

# Uncertainty

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
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# Random Variable




State Space

$$\Omega = \{outcome_1, outcome_2, \dots, outcome_n\}$$


Random Variable

$$X = x_i \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, n$$

# Event



# Event



# Self-Information

$$\underline{I(x_i)} = \log\left(\frac{1}{P(x_i)}\right) = -\log \underline{P(x_i)}$$

Unit = bits       $\log_2$   
Unit = nats       $\log_e$

Probability of  
the event  $X = x_i$

Self-information 

Probability 

# A Priori and a Posteriori

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Two types of knowledge, justification, or arguments

**A Priori** - “from the earlier”

independent of experience

*“All bachelors are unmarried”*

**A Posteriori** - “from the later”

Dependent on experience or empirical evidence

*“Some bachelors are happy”*

# Bayes' Rule (1)

| means "given"  
**H** : Hypothesis  
**E** : Evidence

The **prior probability**  
the probability of **H**  
before **E** is observed.

The **likelihood**  
of observing **E** given **H**

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H) \cdot P(H)}{P(E)}$$

The **posterior probability**  
the probability of **H** given **E**,  
i.e., after **E** is observed.

the **marginal likelihood**  
or "**model evidence**"  
the same for all possible hypotheses



# Bayes' Rule (2)

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H) \cdot P(H)}{P(E)}$$

$P(H)$ , the **prior probability** –  
the probability of **H** before **E** is observed.

This indicates one's *preconceived beliefs* about how likely different **hypotheses** are, **absent evidence** regarding the instance under study.

$P(H|E)$ , the **posterior probability** –  
the probability of **H** given **E**, i.e., **after E** is observed.  
the probability of a **hypothesis given** the observed **evidence**


$P(E|H)$ , the probability of observing **E given H**, is also known as the **likelihood**.  
It indicates the **compatibility** of the **evidence** with the **given hypothesis**.

$P(E)$ , the **marginal likelihood** or "model evidence". This factor is the **same** for all possible hypotheses being considered. This means that this factor does not enter into determining the relative probabilities of different hypotheses.

# Bayes' Rule (3)

| means “given”  
**H** : Hypothesis  
**E** : Evidence

$$P(H|E) = \frac{P(E|H) \cdot P(H)}{P(E)}$$



The **posterior probability**  
the probability of **H** given **E**,  
i.e., **after** **E** is observed.

The **likelihood**  
of observing **E** given **H**

The **prior probability**  
the probability of **H**  
**before** **E** is observed.

# Example

If the **Evidence** doesn't match up with a **Hypothesis**, one should reject the **Hypothesis**.  
But if a **Hypothesis** is extremely unlikely a priori, one should also reject it,  
even if the **Evidence** does appear to match up.

$$\frac{P(E|H)}{P(H)} \ll$$

Three **Hypotheses** about the nature of a newborn baby of a friend, including:

- **H1**: the baby is a brown-haired boy
- **H2**: the baby is a blond-haired girl.
- **H3**: the baby is a dog.

$$P(E|H)$$

Consider two scenarios:

I'm presented with **Evidence** in the form of a picture of a blond-haired baby girl.  
I find this **Evidence** supports **H2** and opposes **H1** and **H3**.

I'm presented with **Evidence** in the form of a picture of a baby dog.  
I don't find this **Evidence** supports **H3**,

since my prior belief in this **Hypothesis** (that a human can give birth to a dog) is extremely small.

$$P(H)$$

Bayes' rule

a principled way of combining new **Evidence** with prior **beliefs**, through the application of Bayes' rule.  
can be applied iteratively: after observing some **Evidence**, the resulting posterior probability can then be  
treated as a prior probability, and a new posterior probability computed from new **Evidence**.

Bayesian updating.

# Maintain Magnetic Field

Suppose there are two full bowls of cookies.  
Bowl #1 has 10 chocolate chip and 30 plain cookies,  
while bowl #2 has 20 of each.

When picking a bowl at random, and then picking a cookie at random.  
No reason to treat one bowl differently from another, likewise for the cookies.  
The drawn cookie turns out to be a plain one.  
How probable is it from bowl #1?

more than a half, since there are more plain cookies in bowl #1.

The precise answer

Let  $H1$  correspond to bowl #1, and  $H2$  to bowl #2.  $P(H1)=P(H2)=0.5$ .

The event  $E$  is the observation of a plain cookie.  
From the contents of the bowls,  $P(E|H1) = 30/40 = 0.75$  and  $P(E|H2) = 20/40 = 0.5$ .


Bayes' formula then yields

$$P(H1|E) = \frac{P(E|H1) \cdot P(H1)}{P(E|H1)P(H1) + P(E|H2)P(H2)} = \frac{0.75 \times 0.5}{0.75 \times 0.5 + 0.5 \times 0.5} = 0.6$$

# Posterior Probability


$P(H1)=0.5$

Bowl #1




$P(H2)=0.5$

Bowl #2



$$P(E|H1) = 30/40 = 0.75$$

$$P(E|H2) = 20/40 = 0.5$$



$$P(H1|E) = \frac{P(E|H1) \cdot P(H1)}{P(E|H1)P(H1) + P(E|H2)P(H2)} = \frac{0.75 \times 0.5}{0.75 \times 0.5 + 0.5 \times 0.5} = 0.6$$

# Maintain Magnetic Field

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# Storing Magnetic Energy

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# Dissipate Magnetic Energy

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## References

[1] <http://en.wikipedia.org/>

[2] R Bose, Information Theory Coding and Cryptography, 2003