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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # MR 10-094, #2
State Jew 3/9/04 CIA 4/1/10
By dal NARA, Date 5/5/10

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N. Y.)
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (R-Indiana)
Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (R-Ohio)
Congressman Dante B. Fascell (D-Florida)
Congressman John Brademas (D-Indiana)
Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Maryland)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME: Thursday, June 19, 1975
8:50 - 10:22 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office
The White House

President: This meeting is even more appropriate than when we spoke last week, Ben. There have been some developments since then. There is a glimmer of hope -- the Clerides/Denktash talks have gone on, even though there has been no progress yet.

I met with Karamanlis and Demirel at Brussels. Both of them talked tough and they both realize something needs to be done. They had a good meeting together.

The Senate vote was close but it was good. Something needs to be done. But before we get into a discussion, I would like Secretary Kissinger to bring you up to date on the discussions and on the internal situation in Turkey.

I see Karamanlis nominated Zatsos as President.



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~~TOP SECRET - XGDS (S)~~
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
Amended 5/29/04 lb

Kissinger: Let me explain where the situation is and what the Turkish domestic situation is. Let me start in February, whatever our views about what happened before.

I met Bitsios in February. He said he would accept a bizonal solution if we could work out the territorial arrangements. Karamanlis wanted a quick solution, to minimize the impact on the Greek domestic situation. I then went on to Turkey, which had a caretaker government. They said they had no power to do anything. But I met with every Turkish leader, urging them to put forth specific proposals to resolve the situation and prevent the development of complex international situation making it more difficult to resolve. They all agreed that they wouldn't discuss it while the embargo was on. They didn't promise to move afterwards, but they certainly would not move before; it would look like they were yielding to pressure. The Greek side has been very conciliatory -- we couldn't ask for a better position than they are now willing to take.

Demirel then came in, which complicated the situation. Demirel couldn't accept the deal we had been working on, for domestic reasons. If Ecevit were in office, I am convinced we would now have a solution. I went to the CENTO meeting in May -- not for CENTO but to talk to the Turkish leaders. Ecevit won't take a position until the coalition does. He basically wants new elections which he feels certain -- as do most of the Parliament -- that he would win. He took Cyprus and he can blame the coalition for giving it away. Demirel was Prime Minister when Turkey didn't move in '67.

The President had good talks with Demirel. But Demirel is looking for some way to manage it so he doesn't get beaten to death domestically.

[He read from the message from Demirel of June 9, at Tab A]

This was followed by an intelligence report we received that our NATO bases would be closed Monday. It is the non-NATO ones that we are most concerned about. They are of major importance to us. We called in the Ambassador and we got a 30-day extension.

Demirel wants to be able to show he stood up to the U.S., or to get the embargo lifted so he can show he got something back Ecevit had lost.

We expect Turkey to make progress in the Cyprus negotiation regardless of the embargo. I think the negotiation is now mostly a matter of Greek and Turkish domestic politics. The range of the issues is reasonably clear. It is not clear whether either side can make the required movement.



The Turks spent the first 20 minutes with the President talking about the arms embargo. I know there is a difference of opinion about our strategy. But I assure you we had no other motive than to bring Turkish concessions. Even if the embargo is lifted, progress on Cyprus would be tough. But if the embargo is lifted, they would know the President's prestige is involved and they couldn't sit. There is still a gap, but it is not unbridgeable. There are only two issues: the nature of the central government and the territorial division. There is also the issue of refugees. [He describes refugee issues.] If they can break the logjam, the issues aren't too difficult. But getting started is the problem. If Greece made a move and it was turned down by Turkey, it would be disastrous for them. If Demirel moves in a way which looks weak, the coalition will break up.

Brent, will you discuss our installations.

General Scowcroft: [Described the bilateral installations.]

Fascell: If we move, won't we have Greek riots, etc.?

Kissinger: The Greeks asked the President in Brussels to warn against military action, especially in connection with the Aegean. We did so. We are preparing military assistance to Greece but we shouldn't link them.

Fascell: But you think there would be no eruption?

Kissinger: Papandreou and Mavros would complain bitterly. But we are convinced Karamanlis wants to get this behind him. If the embargo was lifted and there was no progress, there would be trouble.

Whalen: Let's get right down to cases. We are concerned and want to do something. Our way is the Hamilton Amendment which passed the Senate 41 - 40. Let's face it. You have won some victories which have made the freshmen bitter. We need to resolve it in a way to try to avoid a bitter confrontation. Maybe you have some ideas.

The President: What do you all think?

Brademas: I want to thank you for inviting us, Mr. President. One idea I would like to put forth -- we have mentioned it earlier, but maybe we could modify it some. This idea is to employ the waiver authority. We have checked the legality with the GAO. We would want some private assurance that some action was forthcoming acceptable to both sides; then



the President could waive the \$50 million without Turkey publicly having to say anything. To be sure that there is no renegeing on the agreement, you could assure them there would be another \$50 million coming -- using both FY 75 and 76 -- that is more than the grant we are now giving.

If you announced a reassessment of US-Turkish relations at the same time, it would be a gentle reminder that we don't like ultimatums thrown at us. Another idea is to get NATO more involved to soften the US-Turkish aspects of it. As you know, we here are NATO supporters. We voted against NATO cuts. And I tell the Turks I want aid to Turkey. I have 450 voting Greeks. I don't need it politically.

We know there will be no settlement as good as the Greeks had before the crisis.

President: We discussed the waiver policy before. The lawyers can argue whether the waiver is legal. I think the GAO argument is questionable and I as a lawyer think it is probably not right. Suppose I waive and we either don't get a settlement or it isn't satisfactory. Then I am out on a limb. I don't think that is a satisfactory situation. I talked with Demirel for an hour. He pointed out that there are arms paid for that he can't get shipped and is even having to pay for storage. They just don't understand this and the waiver won't answer it.

Brademas: We are trying to find a way out. I agree, let's forget last August. But it is virtually impossible for Congress to turn around without something happening. We must save face and I think it is fundamentally wrong. Sure it causes you some problems. But we have the national interest to consider. I am offended by the Turkish ultimatums. I disagree with your waiver interpretation. I agree with Kissinger that the sides aren't that far apart. If we could get them \$50 million, get some movement, another \$50 million, more movement and we can end the whole thing in 8 - 12 weeks. In the face of the Turkish ultimatum, even if we tried to just lift the embargo, we would be hung in effigy.

President: I have spoken with some of the leaders -- Tip, for example. Kissinger has talked to Burton. You know the Democratic freshman better than I. I have gotten to know some of them, including Hubbard -- he seems to want to help. It might be worth a try for Kissinger and me to talk to them. I am not sure they understand the nature of the problem.

Whalen: I understand what you both are saying. I see you out on a limb where you could have a problem. What if we applauded your use of the waiver. That might help.



Sarbanes: I think a starting premise has to be an understanding of some accommodation by the Turks. If we can get that, we can orchestrate to save their face. I don't think we can approach the problem from the view of just getting the decision changed. I think it was correct. If we just change, we would be in the position of sustaining aggression. If we know certain things will be done, there are arrangements which can be made -- commercial sales, military sales, grants, etc.

President: Let me follow up on that point. There are differences in the kinds of military deliveries and they can be legally treated differently -- especially when they have bought and paid for things.

Let me throw this out. Is there a possibility of exempting sales?

Sarbanes: There is a fundamental premise though, and that is that movement by us without moves by them.

Kissinger: What bugs the Turks is not grant aid -- that is within our sovereign rights. It is the sales, where they can't get things they have bought. So the waiver gets at what bothers them most.

On the negotiations, there isn't any minor movement on which we could report. It will be done all together, or not at all. If the Turks decide to move, it will be done in six weeks -- but I can't say when they will decide to move.

If Ecevit were in office, we could get a settlement quickly.

Brademas: That is not Clerides' view. He thinks turning the arms on lose us all our leverage. He thinks that sticking fast will put such a bite on Turkish military that they will force a movement.

There is another group in the House which feels more strongly from a different view -- Rangel.

Hamilton: I think there is a trend in the House that the ban should come off. Many who voted for the ban are looking for reasons to change and the trick is to come up with something to help them to change. Can't we explore something other than full restoral? One quirk of the law is that cutoffs are in perpetuity. Maybe we could put on a time limit. Maybe we could permit enough aid to let Turkey fulfill its NATO commitment. I don't think right now you would get the votes to lift the ban.



President: Have you got some language?

Hamilton: We have been working on some ideas.

President: Why don't we have our people work with you. I can see the need for a parliamentary maneuver to avoid a head-on collision. The situation is bound to deteriorate otherwise -- and it is not only Cyprus. Demirel did mention the Aegean and the Greek buildup on the islands. They are just off the Turkish coast. He didn't threaten, but it obviously is a concern. If this continues to unravel, with the Middle East situation nearby, we could have a holocaust. I can't sit here and do nothing.

Brademas: But we can't just turn the arms back on without some actions by the Turks. That leaves us in an indefensible legal and moral situation. That would put the aid bill in jeopardy if we turned any part of it on without any progress from Turkey. We would in that case have to modify our position on the aid bill.

President: We have to be realistic about the situation in Greece and Turkey. For either to take a public position would create an impossible situation.

Brademas: We agree. That is why we want to do it privately -- to let them save face.

Sarbanes: I would like to broaden the discussion to the nature of U.S. foreign policy and providing arms and for what purpose. Aggression has been committed and we can't back off that principle. People may differ on that principle, and the Secretary and I part company on it. But just as we can divide categories of aid, we can divide categories of Turkish response.

The other concern is Greece. Kissinger seems to assume Greece will always be there.

Kissinger: No.

Sarbanes: I don't think so and if we move without any justification, I think there would be an explosion. I know it could even be involved with Yugoslavia, with Tito's departure and a possible crisis involving Greece. So I think we must move in a way which does not antagonize Greece.

President: Can you differentiate between sales and grants?



Sarbanes: Yes, but I can't turn around on any part of it without anything on which to rest it. Because of the critical nature of our relationship to Greece. We want to restore relations with both Greece and Turkey. I think Turkey has more than it needs. I think it is in Turkey's interests to resolve this.

Kissinger: I think most of them want a resolution -- maybe even Makarios. We can't get Turkish progress by 15 July. We also can't get it if there is a linkage with aid. But the President told Demirel that if the President sticks his neck out and they don't act, they are then up against the President also.

Brademas: Then what?

Hamilton: There is another aid bill.

Brademas: We have kept quiet. But it hasn't helped getting Turkish movement when the Executive keeps making statements trying to get Congress to turn around.

Whalen: The language is "substantial progress." I think there has been some.

Kissinger: We can't in good conscience say there has been.

Whalen: Would you rule out John's suggestion on the waiver?

President: It is such a marginal question legally. It puts me out on a limb. I am not saying you would cut it off, but let's be realistic. Statements by you on the floor would be helpful.

Taking Lee's idea of making it affirmative action in support of NATO and sales versus grants, let's see what we can do.

Rosenthal: Findley has a proposal to give NATO \$100 million and let them do it. But the bases problems aren't NATO, but a bilateral problem.

Brademas: Would this proposal... you are discussing be something different from a waiver?

President: Right.

Brademas: But the key part of a waiver was a private assurance from Turkey. If that would be included, I would look at it with an open mind.



President: I haven't explored this with Caramanlis and Demirel.

Brademas: I think that would be crucial.

Sarbanes: Could we keep a couple of tracks open -- the waiver for example? We could also phase down what progress there is in line with what kinds of arms are released. We have tended to look at all this in total packages. Maybe we need to separate things out.

Whalen: I have concerns of time. It will take time. Second, what would we do about private assurances? If we start to debate on the floor....

Sarbanes: There have been peripheral ones -- to Waldheim -- for example. Straightening out some lines, maybe. Can we put together enough peripheral items to justify sales? Maybe. If we can work together.... Congress is helping Greece as against the Turks and the Executive is helping Turkey as against Greece.

President: I will reexamine the waiver, although I have grace reservations. If you could look at Lee's ideas...

Kissinger: I don't exclude that we could put something together like Paul says. The best place to do it is at the Greek-Turkish talks at the end of July.

Rosenthal: We also can't appear to give in to Turkish threats. That would be a sign to others like Portugal.

Sarbanes: Rather than crumble, maybe we should say we should reevaluate our policy.

President: But if I use a waiver, doesn't that look like buckling?

Whalen: That is right. We would have to help the President.

Rosenthal: We are all in this together. Let's explore it again.

Sarbanes: The other should be looked at, too. That puts us in the same boat.

President: We have not only the deadline of the Karamanlis-Demirel talks. There is also the August recess, the end of the fiscal year, etc. There are lots of deadlines.



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9.

Brademas: If we would put this together I can't think of anything better for the country right now.

Fascell: I want to table something here about delivering the material already paid for. There is nothing more basic than the sanctity of a contract. We have got to consider resolving that.

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GERALD R. FORU



Department of State

TELEGRAM

W/H Com # 13
E. J. ...
Gen. Sec. ...

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines, state review 3/9/04
By , NARA, Date 5/20/04

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NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS ATHENS AND NICOSIA AS DESIRED
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHARGE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, TU, CY, GR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FUMMIN CAGLAYANGIL

REF: STATE 133607

1. I MET WITH FUMMIN CAGLAYANGIL LATE AFTERNOON JUNE 9 TO DELIVER YOUR MESSAGES (REFTEL). HIS DIRECTEUR DE CABINET AKBEL WAS ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT. AFTER HEARING YOUR MESSAGE, FUMMIN PONDERED A BIT AND THEN DICTATED A REPLY IN TURKISH TO AKBEL WHO THEREUPON ORALLY TRANSLATED IT INTO ENGLISH FOR ME AT DICTATION SPEED.

2. BEGIN ORAL MESSAGE: "I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE SECRETARY OF STATE VERY MUCH, PARTICULARLY FOR HIS MESSAGE. OUR MEMORIES OF OUR MEETING IN BRUSSELS WITH PRESIDENT FORD AND THE SECRETARY ARE ALSO VERY PRECIOUS. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY DEEP THANKS AND APPRECIATION ON BEHALF OF MY PRIME MINISTER AS WELL AS MYSELF FOR THE PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY KISSINGER'S CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE.

"THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN DEMIREL AND CARAMANLIS HAS, IN OUR VIEW AS WELL, BEEN UNSTRUCTIVE AND EFFECTIVE. IT HAS DEEPENED EACH SIDE'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER AND

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY





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PRACTICAL OUTCOMES HAVE ALSO EMERGED. IT WAS DECIDED THAT APPRECIATION OF THIS PROGRESS SHOULD BE RECORDED AND EFFORTS SHOULD BE EXERTED TO REACH SOLUTIONS THROUGH MEETINGS AT MINISTERIAL LEVELS.

"THE ISSUE OF TERRITORY SHOULD CONSTITUTE THAT PART OF THE QUESTION WHICH HAS TO BE DEALT WITH AT THE VERY FINAL STAGE. THE SOLUTION OF OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES, BESIDES THAT OF TERRITORY, THROUGH MUTUAL AGREEMENT, WOULD ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF TERRITORY. I THINK THAT OUR GREEK COLLEAGUES HAVE ALSO UNDERSTOOD AND ADOPTED THIS VIEW OF OURS.

"THERE ARE TWO SUBJECTS ON WHICH I HAVE TO SPEAK CLEARLY NOW. I HOPE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND ME. AS LONG AS THE ARMS EMBARGO IS IN EFFECT, THERE IS NOT REPEAT NOT MUCH WE CAN DO ON THE ISSUE OF TERRITORY. AN IMAGE TO THE EFFECT THAT TURKEY HAS FINALLY GIVEN IN TO THIS THREAT, OR THE EXPLOITATION OF SUCH A CLAIM, IN INTERNAL POLITICS, COULD IRREPARABLY DAMAGE TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

"SECONDLY, UNLESS THERE IS AMELIORATION IN THE EMBARGO DECISION, THE POSSIBILITIES TO PREVENT COUNTER ACTION WILL NOW REPEAT NOW BE EXHAUSTED. I HOPE THAT DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A SURPRISE. AS WE HAVE STATED TO YOU BEFORE, WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO REMAIN MODERATE. END OF ORAL MESSAGE.

3. FONMIN ASKED IF I HAD ANY QUESTIONS ON FOREGOING. I ASKED HIM TO EXPAND A BIT ON THE "OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES" HE MENTIONED IN HIS THIRD PARAGRAPH OF HIS ORAL MESSAGE. HE REPLIED THAT IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE PUNERS OF THE FUTURE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL. HE MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION SUCH ANCILLARY ISSUES AS PROVISION FOR A UNIFIED ECONOMY FOR THE ISLAND, DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD, A SINGLE PENAL CODE, AND THE DEFENSE OF THE FEDERAL STATE. UP TO NOW, CONTINUED CAGLAYANGIL, THE GREEKS SAY THEY HAVE NOT ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE OF A FEDERAL STATE. CAGLAYANGIL FELT THIS STILL SHOULD NOT PREVENT DISCUSSION AS TO HOW AS "PURELY HYPOTHETICAL" FEDERAL STATE COULD BE CREATED. THE GREEKS COULD RESERVE THEIR POSITION

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ON THE PRINCIPLE WHILE SUCH A DISCUSSION WERE GOING FORWARD. CAGLAYANGIL CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ANY PROGRESS ON ISSUES SUCH AS THESE WOULD BE FACILITATING FACTORS ON THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES AND TERRITORY. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AS SOON AS THE TWO SIDES BEGIN TO DISCUSS THESE TWO LATTER ISSUES, THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY BLOCKED. THERE IS NO WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THIS FASHION, HE DECLARED.
BERGUS

NOTE: NOT PASSED ATHENS AND NICOSIA BY OC/T.



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much - G...
Monday

copy of March letter -
P/Hamilton/Whelan/Foxell/Badham
Rosenthal/Sarbano/K

19 June 75

✓

P This mtg is more of prep than
when we spoke last week, then. Some objections
since then. There is glimmer of hope -
E/D talks thru your mtg, want to see
prop. again.

Meeting w/ K + D at Bensons - Ben
talked through but they both realize something
needs to be done. They had good mtg
together.

Some notes also but good. Something
needs to be done. But before we get into
discussion, I would like K to try get
to do those chris. + central sit mtg.
I see how unwarranted Boles as P.

K had no opinion about sit. + what I
domestic sit. but see it in Feb, what
are mins about what happened before.

I met Boles in Feb. He said he would
accept regional solution if we could
work out structural arrangements. He
wanted a quick solution to winning
majority on a domestic sit. I then went
to see T which had custodial part. They said
they had no power to do anything, but I met
w/ many T leader urging them to put forth
specific proposals to solve sit + prevent
disrupt of complex ind sit making it more
diff to resolve. They all agreed they
would sit on while working on - didn't



which he feels certain - as the result
of practice, that he would win. ①

promise to meet after, but certainly not
before - could look like pushing a pressure.
A side has been very energetic - we could not
not better position than they have working to
take.

Demirel then came in, which complicated it.
Demirel couldn't accept a deal we had been
working on, for dramatic reasons. When
Ercit in & Communism would now have
action. I wanted to ~~to~~ ~~to~~ - not for ~~to~~ but
to talk to Turgut. Ercit won't take position
til exhibition date. ^{He originally wants now election} He took Cyprus + em house
exception for giving it away. Demirel PM when
I didn't move in 67.

I had good talks w/ Demirel. Best to looking for
some way to manage it so he doesn't
get benton to death directly.

(Reads letter from Demirel)

This was followed by intel report that were
Nato bases would be closed Sunday. It is a
non-Nato ones are most concerned about.

They are of major importance to us. We
called in Arab and got a 30 day extension
extension.

Demirel wants to be able to show he steel
with US, or to set something up to be con-
firmed he got something back Ercit had
lost. we

We expect T to make party in Cyprus



would be a matter of embargo. I think
a wallet and more mostly matter of EC
domestic politics. The range of a response
is unusually clear. It not clear whether
within side can make a required movement.

That is spare, it is main w/p talking
about a crisis embargo. I know there a
diff of pin about our strategy. But I
assume you are not in any position other
than to bring T concessions. Even if embargo
light, pro or logans would be long.
But if embargo light, they would have
P prestige involved & they would not set. There
is still a gap, but not unbridgeable.

There are only 2 issues: nature of control
post & technical division. Also one
of refugees. However (Describes refugee
issues). If they can once break a
logjam, a series are to die. But getting
started is a prob. If to make a man &
it was run down by T, it would be done
in time. If D was in a way which looks
worse, France a condition would be made.

But will you do any more installations.
(Describes bilateral installations)

Sc France If no man, would we have Greek into, etc.

K The 6 armed C P in Bonn is not an
agony indication, esp in connection
w/ Algeria. We did so. We also



preparing unit assets to G but we ~~can't~~ ^{shouldn't} think that.

F & But you think would be no crystallization.

R ~~Peasanthorn~~ + Murro would crystallize better. But we convinced Renee ~~wants~~ wants to get this behind him. If exchange was lifted & we pay, then would be trouble.

W ~~We are concerned~~ but get right down to it. We ~~are~~ ^{are} concerned & want to do something. Our way is to mind the ground which passed Senate 91-40, let's put it. You have seen some in trials which have made a fisher better. We need to work it in a way to try & avoid a better expansion. Maybe you have some ideas.

P What do you all think

B Thanks for meeting us. One idea I would like to put forth - we have mentioned it earlier, but maybe we could modify it some. This idea is to regulate various activities, we have checked legality w/ A.D. We would want some private agreement formation forthcoming, acceptable to both sides, CP could write ^{to} 50 mil w/o T publicly have to say anything. To be sure no reneging on agreement, you could assume there would be another 50 mil coming - using both ~~to~~ Fy 75 + 76 - that more than guarant us now paying.



If you announced withdrawal of US-T relations at some time, it would be quite reasonable as don't like interventionism there at all. Another idea is to get NATO more involved to soften US-T aspects of it.

As you know, we have an NATO supporter who is hostile against NATO itself & tell us I won't aid to T. I have 450 writing to A. I don't read it politically.

We know there will be no settlement as good as C had hoped a crisis.

A We discussed various points before. Lawyers can argue whether waiver is legal. I think BAO argument is questionable & lawyer think it far not right. Suppose we I waive & we either don't get a settlement or it isn't satisfactory. Then I am out on a limb. I don't think that's satisfactory. I talked w/ Admiral for an hour. He pointed out there are some paid for he can't get shipped & is now having to pay storage. They just don't understand this -- waiver won't answer it.

B We trying to find a way out. I agree lots of people but say. But it is virtually impossible for Congress to turn around w/o something happening. We must save face & I think it fundamentally wrong. I wish it could give you some prob. that we have a real interest to consider. I am offended by a T ultimatum I disagree w/



your money interpretation. I agree w/ K that
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them 50 mil, get some movement, another
50 mil, more movement + we can end the
whole thing in 8-12 wks. In face of T
restriction, even if we tried to just get
a package, we would be having in effigy.

P I have spoken w/ some of the links - Trip, for example.
K has talked to Brinker. You know a David Jackson
better than I. Gordon to know some of them, and
Hartford - he seems to want to help. They just be
worth a try for K + me to talk to them. I not sure
they understood a nature of a job.

W I understand what you both are saying. I
see you out in a link where you could
have a job. What if we approached you as
of a worker. That might help.

Sadness I think a starting premise has to be understanding
some accumulation by T. If we can get
that we can restructure to some other face. I
don't think we can approach a pro from view of just
getting - design changed. I think it was correct.
If we just change, we would be in position
for strong expression. If we know certain
things will be done, there are arrangements which
can be made - bond sales, oil sales, grants, etc.

I had some feedback on that point. There are dog
in bands of oil companies + they can be legally
traded dog - dog where they have lot of funds for
their -



but we think this out. Let there be possibility
of anything else

Sar. I have a fundamental premise tho, a debt is
inherently as w/ a means by the

R. What says T. Not great evil - that is/ in
our own right. It is a sales, where they
can't get things they have been bought. So never
gets at what bothers them least.

On my part, there isn't any minor movement
to which we could report. It will be done
all together, or not at all. If the T doesn't
move, it will be done in 6 wks - but I
can't say when they will do it to move.

If I wasn't now in office, we could get without
difficulty.

B. That's not Charles' view. He thinks many arms
we will lose us all our leverage. He thinks
slashing fast will put us in a bit on T. military
that they will join movement.

There is another group in House which
feels more strongly for a by word - Rangel

A. I think there is a trend in House that
a law should come off. Many who would
for a law are looking for reasons to change &
the trick is to come up w/ something to help
them to change. Can't we apply something
other than full restraint. I've got it -

law is that w/ w/ a use in perpetuity.
Maybe we could put an atomic limit. Maybe



we could permit some and let T fulfill its Nato contract.

I don't think right now you should get credits to lift a ban

P How are you getting some language.

H We have been working on some ideas.

P Why don't we have some people work w/you. I can see a need for a police. Provision to avoid nuclear war. It is

bound to degenerate otherwise - it not only by pass. I did mention Agassiz & B building on islands. They are just off T coast. Diebit threaten, but it is mainly a concern. If this continues to normal, w/c NE sit nearby, we could have a holocaust. I can't sit here & do nothing

B But we can't just turn a arm back on w/o some action by the T that leaves us in an indep. legal & moral sit. T not would put out bill in jagah if we turned any part of it on w/o any prog from T. We would in that case have to working on position on ant bill.

P We have to be enthusiastic about that in Core T. Friction to take public position would create irreparable sit.

B We agree, that why we want to do it privately - to let them try first -

See. I would like to broaden the discussion - to



nature of US FP + pointing arms + for what purpose. Aggression has been noted & we can't back off that principle. Legh may differ on that principle, but and so - & I put everyone on it. But just as we can divide categories of aid we can divide categories of response.

Other concern is G. K seems to assume G will always do these

K No

S I don't think so + if we know w/o any proof, I think there could be an explosion. I know it even involved w/ y w/o, TATO department + possible crisis involving G. So I think we must move in any which doesn't antagonize G.

P Can you differ, but who + grant

S Yes, but I can't base myself on any point of w/o anything on which to rest it. Because of recent nature of our relationship to G. We want to restore relations w/ both G + T. I think T has more than its needs. I think it in T interest to resolve this.

K I think most want resolution - maybe even mechanism. We can't get T prog by 15 July. We also can't get it if linkage w/ aid. But P told D that if P sticks his neck out + they don't act, they are then my enemy + P also.

B Then what

H There is another aid bill.



B. We have kept quiet. But it hasn't helped getting T movement whenever they make statements ~~we~~ trying to get them to turn around.

W. The language is substantive prog. I think there has been some

K. We can't in good conscience say there has been

W. Would you rule out John's say on conviction.

P. It is a marginal case, legally. It gets out on a hook. I'm not saying you would get it off, but let's be realistic. A statement by you or John would be helpful. Taking his idea of making it apparent action in support of Nato & John's grant, let's see what we can do.

R. Friendly has proposed to give Nato 1000 mil. let them do it. But a base ^{parts} isn't Nato, but substantive.

B. Would this proposal... you are discussing something diff from conviction.

P. Right

B. But by part of conviction was private assess for T. If that would be included, I would look at it w/ open mind

P. I haven't exposed this w/ John or demise.

B. I think that would be demise.

S. Could we try a sample tracks from - conviction for example. We could also show down what prog is in line w/ what kind of arms are used. We have tended to look at all this in total packages, maybe we could separate things out.

- W I have concerns of time - It will take time.
2nd, what would we do about private demands.
If we start to debate on floor...
- S There have been peripheral ones - to Waldheim
for exchange. Straightening out some lines,
maybe. Can we put together any peripheral
items to justify some? maybe. If we
can work together... my is helping G as
against T + Eric helping T as against C
- P I will welcome advice, the same general
reservations. If you could look at his
ideas...
- K I don't exclude we could put something
together like Paulson. Best place to
do it is at C - T talks end of July.
- R We also can't appear to give in to T threats.
That would be very to others like Pat.
- S Rather than wobble, maybe we should say
we should reevaluate our policy.
- P But if that does occur, doesn't that
look like wobbling.
- W That right. We would have to help C Pub.
- R We all in this together. Let's explore it again
- C The other should be looked at too. T not puts
us in the same boat.
- P Not only deadline of C-D talks. Also any
mess, end of fiscal yr, etc. lots of
deadlines >
- Q If we would put this together I can't think

~~Do not know if that may left~~

(12)

F I want to table something here about
changing material already paid for.
Nothing more basic than sensitivity of
contract. We got to ensure clarity that

