Qaida facilitator Abu Bakr Muhammad Bulghiti aka Abu Yasir Al Jazaieri aka Abu Usama aka Abu Hamza aka Fayiz aka Isma'il. Abu Yasir stated he traveled to Pakistan with this group in 1986 after they left Algeria, taking a year and a half to complete the transit. It is unknown if detainee also met with UBL in Mecca, although it is likely. Abu Yasir was also likely the Abu Yasir at Abu Zubaydah's Faisalabad guesthouse with responsibilities for the Electronic Detonator Course.)

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AG-000705DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee has associations with the Lashkar-E-Tayiba. Pakistani authorities captured ISN 744 with detainee at the detainee's home in Riga, located outside of Peshawar, PK. Detainee identified ISN 744 as a member of the Lashkar-E-Tayiba. (Analyst Note: Pakistani authorities arrested Abu Zubaydah on 28 March 2002. Abu Zubaydah had been in Pakistan for approximately two months hiding from authorities with the assistance of the Lashkar-E-Tayiba and attempting to conduct electronic detonator training for IEDs. The Lashkar-E-Tayiba is a Tier 1 Counterterrorism target defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, that have demonstrated the intention and the capability to attack US persons or interests.)
- (S//NF) Detainee likely has information regarding the Wafa NGO's illicit activities in support of extremism and the Taliban. Detainee claimed his duties with the Wafa NGO centered on humanitarian projects, specifically digging water wells and transporting construction equipment and supplies. However, sources including the Wafa director for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Abdullah Alamatrafi US9SA-000005DP (ISN 005), identified the detainee as ISN 005's deputy. Detainee managed the Kandahar office of Wafa during ISN 005's absences from the office. (Analyst Note: Detainee rarely detailed his specific duties with Wafa. The 9/11 Commission Report states that entire charities, such as the Wafa Organization, may have wittingly participated in funneling money to Al-Qaida. In those cases, Al-Qaida operatives controlled the entire organization, including access to bank accounts. Charities were a source of money and also provided significant cover, which enabled the operatives to travel undetected under the guise of working for a humanitarian organization. The Wafa NGO is an NGO Tier 2 Counterterrorism target defined as NGOs which have demonstrated the intent and willingness to support terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests.)
- (S//NF) US9YM-000627DP admitted to hosting Al-Qaida Anthrax program developer Yazid Suffat aka Abu Malik at the Kandahar, AF, Al Wafa office. (Analyst Note: As a senior official in the Kandahar office, detainee likely has knowledge regarding the assistance the Wafa NGO provided to Suffat for anthrax development.)
- (S//NF) Detainee lived in Yemen from 1995 to 1997. Detainee worked under Sheikh Muqbil near Sana'a, YM. (Analyst Note: Detainee's return to Pakistan coincides with the approximate move of UBL's organization from Sudan to Afghanistan. It is likely that Sheikh Muqbil is Sheikh Muqbil Bin Had al-Wad'a. Sheikh Muqbil was a Yemeni Islamic fundamentalist leader and founder of the Al-Salafiah (Salafist) Movement in Yemen. Sheikh Muqbil operated a number of institutions such as the Damaj Center located in Sadaa, north of Sana'a. The Damaj Center is a suspected terrorist training facility. Numerous detainees, including some identified as UBL bodyguards, attended the Damaj Center or had associations with its founder.

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AG-000705DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee is not forthcoming with interrogators. He has a history of lies, contradicting previously supplied information, and omitting key elements in his story. (Analyst Note: Detainee attempts to limit his participation in terrorist organizations and supporting activities.)
 - (S//NF) During his initial interview under US control, detainee claimed to have been a gas station owner in Peshawar, PK, and omitted any association with the Wafa Humanitarian Organization. Additionally, detainee claimed to have been a “honey” salesman in Jalalabad, AF. In yet another interview, the detainee claimed to have been both a “honey” salesman and a gas station owner traveling between Peshawar and Jalalabad. (Analyst Note: Frequent cross-border travels are indicative of facilitation activities. Due to detainee’s associations with Abu Yasir and Abu Suleiman, he likely assisted these Al-Qaida facilitators in the performance of their duties.) Detainee added that the Taliban facilitated his business ventures and that he lived in the Taliban Intelligence area of Jalalabad.
 - Detainee claimed he went to Wafa to ask for assistance to transport his family out of Afghanistan but instead was offered a job to work in the Kandahar, AF, office. Detainee contradicted himself when he stated that he was called and asked to come work for Wafa and then worked in the Jalalabad, AF, office. (Analyst Note: There was no Jalalabad, AF, Wafa office and other detainees have identified the detainee as a Wafa employee in Kandahar. Links to Wafa in Jalalabad are probably more accurately described as connections to the North African Extremist Network.)
 - Detainee claimed that with his dowry, received upon his marriage to a local girl, he was able to purchase land in the village and build a house.

c. (S//NF) Detainee’s Conduct: Detainee’s overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile in nature.

6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined detainee is of HIGH intelligence value.

- (S//NF) Detainee is a relatively untapped resource due to his previous truthfulness. As a senior member of the Wafa NGO, detainee was privy to unique information related specifically to the Jalalabad and Kandahar offices and Wafa as a whole, especially due to his supportive duties for the Wafa director co-located with detainee. Detainee can provide information on the Wafa NGO, Wafa sponsored training programs and assistance to Al-Qaida and the North African Extremist Network. This includes Anthrax production, funding and facilitation activities. Detainee can also provide information on the activities and personnel associated with these entities. Detainee can provide information on procurement and production of false documentation to include passports in North Africa and Central Asia in support of international extremist travels.


JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9AG-000705DP (S)

b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

- Wafa NGO
 - Personnel – co-workers, duties and responsibilities, leadership activities, personnel at large
 - Wafa monetary support to Al-Qaida
 - Wafa support to operatives – Al-Qaida and North African Extremist Network transiting operatives, cover story support, documentation and facilitation support, links to Kuwaiti extremists
 - Militant training – Wafa training camps (reportedly in Herat and near Kabul), reported heavy weapons planned purchase by ISN 005.
 - Funding – sources, methods, personnel (transfer, procurement, distribution)
 - Wafa training camp – personnel, trainees, curriculum, links to Taliban and Al-Qaida
- Al-Qaida and Al-Qaida affiliated training and support facilities
 - Khaldan – funding and documentation support to trainees and operatives
 - Personnel - Abu Zubaydah, Abu Suleiman, Abu Jaffar Al Iraqi
 - Algerian guesthouse, Jalalabad, AF – Abu Jaffar Al Jazaieri
 - Damaj Institute, Sadaa, YM – Training programs, personnel, Sheikh Muqbil, links to UBL and Al-Qaida
 - North African Extremist Network
 - Links to Wafa – support, personnel, funding, facilitation
 - Personnel – recruits, links to European and African countries
 - UBL facilities in Saudi Arabia – Link between UBL’s guesthouse and the Mecca, SA, mosque and the IIRO.

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee’s enemy combatant status was reassessed on 23 September 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.


JAY W. HOOD
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding